Archive | June, 2024

‘Occupied’ Palestine: Jerusalem Annexed, Gaza Genocide, West Bank Apartheid

20 Jun

[Prefatory Note: RAF interview conducted by Daniel Falcone, published in Truthout, May 13, 2024, and republished here with modifications of my responses to reflect intervening developments. In the month since the initial publication, the situation as described below has become even more severely abusive toward the civilian population of Gaza, with the Israeli Government making no effort to uphold its legal or moral responsibilities as Occupying Power to protect the Occupied Palestinian People under its administrative control as requi red in the 4th Geneva Convention governing Belligerent Occupation. The Israeli Government has exhibited a total absence of empathy, in policies and practices that exemplify the worst features of the international crime of apartheid. Even if life in Gaza quiets down, housing restored, Israel security forces withdrawn and some gestures of normalization have been made, the situation in the West Bank, unless modified, will continue to exhibit apartheid characteristics generating a different kind of humanitarian catastrophe. Overall, the Palestinian future can only be redeemed by terminating the Israeli role at the earliest possible time and internationally enforcing the dismantling of Israeli settlements, removal of settlers, and the termination of Israel’s administrative presence and repression. The UN although reporting and documenting human rights violations committed by Israel has so far lacked, in the face of P5 strategic support of Israel, the ability or relevant political will to implement its own recommendations relating to compliance with international humanitarian law. That which is humanly necessary seems politically impossible; the result is a moral scandal of global significance, and a human tragedy brought on my unspeakable and persistent criminality.]

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Israel Continues Unfettered Colonization of the West Bank Amid Genocide in Gaza

Daniel Falcone: The West Bank has posed the biggest challenge to the Zionist settler movement’s pursuit of a “Greater Israel.” Amid the genocidal campaign in Gaza, Israel has expanded its settlement project and markedly increased colonial violence and human rights abuses against Palestinians. “Killings are taking place at a level without recent precedent” in the occupied West Bank, according to a report by Human Rights Watch.

In this exclusive interview for Truthout, international relations scholar Richard Falk reminds us of the reality and aims of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Falk details the degradation, starvation, human rights abuses, unchecked political power and resource control in the occupied Palestinian territories. He also explains the U.S.’s aims in the West Bank and how they differ from those in Gaza.

Daniel Falcone: With a lot of the attention on Gaza due to the extremity of Israel’s bombing in Rafah, the West Bank is sometimes overlooked in media reports and political discussions about the ongoing Palestinian struggle for survival. How can we understand the differences between Israel’s strategic aims in Gaza and the West Bank?

Bottom of Form

Richard Falk: The three territories of East Jerusalem, West Bank and the Gaza Strip have experienced rather different conditions of occupation and governance during the 57 years of Israeli control, none of them with remotely positive results.

The whole of Jerusalem was officially declared by the Knesset in 2019 to be “the eternal capital of the Jewish state of Israel.” Such a unilateral action on Israel’s part was incompatible with international humanitarian law. It also violated the letter and spirit of unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 242, which immediately after the 1967 War looked toward the complete withdrawal of Israel’s occupying armed forces in the near-term future with an unspecified consideration give Israeli demands for “minor border adjustments.” It has always been a Palestinian demand and expectation of most international advocates of a two-state solution that East Jerusalem would be the capital of any future Palestinian state. This Palestinian position has been generally regarded as an integral element of the UN consensus that developed around the widespread support for “a two-state solution” that persists today despite many reasons to believe it would not be sustainable.

In 1967 Gaza was deemed the third and least important element in the administration of the occupied territories that came under Israel’s control during the war. Its status was viewed ambivalently at first, mainly because it was deemed outside the Zionist project. The Zionist commitment to return to “the promised land” that formed the geographic contours of the Zionist vision of a Jewish supremacy state was not included in most versions of Zionist thought and political vision. It also seemed overcrowded and imporverished at first, possessing little economic promise from Israel’s point of view. Nevertheless, in the period of 1967 to 2005 Gaza was treated by Israel as part of Occupied Palestine, with an intrusive and abusive IDF [Israel Defense Forces] military presence, and the unlawful establishment of Jewish settlements along the Gaza coast that became home for 8,000 Jewish settlers. The administration of Gaza was long viewed by Tel Aviv as an economic burden and security challenge for Israel, and a center of Palestinian resistance radicalism.

The major resistance initiative directed at Israeli occupation known as the First Intifada originated in Gaza in 1987, challenging both Israel and the Palestinian leadership of Yasser Arafat and the coalition of secular Palestinian groups known under the rubric of the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization]. In 2005, Israel formally “disengaged” from Gaza, contending that the withdrawal of its armed forces and the dismantling of its settlements relieved Israel of further responsibilities as Occupier in Gaza, with possible future peace solutions for the Gaza Strip as involving of some sort of federated arrangement whereby Gaza would become subject to the sovereign control of Jordan and/or Egypt. This Israeli interpretation of disengagement was rejected by the UN and both Arab states. They considered Israel’s revised approach to Gaza as nothing more substantive than a redeployment of IDF ground forces to just across the Israeli border coupled with the maintenance of total control of Gaza’s air space and offshore waters. The approach also included a tight regulation of the entry and exit of persons and goods to and from the Strip. Despite announcing “disengagement” as a step toward peace Israel never overcame the perception of Gaza as “the largest open-air prison” in the world, which for many in Gaza, including secular Palestinians, meant growing sympathy with and support for Hamas as dedicated to active struggle to obtain Palestinian sovereign territory.

The complex Gaza narrative after disengagement included the unexpected 2006 electoral victory of Hamas, previously listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and EU, as well as Israel. Despite Hamas agreeing to forego “armed struggle,” in 2007 Israel imposed a strict and economically punitive blockade of goods and persons seeking to leave or enter Gaza, engaging in periodic major military operations, described by Israeli security advisors as ‘mowing the lawn’ and putting the population on what was unfeelingly described as “a diet” by restricting the import of food.  Despite Israel’s repressive moves and military incursions, Hamas put forward long-term ceasefire and co-existence proposals that were ignored by Tel Aviv and Washington. When such an effort to suspend the violent aspects of the conflict failed, Hamas revived it resistance struggle. A creative nonviolent campaign of resistance known as “the Great March of Return” attributed to Palestinian refugees and their descendants, as well as Hamas, was met with deadly Israeli sniper violence in 2018 at the border, including the apparenr lethal targeting of well-marked journalists.

Finally, Israel’s provocations and the Hamas-led attack of October 7 set the stage for the latest genocidal phase of Israel’s presence, combining the wrongs of occupation with many crimes of oppression, dehumanization, devastation, starvation, ethnic cleansing and apartheid, culminating in genocide. It seemed that as of 2024, Gaza is strategically and economically far more important to the right-wing Benjamin Netanyahu government and its settler temperament than it was earlier. This is due to the discovery of extensive offshore oil and gas deposits, and a reported interest in a major engineering undertaking that has blueprinted the Israeli construction of a Ben Gurion Canal traversing part of Gazan territory, with the goal of creating an alternative to the Suez Canal. While the devastation Gaza was still a daily reality, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, obscenely proposed luxury waterfront homes for settlers in a Gaza emptied of Palestinians.

It is against this background that the West Bank has posed the biggest challenge to the pursuit of “Greater Israel,” which was the animating ideal of the settler movement. Maany settlers were closely allied with the extreme right Religious Zionism coalition partner of the Netanyahu-led government that took over the governance of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in January 2023. From its first days of governance, it became clear that Israel was preparing to push to completion a maximal version of the Zionist Project. Israeli radicalism along these lines was exhibited by the greenlighting of settler violence on the West Bank that included a series of inflammatory incidents intended to make the Palestinians feel unsafe and unwelcome in their own homeland. The occupying government in Tel Aviv revealed its orientation through tacitly approving settler violence rather than responsibly fulfilling their legal duties to protect Palestinian residents. Crimes against West Bank Palestinian residents, including land seizures and gratuitous vigilante violence, were not only tolerated but applauded by rightist members of Netanyahu’s inner circle.

Of supplemental relevance was the official endorsement of increasing the settlement population in the West Bank by expanding building permits and territorial extensions to settlers and their settlements — already estimated to number 700,000 (500,000 in the West Bank, 200,000 in East Jerusalem). This move to ensure Israeli permanence on the West Bank was combined with the acceleration of diplomacy that focused on forming a de facto alliance with Sunni-dominated Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and the containment and destabilization of Shiite-dominated Iran. Further, Netanyahu’s September 2023 performance at the UN General Assembly in which he arrogantly displayed a map of “the new Middle East” on which Palestine was erased — treated as nonexistent — must have made a show of Palestinian resistance imperative.

These elements are the background context preceding the Hamas-led attack of October 7. The true character of the attack itself needs to be internationally investigated, given the extensive and credible warnings given to the Israeli government, Israel’s ultra-sophisticated surveillance capabilities, and the inflated initial accounts that blamed Hamas for all the most barbaric crimes allegedly committed during the attack. Some of the initial macabre claims of October 7 were later discredited and even modified by Israel. The most suspicious element of the Israeli response was its readiness to embark upon a genocidal campaign, which, while concentrated on Hamas and Gaza, seems also intended to induce a second Nakba with major secondary impacts on the West Bank residential security of Palestinians.

In the months preceding the Hamas-led attack, the West Bank had been the scene of increased settler violence and a heightening of the IDF’s repressive tactics. In the years before October 7, Israel was found guilty of the international crime of apartheid in a series of well-documented reports compiled by objective, expert sources (Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and B’tselem). Liberal democracies and the mainstream media refused to acknowledge this damaging consensus bearing on the legitimacy of Israeli occupation of the West Bank, and instead smeared and blacklisted Israel’s critics. The US Government deflected questions from the media, refusing to respond substantively and opting for institutional silence despite the mounting evidence and legal analysis of objective sources.

In addition to the settlements, Palestinian property rights, mobility and security of residence were undermined and threatened in various ways in the West Bank. Palestinian land was further encroached upon at the end of the 20th century by the construction of a separation wall between pre-1967 Israel and the West Bank that expropriated additional Palestine-owned land and divided villages such as Bil’in. Although this mode of constructing the wall on occupied Palestinian territory was found to be illegal by a near unanimous majority of the judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2003, Israel defied the findings of the Advisory Opinion, as requested by the UN General Assembly over the objections of the US and Israel. In the end Israel continued its wall project without deference to international law or international procedures of accountability.

Israel’s rejection of attempts to establish Palestinian statehood with sovereign rights within delimited borders have long concentrated upon the West Bank. This pattern goes back as long ago as 1947, when the UN approved a controversial plan for the partition of Palestine relying on internal and international borders derived from the British mandate over Palestine. In the dark shadows being cast by the Holocaust and given influence by Zionist pressures, there emerged a UN consensus that the only viable solution for the struggle of the two peoples claiming Palestine as their homeland was to split sovereign rights between two equal states, assumed to be named Israel and Palestine.

Distinguished commentators from both peoples opposed such a territorial division for a variety of reasons, well summarized from a Jewish perspective in Shaul Magid’s The Necessity of Exile and from a Palestinian perspective in the later writings of Edward Said.

Always the central question, even if often left implicit, was the destiny of the West Bank and its residents, as well as whether Palestinian “security” would be restricted by demilitarization and dependence on Israeli forbearance in the two-state models, and whether the Zionist commitment to a Jewish supremacist state, as projected in Israel’s 2018 Basic Laww, could be accommodated or needed to be modified in the one-state models.

Falcone: What are the U.S. goals in the West Bank and how do they differ from its Gaza policy?

Falk: The U.S. has a strong reputational interest in retaining the identity of the West Bank as Occupied Palestinian Territory. If Israel extends its sovereignty over the West Bank, which it has long claimed should be classified as “disputed territory” rather than “occupied territory,” it would bring to a screeching halt any further pretense by the U.S. government to be serious about the advocacy of a “two-state solution.”

Trump’s proposed “deal of the century” contained a nominal Palestinian mini state to sustain the illusion that the interests of both peoples were being considered, but it failed to fool almost no one, including two-state advocates that naively envisioned two states with equal sovereign rights and sovereign control over national security policy. .

American credibility as an “honest broker” in the Oslo Peace Process, and elsewhere, was greatly eroded by its gradual acquiescence in the establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank despite their patent illegality and their negative impacts on a meaningful political compromise embedded in the final territorial allocation  of Palestine between the two peoples. The U.S.’s mild reaction to settlement expansion was limited to the muffled whisper that such behavior “was not helpful.” In actuality it was essential to the validation of the Israeli network of settlements.

By now, given the bipartisan U.S. endorsement of Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its repeated use of the veto to block a meaningful ceasefire directive and a widely supported initiative to treat Palestine as a full member of the UN, I believe that the U.S. could not any longer put itself forward as a trustworthy intermediary in any future bilateral negotiating process. It would covertly and overtly become Israel’s international sword and shield, exhibiting the extreme partisanship of the US while its leaders and media falsely claiming that the American posture supports adherence to international law and diplomatic balance.

With regard to the differing interests of the U.S. in the West Bank and Gaza, it comes down to two issues: first, supporting Israel’s right to defend itself in Gaza, while maintaining Israel’s legitimacy as an occupying power in the West Bank and insulating its violations of international humanitarian law from UN censure, boycotts and sanctions; and secondly, recognizing that the West Bank is the integral core of a Palestinian state.


Falcone: How does Israel complicate the work on the ground by scholars, activists and elected officials? The fact that the two regions are separate seems to make the problem even more insurmountable. 

Falk: The differing character of Israel’s approaches to the two areas creates many complications for those who seek normal operating conditions. Gaza is considered by Tel Aviv to be administered by Hamas, a terrorist entity in its view, whereas the West Bank is co-administered with the quasi-collaborationist Palestinian Authority to ensure that resistance activities are minimized, or when occurring, treated punitively by Palestinian security forces. Even peaceful forms of resistance face harsh punishment in the form of Palestinian enforcement , and since Israel came under more extremist leadership, the conditions of daily life have become so unpleasant and dangerous that some Palestinians are being forced to leave for neighboring countries, and accept the loss of their homeland, becoming refugees or exiles, harboring resentment and hatred resulting from their mistreatment in what was their homeland.

Until recently the balance of opinion in Israel was wary about any Israeli state that purported to include Gaza. This wariness was associated with Israeli concerns about an emergent “demographic bomb” accompanying any attempt to absorb an additional 2.3 or 2.4 million Palestinians with high fertility rates into Greater Israel. As Israel has replaced its liberal democratic façade with a hardening apartheid regime the issue of democratic legitimacy has receded.

In the West Bank, Israel was nervous about the effect of civil society activism, and even scholarly work and cultural expressiveness, generating unfavorable international publicity as to the nature of such a prolonged occupation. As mentioned, the Israeli occupation is currently being challenged at the ICJ following a General Assembly request to legally assess the continued validity of Israel’s administrative role, given the passage of time, unlawful practices, and frequent recourse to severe forms of collective punishment. This UN effort to challenge Israel’s occupation comes after 57 years without the slightest sign of willingness to implement the withdrawal of Israeli forces envisioned by UN Security Council Resolution 242 and in the face of numerous flagrant continuing violations of international humanitarian law. Quite the contrary, as Israel seems more dug into a permanent domineering presence in the West Bank.

Even prior to the present Netanyahu government, Defense Minister Benny Gantz issued decrees in 2021 banning the activities of respected West Bank NGOs by classifying them “terrorist organizations.” Elected Palestinian leaders have been harassed and imprisoned despite Israel’s collaboration on security and administrative funding over the years with the Palestinian Authority, which is distrusted and disapproved by a growing number of Palestinians inside and outside of the Occupied Territories.

Falcone: What is the role of the West Bank in President Joe Biden’s foreign policy? 

Falk: The West Bank is an indispensable component of Biden’s persistent, although half-hearted advocacy of a two-state solution. This advocacy was always half-hearted and never a persuasive expression of genuine U.S. policy intentions. The two-state mantra seems more and more like a public relations posture to satisfy world public opinion as time passes without the slightest expectation that it will ever be realized except possibly in some nominal form. If it had been a genuine goal, Biden would have challenged Israeli moves of recent years, which became more pronounced since the Netanyahu coalition took over in 2023. Even if Biden is regard as lacking high intelligence, few regard him as so stupid that he remains oblivious to Israel’s quest for a Greater Israel.

 It was an open secret that this extremist coalition was committed to the unilateral completion of the Zionist Project by establishing Greater Israel in the shortest possible time even if it required brute force and massive ethnic cleansing to get the job done. Extending Israeli sovereignty to the West Bank would have the consequence of making even formalistic adherence to two-state advocacy a sign of geopolitical ignorance, so out of touch with the geographic contours of Palestinian statehood as to be in the category of a bad joke.

A viable Palestinian state presupposes full sovereign rights over the West Bank, which must include territorial governance and the substantial dismantlement of the settlements. Neither seems likely to happen if Zionist ideology continues to shape the policy of the Israeli state. It would be awkward for Biden to be asked what kind of Palestinian state does the U.S. favor. He likely would be inclined to answer evasively by saying that “it is up to the parties.” But if he was forthright, it would probably look like a permanently demilitarized Palestinian state with settlements governed according to Israeli law, exempted from territorial regulation, and traveling on roads for Jews only to and from Israel proper. Such a Palestinian state might could possibly the formal requirements of statehood, but it would be a nonstarter for many Palestinians, who continue to insist on their inalienable right of self-determination. The long Palestinian ordeal, stretching over the course of more than a century, would not be ended by the willingness of Israel to allow the formation of a puppet state. After its complicity in the Gaza genocide, the US, as well as any other NATO and G7 should be ruled out of any future part in a genuine peace diplomacy. It is a dangerous sign that the US geopolitical weight is still great enough to allow it to put forward a post-Gaza peace initiative that even Israel is willing to endorse, and so is Hamas. The days of American leadership in global diplomacy should have ended during its months of being a facilitator of the crudest and most transparent genocide of all history, transmitted by images and on site commentary in real time to the peoples of the world.

A Judicial Web of Confusion: the ICJ, ICC, and Civil Society or Peoples Tribunals (5/24/24)

4 Jun

An intriguing sideshow during the seven months of savage genocidal violence against the entrapped Palestinian population of an estimated 2.3 million has been the attention given to international law and to international procedures available for its interpretation and enforcement. To begin with, many concerned persons wonder about why there are two distinct tribunals: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Beyond this, for many never exposed to a sophisticated explanation of the process by which international law is judicially implemented the distinction between these two tribunals, both located in The Hague, is far from transparent. This short essay is a simplified introduction to the ICJ and ICC, both indispensable judicial resources of a functionally effective and equitable international legal order. Their positive contributions to law and justice are diminished to the extent that such institutions are subject to geopolitical manipulation.[1] To acquire legitimacy and respect such institutions must operate in an atmosphere of judicial independence. The record to date is mixed and difficult to assess.

At the same time, the pronouncements of these institutions can have major symbolic influence even if their rulings are ignored or violatied. The experience of the ICJ in relation to Israel’s defiance of its Interim Orders in the case of South Africa v. Israel is suggestive, adding a further element of legitimacy to civil society activism in opposition to Israel’s continuation of  the Gaza genocide.

ICJ

All states that are members of the UN are automatically parties to the legal instrument framing the activity of the ICJ known as the ‘ICJ Statute.’ The relationship between the UN and the ICJ is set forth in Chapter XIV of the Charter, Articles 92-96. This Statute frames in technical detail the role, procedure, and scope of concerns of the ICJ. The main function of ICJ is to decide legal disputes between sovereign states as an integral aspect of the UN Charter’s encouragement of ‘the pacific settlement of disputes’ conceived as a principal instrument of war prevention (UN Charter, Articles 2(3), 33-38). The underlying justification for the ICJ is to provide members of the UN with a politically independent and professionally distinguished panel of judges with strong credentials in international law to pronounce upon its relevance and development to the resolution of disputes brought before it. Such a judicial mechanism offers states an alternative to war and political stalemate. This judicial remedy is only available if both sides agree to resolve an international dispute by recourse to the ICJ and the Court decides that the dispute is of a legal character rather than being a political or moral dispute.   

Israel recently contended that there was no legal dispute with South Africa about the interpretation of the Genocide Convention, but the ICJ disagreed by a near unanimous vote of its seventeen judges. The ICJ ruled that a legal dispute between South Africa and Israel existed as to the application of the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Article IX authorizes any party to the Convention to submit a complaint relating to a legal dispute to the ICJ for resolution. The ICJ has no jurisdiction with respect to individuals or criminality, its legal authority to adjudicate being limited to states. It also lacks authority to act with respect to political disputes. This sometimes raises troublesome questions as to the distinction between law and politics.

The ICJ as an institution within the UN orbit has no enforcement capabilities of its own. Its legal judgments are mere declarations of law unless the losing State party voluntarily complies, or the Security Council possesses the political will to enforce an ICJ decision that is not being complied with by the losing party. This means that the Security Council must have support from its membership, including the affirmative vote or abstention of all five of its Permanent Members that possess a right of veto. The General Assembly possesses the authority to recommend compliance with decisions of the ICJ or other measures designed to overcome non-compliance but has no coercive authority of its own by which to implement ICJ decisions. Yet, as mentioned, civil society activism if mobilized can impose punitive responses to high profile instances of non-compliance, as here

The ICJ has certain distinctive features several of which are worth briefly mentioning:

            –there are fifteen judges elected for nine years terms, no two of which can come from the same country, and each is expected to have strong experiential credentials as a jurist.  If a party to a legal action at the ICJ is from a country not represented by one of the fifteen elected judges then it is entitled to appoint an ad hoc judge for this case. As neither Israel nor South Africa were so represented, each exercised this right to select an ad hoc judge, and thus the panel of judges in the genocide case numbered seventeen.

–over the course of its history the ICJ has earned a reputation of judicial independence and professionalism but has been criticized for excessive formalism and cumbersome procedures, centering on the lengthy intervals of years between the date of submission and that of judgment. The ICJ has never before been so deeply engaged with an ongoing high profile legal dispute, and so far, has received widespread praise for its measured and legally well-reasoned treatment of South Africa’s effort to obtain a ruling that will legally repudiate and put an end to Israel’s response to the Hamas attack of October 7 by concluding that Israel is indeed guilty of perpetrating the crime of genocide. Israel has already been ordered by the ICJ to take provisional measures in light of the humanitarian emergency imperiling Palestinian lives in numerous ways, while awaiting the decision on the merits of the allegation of genocide that will not be forthcoming for several years or long after the probable end of violence in Gaza;  

            –the judges are elected by the members of the General Assembly and Security Council, but a negative vote by one of the P5 is treated as a normal vote, and doesn’t count as a veto;

            –in response to formal requests from the distinct organs and specialized agencies that make up the UN System, including its specialized agencies, the ICJ also has a parallel authority and duty to render what are called in its Statute ‘Advisory Opinions.’ These are issued in response to formal requests, but only from organs and specialized agencies of the UN. As the language implies, the legal findings of advisory opinions are not binding, and there is no expectation that where the issues are controversial, the rulings will change behavior of the government(s) whose policies and practices are incidentally found to be unlawful by the ICJ in this advisory role, although remembering that the ICJ does not directly use an advisory opinion to assess the legality of the behavior of sovereign states. Nevertheless, the legal assessments of the judges rendering Advisory Opinions may exert a considerable educational and political influence in relation to the future development of international law. Diminishing the authority of advisory opinions is one example of how the UN balances sovereign rights of its members against the supposedly overriding authority of international law;

            –states have an option of signing up for compulsory jurisdiction, which means that if an adversary state is mutually so bound, it can invoke a legal obligation to resolve an international legal dispute by submitting it to the ICJ. In some instances, as in the Genocide Convention, the duty to have legal disputes adjudicated if a party to the treaty formally requests is written into the treaty itself;

            –the ICJ has rendered some unpopular and dubious decisions in the course of its history, as in the so-called Southwest Africa Cases back in 1966 whereby the outcome was upheld by a close vote. It upheld South Africa’s legal right to govern as the mandatory authority in South West Africa (now Namibia) by relying on the same kind of apartheid regime it applied to its own domestic racial divide.[2] Again, the secondary effects of an ICJ decision can be significant even if contrary to its legal reasoning. The anger among government of the Global South at the UN resulting from an ICJ decision that favored apartheid South Africa, led the General Assembly abruptly to terminate South Africa’s mandate, facilitating the achievement of sovereign statehood for South West Africa;

            –the contributions of the ICJ to the development of international law through its well-analyzed and researched opinions, including dissents and separate opinions, has been at least as important as its assigned priority of resolving international legal disputes. It has been given very few opportunities during its almost 80 years of existence to render judgment on legal disputes between geopolitical rivals..

ICC  

The ICC is still quite a young institution that did not come into existence until 2002, or 57 years after the UN was established. It came about as a projectthat gained political traction by creating a collaborative coalition of governments from the Global South and many civil society actors, or NGOs. To become a member of the ICC it is necessary to become a party to the Rome Statute, a stand-alone international treaty, that provides the technical framework for the operations of the tribunal. Unlike the ICJ, the ICC operates without any formal relationship to the UN.

Such a procedure requires states to submit the Rome Statute as an international treaty to diverse national constitutional procedures that involve typically signature by a representative of the executive branch of government followed by legislative approval, sometimes requiring  a super-majority. As of 2023, 124 countries have become ICC members, including all of the European states that have supported Israel’s claim to act in defense of its security, but to a lesser degree than the US.

Unlike the ICJ, the ICC has only jurisdiction over individuals who are physically subject to its authority. Members of the ICC are obligated to cooperate with its formal orders, including the arrest of individuals accused of international crimes after a lengthy investigation of the evidence of criminality has been obtained and evaluated. A weakness of the ICC is that the most important geopolitical actors, the US, China, and Russia chose not to join for pragmatic and ideological reasons, challenging the basic notion that international criminal law took precedence over national sovereignty and its legal institutions.

A controversial aspect of the Rome Statute is its grant of authority to the ICC to prosecute properly accused individuals who allegedly committed crimes on the territory of member states but were themselves nationals of non-member states. The Global West, especially the US and Israel have made this issue into a challenge in current circumstances to the effectiveness and legitimacy of ICC operations. After the Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 the US and European members pushed hard for the arrest of Putin and others, while in the context of Israel’s genocide, these same governments were outraged when the Senior Prosecutor of the ICC recommended the issuance of arrest warrants for top Israeli leaders. At this point, there is no finality as the recommendation awaits action by a panel of three ICC judges who must decide to approve or reject. In any event, there is no prospect of implementing ICC arrest warrant against Israel as only member states are obliged to give effect to such warrants should they be issued.  

Nevertheless, even at this preliminary stage, these recommendations pertaining to arrest warrants has some adverse implications for the individuals targeted and the country of their affiliation. The indicted individuals might hesitate before traveling to countries, such as the UK and France, which are ICC members, and obligated to carry out arrests, especially if they have incorporated universal jurisdiction legislation as part of their law. It is bears on how the political actors are perceived in civil society, tilting the scales of legitimacy. This could have reputational implications for both the countries involved and for the reputation of the ICC, causing, as here, an angry Israeli backlash against all forms of internationalism.

It should be observed that in the past, the ICC has been criticized for its focus on the alleged criminal wrongdoing of political leaders in countries of the Global South, especially those from Sub Saharan Africa. When the ICC earlier attempted to investigate evidence of crimes by Israel in Occupied Palestine and those of the US in Afghanistan there was a furious reaction in Washington including the formal adoption of sanctions against ICC officials, including the ICC. The failure to move forward, despite the abundant evidence, created an impression that the ICC was a weak institution not capable of consistent professionalism or of fulfilling the expectations contained in the Rome Statute. Again, in relation to the Gaza genocide there have been calls for ‘sanctions’ against the Prosecutor and other officials of the ICC should the recommended issuance of the arrest warrants or other actions against Israelis take place.

The future of the ICC, and indeed the struggle to extend criminal accountability to the strongest political actors will be seriously affected by the outcome in Gaza, and by whether the ICC responds to current geopolitical pressures in ways that improve its reputation for judicial independence. Ever since the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials international criminal law has been seriously compromised in war/peace contexts by its failures to treat equals equally. The damning fact remains that these World War II prosecutions only addressed the crimes of the losers while excluding from consideration the crimes of the winners. Such a double standard has tainted all efforts since 1945 to strengthen generally legal accountability for international crimes. It raises the question as to whether ‘the primacy of geopolitics’ within the UN and elsewhere in managing global security is subject to challenge. The planned summit scheduled for September 22-23 on the future of the UN [Summit for the Future: Multilateral Solutions for a Better Tomorrow] should cast light on this fundamental question, but may well not touch a  topic that is so sensitive and bound to give rise to inter-governmental friction.

Peoples’ Tribunals

Ever since the Russell Tribunal of 1966-67 organized as a project of civil society activism in the middle of the Vietnam War, the ad hoc organization of such tribunals have created a non-state mode of instituting a judicial approach in situations where controversial international conflicts were not being addressed in a manner that calmed public concerns. Such tribunals can alter public discourse by media impacts and through documentation of allegations, as articulated by individuals with

reputations as public intellectuals and persons of conscience. Unlike the ICJ or ICC, the emphasis is put upon morality and politics.

It is also possible for civil society representatives to file briefs or make suggestions to the ICJ and ICC in a variety of ways. A particularly interesting initiative has been taken by the Geneva International Peace Research Institute submitting a long scholarly, prudently phrased statement to the ICC Prosecutor advancing an argument for why a formal investigation should be undertaken of the complicity crimes relating to the Gaza Genocide allegedly committed by Ursula von der Leyen in her role as  President of the European Commission.

This interplay between civil society activism and the working of the formal statist procedures deserves further investigation and commentary..   


[1] A clear case of geopolitical interference has been clearly present with respect to the role of the U agency entrusted with the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in relation to the Douma Incident in 2018.

[2] The vote in the ICJ was 7-7, which according to its rules, meant that the President of the Court, who supported the South African legal position has a second ‘casting vote’ that broke the tie.