[Prefatory Note: What follows is an essay that originated from my responses to some questions from a journalist preparing his own article on the Dahiya Doctrine. It led me to consider the relevance of the doctrine, and link it to the events of the last several months in Gaza, the Hannibal Directive, antisemitism, and genocide.]
What is the Israeli military’s “Dahiya Doctrine?”
The label ‘Dahiya Doctrine’ was apparently first publicly discussed by a former IDF Chief of General Staff, Gadi Eisenkot. Dahiya is a neighborhood village in southern Beirut that was believed to be a residential stronghold for Hezbollah, the radical Islamic Shi’ite movement opposed to Israel’s encroachments on Lebanese territorial sovereignty and pro-Palestinian in its wider political agenda. The doctrine came as no surprise to persons familiar with past Israeli tactics, although its articulation with reference to events back in 1986 and 2006 entailed an open rejection of compliance with applicable international law. Undoubtedly, the disclosure raised a few eyebrows of disapproval in Tel Aviv as such matters are not generally considered fit for open discussion.
The Dahiya Doctrine is a summary description of Israeli tactics ever since the time of the British Mandate, but was specifically invoked by General Eisenkot with reference to the 2006 Israeli use of disproportionate force (relative to what was regarded by Israel as Hezbollah resistance provocations) to destroy the civilian infrastructure of Dahiya. It was set forth not only as a rationale of past practice, but to describe Israel’s distinctive claim of intention and entitlement to use force in this manner against non-state adversaries as the core of a two-part doctrine of counter-terrorist deterrence. It also was an informal attempt to redefine ‘military necessity’ in situations of asymmetric warfare being waged by Israel against hostile non-state actors based in neighboring states. In the specific context of Lebanon, the blame for recourse to disproportionality is assigned to Hezbollah by Eisenkot contending that the Shiite villages of south Lebanon had been transformed ‘into platforms for terror,’ an inflammatory shorthand for armed resistance to Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon.
It is notable that this claim is put forward without the slightest effort on Eisenkot’s part to reconcile the Dahiya Doctrine with international humanitarian law, which imposes a limit of proportionality on any use of force in situations of international combat. It also neglects to take note of the fact that before encounters with Hezbollah, Israel routinely struck back disproportionately at its enemies, especially with respect to Palestinian acts of resistance, even when nonviolent and undertaken in frustrated response to Israel’s prolonged unlawful behavior as was the case with the Gaza Right of Return Movement initiated in 2018 after 11 years of punitive blockade and periodic large-scale Israeli attacks on the vulnerable Palestinian civilian population.
It is significant that the Dahiya Doctrine was first explicitly applied to the non-Palestinian Hezbollah militia movement, which was misleadingly labeled as ‘Iran-backed’ to warn and justify Israel’s claims to strike back disproportionately against any and all adversaries. The military incursions carried out in 2008-09, 2012, 2014, and 2021 in Gaza are each illustrative instances of the application of the Dahiya Doctrine although rarely rationalized in these terms by Israel and its supporters, but rather subsumed beneath diversionary arguments invoking Israel’s claim of an unrestricted right to defend itself. Such a legal justification was itself dubious given that Hamas, along with the West Bank and East Jerusalem were Occupied Territories subject to a special legal regime depicted in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, further elaborated in the First Additional Protocol of 1977. It is widely agreed at the UN and by legal experts that an Occupying Power has no standing to invoke ‘self-defense’ arguments in support of using force, and collective punishment, against an Occupied People, especially in this context as UNSC Res. 242 back in 1967 had unanimously looked toward the withdrawal of Israel’s armed forces from these territories occupied in the 1967 War. Aside from this, Israel is subject to specific legal duties in the 4th Geneva Convention to protect civilians subject to its administration, and to refrain from efforts to displace the occupied people by interfering with their
underlying rights of self-determination as it has massively done by authorizing and even subsidizing a large number of Israeli settlements and annexing as its ‘eternal capital’ the entire city of Jerusalem. With these considerations in mind, Israel, so long as it remains the Occupying Power, the Dahiya Doctrine and disregard of Gaza’s Occupied status is deeply problematic. Israel is entitled to take measures to sustain security in the Occupied Territories as part of its administrate role, but the force used should be considered legitimate only if rendered compatible with Israel’s responsibilities to safeguard the population under its supposedly temporary and not to interfere with its pre-occupation societal integrity. At least, the international community should not have been hoodwinked into abandoning reliance on the international law framework relevant to belligerent occupation. It seemed obliged to take note of the current legal challenge to Israel’s occupation that has lasted 57 years resulting from the General Assembly’s request for an Advisory Opinion on the legality of Israel’s occupation given its long duration and array of unlawful practices and policies. Whatever the outcome at the ICJ the likelihood of Israeli compliance or UN sanctions in the event of non-compliance is virtually nil. At the same time, it is politically valuable to confirm accusations of unlawful behavior by recourse to authoritative procedures, even if unenforceable, as such assessments tend to have legitimating and mobilizing effects with respect to civil society solidarity initiatives such as BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions) and exerts some influence on public discourse in the media and in diplomatic venues.
It is notable that the factfinding mission of the Goldstone Commission established in the aftermath of the 2008-09 Israeli Operation Cast Lead by the UN Human Rights Commission did conclude in its 2009 report that Israeli tactics in Gaza were instances of disproportionality, collective punishment, and state terror in conformity with the reasoning and practice endorsed by the Dahiya Doctrine, while taking note of the unlawfulness of the doctrine and its Gaza application in fact if not by name.
How does the Dahiya Doctrine fit into the prevailing laws of war?
As suggested in the previous response, the Dahiya Doctrine directly contradicts one of the most fundamental norms of customary international law, which also infuses the treaty formulations of limits on the use of force in the Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter. Namely, disproportionate force is prohibited as it is considered a form of excessive force and has the clear intended prohibited effects of targeting a wide range of civilian sites and inflicting severe collective punishment on the civilian population as criminalized as a war crime in Article 33 of the 4th Geneva Convention.
The Israeli retaliatory campaign in reaction to the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, is a grotesque example of the Dahiya Doctrine carried to a transparent genocidal extreme. It highlights the aggravating absence of any Israeli effort to set limits on the extent or degree of disproportionality. As in Gaza, General Eisenkot (IDF Chief of Staff, 2015-2016), with reference to Dahiya made some vague references to the issuance of evacuation orders to limit the loss of life on the part of civilians, but in practice this concern has never been consistently evident in the deployment of Israeli military operations. This disregard is manifestly evident in the current military operations in Gaza, despite weak Israeli protestations that allege Palestinian reliance on ‘human shields’ and blaming Hamas for situating their tunnel strongholds beneath hospitals, refugee camps, UN buildings, and schools. These legal arguments cannot justify a total abandonment of Israel’s legal responsibilities as the Occupying Power of Gaza, and besides, these Israeli explanations are not accompanied by sufficient evidence to offset objections
arising from Israel’s recourse to genocidal tactics and endorsed by dehumanizing language of its highest leaders that fulfill requirements of genocidal intent. The Interim Order of the ICJ on January 26, 2024 reinforces this assessment by concluding nearly unanimously that the evidence supports an inference of ‘plausible genocide.’ Even though provisional, and softened by the usual cautious demeanor of this highly regarded international tribunal, it reinforces the worldwide common sense perception of genocide based on real time imagery and informed journalistic commentary from Gaza sites of carnage.
How is the Dahiya Doctrine being implemented by the Israeli military in Gaza?
Again, earlier responses anticipate this question. Yet there are complexities associated with attributing to the Dahiya Doctrine the totality of blame for the extremity of what has been transpiring in Gaza for more than five months. This complexity arises from the widespread perception that the military operation in Gaza is not primarily about what it purports to be—namely, the destruction of Hamas or Palestinian resistance through disproportionate force and deterrence of future provocations by Hamas or other state and non-state adversaries. The Gaza operation must be viewed in the wider context of Israel seemingly exaggerated and vengeful reaction to the Hamas attack, which objective investigations may eventually reveal was allowed to take place or inflated in the official depictions of its supposed barbaric aspects, so as to provide the extremist Netanyahu coalition government with a pretext for its preexisting resolve to induce forced evacuation and dispossession of as many of the 2.3 million Palestinians from Gaza as possible, with an implicit unacceptable demand, which is openly avowed in settler and religious Zionist activism and literature of confronting the Palestinians, residents not only in Gaza, but even more directly in the West Bank and East Jerusalem with a dire choice between leaving and dying, or at best remaining entrapped in a life of misery.
Palestinians are understandably describing Israeli operations as having the overall purpose of inflicting on the Palestinian people conditions designed to produce a second nakba (or catastrophe), recalling the earlier nakba of 1948 when an estimated 750,000 Palestinians were forcibly made to leave their homes and learn that their villages had been bulldozed. Obliged to seek refugee status in neighboring countries and Gaza (then under Egyptian occupation) with no right of return, was itself a serious violation of a fundamental international human right. In effect, the logic behind the Dahiya Doctrine is certainly one way of viewing the 2023-2024 Gaza operation, but in my view it is incomplete without taking into account the underlying endgame of extreme Zionism, as embodied in the program of the Netanyahu coalition government that has governed Israel since the start of 2023, which is to establish ‘Greater Israel.’ The plan is to solidify the existence of a Jewish supremacy state (containing as few Palestinians as possible) in the whole of historic Palestine, described by its most ardent advocates as ‘Israel from the river to the sea,’ that is, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. In effect, what made this Netanyahu government the most extreme in the whole of Israel’s existence is its stress on completing the Zionist Project through the forced dispossession of Palestinians on at least the scale of the 1948 exodus. More moderate Israeli governments were also committed to such an outcome, although reluctant to acknowledge this, given the international two-state consensus. Earlier Israeli governments were far more ambivalent about turning the settlers loose to terrorize those Palestinians stubbornly refusing to be victims of a second nakba and to use Gaza resistance as a pretext for a genocidal assault on the people and infrastructure of Gaza, making the Gaza Strip uninhabitable and unlivable at least temporarily.
The Hannibal Directive and Israel’s Security Paradigm
The Hannibal Directive named after a historically important general in Carthage (247-183 BC) who claimed to prefer suicide to capture by an enemy was first articulated in 1986 by Israel in response to a series of incidents involving Hezbollah’s seizure of Israeli soldiers occupying Lebanon after the 1982 War. It informed debate about the abduction or capture of a low-ranking Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit in Gaza. Shalit’s release in a prisoner swap for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners being held in Israel jails raised the sensitive issue of whether it would not have better to risk killing Shalit than to be pressured into making such a deal. Although Benny Gantz, as IDF Chief of Staff in 2006, insisted that the IDF was under orders to endeavor to rescue Israelis captured from their abductors, which envisaged the use of lethal force, Israeli soldiers were said to be under strict orders not to kill deliberately abducted Israeli soldiers or civilians. Such a distinction, according to some accounts, was not maintained in practice, where the main goal was to prevent abductees from becoming prisoners.
In 2016 Gadi Eisenkot, while he was IDF Chief of Staff formally repudiated the Hannibal Directive and did not reveal secret replacement protocols for dealing with future abduction/hostage taking. The Hannibal Directive, however named or unnamed, again likely supplied the logic of the shootings of abductors and captured Israeli soldiers and citizens in the course of the October 7 Hamas attack. There are a variety of reports suggesting that IDF troops killed by accident or design abducted Israelis to prevent their seizure as hostages. Israel’s dissenting version of what happened on that day insist that any shootings of Israelis by the IDF was accidental, and attributable to the chaos of the situation. [For insightful analysis of these issues in the course of the 2014 attack on the city of Rafah that resulted in the death of an Israeli officer by IDF action to prevent capture see Finkelstein, Gaza: An Inquiry into its Martyrdom, 2018, 273-277]
The reasons for coupling the inclusion of this brief discussion of the Hannibal Directive are to further illustrate a calculative approach by Israel to issues of life and death for Israelis and others that is complementary in spirit to that set forth in the practice of disproportionate warfare as a prerogative of Israel justified by reference to the behavior and elusiveness of its non-state adversaries, which are consistently linked in state propaganda to its main state enemy, Iran. Such thinking also manifests the dehumanization of the Palestinian people in the event that their presence in their own homeland clashes with the policy priorities of the current phase of the Zionist Project, Such inquiries help us understand the continuities of the prolonged occupation of Palestinian Territories that has imposed oppressive conditions violating the most basis rules and principles of international humanitarian law, mutating from a regime of apartheid to one of forcible expulsion and genocide. For meticulous documentation of such serious charges, see Albanese, Anatomy of a Genocide, A/HRC/55/75, 25 March 2024.
5, Can the Dahiya Doctrine be linked to the Zionist Interpretation and Treatment of Antisemitism?
In my view there is a definite, although complex, linkage. To make such an assessment requires distinguishing three varieties of antisemitism as discourse and as practice:
—antisemitism as hatred of and discrimination against Jews, currently reignited by Israel’s subjugation and abuse of the Palestinians as a people [See On Antisemitism and: Solidarity and the Struggle for Justice in Palestine, Jewish Voices for Peace, 2017]. The core of this phenomenon was in Europe, including Western Russia, and extending to the Global West, including Australia and New Zealand, with deep roots in the dominant narrative of Christianity in which the Jewish establishment of its day collaborated with the Roman imperial presence in assenting to the Crucifixion of Jesus, and given a special twist in most contemporary varieties of Evangelical Christianity that read the Book of Revelations as imparting the message that the Second Coming of Jesus will only occur when all Jews return to Israel (as the successor to historic Palestine). Jews will then be given the choice of converting to Christianity or facing damnation. Despite this genuine type of antisemitism, the state of Israel has learned from its experience during the Nazi period that pragmatic convergences could facilitate the establishment and security of a Jewish state, especially the idea that encouraging Jewish immigration to Israel by any means was vital to the domestic support in the United States and elsewhere of Israel.
Early Zionist leaders even collaborated on arrangements with the Nazi regime in Germany that facilitated Jewish immigration to Israel, in some instances, with assurances that Jewish assets could be taken abroad. [see Suarez, State of Terror, 2018] The same pattern of pragmatic and instrumental use of antisemitism underlay the Balfour Declaration in 1917 by which the British Foreign Secretary pledged UK support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, which it facilitated by welcoming Jewish immigration and cooperating with Jewish leaders to carry out its divide and rule governance of its Palestine Mandate. In other words, the Zionist Movement pursued its goals by negotiating a number of Faustian Bargains with antisemitic adversaries, a part of the Israel state-achieving narrative that is confusing for both followers and critics.
It seems reasonable to ask ‘this may be true, but what has it do with the Dahiya Doctrine?’ It relates to the deep roots of Israeli behavior since the early pre-Israel origins of the Zionist Movement. In essence, because of its weakness in relation to potential and actual adversaries, Israel needed to make up its own pragmatically-driven rules of practice without regard to any sense of duty to comply with the expectations of established political, legal, and moral frameworks. The Dahiya Doctrine is one of expression of such pragmatism, enacted without regard to law or morality against elusive non-state adversary movements. At its extremes, as in Gaza in recent months it invokes the Holocaust to demonize critics, including adverse rulings in widely respected international institutions such as the International Court of Justice, contending that decisions by such actors are tainted by their ‘antisemitism,’ which seems pure smear given the lack of even scant evidence of hostility to Jews as such. In extreme reactions, prominent Israeli spokespersons denounce allegations of responsibility for genocide by contending that given Jewish victimization in the Holocaust, and before, any such accusation is itself a sign of mortal hatred of Jews and disregard of their experience. In effect that Israel, by virtue of its history and national identity can never be held to account for such criminality. In a more implicit and restricted form, this is the essential message to the world transmitted by the Dahiya Doctrine. It seems perverse and cruel to immunize Palestinian victimization from legal and moral criticism because of the Jewish experience in Europe, culminating in the Holocaust. Palestinians had no responsibility for these horrifying manifestation of hatred of Jews and should not be expected to bear the burdens associated with establishing a Jewish sanctuary in their midst without their consent or any show of Zionist respect for the Palestinian presence.
—antisemitism as a weapon against critics who are neither antisemites in the first sense nor deniers of Israel’s legitimacy as a sovereign state. This weaponization of antisemitism draws its effectiveness partly because of the guilty consciousness of the Global West, especially in Germany, UK, and the US, during the pre-war Nazi years, causing extreme sensitivity to any contentions of antisemitism, making weaponization an effective means to shift the conversation away from Israel wrongdoing. [For a searching account see Asa Winstanley, The Weaponization of Anti-Semitism, 2018] Highly professional reporting by Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Commission are consistently defamed by knowingly ‘fake antisemitism,’ invoked by Zionist groups and subsidized by Israeli funding and influence on media reportage. This dynamic is less related to the Dahiya Doctrine but it underpins the Israeli opportunistic defense against criticism emanating from the UN or other responsible circles as ‘blood libels’ against the Jewish people, as was the response by prominent Israeli voices in reaction to the Goldstone Report of 2009, which contributed to its recommendations being sidelined and ignored, even discredited, another instance of Dahiya logic writ large. Israel’s mastery of ‘the politics of deflection’ has been often successful in shifting the media and public focus from message to messenger, with the intended result that the message is never being delivered to the public. (Winstanley, 202-)
This was the case when a series of respected NGOs and many prominent scholars in the years 2017-2022 formed a consensus on the basis of highly documented reports that Israel was guilty of the international crime of apartheid. Rather than engage the issue, Western governments and mainstream media responding to such a damaging allegation with deafening silence, refusing to take notice and offer counter-arguments to the apartheid consensus, again as with Dahiya sustaining the impression of Israeli impunity in relation to normally applicable international criminality.
—antisemitism as emanating from Jews within Israel and Directed against the Jewish Diaspora. The Israeli government and public opinion has moved to the right, embracing the Greater Israel scenario as the basis for its future peace and security, replacing the Oslo diplomatic model of a negotiated end to the struggle of the two peoples on the basis of a political compromise with a victory scenario unilaterally realized with complicit support from Western liberal democracies. This third more obscure and subtle type of antisemitism is underappreciated both in its emergence, its recent surge in Israel, and in relation to Dahiya logic. Part of the obscurity arises because of the overlap of the pragmatic dependence on ideological, political, and economic support of Zionist diaspora networks in the Global West to continue to back Israel financially and diplomatically despite the increasing world clamor for a ceasefire in Gaza, the accountability of Israeli leaders, and a surge of support to implement Palestinian rights long deferred.
As criticism of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinian people grows throughout the world, and especially increasing among younger Jews in the Diaspora, the tensions between Jews living in Israel those spread across the world are intensifying. Such tensions are downplayed in deference to the continued financial and diplomatic dependence on Zionist leverage in the official circles of the Global West and on the continuing belief among Jews living in Europe and North America that Israel retains a right to exist as a secure, legitimate sovereign state.
The tensions are mainly caused by increases in settler violence and the rise in influence of religious Zionism and more culturally oriented assertions heard with greater frequency in Israel to the effect that ‘true Jewish heritage is expressed by speaking Hebrew’ or by a growing internal ambivalence toward the Holocaust noted by close observer of Israeli Jewish remembrance museums where recent changes in exhibitions and pedagogy give greater weight to the outlook of earlier leading Zionist voices such as Theodor Herzl, and even David Ben Gurion, who believed that Jews who failed to immigrate to Israel were oblivious to the inevitability of a repetition in some new guise of the Jewish fate that culminated in the Holocaust, and deserved little sympathy.
Turning back to the Dahiya Doctrine, the shared lesson of the Holocaust is that diaspora Judaism suffered as it did because it was disproportionately weak and passive, deluding itself by ignoring a deeply embedded, if temporarily dormant soft antisemitism limited to the social sphere. Early Israel was modeled on inverting the experience of diaspora Jews by stressing disproportionate strength, creative energy, and pro-active modes of being, which provide the impetus and mentality reflected in the Dahiya Doctrine. The doctrine can also be seen as a metaphor for Israel’s worldview. Indeed, the pre-Israel image of the urban Jew was replaced by the agrarian idealism of early settlements of Jews in Israel, glamorized by claims of ‘making the desert bloom’ and the social idealism of the kibbutz movement of communal living in self-enclosed rural ethnic enclaves. Later Judaism, especially after the 1967 War was caught up in the materialist and militarist dreamland of modernity, the prevailing Western ethos of neoliberal globalization. and the resolute ambition to establish stable security and permanent boundaries unilaterally, by force as necessary, in the course of realizing the goals of a Greater Israel. This meant defying the two-state mantra that was the preferred declared position of Israel’s most influential supporters in the Global West, including the US. Despite all that has changed, the Biden presidency continues to favor, at least in public, Palestinian statehood; only the Trump presidency between 2017-21 seemed content with an outcome that either denied a state to Palestine altogether or offered a token state with virtually no sovereign rights.
In concluding, these views on the Dahiya Doctrine and Hannibal Directive can be regarded as specific to the use of international force by Israel against its adversaries free from any sense of obligation to show respect for settled international law or critical public opinion. These formulations can also interpreted as metaphorical illuminations of Israel’s distinctive approach to the pursuit of its national interests and security as a state among states. It is distinctive because its openness and rejection of the normative order of law, morality, and institutional authority that is widely treated as the basis of global governance. This enactment of 21st century settler colonialism is taking place in a global setting that denies the legality of colonialist claims and affirms the rights of resistance to those subjugated, much less victimized by apartheid, atrocities, and now a genocide adopted vengefully and as the ultimate instrument relied upon to ensure ethnic dominance.
2. How does the Dahiya Doctrine fit into the prevailing laws of war?
3. How is the Dahiya Doctrine being implemented by the Israeli military in Gaza?
[Prefatory Note: On March 14 at the local Music Academy concert hall I gave what was called the ‘keynote address’ in the program of a memorial event honoring the personal and political legacy of David Krieger, the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation here in Santa Barbara, California. In this slightly modified text below I stress the comparison between Oppenheimer the film and Krieger the civil society star anti-nuclear activist as well as the persona of these two extraordinary individuals.]
Let me begin by adding my greetings to those many members of David’s family that are here among us on this most special occasion– at once solemn in our remembrance of loss and celebratory in our sense of David’s lifetime dedication to what Lincoln called ‘our better angels.’
And a warm welcome to those others gathered here today in friendship and admiration for a life well and meaningfully lived by David
I feel moved and challenged to be part of this remembrance of David, coming a few days after the question of nuclear weapons was brought before the American people by the many honors heaped on Christopher Nolan’s Oppenheimer at the Academy Awards ceremony. I believe it accurate to suggest that not since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1961 or perhaps even the atomic attacks on Japanese cities at the end of World War II has there been such public attention given to the dangers of nuclear war by ordinary American citizens. Of course, this flurry of concern was abetted in a variety of ways by the nuclear diplomacy of Vladimir Putin, which can be best understood as both a threat and a warning. It seems to be sending a message to the West that Russia is ready for nuclear war if the US escalates its involvement in the Ukraine War by sending US troops to fight alongside the Ukrainians, a course of action many of us oppose for reasons additional to those associated with Putin.
The loss of David in 2023 given these background circumstances reminds us of his lifelong dedication to ridding humanity of the nuclear menace both by educating Americans and others about the apocalyptic dangers of nuclear war and by his sharp criticisms of the distressing embrace of nuclear weaponry by the US Government and its main alliance partners during the Cold War and ever since. This embrace included the bipartisan failure to comply with international law, most explicitly with Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty requiring nuclear weapons states to seek in good faith nuclear disarmament. In a more personal sense David left us at a time when I know that he felt that his successor as President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation would provide the same commitment, energy, and inspiration in providing the same practical leadership that so vividly defined David’s professional and spiritual identity. I know that I speak for the entire Board and Staff of the NAPF when I say that we all share David’s sense that the Foundation is in the best possible hands under this leadership provided by Ivana [EEVENA] Hughes; we could not be more fortunate having Ivana [EEVENA] as David’s successor, which I am glad to report is a view that David fully shared.
My own special friendship with David stretching over a period of more than four decades combined three dimensions that I have experienced with no other person on this or any other planet—first, an abiding love of poetry as a source of deep knowledge of truth, the good, and beautiful, as stretching our sense of reality beyond what is expressible in ordinary language, and also as poets taking on the most challenging of spiritual practices, secondly, our shared love of tennis as an exalting and satisfying, if at time frustrating blend of sport and fellowship, and thirdly, our shared sense of horror and fear with respect to all that was associated with past, present, and future of nuclear weaponry. This last gave rise in David to a resolve not to be a passive observer in this wrong turn taken by the human species but to embark on a lifelong commitment to do everything within his power to work toward the abolition of this infernal weaponry not primarily to avoid himself experiencing such a culminating human tragedy but more so for the sake of those he loved, of yet unborn future generations, and on behalf a benign destiny for humanity.
We also talked quite often of a fourth shared enthusiasm, which would involve nurturing our fondness for the game of chess. Perhaps, because it might have served as a way of testing our relative abilities we never got around to it, and in this sense it was undoubtedly my good fortune to advert humiliation as we, somewhat suspiciously, never did find an opportunity to match wits in this manner. Another aspect of this special friendship was the closeness of our two families, as more broadly shared with Imaging and Gerry Spence, reinforced by the closeness of my wife, Hilal, with Carolee and Mara, David’s ever so faithful and loving partner and his beloved, amazing daughter.
I know that others more qualified than I have read and will be reading some of David’s poems, but I wanted to frame my remarks by a poem that expresses with devastating concisenss the morbid hypocrisy of those standing guard over our arsenal of nuclear weapons and continuing to this day to do so with a smile of national self-righteousness:
A Short History Lesson: 1945
August 6th
Dropped atomic bomb
On civilians
At Hiroshima.
August 8th:
Agreed to hold War crime trials
For Nazis.
August 9th:
Dropped atomic bomb
On civilians
At Nagasaki.
I have had the odd personal experience of knowing both David as a cherished friend and Robert Oppenheimer as a somewhat irksome acquaintance. I found an unusual mixture of convergence and divergence in my experience of these two extraordinary individuals. Both of their lives were publicly defined by ‘the bomb,’ Oppenheimer by its development, use, and later as a victim of a witch hunting brought to the fore by his morally driven belated opposition to any development of this weaponry beyond its atomic bomb stage. David became what he was by his horrified reaction to the use of the bomb, anti-nuclear activism reflecting his belief that only people could bring the pressures needed to make governments possessing advanced nuclear technology to give it up , and that his form of engaged citizenship in the Nuclear Age was to exercise civil society leadership in advocating abolition.
In contrast, Oppenheimer never wanted to relinquish altogether the fame he acquired by being widely known as ‘the father of the A-Bomb’ or for that matter his access to top-secret classified documents relating to national security. David had no ambivalence about his opposition to the use of atomic bombs against innocent civilian populations at a time in World War II when diplomacy could almost certainly have achieved the national goal of obtaining Japan’s surrender, while Oppenheimer took satisfaction in the success of his mission, including even the use of the weapon, although he later came to fear and oppose further development, specifically with H-Bomb technology that proved to have an explosive force that was 1000 times greater than the bombs used against Japanese cities. It is this posture which got him into unpleasant trouble with the militarist and foreign policy establishment whose eyes were firmly fixed after 1945 on geopolitical supremacy for the country based on military and economic dominance, and not peace and justice for the world. In a sense, Oppenheimer’s life is a metaphor for the red lines that make working within the structures of government for a more peaceful world dangerous and futile, while David’s life enjoyed the benefits of moral purity but was tormented in anguishing ways by the frustrations of mere citizenship in a country that would not act in accord with its proclaimed values, including respect for international law and the United Nations. Both lives will be forever intimately connected with the realities of ‘the nuclear age’—by their shared opposition to the persistence of nuclearism and by their divergent paths of rejection from within and frustrations from without the established political order. I am sure Ivana will find creative ways of keeping alive this dual pedagogical legacy of both David and Oppenheimer as continuing exemplary figures in this ongoing struggle to avoid a future war fought with nuclear weapons.
Again to speak personally, it was my privilege to have learned from these two iconic figures, although far closer in mind, heart, and soul to one than the other. Let me end with a poem written by David in 2020. I have selected it because it so gracefully expressive of David’s rare comprehension among we Westerners of right living, right feeling, and right knowing:
Wisdom Is… available to all, but rare distilled from experience advanced by dialogue listening carefully thinking deeply doing what is right selecting good over evil speaking truth acting with integrity living simply being kind and compassionate demonstrating courage learning from nature Questioning following the Way (Tao) helping others striving for peace with justice being humble choosing hope persevering
Richard Falk, Santa Barbara, California, March 14, 2024
[Prefatory Note The post below is long. The article is devoted to several of my recent central concerns. It was initially published in Global Community:Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, superbly edited by Giuliana Ziccardi (Oxford, 2023). Comments and conversation warmly invited. Adapted from annual Edward W Said Memorial Lecture entitled “The Enduring Legacies of Edward Said,” The American University in Cairo, Nov. 4, 2023]
Pursuing Justice Through Law: Edward Said, the Gaza ‘War,’ and Advocacy Jurisprudence
Richard Falk
Abstract
An exploration of forms of interaction bearing on the assessment of advocacy jurisprudence. This entails underlying reflections on relations between
scholarly identity and public engagement as contextualized by Israel’s military response in Gaza. to the October 7 Hamas attack, featuring a comparison between partisanship in legal inquiry and in the interpretation of literature. It also involves a jurisprudential orientation that presupposes the inevitability of partisanship and favors an explicit acknowledgement rather than pretensions of objectivity, which implies my bias against legalism and its replacement by a disciplined insistence that political and moral contexts be brought into the open. The overall rationale for such an approach is to seek a better alignment between law as practice with justice as the embodiment of humane values exhibiting universal criteria. Although these considerations apply to any legal system, the preoccupation of the article is with conceptions and applications of international law.
Pursuing Justice Through Law: Edward Said, the Gaza ‘War,’ and Advocacy Jurisprudence*
Richard Falk**
Prelude
My career as a teacher and writer on international law has been devoted to realigning law with justice, which involved identifying and deconstructing Orientalist biases that reflected early European tendencies to use law to advance geopolitical interests while simultaneously promoting a llegitimating ideology of civilizational and racial superiority with countries associated with the Global West.[1] Of notable prominence in this regard, was the use of international law to accord legal respectability to European colonialism, including settler colonial offshoots in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Jurists played their part by validating colonial relationships and obscuring the cruelties of colonialist behavior in many settings, including the acceptance of practices and policies now proscribed as ‘genocide’ but were treated neutrally as falling into the domain of conflictual politics, that is, beyond the limits of legal accountability so long as the perpetrators were white Christains and the victoms were persons of color. Only when the victims were ‘European’ as with the Armenians (1915) and later, the Jews, was the idea of criminalizing such behavioral patterns given a name and taken seriously as ‘the crime of crimes.’ Yet the racist/civilizational elements have not been fully eradicated as the political violence in Gaza illustrates where the Palestinian victims are dehumanized and the Israeli perpetrators are given legal cover by speciously inapplicable claims of self-defense.
In the course of seeking concretely to align law with justice I often found greater inspiration and kinship less with my law colleagues in the Global West, with some notable exceptions, and more with what we now identify as dissenting public intellectuals in such cognate disciplines as cultural studies, history, humanities, and social science. In this personal professional trajectory I found Edward Said’s work and public life to be inspirationally congenial as well as motivated by similar humanistic goals that I loosely associate with justice, an admittedly subjective category that needs to be explicated in concrete circumstances.[2]
There are admittedly unsettling features of such a jurisprudential standpoint. The epistemology underlying such a viewpoint adopts certain juridical points of light while rejecting others and interprets them in context, such as the prohibitions imposed on genocide, apartheid, and ecocide, or the Charter llimitations on the use of force in international relations. In almost every concrete instance there is room for contradictory interpretations of what the law prescribes, suggesting that all assertions of unlawfulness or humanistic claims of justice involve advocacy, either for or against fand seek distance from the artificial clarity insisted upon in mainly prevailing legal traditions that strive for an ideals of objectivity.[3] Those that do government lawyering, perhaps motivated by ideology, ethical conceptions, or notions of stability and balance, are similarly selective in interpreting facts and law so as to ensure that international law conforms to their preferred foreign policy commitments. Law functions in such settings as a source of justification, and the articulation of intellectual support in scholarly or journalistic settings is also premised on advocacy jurisprudence, although typically disguised for the sake of persuasiveness. Such work is performed by what might be called ‘assenting public intellectuals’ who characteristically have access to the most influential media platforms as well are welcomed in the corridors of government. To reverse the slogan of dissenters, it is a matter of ‘power talking truth,’ which perceived by oppositional tendencies in civil society as legal cover for state propaganda.
It is my intention here is to discuss law and geopolitics in the inflamed atmosphere of the ongoing high intensity violence taking place in Gaza, alleged to be a response to the Hamas attack in a series of Israeli border communities on October 7, 2023. Edward Said’s life and work as a Palestinian public intellectual living in America seems highly relevant to gain insight into my underlying objective of achieving a better alignment of law and justice. Justice is here conceived in a first approximation as overcoming the hegemomic, hierarchical, and racializing nature of international law in its historical, cultural, and political roles as validating the civilization behavior and biased of the Global West/ A second approximation by reference to contemporary instruments of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, as well as the Nuremberg Principle and certain provisions of the UN Charter.[4] A third approximation occurs when a judicial tribunal issues a judgment that draws conclusions as to the law on the basis of considering the positions advocated by the contending parties. A fourth approxiximation occurs at levels of enforcement and accountability.
Without the strong support of Proofessor Giuliana Ziccardi, as the exceptional veteran editor of the Yearbook I would not have had the courage to attempt to link what was originally a lecture on the life and legacy of a great public intellectual in conjunction with my efforts to align law with justice in international public discourse and even more so in the behavior of sovereign states.
Edward Said’s relevance
It would be insensitive to any remembrance of Edward to frame my reflections on his legacy without also highlighting the uncertain, presently unknowable significance of the extreme gravity of the historic tragedy deeply afflicting the entire, previously long abused civilian population of Gaza explained and now justified by Israel as a response to the Hamas attack of Oct 7th. With each passing day of devastation and atrocity associated with Israel’s military attack, the Hamas provocation, terrible as in its own way it was, it seems increasingly detached from Israel’s extended response. Israel tries to keep the connection to the attack relevant to its disproportionate response by stressing the plight of an estimated 240 or more hostages being held by Hamas, itself a distinct war crime, and by media reports about the deep fissures in Israeli confidence that they were living in a secure atmosphere.[5] Yet as far as public disclosure so far reveals, Israel’s government fails to negotiate a prisoner exchange, and engages in an an unlimited attack that does not seem to offer much of value in exchMy attempt is to reflect on Edward’s amazing legacy while contextualizing these remarks in the current agonizing encounter that are darkening the storm clouds that have long haunted the future of the Palestinian people.
A Few Words on Edward’s Life
When thinking about what aspects of Edward’s varied, vivid personality and wide range of valuable writings I first felt overwhelmed. I took the easy way out by deciding to speak somewhat generally about Edward’s extraordinary legacy that makes his life, ideas, and perspectives more relevant 20 years after his death than when he was alive. Few scholars gain by their publications Edward’s influential intellectual afterlife.
It is difficult to talk about Edward without understanding what he meant to convey in his praise for a dissenting ‘public intellectual.’ Edward’s wished to affirm those for whom their signature trait was truth-telling and bearing witnessing to performative evil, especially embodying the public authority and the power of the modern sovereign state.
In a revealing interview with Tariq Ali not long before Edward’s death he acknowledged some related worries particularly by what he called ‘the commodification’ of public intellectuals in the US, personified by the then media stardom of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, two smart persons who clearly antagonized him by using their screen time to advance an imperial agenda on behalf of their preferred American foreign policy. More generally, Said felt that the think tanks in Washington were stealing the thunder of progressive thought and the high quality of debate that he hoped to engender in university settings and academic writing. It is my sense that that we as citizens are daily exposed to a post-truth public discourse currently deployed, and relied upon, by many world leaders that is far more regressive and alienating than the deteriorating role of public intellectuals that had so concerned Said while he was still alive. Part of what makes this discourse historically now so menacing is that it is rarely challenged by high tech media even in the constitutional democracies that continue to proclaim their political virtues of welcoming debate and tolerating dissent, now best constued as an Orwellian trope that obscures more than it reveals.
It is impossible to consider Edward’s legacy without venturing comments on the experience and contents of his breakthrough book, Orientalism.[6] It was this book that brought Edward fame but also several (mis)readings that bothered him deeply. Edward’s culturally grounded erudite approachto the relations of the West to the Arab world was always nuanced, pointing to the diversities and cultural failings on both sides of the civilizational divide. This made reductive interpretations of such dualisms as speaking of ‘the Orient’ or generalizing about ‘the Orientalist’ deeply misleading. Of course, Edward may have contributed to the confusion by his hostility to Bernard Lewis and his Arabist acolytes’ presentations of the Islamic world. He found such cultural stereotypes well-suited to adoption by imperialists in the post-colonial West as a policy tool, but more because of their policy agenda than their embrace of negative stereotypes about the Arab world and its behavior. There were other scholarly voices in the West whose academic assessments Said found desrving of attention, and often congenial even if containing criticisms of various aspects of Arab behvior. In other words, not all who studied and wrote about the Arab world were guilty of the sins of Orientalism.
Said was most convincing when arguing that the literary works in colonial Europe gave a moral underpinning to colonizing mentalities. These works brilliantly analyzed by Said did, perhaps unwittingly, serve indirectly the dark designs of imperial activists, and still do. It was a major contribution of Orientalism to make many aware of the Orientalizing tendencies of those seeking to exploit the resources and manipulate the strategic outlook of Islamic World elites in the Middle East.
It is such an implicit framing of the Zionist movement of forced displacement and subjugation of the native resident population of Palestine that underpinned Said’s profound critique of Israel’s 1948 celebratory self-righteous narrative. This narrative for Palestinians will be forever memorialized as the nakba, of catastrophe and exclusion that was not only something that happened in 1948 but describes a process that has continued ever since, and is now is in the midst of one of its most traumatizing iterations. It is this Israeli sense of imperial destiny that is currently continuing the gruesome work of justifying forced displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian people living in northern Gaza, an undertaking done with distressing ferocity. The rationalizations emanating from Tel Aviv are situational, but the impact on Palestinian normalcy are similar, reawakening the nightmare of 1948. Yet in Orientalist centers of power of the West what shocks and angers most of the non-Western world as genocide is claimed to be permissible because characterized as a response to ‘terrorism.’[7] By the use of this word alone Israel frees itself from any need to claim it was acting within the law. Supposedly, the T-label confers on Israel a legal entitlement to forego any pretense that its response to the October 7 attack is proportional and properly restricted to military targets. Israel’s hasbara fictionalizes and distorts the realities of what is happening that either disseminates falsehoods or deflects attention from unpleasant truths.
In contrast, the Palestinians, and the Arab street and peoples of the Global Souh spread throughout the world, including many less educated people than the pro-Israeli policymakers in the West are not fooled. They are moved to take spontaneous action by fiery images of huge bombs dropped on crowded refugee camps and on hospitals filled to capacity with wounded or dead infants, children, and severely injured adults. The peoples of the world, including many in the Global West, are smart enough to believe what they see and put aside the propaganda that they hear, becoming enraged by the steady flow of lame excuses for atrocities put forward by apologists and genocidal ideologues in Israel and their powerful allies in the Global West.
As with Orientalism it would be perverse to address Edward’s legacy without revisiting his approach to Israel/Palestine struggle. The special resonance at this time is certainly worse than what Edward’s darkest imaginings anticipated when contemplating what was the future of Palestine and its people twenty years ago.
While Edward was alive, the unresolved conflict involving Palestine increasingly defined his identity as a public intellectual. As well, the sufferings of the Palestinian people caused him great personal anguish. Edward came to possess one of the few keys that if properly turned decades ago might have avoided much of the ensuing misery for both peoples, allowing Jews and Arabs, despite their historic missteps to learn to live together peacefully and justly, rather than engage in what has become a macabre death dance. Edward’s humanistic vision of what should and could have been now seems as remote as the most distant star in the galaxy.
The horrifying events of recent weeks in Gaza account for this less comprehensive treatment of Edward’s legacy, but is not meant to detract from the pertinence of Said’s legacy to the Palestinian fate. These days it would be escapism, indeed denialism, to downplay the preoccupying bloody atrocities occurring in Gaza. In my view, it is not only Palestinians that are the victims. By its recourse to overt genocidal behavior Israel and Zionism have also irreparably tarnished their reputation, and that of Jews generally, overshadowing the prior historic horrifying experiences of victimization endured by the Jewish people and modernizing successes of Israel. Critical observers long have understood that Israel’s gains were achieved at a great human cost. Israel is now putting itself at risk of being perceived the world over as the most disreputable pariah state of our time.
The catastrophic events daily unfolding in Gaza also encourage a departure from standard academic ways of remembering a cherished scholarly friend from a safe aesthetic distance. Previously I might have mentioned a few anecdotes that displayed Edward’s joie de vivre and essentially comic sense of life. He was great fun to be with despite frequently teasing friends and colleagues in challenging ways, especially expecting friends to do better, whether it was on a tennis court or by an engagement with the Palestinian struggle.
It was my good fortune that our lives touched one another at several levels. Such contacts were apart from the convergence of our shared political commitment to a just and sustainable peace between Israel and Palestine, and elsewhere. To begin with, we both had close ties to Princeton University (Edward thrilled my graduate seminar by taking over the class each year for one session, which had its downside as I had to teach those same students the following week). Edward’s political mentors, Eqbal Ahmad and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod were separately my close friends and the four of us formed a kind of braintrust on Palestine/Israel that met periodically in Edward’s Columbia office. Beyond this, we both over-indulged racquet sports pretending that their value in our lives was partly free psychotherapy. In addition, our children became friends. My first secret adolescent crush was inspired by the daughter of my father’s closest friend who mfany years later she married Edward’s PhD advisor at Harvard with whom he became a lifelong friend, with droll side effect of reconnecting me with this lapsed romantic phantasy of my youth.
Of course, there were also fundamental differences in our lives and identities, which seem relevant to the nature of Edward’s particular worldview and ways of ‘being-in-the-world’:
–Edward’s birth in Palestine, childhood in Egypt, and adulthood in America gave him that ‘out of place’ sense of exile that his early memoir made famous, an image which puzzled others who regarded him as a role model of super-success in academic America. Yet as his enticing autobiography makes plain his sense of not fully belonging anywhere, while emotionally confusing for him at times, allowed him to feel somewhat at home everywhere. This hybridity was integral to his envisioning of reality as combining an intense national outlook associated with his ethnicity to a high culture brand of humanist cosmopolitanism.
In contrast, I was spatially exclusively rooted in the American experience from birth, but as I grew to maturity, so much so as to tempt me to say that I was ‘out of place, in place.’ Gradually I became more marginalized almost to a point that could be labeled a form of voluntary ‘inner exile.’ This strange identity became even stranger when combined with a later sense of being a partial expatriate (mainly thanks to my Turkish wife and the time we annually spend together in Turkey);
–To summarize, Edward and I, in our different ways, despite our different life trajectories, were both inside/outsiders, never rejected by our surroundings but neither were we fully accepted or accepting; although ironically Edward increasingly nurtured and clarified his sense of belonging almost exclusively to the torments and dreams of the Palestinian nation, while I continuously diluted my taken-for-granted childhood sense of belonging to the American nation (and even more so to the American nation-state);
–undoubtedly the biggest difference between us was that Edward wrote Orientalism, with its worldwide persisting influence and impact, while I wrote books on international law that few read unless they were forced to do so by the few idiosyncratic progressive law teachers, always an endangered species in corridors of legal studies, at least in white settler colonial societies.
Israel’s War Against the People of Gaza
Despite the extreme grimness of the topic, as indicated, there is no responsible way to evade further commenting upon the horrifying Israeli response to the Hamas attack of October 7 as it relates to Edward’s legacy. This response dangerously reinforced by crucial diplomatic cheerleading and funding support by the United States, climaxing so far in the provocative movement of two aircraft carrier groups into the Eastern Mediterranean. Leading EU members along with the UK went out of their way to lend Israel a helping hand. In view of the ongoing genocidal saga in Gaza this is such a deeply disturbing and dangerous set of developments as to shape the present political consciousness of almost everyone. It has become as the bombs continue to fall in Gaza, especially in Middle Eastern venues, to consider anything other than this unfolding multi-dimensional crisis transparently and vividly portrayed day and night on TV, making the events in Gaaz the most globally transparent instance of genocide in all of human history.
I believe this change of emphasis from what I had originally intended is faithful to the personality, character, and commitment of Edward Said. He possessed remarkable gifts of merging analytical mastery with a passionate ethical/political immersion in the historical present. Confronting what is happening in Gaza, and how it illuminates what is wrong with Israel and the Global West would have certainly aroused in Edward the most intense response of outrage, not only directed at the genocidal policies animating Israel’s leaders cruelly carried out a series of massacres against a totally vulnerable and captive civilian population of Gaza. This ordeal is epitomized by the death, maiming, and traumatizing of every child of Gaza, an outcome of the documented bombing of hospitals, medical convoys, refugee camps, schools, UN buildings. This extreme devastation is further aggravated by the official blood curdling Israeli decree issued by Israel’s Minister of Defense a month ago that totally cut off all deliveries of food, electricity, and fuel to the already impoverished Gazan population, a community already heavily burdened by the world’s highest unemployment and poverty rates, a consequence of 16 years of an economy-crippling blockade. If this were not enough, the Israel attack was waged in a manner that accentuated these terrifying conditions, most unacceptably by the impossible forced evacuation ordering 1.1 million Palestinians in the northern half of Gaza Strip to abandon their homes and livelihoods to go South with no place to go, no safe way to get there, and once there with no place to live and no prospect of a job. This was a fiendish mandatory directive that could neither be followed nor ignored, a nightmare in real life beyond even Kafka’s darkest imagining.
I am quite sure that if Edward was addressing an audience anywhere in the world he would also vent his rage at the complicity of the US government and the refusal of the corporate media to fulfill its commitment to approach world news as if truth and reality were truly its mission. What we find in much of the top tier media in the West is a style of news coverage that is generally faithful to the biases of government policy that has been energetically promoting the dissemination of a pro-Israeli narrative throughout the ‘war’ on Gaza. These views are backed by belligerent government spokespersons and think tanks in Washington that continue even now to present the crime of ‘genocide’ as if it is an instance of justifiable ‘self-defense.’ Instead of giving some attention to responsible critics of Israel’s behavior, even realist mainstreamers like John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Anatol Lieven, the most respected TV news channels, such as CNN, repeatedly invite as their guests IDF spokesmen or leaders, and an endless stream of generals and Washington foreign policy experts in the West who tend to dwell on the tactical obstacles facing Israel’s unquestioned alleged mission of destroying Hamas as an organization and killing as many of its leaders as it can find. The commentary rarely complicates the portrayal of Hamas as ‘terrorists’ although it often meaninglessly and disingenuously cautions a defiant Israel to conduct its future operations within the limits set by international law and with due regard to the protection of civilians. This is a ridiculous bit of guidance given the complete failure to criticize Israel’s ongoing reliance day after day on Israel’s lawless tactics and decrees from its leaders that lend unquestioning support to the toxic action of its military forces, seem intent on inflicting devastating damage on the person and property of Gazan civilians with no established link to Hamas, and utterly contemptuous of critical voices.
If we are to gain a measure of objectivity it is necessary to deconstruct the main items of state propaganda that has muddied the waters of understanding Gaza violence throughout the Global West, while as noted not fooling the street protests throughout most of the rest of the world. Five points stand out in this regard:
–first of all, the reductive presentation of Hamas as a terrorist organization when in fact it is the elected government of an Occupied Territory subject to the 4th Geneva Convention which outlines the obligations of the Occupying Power, with a special emphasis on the duty to protect the civilian population.
–secondly, the manipulative identification of Hamas as nothing other than October 7 attack, which if it is as it seems to be, is certainly an undertaking, however provoked, fraught with extreme criminality and patent cruelly. The Hamas attack even if as barbaric in its execution as being portrayed, and on the basis of past reportage there is reason to be suspicious of Israeli battlefield justifications, overlooks other facts that more adequately delineate the true identity of Hamas. Hamas after being elected and taking control of the Gaza Strip from a corrupt and passive Fatah leadership associated with the Palestinian Authority has been administering Gaza since 2007 despite it being controlled by Israel as the world’s largest open air prison, its inmates further victimized by a punitive blockade years ago described by Israeli official advisors as explicitly implemented to keep all Gazans on a subsistence diet. Whatever else, Hamas is an elected political actor that since 2006 has been representing the people of Gaza, and as such is entitled to exercise rights of resistance although subject to limits set by international law.[8] Hamas earned legitimacy and Pa;estinian respect as a continuing and leading source of active resistance, something that has at least since Arafat’s death in 2004 eluded the international representation of the Palestinian people by the Palestinian Authority despite its well-known collaborative security relationship with Israel, especially resented in the West Bank in recent years.
It should be appreciated that the commission of a war crime, however heinous does not reduce a political actor to such an isolated act that make its reality reducible to an embodiment of terrorism. If this logic prevailed Israel would have been a terrorist movement from the early days of the Nakba in 1948, and many times over before and since.[9] Extreme crimes of a non-state and state actors were perpetrated by the Zionist movement before 1948, and by Israel subsequently. These documented crimes included ‘collective punishment’ (Article 33, Geneva IV) and ‘apartheid.’[10]
In the midst of the Israeli retaliatory fury the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, tried his best to overcome the good versus evil dualism of Israeli hasbara, as propagated in the West, by telling the assembled governments at the UN that the Hamas Attack, which he joined in strongly condemning, did not occur in a vacuum, which indirectly references Israeli crimes of oppression and Palestinian rights of resistance. For daring to speak truth to power Guterres was pilloried by Israel for suggesting, however mildly and indirectly, that Israel had severely provoked the people and Hamas leadership of Gaza for so long and cruelly that violent acts of resistance were the almost inevitable response, and as such called for self-scrutiny rather than a self-blinding orgy of vengeance. Once more Israel greeted criticism with an angry exaggerated response, demanding the resignation of Guterres and calling this self-evident truth a blood libel against the Jewish people. In this feverish pushback, it fortunately failed in its declared objective, and yet it achieved its most serious intended result of repudiating truth-telling and debate and shifting attention from the message to the messenger. What is remembered is not reminding governments of the context of the Hamas attack, but rather whether the call for the resignation of the Secretary-General was justified or not.
–thirdly, even those seeking a post-Hamas role for the PLO and PA in Gaza with the status of being the sole continuing international representative of the Palestinian people, acknowledge an unspecified need for what is described as the ‘reconstituting’ of the PA. In coded language relying upon the abused word ‘moderate,’ it seems widely understood by Israel’s supporters as implying zero tolerance for the assertion of internationally certified legal rights of armed resistance and a low-profile advocacy of legal rights of Palestinians including the muting of objections to West Bank settlements and their further expansion. Such restrictions on Palestinian reactions to unlawful Israeli settlement expansion, land grabbing in the West Bank, and settler crimes against the occupied native population being carried out in an atmosphere of impunity and further often facilitated by the greenlighting of Israeli security forces to refrain from offering protection to Palestinians in the face of violent harrassment. Security restrictions imposed on West Bank political activity disappear when it is the Jewish settlers rather than the Palestinian residents that embark on a violent rampage that kills and wounds even those Palestinians who have sullenly adapted to their fate as a permanently oppressed people living according to the whims of an apartheid regime. It is instructive to compare Israel’s middle of the night terrorizing arrests carried out against stone-throwing children or their predatory attacks on Palestinian rituals associated with the harvesting of olives with the forbearance exhibited toward the lethal violence of the Jewish settlers;
–fourthly, this settler phenomena, itself a direct, defiant, continuous, and massive violation of Article 49(6) of Geneva IV, is the current combat front line of Zionist militants who have long sought sovereign control over the West Bank, and its encouragement is directly subversive of any prospect of a two-strate solution, which despite this, remains the international mantra of advocates of a peaceful solution. One is led to wonder whether this advocacy is a cynical recogniztion of the futility of exerting real pressure on Israel or an example of evasive and naïve wishful thinking. In this sense, as with a skilled magician, some Israeli leaders seem content to have public attention preoccupied with Gaza rather than paying critical attention to the real endgame of Zionist maximalism, which centers on achieving Israeli sovereign control over the West Bank, the only part of ‘the promised land’ yet to be reabsorbed into the Jewish supremist, apartheid state of Israel. While we rightly weep over the acute suffering of the Gazans, we should also be taking a hard look at the simultaneous tolerance, more accurately interpreted as encouragement, by Israel’s leaders of escalating settler lethal violence and ethnic cleansing politics in the West Bank.
As with Gaza, the Israeli settlers are not shy about revealing their goals by way of menacing threats directed at the Palestinians. It went almost unnoticed in the Western media that after a recent violent settler demonstration in the West Bank, leaflets were affixed to Palestinian cars in the neighborhood with a simple chilling message ‘leave or we will kill you;’
–fifthly, it needs to be stressed that the present unity government in Israel is put before the world as a temporary ‘war’ response to Oct. 7. It was intended to underscore the war narrative, and the need to overcame earlier sharp divisions among Jews about the nature of the Israeli Jewish state. It seems true that the current unity government reflects a broad ethnic consensus among Israeli Jews that ‘vengeance’ without restraint was justified in response to the Hamas attack, and indeed alleged necessary if Israel was to avoid future attacks. More tangibly this meant for those so believing, finding an alternative to Hamas to administer Gaza in ways that curbed Palestinian militancy, whether from Hamas or other Palestinian groups of which Islamic Jihad is best known but not the only one. Liberal Zionists tend to argue that such a policing approach has almost no chance of succeeding on its own in restoring Israeli security unless tied to a peace proposal. To have any chance it needs to be combined with giving the Palestinian people a collective belief that a fair peace can be peacefully achieved within the framework of a two-state solution. Such an envisioned future presumes that Israel is finally prepared ‘to walk the walk’ of a two-state solution comprising at the very least inclusion of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as the capital of the new Palestinian state, as well of course as Gaza. As of now, such a future is the stuff of dreams, and lacks a grounding in the realities of either Israel or the US to be a viable political project.
I find this moderate option to be a totally dubious day after tomorrow scenario—most of all because the Netanyahu-led government emphatically doesn’t want it, and never has; it has almost been erased in our collective memory that the Netanyahu coalition that took control at the beginning of 2023 was generally described even in Washington as the most extremist government when it came to the Palestinians during the entire history of Israel. If Tel Aviv has its way, and now may have more latitude than in the past to establish ‘Greater Israel’ under the smokescreen of Gaza and geopolitical worries about a wider war further damaging the world economy and destructive of fragile regional stability. I firmly believe that this total rejection of Palestinian territorial grievances and rights under international law is at the core of Israel’s real Peace Plan.[11]
Even in the highly unlikely event that Netanyahu is forced to resign for his responsibility in the Oct 7 intelligence/security failure, and the Netanyahu extremist coalition government collapses, this kind of future for Israel/Palestine seems a non-starter. Over half a million settlers in the West Bank will fight Tel Aviv rather than having their expansionist ambitions thwarted by implementing any kind of agreement that requires a durable and humane accommodation with the Palestinians. At minimum a sustainable peace presupposes a Palestinian governing authority that has credibility with most Palestinians and a freeze on further settlement construction or more radically, arrangements for a coerced settler withdrawal to within Israel’s pre-1967 Israel borders. It would also necessitate an Israeli willingness to dismantle apartheid within its own state and implement rights of return for long languishing Palestinian refugees in neighboring countries. Even mentioning the magnitude of these adjustments suggests that liberal Zionists living around the world in secure diaspora conditions have little insight into Israel’s resolve to complete the Zionist Project on its terms, and to accept a variety of political costs associated with such an ambition.
As of now the most probable morning after tomorrow setting is likely to produce Israeli victory claims in Gaza, Hamas nominally replaced by a secular grouping of moderate secular Gazans Israel thinks it can rely upon, and a continuing Israeli effort to secure sovereign control in the West Bank, which implies further measure of ethnic cleansing and is virtually certain to produce a new cycle of Palestinian resistance. The Palestinian response if faced with such prospects will undoubtedly shape new modes and styles of resistance reinforced by a greatly increased global solidarity movements at the grassroots level of people, with the UN essentially silent, and even Western governments wary of continuing unconditional support of Israel. If resistance is sustained in effective initiatives, and complemented by greatly increased support from the region and world, it might signal moves among Israeli elites of the type that produced the South African transformative response to the growing pressure from internal resistance and external solidarity initiatives to dismantle apartheid and constitute a new government based on inclusive human rights, including a long deferred Palestinian right of self-determination.
The outcomes in Gaza and West Bank, although weakening Israel’s standing regionally and globally may have the perverse effect of stiffening the Israeli willingness to risk everything by mounting a final campaign to erase the Palestinian challenge, and not primarily in Gaza, once and for all, even if this means a consummated genocide. It will be up to the mobilized peoples of the region, of the Islamic state, and of the Global West to rise up sufficiently to prevent the fulfillment of such a scenario. At present, there is no sign of this happening, but if the present onslaught in Gaza continues much longer and is accompanied by rising violence in the West Bank such an outcome cannot be ruled out.
Geopolitical Ramifications of Israel’s Campaign in Gaza
A first line of reflection in reaction to this series of alarming developments, is to step back from the immediacy of Gaza, and to suggest the relevance of the global context within which these events have occurred. Before Oct 7 and after the Feb 24, 2022 Russian attack on Ukraine some thoughtful persons began to be conscious that a contested geopolical transition was underway that could affect drastically the world order that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union. The outcome of such a transition could be something that either mitigated or aggravated the dangers of major warfare that were evident before Oct 7.
In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, there was a burst of enthusiasm in the West, not only for victory over the Soviet Union and what it stood for, but for a more peaceful and prosperous world order. Hopes were invested in a new kind of economistic global setting in which market forces associated with trade and investment would create a benevolent future for the whole world, geopolitical rivalries and militarism would recede, with peace and security anchored in the diplomatic and defensive military capabilities of the United States, given credibility by the war-prone foundation of ‘full-spectrum dominance.’ This sequel to the Cold War, often labeled ‘neoliberal globalization’ was preoccupied with the financialization of the world economy, with government responsibility for the wellbeing of people diminished, while a growing need to meet an ominous ecological challenge caused by the modern carbon-based economy and known to the public by the soothing words ‘climate change,’ a situation best handled by multilateralism, that is, cooperative problem-solving on a global scale.[12]
The real breakdown of this Global West vision came by way of a series of profound order-challenging developments: the spectacular rise of China between 1980 and 2020, the Russian return to the geopolitical stage, and the unresolved conflict between the Islamic world and the West playing out in the Middle East, with oil and Israel being the core issues. In these respects, the Ukraine War and the Gaza War are parallel pivotal developments in these confrontations between the forces of order and those of change that few persons remain reluctant to talk about. Those that champion a post-colonial reenactment of Western world hegemony as the best attainable framework for peace and security that humanity tend to be advocates of victory over Russian designs in Ukraine, restraint of China in relation to the future of Taiwan, and wish for Israeli success in overcoming Palestinian resistance the completion of the Zionist Project by way of the formal establishment of Greater Israel.
In effect, this is an argument in favor of a transition to a revival of a world order dominated by the interests, political rhetoric, and economic priorities of the Global West as presided over by a US-led coaltion. The was the case in the aftermath of the other two global transformations of the past century: the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall, each of which coincided with defeats of fascism and communism, rival ideologies with their own conflictual world order agendas.
If considered from this wider perspective, the current Gaza/West Bank ordeal should be viewed as a conflict that is not just about Israel and Palestine. It is a conflict about the stability and structure of the region upon which many countries in the Global West continue to depend in meeting their energy needs. It also showcases Western fears and hostilities toward Islamic pressures whether from migration or anti-Western radical forms of nationalism.
This may help explain why, beyond the influence of Zionism, the U.S. has so blindly and unconditionally thrown its support to Israel despite its aggressive and discrediting behavior that undermines trust in the quality of US world order leadership. Israel has managed so far to retain the visible assurance of Western support no matter what it does to the Palestinian people and however arrogantly it flouts international law and the UN Charter. This reflects its strength as a strategic asset of the West and also its extraordinary influence on the domestic political life of the US and UK.
Looked at from the opposite angle, Hamas struck on Oct 7 not only to remind Tel Aviv and the world that the Palestinians were not going to stand by quietly as their presence was being publicly erased. Erasure is what Netanyahu seemed to boast about when he flashed before the UNGA in September 2023 a map of ‘the new Middle East’ with Palestine erased as a territorial presence in the region. This ethnic erasure was given further concreteness at the muddying of the waters at the G20 in September 9-10, 2023 meeting in Delhi that projected a Middle East corridor from India to the Arab World. Such an undertaking was widely interpeted to assume normalization of relations with Israel and the removal of Palestinian grievances from any relevance to this new policy agenda of the region.
The Middle East role in this transition from the post-Cold War reality has been openly ideologized as a new and latest phase of the West’s historic struggle against a reconstituted ‘axis of evil’ which the French leader, Emmanuel Macron, advocated within the framework of anti-terrorism. He put forward this controversial interpretation of world political trends while on a solidarity October visit to Israel during the attack on Gaza, in effect an anti-Islamic coalition of the willing was so overtly proposed in mid-October. He sought to downplay his openly civilizational initiative as an ‘anti-Hamas coalition,’ claiming resemblances to the anti-Daesh (or ISIS) coalition that emerged as a reaction to the US/UK invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, which included the dismantling of Iraqi armed forces. Macron seemed to magnify the already terrible drama of good and evil playing out in Gaza by referencing the connections with Hezbollah and Houthis, but also Syria, and above all Iran. Perhaps, also, it was Macron’s way of ingratiating himself to his Israeli hosts by deflecting attention away from the terrible happenings in Gaza to a wider conflict in which Israel was managing the conflict zone on behalf of the West.
This recourse to a systemic explanation of the Hamas attack recalls the once fashionable ideas of Samuel Huntington who in 1993 alerted the world to an anticipated post-Cold War reconfiguration of world politics as ‘a clash of civilizations.’ Huntington expressed his doubts that peace would follow the end of the Cold War, believing rather in the emergence of a new cast of adversaries hostile to the Global West.[13] Such a civilizational encounter would reconfigure militarized conflict rather than promoting peace, justice, development, and ecological prudence to form the basis of post-1989 world order. If we step back from the transparent immediacy of horror generated by Israel’s targeting of hospitals, refugee camps, and UNRRA buildings in Gaza, and interpret the wider reaches of this violent drama our picture of what is strategically at stake is considerably enlarged. Taking account of the relevance of Hezbollah, Houthi, Syrian, and above all Iranian solidarity with Gaza, as reinforced by the persisting large protest rallies in the city streets in Islamic countries, and indeed throughout the Global South, Huntington’s expectations of 30 years ago seem to be a prophetic prelude to Macron’s initiative as well as to the 9/11 attacks. Huntington’s words resonate anew as they formerly did when articulated just after the Cold War “[n]ation-states remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts will occur between nationals and groups of different civilizations…The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”[14]
Others have elsewhere observed that the conflict between Western civilization and Islam has a lineage that goes back 1300 years. Huntington’s ideological ally at the time was none other than Bernard Lewis who introduced an Orientalist twist by demeaning the whole of Islam as “a culture of rage” portraying those of Islamic faith, in Edward Said’s words, as nothing other than “a neurotic sexualized being.”
In a further twist, the Hamas leadership rationalized its attack on Oct 7 as a necessary way of conveying to Israel that the Palestinians were not going to consent to erasure. Further, in an inversion of the Western images of the Arab as responding only to force [see Raphael Patel, The Arab Mind (1973, updated 2007], Hamas argues with apparent plausibility that Israel only responds to force, and that Palestinian were led to mount an attack to awaken Israelis to the resolve of the Palestinians to resist erasure.
These contrary images of this clash of civilizational mentalities serves as an illuminating, if unconscious, backdrop for Israel’s Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, disgusting language describing the battle against Gazans in words that will be long remembered in the annals of genocidal rhetoric: “We are fighting against human animals, and we will act accordingly.” To so overtly dehumanize Palestinians, as well as its demeaning negation of animals, could make the often insurmountable challenge of establishing genocidal intent easy for prosecutors to meet. Of course, the quoted phrase is further incriminating as its role seemed a public explanation of why food, electricity, and fuel would be totally cut off from any form of transmission to Gaza. All in all Gallant’s notorious decree is fully consonant with Israel’s practices during this past month of violence. It also gains relevance by the failure of Netanyahu or other Israeli officials to modify or in any way soften Gallant’s self-incriminating language. What Galant said is consistent with other statements by Israeli leaders including Netanyahu and by IDF tactics and public rationales confirming such attitudes toward the whole of the Palestinian people.
There is little doubt that the outcome of these two ongoing ‘wars’ will deeply influence the prospects for the stability and acceptance of Western worldwide post-colonial and post-Cold War economic, political, and cultural patterns of hegemony. The hawkish interpretation insightfully, if indirectly, regards the active and undisguised complicity of the Western governments in relation to Gaza as a matter of grand strategy rather than as a testimonial to Zionist influence. This is important to understand, although in light of the rising chorus of moral/legal objections to Israel’s behavior in Gaza, it is rarely publicly acknowledged.
What is new with respect to Samuel Huntington sense of ‘the West against the rest’ was his failure to take note of the Islamic challenge being spearheaded by non-state actors adopting the pre-modern means of combat at their disposal and largely focused on resisting further Western penetration rather than through violence overseas as was the onetime tactic of Al-Qaeda. What 9/11 and later Islamic jihadism added was a religious rationale to resistance and conflict with the West whose identity took largely non-state forms. In effect, the geopolitically phrased assessments of Huntington acquired a moral fervor.
Instead of waging a geopolitical war to determine global power alignments, the war against Hamas can be, as Macron intimated, also internalized giving a fresh stimulus to European Islamophobia and anti-migrant politics. Even during the Cold War the Russians were never demonized as a people or was their civilization demeaned, partly because they were after all white Christians not ‘human animals.’
A politics of demonization, although used in an inflammatory way by Biden in relation to Ukraine, was confined to the person of Vladimir Putin. The main argument consisted of self-serving legalistic rationalizations for defending Ukraine, while excluding from consideration such contextual issues as prior internal violence against the Russian-oriented minority in the Donbas oblasts along with Kyiv’s repudiation of the Minsk 2014-15 agreements, and NATO’s increased engagement with the country’s security policies after the Maidan Coup in 2015.
There are revealing similarities in the Global West responses to these two violent conflicts that are bound to have transformative influences on the future of peace and security in the world. Those who favor a strong material and diplomatic commitment to Ukraine, as with those showing unconditional support of Israel, become hysterical if provocations of Russian aggression or the pre-history of the Hamas attack are taken seriously into account. This is because a fair appraisal of these two contexts subverts the high ground of moral purity and political justification implicit in the militarist modes of response, as well as rendering ambiguous the presume clarity of the claimed legal right of self-defense in the two instances.
The supposedly humanistic President of Israel, Isaac Herzog, adopted the good versus evil framework of Netanyahu that refuses to make the slightest concession to the realities witnessed by the peoples of world. Herzog’s entire effort was to draw the sharpest possible distinction between Israel as the agent of a humane future for all and the Palestinians as the exemplification of the worldview of their barbaric adversary. His words featured as a guest opinion piece in the NY Time are an example of the one-eyed crusading civilizing vision that a broad spectrum of Israelis endorse:
Against our will, we in Israel find ourselves at a tipping point for the Middle East and for the world and at the center of what is nothing less than an existential struggle. This is not a battle between Jews and Muslims. And it is not just between Israel and Hamas. It is between those who adhere to norms of humanity and those practicing a barbarism that has no place in the modern world.[15]
It would seem, at this point, that what is being endorsed in the West, is a second coming of the ‘clash of civilizations’ worldview as further embellished by invoking the dualism of good and evil. It is blended with a last-ditch effort to sustain the unipolar geopolitical alignment that emerged after the Cold War amid a world beset by ecological instabilities as never before. Biden made a lame effort to ideologize the latter stages of the post-Cold War atmosphere by describing the current era as an epic global struggle between ‘democracies’ and ‘autocracies,’ but it was largely ignored as the claim was beset by obvious empirical contradictions of inclusion and exclusion.
The outcome in Gaza for Israel also has major implications for the region and world, including possibly inducing a normalizing diplomacy with Iran, and greater respect for the norms of non-intervention in internal societies, especially Muslim majority countries in closer conformity to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. All things considered, the world will be safer and more secure if the politics of self-determination are managed nationally rather than by a US-led NATO directorate. As well, a positive reappraisal of conflict-avoiding invisible geopolitical fault lines such as were the pragmatic contribution of World War II diplomats at Yalta and Potsdam, and their renewal in the present altered circumstances of seeking conflict management.
Some Alternative Futures for Israel/Palestine
Against this geopolitical background, it seems now appropriate to make conjectures about what sort of future will emerge the violence in Gaza and how it might shape the destiny of Palestinians and Israelis, including the roles will be played by regional and global forces.
As the bombs continue to fall and rockets fill the air in Gaza, some reaching Israel, various ideas are being advanced by outsiders about probable and desirable futures. Three future patterns emerge at this from the rubble and the rising death toll:
–the pessimist’s future: Israel despite alienating people throughout the world retains sufficient hard power leverage to win the peace, establishing a Greater Israel that incorporates the West Bank, reconstitutes the governance of Gaza under a Palestinian Authority leadership to serve as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, possibly even looking to recognize a Gaza micro-state as ‘Palestine.’ I think that this outcome would not satisfy internal or international demands for an acceptable Palestinian solution, and would not end or even mitigate the apartheid nature of present Israeli governance or inhibit resistance activities on the Palestinian side;
–utopian envisioning: holding Israel responsible for the criminality of its Gaza campaign, requiring accountability of the main perpetrators for their crimes and imposing reparations for damage done to Palestinians homes and property; acknowledgement by the Israeli President and Prime Minister of the historic wrongs done to the Palestinian people by the Nakba and subsequent abuses, a point stressed by Edward Said and others with the accompanying sentiment ‘There will never be peace until there is such an acknowledgement is made.” Democratic secularism in a unified or co-existing states based on no ethnic nor religious criteria, featuring democratic elections, and human rights. A right of return of all Palestinian refugees and their descendants. Zionism would revert to the Balfour ethnic pledge of a Jewish ‘homeland’ but no state. The fact that something analogous along these lines happened in South Africa suggests that it could happen in Israel/Palestine, but it seems far beyond the reach of practical politics at present, although the Israeli NGO, International Committee Against Housing Demolition (ICAHD) has circulated a roughly comparable proposal in early November 2023;
–stalemate renewed: a return to the status quo preceding the Hamas attacks, with modifications, but apartheid, border control and blockade roughly as before, resistance continues, global solidarity intensifies in ways that gradually shift the balance of forces in a Palestinian.
None of the Oslo hype clouds the present search for final outcomes of the Palestinian struggle to attain its long denied basic rights as a people and nation. Yet for the foreseeable future the outlook for peace remains dark, including in, maybe especially in Israel.
Concluding Remarks
I would like to believe that Edward would have agreed with most of what I have said, although among his many virtues, was that of intellectual independence, which on occasion could be experienced as a certain cantankerousness. It is entirely possible that after Edward listened to these remarks would approach me after these remarks with a scowl and his half ironic, half serious putdown: ‘Richard, you can’t be serious.’
Despite my intention to be engaged, my words may still have come across as too academic. Yet I must reaffirm that the events of the last month have resulted in the most tormenting emotions that I have ever experienced in reaction to public events. I confess that to some, my rather academic style may seem designed to hide partisanship. To counter such an impression I will conclude by removing any doubt as to where I stand.
I firmly believe that this is a time for persons of conscience to take action as well as to pierce the propaganda manipulating feelings, perceptions, and allegiances
It is past time to confront the double standards and moral hypocrisy of the Global West’
It is also a time to mourn and grieve the terrible human costs endured by the people of Gaza, but also a time to show solidarity with those seeking peace and justice at great risk
And finally, this is a time to repudiate the horrors of warfare and political violence, the disgrace of genocide, and better arrange our lives and organize our collective endeavors on the power of love, courage, struggle, justice, and hope.
Concluding Remarks
As jurist, citizen, and human rights activist, the issues of aligning law in the books with justice in the life of Palestinians has both tested my commitment to a word order in which law and justice become closely aligned. This cannot happen so long as the UN and the management of power and security is left to the priorities of geopolitical actors, at present the US, China, and Russia, particularly if their relations are strained by the emergent struggles particularly evident in relation to Ukraine and Taiwan. The US seeks to retain the unipoarity—that is, the exclusion of other geopolitical aspirants from the managerial roles of global security—in the face of growing challenges not only from Russia and China, but also from the BRICs and a realigned Global South.
The lives of dissenting public intellectuals whether rooted in the scholarship of the humanities, at which Edward Said excelled, or the academic engagements of a social scientist devoted to the alighment of law and justice, the imperatives of values, thought, and action need to be fused and their impact on governmental and UN actors dramatically increased if world order challenges are to have any chance of being addressed in humane and effective ways. In a constructive sense, all legal analysis rests upon disclosed or suppressed what I have characterized as ‘advocaacy jurisprudence.’ Such an assertion builds on the work of legal realism and critical legal studies, and in keeping with the Lasswell/McDougal explicit endorsement of liberal constitutionalism as the guiding principle of constructing legal outcomes, although slightly disguised by their claim of a scientific social science epistemological foundation for their normative preferences.
* Adapted from Edward W Said Memorial Lecture: The Enduring Legacies of Edward Said
The American University in Cairo, Nov. 4, 2023
[1] My jurisprudential orientation accords with and is influenced by Noura Erakat pathbreaking JUSTICE FOR SOME: LAW AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE (2019)
[2] Others I would mention in the ssame spirit are Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg, Cornel West, David Ray Griffin, and from a distance, Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Bertand Russell, Mohatma Gandhi, and Martin Buber. Within my disciplinary orientation of international law, I found the critical work and normative perspectives of TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Llaw) as a compatible complement to the work of jurists in the Global West working toward a similar realignment of law and justice as are dissenting public intellectuals. In this regard I would mention Asli Bali, Noura Erakat, Darryl Lee, Lisa Hajjar, Victor Kattan, and Penny Green as currently active examples in the US/UK setting.
[3] See the influential writings of Hans Kelsen and the many conscious or unconscious Kelsenites. Also relevant is the writing of Max Weber trying to curtail the influence of religion in policy formation and give way to Enlightenment values privileging science. In some attempts to objectify a preferential set of values the issue of subjectivity is shifted but not eliminated. See Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2003) The most notable undertaking of this sort was attempted by the New Haven School of International Law, as principally propounded by Harold Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal at Yale Law School. See their Jurisprudence for a Free Society (1991)
[4] By ‘first approximation’ I want to again emphasize that legal norms are not self-elucidating. Their ambiguity is
somewhat arbitrarily overcome by leaving the authority to finalize the interpretation of norms to judicial bodies.
The dissatisfaction among liberals about the outlook and judgments of the US Supreme court in recent years reveals tensions in the alignment between law and justice. During the Warren Court it was political conservatives that were distressed by what they regarded as misalignment of law and justice.
[5] There are enough discrepancies between the initial Israeli account of the Hamas attack and what actually happened on Oct 7 to support the appointment of an international commission should be arranged to produce a trusted objective and comprehensive account of what actually happened on that tragically eventful day.
[7] No words in political discourse are more manipulated than are ‘genocide’ and ‘terrorism.’ The former
to criminalize dehumanizing behavior, while the later suspends the laws of war be dehumanizing those
that use political violence as an instrument of armed struggle, with more or less justification.
[8] Although indefinite in its contours, international law authrorizes armed resistance to oppressive rule. See UN General Assembly Res. 2625 (1975).This makes the Hamas attack to be a hybrid event, both containing war crimes and a resistance rationale. This rationale points to the failure to find a peaceful solution after more than 75 years.
[9] See Thomas Suarez, How Terrorism Created Modern Israel (2016)
[10] See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the International Crime of Apartheid, 1973; recently documented by Michael Lynk 2021 report to the HRC in his role as SR, Michael Lynk in Richard Falk, John Dugard, Michael Lynk, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE: WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS (2023), 297-312; also the authoritative reports of the UN’s ESCWA, and NGOs Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and B’Tselem.
[11] This reasoning of mine should be compared to the proposals published on October 22, 2023 in Foreign Affairs by the former PA Prime Minister, Fayyad Salam ideas.
[12] For ellaboration see Richard Falk, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE (2001)
[13] Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72: 22-49 (1993)
[Prefatory Note: The post below is the slightly edited text of a keynote address to an organizational meeting for establish a worldwide network of Scientists Against War and the Destructive Use of Science as stimulated by the Israeli genocide against the civilian population of Gaza. This encouraging event of global scope occurred on December 9, 2023, some six weeks before the International Court of Justice issued its historic Interim Order on January 26, 2024 with a near unanimous vote supportive of the ‘plausibility’ of South Africa’s initiative undertaken in accord with Article IX of the Genocide Convention to allow Parties to bring legal disputes as to the applicability of allegations of genocide to be resolved under the authority of ICJ. A video version of my talk is available: https://youtu.be/-kIb-NhVHiQ ].
I find the initiative that the organizing committee has taken in producing this Convention Against War and Destructive Use of Science: Scientists Against Israeli Apartheid, Occupation and Genocide to be a glimmer of light in a dark sky. A dark sky that is dominated by the most transparent instance of genocide in human history.
Where because of the capacity of worldwide media to show the daily unfolding of this terrible criminal action in Gaza and its related effects in the West Bank as well, the peoples of the world are exposed as never before to the concrete exposure of genocide in real time. Past genocides, even the Holocaust, have always been something relatively abstract from our consciousness, with its horrifying realities exposed long after the mass killing has stopped. This immediacy and unmistakable reality of the Gaza genocide, including the exposure of its sadistic details, intensifies the challenge to the collective conscience of humanity..
What is happening in Gaza, it is not only a visible reality for the peoples of the world and the governments, the leaders and those in international institutions, it is also something that is reinforced by the explicit endorsement of such an approach to conflict as has been embarked upon by the leadership of Israel. Never has such a candid admission that one is striking against the people as a whole: cutting off their food and fuel and electricity, bombing their hospitals and places of shelter, targeting places where children and women gather. What is also shocking is that display of horror enjoyed the support and active complicity of several of the leading liberal democracies in the world. It suggests an imperial post-colonial posture toward the Global South in Western Europe and North America, which seems to be largely configured inter-civilizationally.
This Gaza onslaught is a dramatic horror story that makes this kind of transnational professionally grounded initiative against militarism so encouraging, a glimmer of light during dark times when many storm clouds hover close to planet earth. To oppose militarism all of its manifestations will hopefully become a dominant preoccupation of scientists and others, indeed for everyone with a global conscience to motivate them to feel that they must act responsibly in light of such developments that cloud the present and pose dire threats for the future..
Let me refer briefly to my experience with militarism and war-making. Having taught, as was said, at Princeton University for 40 years, I was surrounded by some of the world’s leading scientists including Robert Oppenheimer, John Wheeler, Murph Goldberger, and Freeman Dyson and others of global stature. What intrigued me then was the degree to which these outstanding scientists were enticed by the opportunity to take part in the security dimensions of government policy, which included feeding the militarist appetites of the private sector, exerting an unhealthy influence on public opinion, domestic politics, and a bloated bilateral peacetime military budget over the years by grossly exaggerating security threats and by the economically motivated projection of American power worldwide. This kind of toxic connection between scientists and government policy which is probably more extreme in both its character and effects in the United States than elsewhere. being labeled by the US president ; the degree to which the US has the largest military budget and also is by far the largest arms supplier in the world, making it the largest source of military hardware and software among the national merchants of death. The US President, Dwight Eisenhower warned Americans about the dangers of ‘the military-industrial complex’ in his 1961 Farewell Address, a warning that to this day goes unheeded. Eisenhower’s words are worth recalling:
“we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist.” In actuality, the danger has increased in the last 62 years.
The other reinforcing experience I had was to visit the two leading nuclear strategic centers of global security policy, in the United States, and I take notice of two kinds of personalities that one encountered there. These were venues dominated by scientists.
One was a feeling that by contributing to the military development of weaponry and doctrine and so on scientists were somehow doing something in the “real world” and that this was a source of what struck me then as a kind of careerist excitement for them. And the other kind of scientific personality were people who didn’t know a great deal about politics but were indoctrinated into an unquestioning acceptance of the prevailing ideology of the time and were Cold War activists in a very superficial yet dogmatic way, This led them to believe that their work that consisted of helping with the development of weapons and the worst kind of weapons was something that was positive, that it contributed to a better world, both guarding the peace against the ideological enemy in Moscow and making the world safe for market-oriented constitutionalism.
In other words, ideology underpinned this enthusiasm for robust connections between the scientific community militarism that was broadly present in the society and very very salient, at least in the United States, throughout the entirety of the Cold War—and actually after the Cold War—because it saw the opportunity (with the collapse of the Soviet Union) to become the unipolar dominant presence in the world and didn’t have the imagination to choose anything other than the solidification of its military dominance as the path to establish and maintain its hegemonic role in international political life after the Cold. And this quest continues to guide American foreign policy despite rising resistance throughout the non-West. have focused on the United States partly because I know it best but also because I think it represents, in its own way, a powerful metaphor for the distortions that arise from this misbegotten marriage of militarism and knowledge as filtered through the brilliance of some of the world’s finest scientists.
This kind of initiative, that you all are part of, is an overdue reaction. Perhaps the extremity of what’s happening in Gaza made many of us, regardless of professional orientation, to act in anti-militarist ways that we were not motivated to act before. It overcame a human tendency toward complacency and the feeling of helplessness about taking on these larger issues.
But I think that one of the revelations of this outbreak of genocide in Gaza is the helplessness of the formal structures of war prevention and the protection of peoples against abusive behavior. The UN, which was supposedly created as a war prevention institution after World War II, was, in a sense, designed by its founders to fail because it gave the five most powerful countries in the world the authority to block any kind of effective response that might oppose or neutralize militarism and aggressive and criminal undertakings in the course of war, epitomized by vesting a veto power in the winners of World War II.
This awakening from decades of indulging militarism which I think is happening in many domains, not just among scientists. I’m part of a parallel initiative of so-called global intellectuals that is similarly awakening to the fact that if the peoples of the world do not take responsibility, nothing effective will be done to curtail the menace of militarism and destructive warfare.
And so, this initiative among scientists is systemically important, giving rise that it strengthens over time, and does not dissipate when the current crisis subsides. .
There’s one other general factor that hasn’t often been taken into account, that despite this surge of militarism in the post-Cold War and present world: militarism hasn’t produced political results associated with costly investments in achieving military superiority nationally, regionally, and globally. In the post-1945 period, the large investments in military capabilities have proved in most combat zones to be dysfunctional. In a series of symbolic activities that sought to bring to bear military superiority as a way of controlling the political outcomes in Global South combat zones have ended in political defeat for the side controlling battlefield results. And the assumption of those that make foreign policy for almost all leading governments is that history is constituted by those that prevail in military conflicts. That, in other words, that war and militarism continue to have the same historical agency that in earlier times allowed European colonialism to control most of the non-West.
But recent international experience defies that understanding and the US especially should have learned this by its decade-long experience in the Vietnam War. In that war the US had complete military dominance yet lost the war. It is important to understand tat the lessons of that political defeat cannot be learned by these militarist governing elites. This is because there’s too strong a vested interest in persisting with the belief that military agency is what controls political outcomes and shapes history, a view that although contrary to experience continues to prevail in the coopted most influential media platforms throughout most of the world, reflecting as well the decline of independent media in even the most respected political democracies.
If Vietnam wasn’t enough of a pedagogic experience, then the 20-year commitment to state building in Iraq and in Afghanistan should have been a breakthrough that would encourage a more critical political consciousness in relation to military approaches to global security in the 21st century. But again, the energies of the militarist leverage within societies remained too strong to learn the lesson that in a post-colonial period of important powers, exhibited by persistent national mobilization in response to foreign intervention, that military superiority does not any longer produce favorable cost/benefit calculation. Any objective assessment of all the—not only the examples I’ve given—but Libya, Yemen, Syria, all of these venues of military intervention produced devastation, to be sure. But they didn’t satisfy the objectives of those who invested lives and trillions of dollars in achieving control the political outcomes, losing out both normatively and geopolitically as well.
Basically that’s a constructive reality, and it’s not just applicable to the United States. All the colonial wars with European states were won by the weaker side militarily. And that’s a terribly important lesson. Why it can’t be learned is because it would undercut the profitability of the arms industry and the power of the military within governmental bureaucracies. So what was done after the Vietnam War was not a matter of controlling involvement or the preparation for less militarist, more prudent forms of security, but instead the development of new weapons and the employment of scientists in that process, that is, the cure for the failures of militarism is to invest more intelligently and even more expansively in militarism, a seeming unbreakable cycle that is not susceptible to repudiation by repeated experiences of failure and moral/legal outrage. It will take anti-militarist pressures generated from within civil society, and hopefully achieving global scope and influence.
In effort to control the media during future intervention, the popular slogan in the US was that the Vietnam War was lost not on the battlefield in Vietnam but in the American living room. The idea was that the media would be more subjected to the discipline of a militarized political consciousness was accorded by a high policy priority by think tank and foreign policy elites..
Let me bring these remarks to an end by going back to the Gaza reality for a moment and saying that the Israeli practice there of genocide is in a sense a recognition of the futility of war as between two military capabilities. This is a war against people. And it’s a war that can be won only by the elimination or the dispossession of people. In that sense, it is a correct, perverse, and surrealistic recognition of the futility of conventional war as a way of shaping politics. It’s a horrifying reaction to that futility by resorting to an explicit avowal of genocide as the basis of Israeli security and territorial ambition in a sense, particularly applicable in contexts of settler colonial projects that to succeed must eliminate or totally marginalize the indigenous population, making even longtime residents, strangers in their own homelands.
So let me end by saying I applaud the draft Declaration, which I think is a very powerful document, and I hope that this initiative will lead to a worldwide process of anti-militarism and anti-war sentiment that will enlist powerful support from scientists and widespread respect from independent media, peace minded governments, and citizens of concern and conscience.
Thank you very much for giving me this opportunity to speak at this important occasion.
Update of 2/25/24 EuroMed Article by Richard Falk:
It is helpful to conceive of the Israeli settler colonial undertaking in Palestine as having reached its decisive phase, and as such concerns in addition to resources, land and people. From an Israeli perspective, ‘more land, less Palestinians’; from a Palestinian perspective, ‘steadfastness and resistance in relation to land and residence rights.’
The latest news pertaining to Gaza as reported in the Western media and government circles is that a six week pause in the onslaught in Gaza is being negotiated in Paris and Doha, and possibly will take effect on March 10th, the beginning of Ramadan. The deal being negotiated centers on the release of women, children, and the elderly among the 99 Israel hostages still held by Hamas, and an exchange that is rumored to lead to the freeing of 300 Palestinians currently held in Israeli prisons, often under abusive conditions.
It is coupled with a continuing announced intention by PM Netanyahu of a planned attack on the southernmost Gaza city of Rafah, which is now sheltering as many as 1.5 million displace Palestinian or more than half of Gaza’s 2.3 million population and more than ten times the number of people normally living in Rafah.
The overall genocidal attack in its fifth month now has resulted in more than 30,000 Palestinian deaths with another 7,000 missing, and over 70, 000 injured many badly. A further estimated 576,000 are coping with imminent famine conditions, 85% of Gaza population is displaced, and 80% of residential housing has been destroyed or seriously damaged, as well as 96% of Gaza agricultural infrastructure destroyed or damaged.
To calibrate the extent of loss and suffering by reference to the current US population of 335 million would mean multiplying the above Palestinian casualty statistics by more 140 times, and many fear that starvation, disease, and the Rafah attack will greatly increase Palestinian losses.
Recall Samuel Huntington’s controversial, yet influential, 1993 Foreign Affairs article, “The Clash of Civilizations,” which ends with the provocative phrase, “The West against the rest.” Although the article seemed far-fetched 30 years ago, it now seems prophetic in its discernment of a post-Cold War pattern of inter-civilizational rivalry. It is rather pronounced in relation to the heightened Israel/Palestine conflict initiated by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israeli territory with the killing and abusing of Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers, as well as the seizure of some 200 hostages.
Clearly this attack has been accompanied by some suspicious circumstances such as Israel’s foreknowledge, slow reaction time to the penetration of its borders, and, perhaps most problematic, the quickness with which Israeli adopted a genocidal approach with a clear ethnic cleansing message. At the very least the Hamas attack, itself including serious war crimes, served quite conveniently as the needed pretext for the 100 days of disproportionate and indiscriminate violence, sadistic atrocities, and the enactment of a scenario that looked toward making Gaza unlivable and its Palestinian residents dispossessed and unwanted.
Despite the worldwide transparency of the Israeli tactics, partly attributable to ongoing TV coverage of the devastating and heartbreaking Palestinian ordeal, what was notable was the way external state actors aligned with the antagonists. The Global West (white settler colonial states and former European colonial powers) lined up with Israel, while the most active pro-Palestinian governments and movements were initially exclusively Muslim, with support coming more broadly from the Global South. This racialization of alignments seems to take precedence over efforts to regulate violence of this intensity by the norms and procedures of international law, often mediated through the United Nations. South Africa broke this pattern by its historic initiative at the ICJ that resulted in a near unanimous Interim Order on January 26, 2024, which seems to have had no impact on Israel military tactics or interference with the delivery of humanitarian aid or support by the Global West.
This pattern is quite extraordinary because the states supporting Israel, above all the United States, have claimed the high moral and legal ground for themselves and have long lectured the states of the Global South about the importance of the rule of law, human rights, and respect for international law. This disregard the manifest of intent of the Genocide Convention to urge compliance with international law and morality by both sides in the face of the most transparent genocide in all of human history. In the numerous global pre-Gaza genocides, the existential horrors that occurred were largely known after the fact and through statistics and abstractions, occasionally vivified by the tales told by survivors or given expression in novels or films. The events, although historically reconstructed, were not as immediately real as these events in Gaza with the daily reports in real time from brave journalists in the Gaza combat zones for more than four months, enduring many deaths..
Liberal democracies failed not only by their refusal to make active efforts to prevent genocide, which is a central obligation of the Genocide Convention, but more brazenly by openly facilitating the continuation of the genocidal onslaught. Israel’s frontline supporters have contributed weapons and munitions, as well as providing targeting intelligence and even assurances of active engagement by ground forces if requested, as well as providing diplomatic support at the U.N. and elsewhere throughout this crisis.
Liberal democracies failed not only by their refusal to make active efforts to prevent genocide, but more brazenly by openly facilitating continuation of the genocidal onslaught
These performative elements that describe Israel’s recourse to genocide are undeniable, while the complicity crimes enabling Israel to continue with genocide remain indistinct, being situated in the shadowland of genocide. For instance, the complicity crimes are noted but remain on the periphery of South Africa’s laudable application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that includes a request for Provisional Measures crafted to stop the genocide pending a decision on the substance of the charges of genocide. The evidence of genocide is overwhelmingly documented in the 84-page South African submission, but the failure to address the organic link to the crimes of complicity is a weakness that could be reflected in what the court decides.
Even if the ICJ does impose these Provisional Measures, including ordering Israel to desist from further violence in Gaza, it may not achieve the desired result, at least not before the substantive decision is reached some three to five years from now. It seems unlikely that Israel will obey Provisional Measures. It has a record of consistently defying international law. It is likely that a favorable decision on these preliminary matters will give rise to a crisis of implementation.
The law is persuasively present, but the political will to enforce is lacking or even resistant, as here in certain parts of the Global West, and the ICJ lacks any independent enforcement authority. The UN leaves, as usual, implementation at the mercy of the veto-burdened Security Council..
The degree to which the U.S. has supplied weaponry with U.S. taxpayer money would be an important supplement to rethinking the U.S. relationship to Israel that is so important and which is underway among the American people—even in the Washington think tanks that the foreign policy elites fund and rely upon. Proposing an arms embargo would be accepted as a timely and appropriate initiative in many sectors of U.S. public opinion. I hope that such proposals may be brought before the General Assembly and perhaps the Security Council. Even if not formally endorsed, such initiatives would have considerable symbolic and possibly even substantive impacts on further delegitimizing Israel’s behavior and stimulating solidarity initiatives..
A third specific initiative worth carefully considering would be timely establishment of a People’s Tribunal on the Question of Genocide initiated by global persons of conscience. Such tribunals were established in relation to many issues that the formal governance structures failed to address in satisfactory ways. Important examples are the Russell Tribunal convened in 1965-66 to assess legal responsibilities of the U.S. in the Vietnam War and the Iraq War Tribunal of 2005 in response to the U.S. and U.K. attack and occupation of Iraq commencing in 2003.
Such a tribunal on Gaza could clarify and document what happened on and subsequently to October 7. By taking testimony of witnesses, it could provide an opportunity for the people of the world to speak and to feel represented in ways that governments and international procedures are unable to enact, given their request for Provisional Measures to stop the ongoing Gaza onslaught, it will increase Global South and civil society pressure on Israel and its supporter governments to comply. As Israel has refused to make even efforts to comply with the near unanimous Interim Order of the ICJ, it has escalated pro-Palestinian solidarity efforts throughout the world and cast Israel into the darkest regions of pariah statehood.
In such an atmosphere, nonviolent activism and pressure for the imposition of an arms embargo and trade boycotts as well as sports, culture, and touristic boycotts will become more viable policy options, and can be given symbolic and substantive reality within the private sector, even among individual consumers. This approach by way of civil society activism proved very effective in the Euro-American peace efforts during the Vietnam War and in the struggle against apartheid South Africa, and elsewhere.
Israel is becoming a pariah state due to its behavior and defiance exhibited toward legal and moral norms. It has made itself notorious by the outrageously forthright acknowledgement of genocidal intent of its highest leaders with respect to Palestinian civilians whom they are under a special obligation to protect as the occupying power.
Being a pariah country or rogue state makes Israel politically and economically vulnerable as never before. At this moment, a mobilized civil society can contribute to producing a new balance of forces in the world that has the potential to neutralize the sway of Western post-colonial imperial geopolitics that has dominated the global management of power since the end of the Cold War more than 30 years ago..
It is also relevant to take note of the startling fact that the anti-colonial wars of the last century were in the end won by the weaker side militarily. This is an important lesson, as is the realization that anti-colonial struggle does not end with the attainment of political independence. It needs to continue to achieve control of national security and economic resources as the recent wave of anti-French coups in former French colonies in sub-Saharan Central Africa illustrate. The most recent of these coups occurred in Niger about a year ago.
In the 21st century weapons alone rarely control political outcomes. The U.S. should have learned this decades ago in Vietnam, having controlled the battlefield and dominated the military dimensions of the war, and yet having failed to achieve control over its political outcome, and correctly perceived as having lost the war..
The U.S. is disabled by its internal political structure from learning the appropriate lessons from such defeats. Such learning would weaken the leverage of the military-industrial-government complex, including the private sector arms industry and the corporatized media. This would subvert the domestic balance in the U.S. and substantially discredit the global geopolitical role being played by the U.S. throughout the entire world.
So, it is. currently an anachronistic situation. Despite knowing what to do. yet well-entrenched special interests preclude rational adjustments, and the military malfunctions and accompanying geopolitical alignments persist, ignoring costly failures along the way.
In effect, experience suggests strongly what should be done, but the political clout does not exist to get the needed job done. Global public opinion is shifting, peace-minded coalitions are forming, and demonstrations globally are building opposition to continuing the war.
Iran
There is a huge U.S./Israel propaganda effort to tie Iran to everything that is regarded as anti-West or anti-Israeli. It has intensified during the Gaza crisis, starting with the October 7 attack by Iran’s supposed proxy Hamas. You notice even the most influential mainstream print media such as The New York Times routinely refers to what Hezbollah or the Houthis do as “Iran-backed.” Such actors are reduced misleadingly to being proxies of Iran. In contrast, references to Ukraine never make explicit the US or NATO backed and materially supported Kyiv government, which is so much more tangible than whatever involvement Iran seems to have with pro-Palestinian initiatives undertaken by non-state actors in the region.
This way of denying agency to pro-Palestinian actors and attributing behavior to Iran is a matter of Israel/US state propaganda trying to promote belligerent attitudes toward Iran to the effect that Iran is our major enemy in the region, while Israel is our loyal friend. At the same time, it suppresses the reality that If Iran is backing countries and political movements, it obscures what the U.S. is doing more overtly and multiple times over throughout the Middle East.
It is largely unknown what Iran has been doing in the region to protect its interests. Without doubt, Iran has strong sympathies with the Palestinian struggle, and is strongly in favor of minimizing US presence and influence.. Those sympathies coincide with its own political self interest, especially its national security, in not being attacked. Additionally, Iran has lots of problems arising from opposition forces within its own society.
But I think dangerous state propaganda is building up this war-mongering hostility toward Iran. It is highly misleading to regard Iran as the real enemy standing behind all anti-Israeli actions in the region. It is important to understand as accurately as possible the complexity and unknown elements present in this crisis situation that contains dangers of wider war in the region and beyond. As far as is publicly known, Iran has had an extremely limited degree of involvement in the direct shaping of the war and Israel’s all-out attack on the civilian population of Gaza.
Hamas and a Second Nakba
While I was special rapporteur for the U.N. on Israeli violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, I had the opportunity to meet and talk in detail with several of the Hamas leaders who are living in Doha and Cairo, as well as in Gaza. In the period between 2010 and 2014, Hamas was publicly and by back channels pushing for a 50-year cease-fire with Israel. It was conditioned on Israel carrying out the unanimous 1967 Security Council mandate in SC Res 242 to withdraw its forces to the pre-war boundaries of “the green line” established after the 1948 War. Hamas had also publicly sought a long-range cease-fire with Israel after its 2006 electoral victory in Gaza of up to 50 years.
Neither Israel nor the U.S. would respond to those diplomatic initiatives. Hamas leader Khalid Machal, the most intellectual of the Hamas leaders with whom I met, told me in some detail that he had personally warned Washington of the tragic consequences for civilians on both sides of the conflict, if it was allowed to go on without a long-term cease-fire sustained and accepted. Machal’s efforts were confirmed by non-Hamas independent sources, which also confirmed that this effort to prevent further violence met with no encouragement in either Tel Aviv or Washington.
entanglement with geopolitical hegemony in relation to international criminal law and structures of global governance.
The South African World Court Case, Pariah State, and Popular Mobilization
The South African initiative is important as a welcome effort to enlist international law and procedures for its assessment and authority in a context of severe alleged criminality. Since the ICJ, the highest tribunal on a supranational level, has responded favorably to South Africa’s highly reasonable and morally imperative
Where can Palestinians go as the population suffers from famine and continued bombing? What is Israel’s goal?
I see the so-called commitment to thinning the Palestinian presence in Gaza as leading deliberately to a functional second Nakba. This is a criminal policy. I don’t know that it has to have a formal name. It is not a policy designed to achieve anything but the decapitation of the Palestinian population, if not in whole, at least in part, explaining the ICJ concern about halting what leaves the strong impression of genocide. Israel is exerting incredible pressure t to move large numbers of Gazans to the Egyptian Sinai, and the Egyptian al-Sisi government has declared that it opposes an influx of Palestinian refugees, yet rumors suggest that elaborate efforts to overcome Egyptian resistance include large-scale debt relief and IMF loans..
This is not a policy. The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are being confronted with a threat of elimination or replacement, which is a characteristic of every settler colonial project. The Israeli campaign after October 7 was not predominantly directed toward Hamas’ terrorism nearly as much as it was focused on the forced evacuation of the Palestinians from Gaza and intent on the related dispossession of most Palestinians from the West Bank, the real prize of this military campaign and the priority of the settler-oriented Netanyahu coalition government..
If Israel really wanted to deal with its security in an effective way, much more efficient and surgical methods would have been relied upon. There was no reason to treat the entire civilian population of Gaza indiscriminately as if it every Gazan was implicated in the Hamas attack, and there was certainly no justification for Israel’s genocidal response. The Israeli motivations seem more related to completing the Zionist Project than to restoring territorial security. All indications are that Israel used the October 7 attack as a pretext for a preexisting master plan to get rid of the Palestinians whose presence blocks the establishment of Greater Israel by finally obtaining sovereign control over the West Bank and at least portions of Gaza.
For a proper perspective we should remember that before October 7, the Netanyahu coalition government that took power at the start of 2023 was known as the most extreme government ever to govern the country since its establishment in 1948. The new Netanyahu government in Israel immediately gave a green light to settler violence in the Occupied West Bank and appointed overtly racist religious leaders to administer those parts of Palestine still occupied. What made it extreme, was its rejection of the pretense of a negotiated end to a struggle between the two peoples that purported to be based on co-existence rather than victory by the stronger side. The UN consensus, with almost universal support, presupposed Palestinian sovereign statehood while many Palestinian intellectuals and activists favored a single possibly confederated secular state guaranteeing ethnic and secular equality.
With the Gaza onslaught ambiguity was removed from Israel’s settler colonial end game , consisting of Israel claiming territorial sovereignty over the whole of the so-called promised land, enabling Greater Israel to come into existence as a Jewish supremacy state in accord with the forthright earlier Basis Law enacted in 2018 long before the Netanyahu coalition and the Hamas attack took place. What the Gaza operation since October is added is a resolve by Israel to defuse the so-called ‘demographic bomb’ by inducing Palestinian death and departure by mounting a sustained campaign of unrelenting state terror, with its heavy reputational costs exacted among the peoples of the world, including even in the long supportive Global West, where in the US and elsewhere pro-Palestinian sentiments become relevant to electoral outcomes scheduled to occur in 2024 and beyond.
The Need for a Different Context
We need to establish a different context than the one that exists now. That means a different outlook on the part of the Western governmental and NGO Jewish networks in the former colonial Europe and settler colonial white governments elsewhere steadfast supporters of Israel even now. This implies a different internal Israeli sense of their own values and security interests, and their own future development. The South African suggestive antecedent shows that it is only when sustained substantive pressure is brought to bear on national governing elites that have gone to these extreme lengths of relying on apartheid or genocide that startling transformative moves away from hegemony in the direction of constitutionally-based coexistence occur.
The lengths that the Israeli government has gone are characteristic of settler colonial states. All of them, including the U.S. and Canada, have acted violently to neutralize or exterminate the resident Indigenous people. That is what this genocidal interlude is all about. It is an effort to realize the goals of maximal versions of Zionism, which can only succeed by eliminating the Palestinians as rightful claimants to live in the coveted land, much less share in its governance. It should not be forgotten that in the weeks before the Hamas attack, including at the U.N., Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was waving a map of “the new Middle East” that had erased the existence of Palestine.
Undoubtedly, one of Hamas’ motivations was to negate the view that Palestine had given up its right to self-determination, and that Palestine could be erased from political consciousness. Recall the old delusional pre-Balfour Zionist slogan: “A people without land for a land without people.” Such utterances of this early Zionist utopian phase literally erased the Palestinians who for generations lived in Palestine as an entitled Indigenous population, and anticipated what became a top priority political project. With the Balfour Declaration of 1917, this settler colonial vision was embodies in the governance of the Palestinians, enjoying the blessings of the leading European colonial powers and the liberal democracies that emerged after the indigenous people of the land no long presented a political obstacle to their replacement.
Given post-colonial realities, the Israeli project is historically discordant than earlier settler colonial undertakings, and hence more extreme. It exposes the reality of Israel’s policies and the inevitable resistance response to Israel as a self-proclaimed racially supremacist state. Israeli state propaganda and management of the public discourse long obscured this maximalist agenda of Zionism and we are yet to know whether this was a deliberate tactic or just reflected the phases of Israel’s development and self-confidence.
This may turn out to be a moment of clarity with respect not only to Gaza, but to the overall prospects for sustainable peace and justice between these two embattled peoples that must reflect the exercise of rights of self-determination and achieve some version of constitutially equal coexistence..
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor is a Geneva-based independent organization with regional offices across the MENA region and Europe
[Prefatory Note: I am re-posting this text because of its relevance to ongoing events and with this new Prefatory Note, partly because illness has kept me from a normal blogging rhythm. The post below is the text of my foreword to Suzanne Hammad’s important book, which explores from an ethnographic perspective, the deep and often hidden roots of resistance to alien occupation, and gives an account based on her lived experience about the specificities of Palestinian resistance in the West Bank town of Bil’in, a place known for public protests against the intrusive presence of Israel’s unlawful separation wall. This tale of resistance is also anguishly relevant to ongoing relevant to the criminal onslaught being carried out by Israel in Gaza, illustrating the extremities of violence relied upon by the Occupying Power to a totally vulnerable entrapped Palestinian population of 2.3 million persons as its regime of apartheid culminates in textbook genocide, a human catastrophe like no other in its transparency accentuated by support received from liberal democracies in the West.]
RAF Foreword to
Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything
Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)
[Prefatory Note: I am re-posting this text because of its relevance to ongoing events and with this new Prefatory Note, partly because illness has kept me from a normal blogging rhythm. The post below is the text of my foreword to Suzanne Hammad’s important book, which explores from an ethnographic perspective, the deep and often hidden roots of resistance to alien occupation, and gives an account based on her lived experience about the specificities of Palestinian resistance in the West Bank town of Bil’in, a place known for public protests against the intrusive presence of Israel’s unlawful separation wall. This tale of resistance is also anguishly relevant to ongoing relevant to the criminal onslaught being carried out by Israel in Gaza, illustrating the extremities of violence relied upon by the Occupying Power to a totally vulnerable entrapped Palestinian population of 2.3 million persons as its regime of apartheid culminates in textbook genocide, a human catastrophe like no other in its transparency accentuated by support received from liberal democracies in the West.]
RAF Foreword to Suzanne Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything
Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)
This fascinating book gives us not only creative ways of grasping the underlying continuities of the Palestinian ordeal but also a truly original conception of why the long arc of resistance and resilience, stretching across time and taking certain distinctive forms, has been sustained for more than a century in the face of assorted trials and tribulations. None of these tests of Palestinian resistance was greater than the double assault on the fundamentals of Palestinian normalcy in the West Bank than that posed by the ever-expanding settlement movement and the connected construction of an encroaching Separation Wall on mostly occupied Palestinian land commencing in 2001.
Suzanne Hammad views the evolving Palestinian reality through an ethnographic lens that complements what the media reports, leaders and intellectuals have to say, and militants achieve by direct confrontation with the daily[MK1] experience of Palestinians living under the heavy boot of Israel’s apartheid regime which pursues with accelerating vigor its own agenda of ethnic cleansing and dispossession of people from their land. To carry out such an exploration led Hammad to conduct her field research for three years in a single West Bank community, the village of Bil’in. The implications of her findings have a broad resonance for Palestinian studies as they illuminate the realities of many similar villages subject to occupation, and indeed inform the situation and consciousness of all Palestinians regardless of whether living under occupation, in Arab refugee camps, or in pre-1967 Israel. In this sense, Bil’in with its population of less than 2000 offers us a rich metaphor by which to decipher the entire Palestinian predicament, and better appreciate the various modes of response that underpin resistance not only to the existential abuses being experienced under occupation but to the foreshadowing of an inevitable liberation that Israel’s state violence is capable of punishing harshly, yet unable so far to destroy. It might even be unable to comprehend such resistance. It is bringing to light these under-appreciated facets of Palestinian sumud or steadfastness that makes this book illuminating reading for all who wish to gain a deeper comprehension of this tragic struggle that remains horizonless as to beginning and end.
Although Bil’in is but one of many West Bank villages, its selection by the author as her main case study is hardly accidental or arbitrary. This village distinguished itself from many other superficially similar villages in at least two important[MK2] ways. First, residents experienced the severe intrusion of the Wall upon its living space, vividly exemplified by the barbed wire, electrified fence passing through Bil’in in ways that cut its residents off from 60% of their agricultural growing and grazing land, as well as the surrounding ‘empty’ areas used for recreation, reflection, and spiritual growth, including gatherings of the whole community during holidays, and even more during the harvesting times, especially of olives. Bil’in’s inhabitants were cut off by a permit system that was required to pass the single gate in the wall that granted them permission to go beyond the mostly residential part of the village, and in some cases, gain access to their own farmland. Secondly, residents reacted through collective anti-Wall protests every Friday for at least 15 years starting in 2005. The continuity and persistence of these protest dramatized Palestinian opposition to the Wall and the resolve of villagers to resist non-violently, yet with courage and resolve. This activism in Bil’in contrasted reliance on peaceful methods with the violent brutality of Israel’s apartheid regime, which imposes Jewish supremacy even in occupied Palestine and in defiance of international humanitarian law. In relation to the Wall, Israeli defiance became overt as Israel rejected the near unanimous (14-1) findings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 2004. Such an authoritative legal endorsement of Bil’in fundamental grievance added legitimacy to the Friday protests by confirming that it was unlawful for Israel to construct a supposed security Wall on Occupied Palestinian Territory, and hence the Wall should be dismantled, and the Palestinians given reparations for the harm sustained. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion was the related idea that Israel’s situating the Wall on Palestinian territory was more a land grab than a genuine security measure.
We ignore the special contribution of Hammad’s inquiry if we are content with this most visible level of interaction, which is to depict both the depth of Palestinian suffering and its transcendence in the lived daily life of the residents of Bil’in. On the one side a deprivation so severe that it prompts inhabitants to pronounce their condition by such sayings as ‘we’re alive only because we are not dead yet” or “if we had the chance we would choose death over living under occupation.” And yet, this is not at all the bleak understanding that Hammad seeks to impart, which is rather a seemingly contradictory sense in Bil’in that our life is not worth living and yet if we will go on living our values, resisting Israel’s encroachments, and transcending their harmful intentions, by nurturing the pride and pleasure associated with sustaining our way of life in the face of hardships, humiliations, and humbling adjustments we will be living the best possible life given the circumstances. To get at this interface between despair and transcendence, Hammad enables us to listen closely to the voices of Bil’in’s people, which dominate the text. This witnessing by Bil’inians decries the pain of profound loss yet seamlessly affirms their pride and meaning of life by maintaining organic connections as best they can with the land and their ancestral homes by doing as much of what they did before the Wall by walking alone or with a friend in the arid wilderness beyond the fertile land or convening the village children and elders to take part in the annual olive harvests that are more than agricultural and livelihood happenings, but are truly sacred rituals that combine work, play, festivals of remembrance, and defiant reaffirmations of a sense of belonging that guns, settlements, and provocations are incapable of damaging, let alone destroying.
Along the way we become privy to many telling details that add credibility to this seeming impossible atmosphere of existential contradiction. For instance, the residents of Bil’in do not waste a moment of regret lamenting their decision to stay in their homes as near as possible to their land on the wrong side of the Wall, come what may in terms of settler violence, encroachment, and Israeli tactics of repression. On the contrary, those Palestinians who departed from their homes and land increased their experience of injustice and suffering associated with Israeli 1948 tactics of dispossession and subsequent reenactments of the nakba; in retrospect, those so coerced, should for their own sake have stayed, resisted, and even accepting death as preferable to displacement, however cruelly induced to attain the Zionist settler colonial goals.
In another telling example, Hammad show us how those Bil’in residents rendered unable to grow their own subsistence food on their diminished farmland, losing the dignity associated with living off the produce yielded from one’s own land as generations before them had done. A further creative initiative undertaken not only for practical reasons, but in the spirit of nonviolent resistance is a food sovereignty movement in Bil’in which seeks to act collectively as a community to maintain local subsistence living standards without outside dependence.
These ways of balancing the ordeal of the occupation against a resolve to live as authentically as possible in traditional ways is what most truly captures the complex truths of life in Bil’in. In other words, the weekly protests that gave Bil’in worldwide prominence are the visible display of stubborn resistance. These marches to the wall opposed by Israel’s active military presence are the front story, but it is the back story of the daily lived life of residents that is the core of a resistance-unto-death that is quietly enacted on an hourly basis by the people of Bil’in. This extended exposure to the voiced experiences of Bil’in’s residents also abandons the conventional reliance of scholarly inquiry on the binary optics of oppressor/victim or victim/resister. This enriches the appreciation that Palestinian life under occupation is not properly interpreted as an either/or reality, but is more truly constituted by a richer interwoven texture of creative adaptation, stubborn revolt, depressing captivity, and liberating defiance.
Suzanne Hammad’s relationship to this account of her experience in Bil’in is at once deeply personal while at the same time managing to uphold the best traditions of academic rigor. She does not obscure her own background whose father left Nablus in the 1967 War for the sake of economic opportunity to start a family outside, taking refuge in an Arab country. She makes no effort to offer a balancing rationale for the Zionist Project or set forth the Israeli security narrative, yet this book came across to me as not only revelatory but entirely trustworthy. Hammad attains her goals by allowing the people of Bil’in to speak about their lives in ways that enlighten readers no matter how familiar they are with the large literature on the Palestine struggle. This study is also a rebuke to those who insist that objectivity requires a total detachment from partisan perspectives by achieving an understanding of Palestinian resistance that has eluded conventional scholarship for more than seven decades.
There are some lingering questions that make me urge Hammad to consider undertaking a sequel.
–Is this attachment to home and place especially strong in Bil’in because the fence/Wall bisects the lived life of the village, or has this sense of loss transcended the physicality of Bil’in to become part of a broader Palestinian imaginary by way of empathy and projection?
–If after a few years, will a renewed immersion in Bil’in after a year or so confirm the persistence of Hammad’s findings, given the heightened Israeli provocations of the extremist leadership that took over the Israel government at the start of 2023, and put the West Bank at the top of its expansionist policy agenda?
–How do the daily lives of city dwellers in Jenin or Nablus exhibit resistance in ways that either resemble or differ from Bil’in and from one other?
–And even more wider afield, is everyday Palestinian resistance, with its pride of place and home attached to sumud unique to the Palestinian reality, or is it paralleled in other national situations of sustained repression of an ethnically distinct people in similar or differing ways? For example, Kashmir, Western Sahara, Catalonia, Tibet, Rohingya (Rakhine State, Myanmar)?
Hammad’s inspiring study has many additional ramifications that invite further study, but as a way of conceiving the Palestinian ordeal this book presents the most convincing, compassionate, and imaginative understanding of just how deep and abiding are the roots of Palestinian resistance. It is a great achievement as well as a loving tribute to the forms of resistance enacted by the village people of Bil’in against the apartheid regime of mighty Israel.
Richard Falk
Rome, July 24, 2023
Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything
Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)
This fascinating book gives us not only creative ways of grasping the underlying continuities of the Palestinian ordeal but also a truly original conception of why the long arc of resistance and resilience, stretching across time and taking certain distinctive forms, has been sustained for more than a century in the face of assorted trials and tribulations. None of these tests of Palestinian resistance was greater than the double assault on the fundamentals of Palestinian normalcy in the West Bank than that posed by the ever-expanding settlement movement and the connected construction of an encroaching Separation Wall on mostly occupied Palestinian land commencing in 2001.
Suzanne Hammad views the evolving Palestinian reality through an ethnographic lens that complements what the media reports, leaders and intellectuals have to say, and militants achieve by direct confrontation with the daily[MK1] experience of Palestinians living under the heavy boot of Israel’s apartheid regime which pursues with accelerating vigor its own agenda of ethnic cleansing and dispossession of people from their land. To carry out such an exploration led Hammad to conduct her field research for three years in a single West Bank community, the village of Bil’in. The implications of her findings have a broad resonance for Palestinian studies as they illuminate the realities of many similar villages subject to occupation, and indeed inform the situation and consciousness of all Palestinians regardless of whether living under occupation, in Arab refugee camps, or in pre-1967 Israel. In this sense, Bil’in with its population of less than 2000 offers us a rich metaphor by which to decipher the entire Palestinian predicament, and better appreciate the various modes of response that underpin resistance not only to the existential abuses being experienced under occupation but to the foreshadowing of an inevitable liberation that Israel’s state violence is capable of punishing harshly, yet unable so far to destroy. It might even be unable to comprehend such resistance. It is bringing to light these under-appreciated facets of Palestinian sumud or steadfastness that makes this book illuminating reading for all who wish to gain a deeper comprehension of this tragic struggle that remains horizonless as to beginning and end.
Although Bil’in is but one of many West Bank villages, its selection by the author as her main case study is hardly accidental or arbitrary. This village distinguished itself from many other superficially similar villages in at least two important[MK2] ways. First, residents experienced the severe intrusion of the Wall upon its living space, vividly exemplified by the barbed wire, electrified fence passing through Bil’in in ways that cut its residents off from 60% of their agricultural growing and grazing land, as well as the surrounding ‘empty’ areas used for recreation, reflection, and spiritual growth, including gatherings of the whole community during holidays, and even more during the harvesting times, especially of olives. Bil’in’s inhabitants were cut off by a permit system that was required to pass the single gate in the wall that granted them permission to go beyond the mostly residential part of the village, and in some cases, gain access to their own farmland. Secondly, residents reacted through collective anti-Wall protests every Friday for at least 15 years starting in 2005. The continuity and persistence of these protest dramatized Palestinian opposition to the Wall and the resolve of villagers to resist non-violently, yet with courage and resolve. This activism in Bil’in contrasted reliance on peaceful methods with the violent brutality of Israel’s apartheid regime, which imposes Jewish supremacy even in occupied Palestine and in defiance of international humanitarian law. In relation to the Wall, Israeli defiance became overt as Israel rejected the near unanimous (14-1) findings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 2004. Such an authoritative legal endorsement of Bil’in fundamental grievance added legitimacy to the Friday protests by confirming that it was unlawful for Israel to construct a supposed security Wall on Occupied Palestinian Territory, and hence the Wall should be dismantled, and the Palestinians given reparations for the harm sustained. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion was the related idea that Israel’s situating the Wall on Palestinian territory was more a land grab than a genuine security measure.
We ignore the special contribution of Hammad’s inquiry if we are content with this most visible level of interaction, which is to depict both the depth of Palestinian suffering and its transcendence in the lived daily life of the residents of Bil’in. On the one side a deprivation so severe that it prompts inhabitants to pronounce their condition by such sayings as ‘we’re alive only because we are not dead yet” or “if we had the chance we would choose death over living under occupation.” And yet, this is not at all the bleak understanding that Hammad seeks to impart, which is rather a seemingly contradictory sense in Bil’in that our life is not worth living and yet if we will go on living our values, resisting Israel’s encroachments, and transcending their harmful intentions, by nurturing the pride and pleasure associated with sustaining our way of life in the face of hardships, humiliations, and humbling adjustments we will be living the best possible life given the circumstances. To get at this interface between despair and transcendence, Hammad enables us to listen closely to the voices of Bil’in’s people, which dominate the text. This witnessing by Bil’inians decries the pain of profound loss yet seamlessly affirms their pride and meaning of life by maintaining organic connections as best they can with the land and their ancestral homes by doing as much of what they did before the Wall by walking alone or with a friend in the arid wilderness beyond the fertile land or convening the village children and elders to take part in the annual olive harvests that are more than agricultural and livelihood happenings, but are truly sacred rituals that combine work, play, festivals of remembrance, and defiant reaffirmations of a sense of belonging that guns, settlements, and provocations are incapable of damaging, let alone destroying.
Along the way we become privy to many telling details that add credibility to this seeming impossible atmosphere of existential contradiction. For instance, the residents of Bil’in do not waste a moment of regret lamenting their decision to stay in their homes as near as possible to their land on the wrong side of the Wall, come what may in terms of settler violence, encroachment, and Israeli tactics of repression. On the contrary, those Palestinians who departed from their homes and land increased their experience of injustice and suffering associated with Israeli 1948 tactics of dispossession and subsequent reenactments of the nakba; in retrospect, those so coerced, should for their own sake have stayed, resisted, and even accepting death as preferable to displacement, however cruelly induced to attain the Zionist settler colonial goals.
In another telling example, Hammad show us how those Bil’in residents rendered unable to grow their own subsistence food on their diminished farmland, losing the dignity associated with living off the produce yielded from one’s own land as generations before them had done. A further creative initiative undertaken not only for practical reasons, but in the spirit of nonviolent resistance is a food sovereignty movement in Bil’in which seeks to act collectively as a community to maintain local subsistence living standards without outside dependence.
These ways of balancing the ordeal of the occupation against a resolve to live as authentically as possible in traditional ways is what most truly captures the complex truths of life in Bil’in. In other words, the weekly protests that gave Bil’in worldwide prominence are the visible display of stubborn resistance. These marches to the wall opposed by Israel’s active military presence are the front story, but it is the back story of the daily lived life of residents that is the core of a resistance-unto-death that is quietly enacted on an hourly basis by the people of Bil’in. This extended exposure to the voiced experiences of Bil’in’s residents also abandons the conventional reliance of scholarly inquiry on the binary optics of oppressor/victim or victim/resister. This enriches the appreciation that Palestinian life under occupation is not properly interpreted as an either/or reality, but is more truly constituted by a richer interwoven texture of creative adaptation, stubborn revolt, depressing captivity, and liberating defiance.
Suzanne Hammad’s relationship to this account of her experience in Bil’in is at once deeply personal while at the same time managing to uphold the best traditions of academic rigor. She does not obscure her own background whose father left Nablus in the 1967 War for the sake of economic opportunity to start a family outside, taking refuge in an Arab country. She makes no effort to offer a balancing rationale for the Zionist Project or set forth the Israeli security narrative, yet this book came across to me as not only revelatory but entirely trustworthy. Hammad attains her goals by allowing the people of Bil’in to speak about their lives in ways that enlighten readers no matter how familiar they are with the large literature on the Palestine struggle. This study is also a rebuke to those who insist that objectivity requires a total detachment from partisan perspectives by achieving an understanding of Palestinian resistance that has eluded conventional scholarship for more than seven decades.
There are some lingering questions that make me urge Hammad to consider undertaking a sequel.
–Is this attachment to home and place especially strong in Bil’in because the fence/Wall bisects the lived life of the village, or has this sense of loss transcended the physicality of Bil’in to become part of a broader Palestinian imaginary by way of empathy and projection?
–If after a few years, will a renewed immersion in Bil’in after a year or so confirm the persistence of Hammad’s findings, given the heightened Israeli provocations of the extremist leadership that took over the Israel government at the start of 2023, and put the West Bank at the top of its expansionist policy agenda?
–How do the daily lives of city dwellers in Jenin or Nablus exhibit resistance in ways that either resemble or differ from Bil’in and from one other?
–And even more wider afield, is everyday Palestinian resistance, with its pride of place and home attached to sumud unique to the Palestinian reality, or is it paralleled in other national situations of sustained repression of an ethnically distinct people in similar or differing ways? For example, Kashmir, Western Sahara, Catalonia, Tibet, Rohingya (Rakhine State, Myanmar)?
Hammad’s inspiring study has many additional ramifications that invite further study, but as a way of conceiving the Palestinian ordeal this book presents the most convincing, compassionate, and imaginative understanding of just how deep and abiding are the roots of Palestinian resistance. It is a great achievement as well as a loving tribute to the forms of resistance enacted by the village people of Bil’in against the apartheid regime of mighty Israel.
[Prefatory Note: I wanted to share a foreword that I wrote to an exceptional ethnographic study of everyday resistance by residents of the Palestinian village of Bil’in, quite near Ramallah, based on the Suzanne Hammad three years of residence and informed observation. It enriches our understanding of core forms of resistance embedded in home and land. It offers a parallel to the commin perception of resistance as distinct protest activity, both violent and non-violent, for which Bil’in was previously international known as a result of its weekly protests that were provoked by the intrusive construction of the Israeli separation wall. This book written well before October 2023 when the genocidal onslaught by Israel on Gaza was published in 2023 by Rowman & Littlefield, and available in a Kindle edition, unfortunately with a high price-tag.]
Suzanne Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything
Starts and Ends with the Land, Foreword by Richard Falk, 2023.
This fascinating book gives us not only creative ways of grasping the underlying continuities of the Palestinian ordeal but also a truly original conception of why the long arc of resistance and resilience, stretching across time and taking certain distinctive forms, has been sustained for more than a century in the face of assorted trials and tribulations. None of these tests of Palestinian resistance was greater than the double assault on the fundamentals of Palestinian normalcy in the West Bank than that posed by the ever-expanding settlement movement and the connected construction of an encroaching Separation Wall on mostly occupied Palestinian land commencing in 2001.
Suzanne Hammad views the evolving Palestinian reality through an ethnographic lens that complements what the media reports, leaders and intellectuals have to say, and militants achieve by direct confrontation with the daily experience of Palestinians living under the heavy boot of Israel’s apartheid regime which pursues with accelerating vigor its own agenda of ethnic cleansing and dispossession of people from their land. To carry out such an exploration led Hammad to conduct her field research for three years in a single West Bank community, the village of Bil’in. The implications of her findings have a broad resonance for Palestinian studies as they illuminate the realities of many similar villages subject to occupation, and indeed inform the situation and consciousness of all Palestinians regardless of whether living under occupation, in Arab refugee camps, or in pre-1967 Israel. In this sense, Bil’in with its population of less than 2000 offers us a rich metaphor by which to decipher the entire Palestinian predicament, and better appreciate the various modes of response that underpin resistance not only to the existential abuses being experienced under occupation but to the foreshadowing of an inevitable liberation that Israel’s state violence is capable of punishing harshly, yet unable so far to destroy. It might even be unable to comprehend such resistance. It is bringing to light these under-appreciated facets of Palestinian sumud or steadfastness that makes this book illuminating reading for all who wish to gain a deeper comprehension of this tragic struggle that remains horizonless as to beginning and end.
Although Bil’in is but one of many West Bank villages, its selection by the author as her main case study is hardly accidental or arbitrary. This village distinguished itself from many other superficially similar villages in at least two important ways. First, residents experienced the severe intrusion of the Wall upon its living space, vividly exemplified by the barbed wire, electrified fence passing through Bil’in in ways that cut its residents off from 60% of their agricultural growing and grazing land, as well as the surrounding ‘empty’ areas used for recreation, reflection, and spiritual growth, including gatherings of the whole community during holidays, and even more during the harvesting times, especially of olives. Bil’in’s inhabitants were cut off by a permit system that was required to pass the single gate in the wall that granted them permission to go beyond the mostly residential part of the village, and in some cases, gain access to their own farmland. Secondly, residents reacted through collective anti-Wall protests every Friday for at least 15 years starting in 2005. The continuity and persistence of these protest dramatized Palestinian opposition to the Wall and the resolve of villagers to resist non-violently, yet with courage and resolve. This activism in Bil’in contrasted reliance on peaceful methods with the violent brutality of Israel’s apartheid regime, which imposes Jewish supremacy even in occupied Palestine and in defiance of international humanitarian law. In relation to the Wall, Israeli defiance became overt as Israel rejected the near unanimous (14-1) findings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 2004. Such an authoritative legal endorsement of Bil’in fundamental grievance added legitimacy to the Friday protests by confirming that it was unlawful for Israel to construct a supposed security Wall on Occupied Palestinian Territory, and hence the Wall should be dismantled, and the Palestinians given reparations for the harm sustained. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion was the related idea that Israel’s situating the Wall on Palestinian territory was more a land grab than a genuine security measure.
We ignore the special contribution of Hammad’s inquiry if we are content with this most visible level of interaction, which is to depict both the depth of Palestinian suffering and its transcendence in the lived daily life of the residents of Bil’in. On the one side a deprivation so severe that it prompts inhabitants to pronounce their condition by such sayings as ‘we’re alive only because we are not dead yet” or “if we had the chance we would choose death over living under occupation.” And yet, this is not at all the bleak understanding that Hammad seeks to impart, which is rather a seemingly contradictory sense in Bil’in that our life is not worth living and yet if we will go on living our values, resisting Israel’s encroachments, and transcending their harmful intentions, by nurturing the pride and pleasure associated with sustaining our way of life in the face of hardships, humiliations, and humbling adjustments we will be living the best possible life given the circumstances. To get at this interface between despair and transcendence, Hammad enables us to listen closely to the voices of Bil’in’s people, which dominate the text. This witnessing by Bil’inians decries the pain of profound loss yet seamlessly affirms their pride and meaning of life by maintaining organic connections as best they can with the land and their ancestral homes by doing as much of what they did before the Wall by walking alone or with a friend in the arid wilderness beyond the fertile land or convening the village children and elders to take part in the annual olive harvests that are more than agricultural and livelihood happenings, but are truly sacred rituals that combine work, play, festivals of remembrance, and defiant reaffirmations of a sense of belonging that guns, settlements, and provocations are incapable of damaging, let alone destroying.
Along the way we become privy to many telling details that add credibility to this seeming impossible atmosphere of existential contradiction. For instance, the residents of Bil’in do not waste a moment of regret lamenting their decision to stay in their homes as near as possible to their land on the wrong side of the Wall, come what may in terms of settler violence, encroachment, and Israeli tactics of repression. On the contrary, those Palestinians who departed from their homes and land increased their experience of injustice and suffering associated with Israeli 1948 tactics of dispossession and subsequent reenactments of the nakba; in retrospect, those so coerced, should for their own sake have stayed, resisted, and even accepting death as preferable to displacement, however cruelly induced to attain the Zionist settler colonial goals.
In another telling example, Hammad show us how those Bil’in residents rendered unable to grow their own subsistence food on their diminished farmland, losing the dignity associated with living off the produce yielded from one’s own land as generations before them had done. A further creative initiative undertaken not only for practical reasons, but in the spirit of nonviolent resistance is a food sovereignty movement in Bil’in which seeks to act collectively as a community to maintain local subsistence living standards without outside dependence.
These ways of balancing the ordeal of the occupation against a resolve to live as authentically as possible in traditional ways is what most truly captures the complex truths of life in Bil’in. In other words, the weekly protests that gave Bil’in worldwide prominence are the visible display of stubborn resistance. These marches to the wall opposed by Israel’s active military presence are the front story, but it is the back story of the daily lived life of residents that is the core of a resistance-unto-death that is quietly enacted on an hourly basis by the people of Bil’in. This extended exposure to the voiced experiences of Bil’in’s residents also abandons the conventional reliance of scholarly inquiry on the binary optics of oppressor/victim or victim/resister. This enriches the appreciation that Palestinian life under occupation is not properly interpreted as an either/or reality, but is more truly constituted by a richer interwoven texture of creative adaptation, stubborn revolt, depressing captivity, and liberating defiance.
Suzanne Hammad’s relationship to this account of her experience in Bil’in is at once deeply personal while at the same time managing to uphold the best traditions of academic rigor. She does not obscure her own background whose father left Nablus in the 1967 War for the sake of economic opportunity to start a family outside, taking refuge in an Arab country. She makes no effort to offer a balancing rationale for the Zionist Project or set forth the Israeli security narrative, yet this book came across to me as not only revelatory but entirely trustworthy. Hammad attains her goals by allowing the people of Bil’in to speak about their lives in ways that enlighten readers no matter how familiar they are with the large literature on the Palestine struggle. This study is also a rebuke to those who insist that objectivity requires a total detachment from partisan perspectives by achieving an understanding of Palestinian resistance that has eluded conventional scholarship for more than seven decades.
There are some lingering questions that make me urge Hammad to consider undertaking a sequel.
–Is this attachment to home and place especially strong in Bil’in because the fence/Wall bisects the lived life of the village, or has this sense of loss transcended the physicality of Bil’in to become part of a broader Palestinian imaginary by way of empathy and projection?
–If after a few years, will a renewed immersion in Bil’in after a year or so confirm the persistence of Hammad’s findings, given the heightened Israeli provocations of the extremist leadership that took over the Israel government at the start of 2023, and put the West Bank at the top of its expansionist policy agenda?
–How do the daily lives of city dwellers in Jenin or Nablus exhibit resistance in ways that either resemble or differ from Bil’in and from one other?
–And even more wider afield, is everyday Palestinian resistance, with its pride of place and home attached to sumud unique to the Palestinian reality, or is it paralleled in other national situations of sustained repression of an ethnically distinct people in similar or differing ways? For example, Kashmir, Western Sahara, Catalonia, Tibet, Rohingya (Rakhine State, Myanmar)?
Hammad’s inspiring study has many additional ramifications that invite further study, but as a way of conceiving the Palestinian ordeal this book presents the most convincing, compassionate, and imaginative understanding of just how deep and abiding are the roots of Palestinian resistance. It is a great achievement as well as a loving tribute to the forms of resistance enacted by the village people of Bil’in against the apartheid regime of mighty Israel.
An interview given on Jan 27 to Middle East Eye during the Emergency London Conference to stop genocide in Gaza, held a day after the ICJ grant of Provisional Measures requested by South Africa. The prospect of non-compliance by Israel and its enablers, shifts responsibility to civil society to overcome the implementation crisis through global solidarity activism. Together with praise and assessment for the South African initiative, the role of civil society was a major theme of the conference.
[Prefatory Note: Program of London Conference of Conscience and Concern to Stop Genocide held on January 27, and live streamed and recorded for later distribution; it comes the day after the historic ruling by the ICJ on South Africa’s request for Provisional Measures to stop genocide.]
EMERGENCY LONDON CONFERENCE OF GLOBAL INTELLECTUALS OF CON-SCIENCE ON JANUARY 27, 2024
Opening Session
09.30-10.30
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Türkiye; Author of Strategic Depth
Richard Falk, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967 (2008-2014), Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton University, Chair of Global Law, at Queen Mary University of London, UK, Department of Law
Coffee Break: 10.30-11.00
Session One: Realities and Prospects. 11.00 -12.30
Depicting the Ordeal: Including Clear and Present Dangers of Present Stalemate—from forced dis-placement across borders—ethnic cleansing, prolonging genocide
Moderator:Hilal Elver, Professor of International Law, UN Special Rapporteur on Right to Food (2014-2020), Türkiye
2. Avi Shlaim, Historian; Author of The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, Oxford,UK / Israel
3. Mustafa Barghouti, Physician, Human Rights Activist, Political Leader, West Bank, Palestine,
Coffee Break: 12.30-13.00
Session Two: Towards Action 13.00-14.30
Realistic commitments to action beyond words, what civil society can do to uphold international law and findings within UN, and on its own to mount pressures to push Israel to end its Gaza onsla-ught by immediate ceasefire, emergency relief and reconstruction campaign, and political admi-nistration of Gaza and restraint of settler violence
Moderator:Mustafa Ceric, Grand Mufti Emeritus of Bosnia, President of the World Bosniak Congress Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ramzy Baroud, Author, Academic, Editor of The Palestine Chronicle, Palestine/ USA
Phyllis Bennis, Journalist, Author and Social Activist, Institute of Policy Studies, Australia;
3. Walden Bello, Philippines, Professor, Activist, and Politician
4. Usman Bugaje, Professor, Former Chair, House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Nigeria’s House of Representatives, Nigeria
5. John Whitbeck, International Lawyer and Author, Paris
( Maybe Zoom: Tu Weiming, Member of UN Group of Eminent Persons for the Dialogue Among Civilizations, Professor Emeritus, Harvard University, USA; Founding Director of the Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies, Peking University, China)
Lunch: 14.30-15.30
Session Three: Empowering of the UN; Peoples Tribunal of Conscience 15.30-17.00
An exploration of more ambitious action projects that seek to create a greater awareness of full sco-pe of Gaza Criminality, and UN reforms that could do more to prevent any future recurrence of ge-nocide or other severe international crimes.
Moderator: Avery F. Gordon, Professor Emerita University of California Santa Barbara, USA;
1. Richard Falk
2. Penny Green, Professor of Law and Globalization, Director, International State Crime Initiative Queen Mary University of London.
3. Maung Zarni, Human Rights Activist, Non-resident Fellow, (Genocide) Documentation Center – Cambodia
4. Jan Oberg, Chairman of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, Lund, Sweden.
5. Asli Bali (Video message) Professor of Law, Yale University, School of Law.
Coffee Break: 17.00-17.30
Closing Session / Press Conference : 17.30
Moderator: Victoria Brittain, Former Associate Foreign Editor of the Guardian, Part of Founding Committee of Palestine Festival of Literature, for first 11 years organiser of the Palestine Book Awards, UK
Welcome, everyone. My name is Dr. Piers Robinson. I’m the research director for the International Center for 9/11 Justice. Today we are holding a symposium on geopolitics and the war on Palestine, titled Genocide and Empire.
Now, IC911, for those of you who aren’t familiar with this organization, is a nonprofit organization which has been set up in order to research and investigate issues surrounding 9/11—the 9/11 event. As you can see on the screen, we are engaged in a variety of activities, including public education—getting information out about what happened on 9/11 in a recent film, Peace, War and 9/11, on the late Graeme MacQueen, which people can view for free.
We’re also engaged in activism—supporting, for example, the Campbell family in their quest to gain a new inquest into the death of Geoff Campbell on 9/11.
And we’re also involved in facilitating and encouraging research into 9/11-related issues.
And we have The Journal of 9/11 Studies, hosted at IC911.
Now, one of our remits is to understand 9/11 better, to educate people about what happened on 9/11, but also to look at the consequences of 9/11. And, obviously, 9/11 itself was a key initiating point for a series of regime-change wars in the international system—in the Middle East primarily.
And you can see there on the slide—just as a little reminder here of the relevance of 9/11 to what we’re seeing today in the Middle East, in Israel and Gaza—these are two documents produced by or released by the Chilcot Inquiry in the UK and the communications between Tony Blair and President George Bush.
At the top there you can see discussion about Syria and Iran and a discussion about when it is optimum to engage each of these countries militarily. The quote there is: Well, if we’re going to topple Sudan, if that’s our priority, then we better do that with Syria and Iran in favor or acquiescing, rather than hitting all three at once.
And what you see there, obviously, is a discussion about the regime-change wars, which we know were being planned prior to 9/11 and which are documented in the Chilcot Inquiry and from other people who’ve spoken out about that. This was the planning that was going on in the immediate aftermath of 9/11—within weeks of that.
You can see below there’s another truth quote from the same document: Tony Blair talking about the Middle East being set for catastrophe—again, immediately in the aftermath of 9/11.
And this really goes to highlight the importance of 9/11, I think, in terms of setting the scene for what we’re seeing now in the Middle East. The conflict and the violence and the potential for escalation we have at the moment is very much part of events which were set in a process, which were set in train, around 9/11.
So, this is highly relevant for us as an organization to be looking at. We want to look at 9/11. We want to look at the consequences and also help people understand events today through an understanding of 9/11.
And so, this is what we have today. Today we’ve brought together a fantastic lineup of experts to speak about the current situation between Palestine and Israel and the situation in the Middle East.
We have Professor Richard Falk, who is an expert on international legal matters. He was UN rapporteur for Palestine in the United Nations.
We will also have Atif Kubursi, who’s a professor of economics—an emeritus professor from McMaster University. [Atif] also worked in the United Nations. He’s going to be talking through some of the resource and economic components of the conflict we see in the Middle East.
We have Kevin Ryan, who is a board member of IC911. He’s a 9/11 whistleblower and currently editor of the Journal of 9/11 Studies. He’s going to be talking about structural deep events and state crimes against democracy.
We’re also going to have Dr. Aaron Good, who runs the American Exceptionpodcast. His thesis, his PhD, was on American Exception, Hegemony and the Tripartite State. And he’s going to be talking about understanding October 7 and the current situation in the Middle East, as it potentially is a deep state event.
And finally, we will have Vanessa Beeley, an independent journalist who has deep and rich expertise on the Middle East. She’ll be talking about the broader geopolitical picture and where things are going in the Middle East.
Now I shall turn straight to Professor Richard Falk, who is going to be talking to us about genocide and self-defense under international law. As I mentioned before, Richard is a renowned international expert, the rapporteur on the Palestine case for the United Nations, and he’s going to talk to us about the question of genocide, what we’re seeing at the moment, the question of self-defense, and where we’re going in terms of the International Court of Justice and the South African attempts.
So, Richard. . .
Professor Richard Falk:
Thank you, Piers. I’m very honored and pleased to be part of this panel, and I think it’s very crucial to link the genocidal events in Gaza—and in a sense in all of occupied Palestine—to the configurations of empire in the post-9/11, post-Cold War international environment. And not forgetting the Ukraine dimension while we focus on the Middle East.
The Hamas attack on October 7 is itself surrounded by suspicious circumstances of Israeli foreknowledge—and therefore allowing these horrific events to unfold and being very slow to respond to the actuality of the attack, and the quickness with which it converted a limited instance of Palestinian resistance under Hamas’ leadership into the pretext for launching this vengeful and genocidal onslaught on the civilian population of Gaza.
That’s a shocking sequence of events on its own. And then, when you consider the magnitude of the violence that’s been inflicted on Gaza and the population—the whole of the population—you have to understand that this is a horrific, transparent, and, in a way, original confrontation with the crime of crimes: genocide.
In the past, genocides have been known mainly in retrospect and indirectly. We have not had the experience unfolding before our eyes on nightly television. The imagery of bombing hospitals and refugee camps, of babies being buried in mass graves, is something grotesque that not only is occurring as a result of Israeli actions, but enjoys the complicity of important countries in what I would call the settler colonial states of the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, plus the main members of NATO, which include Germany, the UK, and France, who are also colonial powers. And so, this has to be seen as part of the post -colonial effort by the global white West to maintain hegemonic control over the whole world system.
If we look at the casualties and the damage that has been done in Gaza up to this point, in the three months that these horrendous events have unfolded, and multiply them proportionately to the population of a country like the United States, which has supported, materially and diplomatically, at every stage so far, the occurrence of such violence, we would multiply the death totals of over 20,000 by 175 to take proportional account of the relative populations. That’s a shocking total and [is] predominantly civilians, and seemingly having only a marginal connection with Israeli security.
If Israeli security was the dominant motive, they would do differently what might prevent some similar act of resistance to take place in the future. They would, first of all, correct the bureaucratic process that led to the so-called “security lapse.” That would probably be sufficient to reestablish their security. They would also try to accommodate the needs of the people of Gaza by lifting the fifteen-year-old blockade and make any acts of resistance seem less like a jail breakout than an isolated instance of violence.
When we look at the Genocide Convention itself, we see that both Israel and the United States and the leading NATO members and those settler colonial states are all parties to that convention, which was viewed as a key element in creating a kind of wall against a repetition of what happened in the Holocaust. And what we’ve seen, not only in Gaza now but elsewhere, in Rwanda, in Myanmar, is an inadequate capacity to implement the intention of the Genocide Convention to prevent its recurrence.
But what is clear is that the facts of bombing so indiscriminately and so persistently and disproportionately, in opposition to international humanitarian law, the civilian population of 2.3 million Gazans creates the factual foundation of the genocidal allegation. That factual allegation is reinforced by the statements of the highest Israeli leaders—Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Herzog, and Minister of Defense Yoav Galant.
All of them have articulated views about the total decimation and devastation of Gaza, the destruction of up to 80% of the housing in northern Gaza, which was part of a deliberate policy of forced evacuation with the evident intention of ethnic cleansing. In other words, all the evidence we have points to the fact that the October 7 Hamas attack served as a pretext for the completion of the Zionist project by the dispossession by Israelis of Palestinians living not only in Gaza, but [also] in the West Bank, which has experienced unrestricted settler violence in this period and has also suffered unusually severe casualties during this time.
So, what we have is a transparently evident instance of genocide that has been defended very weakly and without substantive argument as a case of self-defense. We know from international law that self-defense does not allow the state that claims it to engage in disproportionate and unlimited violence or to commit what would otherwise be crimes under the cover of claiming self-defense.
And, in this instance, the claim of self-defense is particularly weak, because Gaza and the West Bank are occupied territories under the administrative responsibility of Israel as the occupying power since 1967. Israel has not implemented the unanimous Security Council Resolution 242 back in 1967, which called upon it to withdraw to the ’67 borders, and instead has used that period to engage in unlawful territorial encroachments on the occupied territory of the West Bank through its extensive settlement network, which has 650,000 Israelis living there and is really the death warrant of any realistic hope that a two-state solution could be achieved in light of this kind of territorial ambitious expansionism.
So, it’s questionable under any circumstances that a claim of self-defense is appropriate in an occupied territory governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention, because, in effect, self-defense is only tactically available if the combatants are both in some sense political actors of an international status.
You cannot defend yourself against part of what you are administering within your own territory. You can make reasonable claims to establish security or to reestablish security. But, as I’ve suggested, Israel has not tried to do that.
As shocking as these genocidal crimes have been, I find as disturbing the complicity of these countries in the world that have held themselves before international public opinion as models of democracy, as champions of human rights, as supporters of the rule of law. For the United States to undermine its own reputation by supporting this sort of transparent genocide should be shocking to the peoples of the world—and has been, if one takes account of the popular demonstrations all over the world.
These acts of complicity go against the obligations of the Genocide Convention, which require parties to the convention, all of which encompass both Israel and the US as well as the members of NATO and the settler colonial states. All of them are expected, as a matter of law, to take what action is reasonably possible in order to prevent or disrupt the continuation of genocide. They are all perpetrating crimes as an accessory to genocide.
It is an act of shame that they have done little to distance themselves or to actively oppose the continuation of these developments and to use their leverage at the United Nations to disempower the Security Council that sought, by an overwhelming vote of 14-to-1, to establish a ceasefire weeks ago.
This is not only failing to prevent genocide, it’s a matter of facilitating genocide. That should be taken into our political imagination and our moral imagination when we think about accountability for the crimes that are being committed.
South Africa has recently initiated, under Article 3 of the Genocide Convention, its right as a party to the convention to call for the International Court of Justice to impose provisional measures of a character that would instruct Israel, as a matter of International Court of Justice authority, to immediately cease any kind of violent activity that is part of the crime that is being committed and would also consider whether Hamas should fall within the scope of such a crime.
This is a serious challenge both to the complicit countries to stand aside if the rulings that are expected in the coming weeks of the World Court do uphold the South African application that is calling for these immediate measures as a prelude to a decision on whether the allegation of genocide, which is contained in a 94-page document that goes through, in agonizing detail, the facts of genocide that have transpired in this period, starting with the day after October 7.
There is also the question of who will endorse this South African initiative. Turkey, so far, is the only NATO member that has endorsed it. Jordan and Malaysia have joined in that endorsement. And we notice that none of the European colonial powers and none of the settler colonial states have seen fit to uphold a judicial determination of whether action should be taken to prevent this genocide from going on.
So, what is presented to the world is a crisis of implementation and accountability. There’s no doubt that a crime of a high magnitude is being committed and indeed is virtually confessed to be committed, despite Israel’s record of defiance of international law throughout its occupation and its allegations that any criticism, wherever it emanates from, is an instance of antisemitism.
It called the International Criminal Court’s decision to investigate crimes by Israel alleged by Palestine subsequent to 2014, before these recent events—Prime Minister Netanyahu reacted by saying, “This is pure antisemitism,” as if the respected international institution is motivated by such base intentions.
Similarly, they’ve attacked the South African initiative as a blood libel against the Jewish people.
A blood libel was the kind of anti-Jewish allegation made in the early Christian period—that the Jews were guilty of murdering Christian babies. And it was genuine antisemitism of an extreme sort to make these false allegations.
But to contradict what we see before our eyes and call that a blood libel is itself something that suggests an unwillingness of Israel to accept any authority that challenges its policies, however unlawful and criminal.
And it has done that throughout the occupation. It has made life miserable for people like me, who acted as special rapporteurs that were expected to report as honestly as we could on violations of human rights associated with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.
So, we have a situation where the prospects of implementing a favorable International Court of Justice decision against Israel will depend on the willingness of the Security Council to use its authority and to take the steps necessary to implement that decision.
And once again that will hinge on whether the permanent five members of the Security Council will either abstain or at least and thereby suspend their right of veto or actually vote in favor of implementing the findings and the orders of the International Court of Justice.
In the longer run, there seems to be a need for some kind of accountability procedure to address these crimes—both the crime of genocide as perpetrated by Israel and the crimes of complicity as led by the US and supported in various ways by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
So this is a crisis of not only conscience but of law and the protection of vulnerable people in a world that is beset by a variety of challenges, including the ongoing Ukraine War, and is seeking a new kind of managing the very power and security that doesn’t depend on the unipolar imperial authority that has been exercised by the United States since the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union. A new phase of international relations will emerge out of this crisis.
In bringing my remarks to a close, I would also say there’s a great danger that Israel will seek to widen the war in the region, because it will be cornered politically, which is beginning to be evident in some of the violence beyond the borders of Gaza itself.
And it’s cornered because it can neither prevail and convincingly declare some kind of victory that is credible nor can it afford to lose, given the investment it’s made in terms of its own law, the lives of Israeli soldiers and citizens, and the damage it’s done to its global reputation.
It’s no longer a legitimate state after this form of sustained behavior. It is condemned almost universally. The peoples of the governments that are condemning it are seeking to exert pressure for some sort of implementation. So, there is this moment of crisis and appeal to the peoples of the global West to rise in a way that exerts pressure on their own governments to take international law seriously, to promote, at this late toxic stage, justice for the Palestinian people.
Let me stop there.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you, Richard, for that forensic and unequivocal assessment of what is happening at the moment in relation to the question of genocide. We’ll also have many questions at the end in the panel discussion. It just strikes me that the weaponization of the term “antisemitism” I think is wearing thin given what we’re seeing in the Middle East at the moment.
That was a fantastic presentation. Before we turn to Atif Kubursi—for me to introduce him—I just want to send a quick reminder. People can ask questions for the panelists, and we will try to include some questions in the panel discussion at the end. And there’s an email link on the website showing where you can send the questions to. So please do feel free to send questions and we’ll try to field some of them at the end.
Oil, Canals and Trade Routes: Economic Factors Underlying the Ongoing Genocide
Now, we turn to Professor Atif Kubursi, who is emeritus McMaster professor and an expert on economics.
We’ve had an extremely detailed and careful analysis of the legal situation, and Atif is going to talk to us about the economic underbelly of this conflict, trying to understand what we’re seeing at the moment in terms of questions of resources and so on.
To keep on time, I won’t go into too long an introduction to Atif. He’s a very renowned international expert in economics. As I said before, he’s worked in a United Nations capacity.
He has great expertise. We look forward to what you have to tell us now, Atif, about the economics of the situation.
Atif.
Professor Atif Kubursi:
Thank you very much, Piers, for your kind introduction. I’m delighted to be part of this distinguished panel here, and I see that my presentation is quite complimentary to what Professor Falk had presented.
The issue here is that the events that happened on October 7 and the justification and the reactions call into question some of these events in a way that asks why they happened—why did they happen the way they did. How a country that has such sophisticated, advanced technology and that is very concerned about security would allow something like this to happen. And for the reaction to take so long to come forward. And then the scale of the reaction and the onslaught—the incredible toll of the civilians—particularly children and women and all people.
The issue, as Professor Falk mentioned, is part of the Zionist attempt to try, as much as possible, to complete, so to speak, the Greater Israel project and to expand and to grab more land. And then the declared objective is that we have to dismantle Hamas for the sake of the security of Israel and we have to liberate the hostages and we have to make sure that no future scale attempt of this sort would ever happen.
These are the declared objectives. But then, how would you explain this incredible carpet bombing, this huge reaction, this heavy toll, the likes of which we have never seen. Even Dresden did not suffer what Gaza has suffered. And the number of deaths and wounded. And the scale of transferring people from one side to the other is unbelievable.
But what’s more important are the undeclared objectives. What seems to be the case here is that there is an attempt to make Gaza unlivable. That there is really a way, in which Professor Mearsheimer, on December 12, has claimed that the objective here is to flatten, erase, destroy, make Gaza unlivable, transfer the population of Gaza, empty Gaza of its people.
But why would Israel seek this type of objective? The story here is that it’s only presented as if it’s part of that Greater Israel—the Zionist project that would not be completed until Israel is from the Euphrates to the Nile, as it has been expressed in many areas.
But the story is, there are a number of very credible and very substantive reasons that would make this project to be also in pursuit of the colonial economic advantages. I’m going to mention three major objectives and three major projects that would point out that Israel is seeking some economic gains here. The colonial advantage that has always been part of any colonial project is at play here.
The first and foremost objective is the control of gas in—where you see in the map—the Levant Basin. This Levant Basin is now home to about 122 trillion cubic feet of gas. And this is from the US Geological Survey. This has become extremely valuable, particularly in the aftermath of the destruction of Nord Stream 2 and the withdrawal of any supply coming from Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine-Russian War.
And this area has also about 1.7 billion barrels of oil. It’s a shared resource. It’s shared between, as you can see, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus. And in this respect, one would have expected that this shared resource would be one that would be managed collectively and in the interest of the collective number of countries that are riparian to this.
There are some very important characteristics about gas and oil and about energy that are really quite serious and fundamental. First and foremost, oil [and] gas as fossil fuels are nonrenewable, which means that any time you exploit them today you’re denying, forfeiting the right of future generations to exploit them.
The second, that because they are shared resources, it means, given that they are finite, nonrenewable, that if one party exploits this resource, less is available for the rest of us. And there is no question about it. This seems to be at play here, as I will show what happened with Israel exploiting the Meged oil fields in Area C in the West Bank.
And the other thing is that it’s a fugitive type of resource. Especially gas. It doesn’t stay in one place. The other thing: Being basically underwater, there is no guarantee that there is any consistency of the existence of the resource in terms of the political borders. It straddles all these borders, and they are shared things, in the sense that there was an agreement between Israel and Lebanon about the Karish and Qanaa. And many people felt that this was not really a very good agreement, because there is no way Lebanon, which would become able to produce and lift some of this gas and oil in five years’ time, would find anything. Because if these are really shared resources and Israel is using it now, by the time the Lebanese are able to lift, there would be probably nothing left. There’s no way you can prevent a party to use its only share.
The United States has the same similar situation in Oklahoma and Texas, where oil was found under the ground of many farmers and [other] parties. What they really found to be important—and this really was according to a great economist, Ronald Koz, who got Nobel Prize for it—is that you have to unitize. Unitize: By this we mean that no party is allowed to lift or to use this resource without the acquiescence and sharing with the rest.
And what would you do is you allow one party, on behalf of the collective, to exploit it in the most efficient way. Because if each one were to pierce a hole and lift it, it would dissipate the natural flow and become extremely expensive to do that. There would be basic, major reasons for conflict. Unitization would mean that it would be exploited on behalf of all. All the resources are now exploited by one party and representing everybody, and it would exploit it in the most efficient way. It would lift all the resource and sell it and put it in a kitty, in an escrow fund that would be divvied up among the different parties.
This is not what Israel is doing. Israel is trying to basically and fundamentally make sure that the Lebanese are not getting their fair share and making sure that Gaza is not getting any of its share.
And this is exactly what we see here. It is a situation in which Gaza . . . there are [see map] Marine 1 and Marine 2, and there is an incredible amount of gas, and it’s about only 20 nautical miles from Gaza. Also, in the Oslo II Accord, the Palestinians were given the right to exploit in their economic zone all the way, as you see in this picture, to the very end of that triangle. That should really be the amount that the Palestinians would use.
There were negotiations once it was discovered in 1999. The Ehud Baruch government tried to see that maybe there would be a way in which we could take this gas from the Palestinian wells and send it to Israel—to the Israeli electric company. And the contract was signed with the parties. At one time, Arafat took a group and there was a Lebanese group called CCC—the Consolidated Contractors Company—who invested money to build this pipeline. They would send it to Israel, and this would be put as part of the money that the Palestinian National Authority would use.
Then Sharon came and said, “No way, we’re not going.” And there was a very evident group of Israeli companies that had lobbied the government, [paraphrasing], “You should not allow them to produce anything, because the money they’re going to get would be used to fund terrorism against us. No country should allow a pipeline of wealth that would be used against it.”
This was at the time where the Oslo Agreement was with the Palestinian National Authority, and they had already arrived at some arrangement. The story of the negotiations—they are detailed in my paper, and I can make it available for anybody to look at—suggests that Israel was trying basically, fundamentally, to deny the Palestinians any use of this resource, in much the same say it denied the Palestinians the use of their oil, which was in Area C of the West Bank. Many residents of the area near Meged said that houses were shaking and were damaged because Israel was literally drilling for oil, siphoning this oil that should really be legitimately used for the economic development of the Palestinians.
And this is in contravention, as Dr. Falk has written and explained, that the occupier has no right to use the resources of the occupied people, only if it will be used to benefit the people under occupation. But here is Israel taking, siphoning all this oil for its own interest at the expense of the Palestinians’ ability to use this resource.
If this was not sufficient, there are other reasons, and these reasons are incredibly becoming now important and becoming very substantive.
At one time in the 1960s, the US had underwritten a project and got an American company to study the development of an alternative to the Suez Canal. At the time, Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal and there were troubles from the French and British, who had attacked in 1956. But the story was that the Americans felt that there is no way they can live, accept, and feel comfortable about a very important canal such as the Suez Canal, to be in a way that would be totally outside the command and control and the full exercise of sovereignty of the Egyptians.
The Suez Canal is only 196 kilometers [in length], only 100 meters wide, 50 meters—sometimes less—deep, and allows only one-way traffic. If the traffic is going from south to north, from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, then there would be no chance for ships to come from the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea.
And there was a big problem—the problem being that it needs dredging very often, because it’s in a sandy geological situation and any sandstorm will really fill it up. It needs to be dredged, and it’s becoming quite costly to do that. As you can remember, just a few months back, a very important ship ran aground, and it took days and weeks and big losses, estimated at 10 billion dollars, to clear the canal. 12% to 15% of the world trade goes through this canal. And about 30% of the total container traffic goes through this canal. A bit of the oil that comes from the Middle East, particularly from the Gulf of Saudi Arabia, from Kuwait, from Iran and other countries in the Gulf, goes through the canal as it goes to Europe. And it saves three weeks of travel. I mean the area from Mumbai in India—or take it to China—all the way to London is about 17,000 nautical miles if you go around Africa, but if you go through the canal, you will find that there is really a major saving in time. You will be saving around literally 4,000 nautical miles, which would be about literally three weeks, as I mentioned.
And this is really a major saving in terms of the cost of transporting all these products and energy from the Gulf or from India or from China or from Japan or anything that world trade would be in a very substantive way impacted in the course [inaudible]. Some people are really saying that now, with the Yemenis trying to interfere into the free flow of these commodities going through the canal, are basically and fundamentally imposing a very high cost for the rest of the world. Most people are saying that prices of oil that had dropped to a very low level, now below 70 dollars, may really start to rise—and rise in a significant way.
The Ben Gurion Canal that was conceived in the ’60s, then lay dormant, and then, all of a sudden, the Israelis now are saying, Look, we’re going to build this Ben Gurion Canal, and it’s going to be 200 meters wide, which would allow two-way traffic. It’s going to be deeper by about 10 to 15 and some people say another 50 meters deep, and this would allow much larger, the largest ships that are now unable . . . particularly for the Americans and the Imperial West to have a free flow of their aircraft carriers going through.
Now this is a situation where, if you really build it, which would completely compromise the ability of Egypt to take advantage of it, Egypt derives about 9.7 billion dollars a year, 2% of the Egyptian GDP, and this is not a small amount, and the absence of other alternative, important economic drivers, Egypt would be hurt in a very fundamental way.
The story here is that, if you look at this map that I have, the original plan was to go from Eliat, which is on the Red Sea, all the way to Ashkelon. But it is still within the reach of weapons in Gaza. And the best and most efficient way you could get this canal would be to go to a straight line, which is the shortest distance, and this would have to go through Gaza.
To a great extent some people are saying, “Okay, what does it really do?” It would save about 40 to 50 kilometers in space. But more important, if you go through the Negev, you’re going through sand. If you go directly through Gaza, the geological structure of the canal would be primarily into a rocky area, which would save all this incredibly cost of dredging, which would be continuous and would allow also to have a wider canal, a deeper canal.
In this respect, there is really a very serious threat that would be presented by this canal. And this canal could really be the most optimal geologically and the shortest distance, which is a straight line, to go directly to the north and Gaza or even southern Gaza, but this would require emptying Gaza.
So, emptying Gaza has now two dimensions:
One, you prevent anybody from Gaza ever claiming gas that would now be totally exploited by Israel in a very serious situation where now gas has become three to four times more valuable than it was a few years back because of the incredible need. Europeans are all coming to Israel in a way they never really came [before] in the hope of laying claim to some of this to replace the gas that they have missed because of the destruction [of Nord Stream], which raises the question of who destroyed Nord Stream and who will benefit from this destruction.
The other one is that this canal would become really optimal and would be a real substitute for the Suez Canal to the extent that it is in that rocky area that would allow two-way traffic that would be deep and would not be requiring all this dredging on a continuous basis.
If these two [dimensions] are not enough to empty Gaza and to explain why the Israelis have been very adamant about making Gaza unlivable, destroying all the housing infrastructure . . . I mean, one of the ministers has suggested that now when we finish, we should not allow the Gazans to get to a single commodity that would be required for reconstruction. We should make sure they cannot reconstruct, because what we really want is for them to leave. And it would be—this is the farce—a voluntary departure. Of course, they don’t have any homes. But, hey, when you control the borders, you control access to everything coming in. That is really the genocide that Professor Falk was talking about.
This is basically—the intent of the Israelis is to make Gaza an empty space, to make it unlivable, to make sure that people are driven out. They have already . . . the day before yesterday, Israeli delegations went to Rwanda and went to Chad trying to persuade these two countries to accept massive transfers of Palestinians to them, promising them money, promising them weapons, promising support in any shape or form that would allow these to accept this transfer.
The Israelis are still bent on emptying Gaza—emptying Gaza by destruction of the people continuously. Every day you see this violent onslaught of killing en masse—a huge number of children and women.
One would wonder if this attack of “self-defense” is to prevent future events from happening. There is no question this violence is sowing the seeds of future violence. The only one certain aspect about violence is, it breeds violence. What you do today is likely to come back at you in the future. History is rife with examples.
If these two projects are not sufficient reasons to explain why the Israelis—though they have not declared it—have continued to be adamant about occupying Gaza, emptying Gaza, erasing Gaza, making it unlivable so that it would become a very safe place for the Israelis, to prevent them from using their gas, to prevent them from obstructing the most efficient possible way to replace the Suez Canal, there is the third one that’s coming also.
[This third project] is also playing into the hands of the American Empire. The Americans are adamant about creating an alternative to the Silk Road. The Silk Road is a project that China has sponsored and has invested heavily in and has devoted literally billions if not trillions of dollars to create this route that would take it from China all the way to Europe and the Middle East and Africa in a way that will allow the Chinese to sell their goods and services unimpeded and in no way to be subject to any control of the seas.
Iran was also one of the hubs on this Silk Road that would go from China through Asia, Pakistan, and then Iran and then Syria. These are the countries that the United States does not want to get any benefit from. And they persuaded, in some sense they succeeded, but they [inaudible] some doubts about this, that there will be now a multimodal connection between India. It goes all the way to Dubai, from Dubai to Israel, Israel to Europe, bypassing Iran, bypassing Syria, bypassing Egypt, bypassing many of the Arab countries in this.
And why would the Israelis go on such an expensive one? It’s because it’s underwritten by the Americans. The Americans seem to completely have an open hand when it comes to Israel.
At one time, and if you think I’m exaggerating, our friend, Mr. Biden, said that investing 3.6 billion dollars — this is only the amount of money that’s given to the military — is a gilt-edged investment and is purely a good investment. Good in terms of what? Investment is cost. But then it’s really returns. What are the returns America is expecting? They’re basically funding and using Israel as a hegemonic power in the Middle East that would serve to suppress and to contain and to emasculate any possible group that might really work with the Russians or Chinese or any contending and contesting power.
This is part of the hegemonic exercise of the empire and unipolar world. And they find in Israel and the UAE a very willing partner. And some people said that this alternative to the Silk Road has worked in the past few weeks. There are now some concerns that UAE has been sending multiple trucks with fresh food and everything to Israel that goes from Dubai into Saudi Arabia and into Jordan and then into Israel.
The other parties have denied this, but to some extent, the Israelis have been very adamant that this is happening. And now we’re seeing that this route, this alternative, is not an imaginary one but that they are basically, fundamentally implementing it and taking the benefits that could come from it.
What does this all mean? What it really means is that this war is definitely motivated by Zionist ideology and Zionist aims and designs. But that’s not mutually exclusive with some of the arguments I’m presenting. There are colonial economic and material advantages that Israel is seeking as a return on its investment in this war. And, in addition to eliminating any competition or action from the Palestinian people in Gaza, there would be returns. And these returns are very lucrative.
There is no question. The total value of the Levant Basin: The oil prices of 2019 were about 350 billion dollars. And if Israel prevents Lebanon — or makes it wait and they can siphon it and slant the drilling — and if they can prevent the Palestinians from exploiting their own natural resources and if the Israelis can use them and if they would get their hands on a very lucrative bundle here and the amounts that are some people really saying with the rise of the price of gas due to the Ukraine-Russian War that these values have risen more than three to four times and then the oil that you will get.
That’s not only energy sufficiency but creating Israel as a petro-state or a gas state with an empire and an important, lucrative investment that would return a huge amount of rents to the Israelis. And if this was not sufficient then add to it the alternative of the Suez Canal, and that may be about 10-to-20 billion dollars in terms of shipping fees and the control on being a major power that would connect the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.
And if these two are not sufficient, let’s go to the third one, which is the alternative to the Silk Road, undermining the capacity of the Chinese to supply routes all the way through Asia, to Europe, and to Africa. In a way, Israel has positioned itself by emptying Gaza as a major economic driver and hegemonic control over trade routes that would serve the empire.
I’ll stop there. Thank you.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you very much, Atif. Economic or resource analysis of what’s going on is so particularly essential because so much of the mainstream popular discussion of these conflicts is purely in terms of identity and so on, and the economics is always hidden from view, certainly for a large section of the public. So, I think that’s extremely useful.
Thank you, Atif, for that presentation.
Identifying Structural Deep Events and State Crimes Against Democracy in Real Time
We’ve had a discussion, we’ve looked closely at legal issues, we’ve looked at the resource economic underbelly of the conflict, and we’re now going to move with Kevin Ryan into thinking a little bit more about some of the other hidden, deep state, deep event aspects of this—the question of deception, the question of instigation or exploitation of events, for various purposes.
Kevin is a whistleblower from the 9/11 event. He is a board member of International Center for 9/11 Justice, editor of the Journal of 9/11 Studies, and author of Another Nineteen, looking at suspects regarding 9/11.
He’s going to be talking to us for about 20 minutes, looking at, in a sense, some wider conceptual theoretical ideas about structural deep events, state crimes against democracy.
I’d like to welcome you and hand it over to you, Kevin.
Kevin Ryan:
I’m very grateful to be here among such distinguished company. And as Dr. Robinson said, I’m a member of the board of the International Center for 9/11 Justice that’s sponsoring the symposium along with UK Column. The International Center is dedicated to, among other things, establishing an accurate account of the crimes of September 11, 2001. We’re also committed to identifying and studying similar events. If anyone listening is not aware of the evidence that 9/11 was a deception, please go to our website, IC911.org, where you can find much information about that.
I’d like to begin the day, though, with a quote from a physicist. Paul Davies is a quantum theorist who said: “It’s a new perspective, not a new piece of information, that leads to intellectual revolutions.” Many of us have found that studying 9/11 and the crimes of 9/11 provides that sort of new perspective. But it’s not comfortable.
One way to describe part of this new view is that the oligarchy that rules us terrorizes us on occasion to facilitate its own objectives. And this leads to the questioning of every new narrative that we receive from the mainstream media and from government.
After 9/11, I began to question every terrorist act that occurred over a period of twenty years. For example, in 2015, I evaluated all of the terrorist acts across the world, including in France and Denmark and Australia and the United States. I found that there was a pattern to these terrorist acts that included the fact that the evidence for the official account was very weak and very convenient, that any other evidence that didn’t support the official account was ignored, [that] the suspects were of course dead immediately, and [that] there was an immediate attempt to associate them with Islam. There had been military or law enforcement exercises that mimicked the events, either coinciding with the events or preceding them, and, of course, there were very quick actions in response, without thorough investigation.
So, what I found is that 9/11 and the other terrorist events during the global war on terror fit this pattern. They’re called “false flag events,” which are acts committed with the intent of hiding the true culprits and blaming others.
Now, false flags are a subset of something called “state crimes against democracy,” which are a subset of what are called “deep events.” But I’ll generally call them “state crimes” in this talk. Or, as with 9/11, I might call them “global state crimes.”
My question is: Can we detect a false flag, a state crime against democracy, or a deep event as it’s happening? It’s important for peace and security to do so, as well as for our own personal safety and liberty. We also don’t want to be part of the harm that’s being caused by any state crime.
And for these purposes, this is not just an academic exercise. But we do have to define the terms involved in order to detect state crimes. So, I’ll begin with state crimes against democracy, which was defined by Lance deHaven-Smith, a professor from Florida State University who coined the term. He said that they are concerted actions or inactions by government insiders, intended to manipulate democratic processes and undermine popular sovereignty.
Two things jump out to me in this definition. First of all, they can be actions or inactions. So, things that should have happened but did not happen can be state crimes. An example might be the fact that the Roosevelt Administration knew that the Pearl Harbor attack would occur before it did and allowed it to happen. So, inactions—not preventing that attack or preventing the people from being killed—are an example of a state crime against democracy.
And government insiders are involved, according to Professor deHaven-Smith. There’s a fine line between government insiders, government officials, and people who go through a revolving door. We’ll keep that in mind.
Professor deHaven-Smith listed about two dozen of these SCADs, or state crimes against democracy, in his writings and in his talks. For him, all of them were US-based. They included assassinations of public figures, like JFK and RFK and Martin Luther King. They included provocations to drive war, like 9/11. They also included election-related crimes.
One more thing Dr. deHaven-Smith did was, he categorized them into what he called highly confirmed SCADs, mid-level SCADs, or low-level SCADs.
He did categorize them as high-level confirmation of being a SCAD if there were confessions or documents of admission. So, documentation or confessions that stated they were, in fact, state crimes made them highly confirmed.
If they were circumstantial, but also included a cover-up, then he would potentially call them a mid-level confirmed SCAD. That would include, for him, both JFK and the 9/11 crimes.
But I think it’s important to note that we will not likely get confessions in a timely manner for the next state crime or the latest state crime. But my point is that it makes sense to maintain a skeptical view of any new narrative if the current perspective suggests it might be a state crime. A useful, practical perspective, or view, does not require nailing down every fact. It should be continually reevaluated, of course, as new evidence is obtained.
One thing many of us have heard is that such perspectives are not within the limits of what’s called the spectrum of acceptable opinion. So, we have to be willing to withstand being smeared as a conspiracy theorist if we might consider such perspectives.
The “conspiracy theorist” term is used to deter others from investigating historic events. It implies that criminal conspiracies among the rich and powerful are impossible or absurd. It takes some imagination to buy into that usage.
Professor Peter Dale Scott defined “deep events” and “structural deep events.” He said a deep event is one of hidden or underappreciated relevance to deep politics. Now, deep politics is the business of deep states, and deep states are covert groups that seek to exercise control over governments or nations. Also, deep events are never presented clearly by the media. “Structural” means the event impacts the whole fabric of society. So, a “structural deep event” impacts all of society.
I’ve noticed that many people can accept the idea of an American deep state—the US deep state. But some people cannot transfer that idea to other countries or to an international or a supranational deep state. Professor Scott was not one of those. He mentioned a number of times a supranational deep state in his writings and in his interviews. He mentioned several organizations that he felt were representative of an international or a supranational deep state, including the Council on Foreign Relations, Cercle Pinay, the Safari Club, and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).
Professor Scott also identified common modalities of structural deep events. These included the instant identification of the designated culprits, the fact that the suspects had hidden intelligence backgrounds and that they were protected by intelligence agencies. This is all very true for the 9/11 crimes.
But one drawback to the deep event definition is that it’s a retrospective vision, meaning some of these modalities are not seen until years later. We can’t see, of course, what’s hidden or falsified, so we may not be able to call something a structural deep event yet at the same time still have enough perspective to see that it’s likely to be a state crime.
In 2020 I was working as the head of quality control for a gene therapy company, and our laboratories were experiencing what’s called “false positive results” for a test technique called RT-qPCR. This is a form of PCR. It’s a nucleotide testing for analytes such as viruses.
And so, it became interesting to me when I read that a Chinese journal of epidemiology had published a peer-reviewed paper saying that in China the testing for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, experienced 50% false positives. That’s quite a bit. It means that every other test that says somebody is infected with SARS-CoV-2 was false. Further confirmatory testing showed that they were not infected.
This led me to look into the test kit being manufactured for the US CDC. I noticed reports in the news that the state laboratories using this kit were experiencing a lot of false positives. So, I looked into the details of the reagents used in the kits—the nucleotide sequences and so forth—and found that they were unable to identify a unique coronavirus. The primers and probes were based on parts of the coronavirus which were highly conserved across different coronaviruses, of which there were already seven common coronaviruses, including the common cold. So, the kit was not testing for a unique coronavirus.
Coupled to this was the fact that there were policy changes in many places that led to the misattribution of death. Anyone who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 and happened to die,
whether they died of heart disease or cancer or being in a motorcycle accident, COVID was listed if they tested positive for it. COVID was listed on their death certificate. This obviously inflated the numbers that people used.
There was also a redefinition of terms. The terms “pandemic” and later “vaccine” were redefined for the purposes of supporting this agenda that appeared to be being implemented. There were oppressive mandates like lockdowns and mandatory vaccinations and so forth implemented. And soon it became clear to me and many others that COVID was also a global state crime—not just an individual state crime, but a coordinated global state crime.
In September 2020, I gave a presentation on parallels between COVID crimes and 9/11 crimes, and I listed eleven features and outcomes that were shared among the COVID crimes and the 9/11 crimes.
I noted that there was media saturation of fear-based messaging.
There was insider trading in both instances.
There were exercises that preceded the events that mimicked what was going to happen, similar to the false flag terrorist exercises.
There was a failure to investigate the origins of the threat.
There was an abuse of science and a widespread censorship of dissent.
It was clear that the response would kill far more people than the original threat.
There were increased mechanisms of population control.
And, of course, there was a huge transfer of wealth and a centralization of power.
Both the 9/11 crimes and the COVID crimes shared these commonalities. And there was a similar formula for the terrorism events during the global war on terror.
So, my question is: Can we use a pattern like this to more quickly identify when a state crime is being committed?
We don’t need confessions before we can identify a state crime for our own purposes. What we also don’t need is to convince 100% of our fellow citizens, or even a majority. We need to be able to take measures in our own best interests—for example, rejecting narratives or sources of misinformation or declining oppressive state measures like experimental injections.
Let’s use the Hamas attack on October 7th as an example of a narrative that can be evaluated as a state crime as well.
I noticed that the Israeli ambassador to the UN called these attacks “Israel’s 9/11.” That raised my attention—I’m sure it did for many people—because that means something quite different to me.
But we can ask: Do these attacks match the pattern?
Was there fear-based messaging? I think that’s fair to say. And even more so, it was in the form of atrocity propaganda. You know, babies having their heads chopped off and people being dismembered and burned alive. All of these stories, it was found out recently, originated with the Netanyahu administration, and many, if not all, appeared to be false.
Were there rapid actions taken that facilitated a preexisting agenda? It’s fair to consider that, I think.
Did the response kill more people? Obviously, the response has killed twenty times more, as Professor Falk stated. This is genocidal in response.
Were there exercises beforehand? There were, in fact, exercises conducted by Hamas in July of 2020 that mimicked what would happen on October 7th. These exercises were monitored by Israeli intelligence. Some of them have said that the exercises reflected the attacks fairly well.
Was there insider trading? Recently, law professors at New York University and at Columbia University published a peer-reviewed article that indicated there was short-selling, a form of insider trading, on Israeli companies related to the October 7th events.
We could go on. Was there censorship? Population control? Transfer of wealth?
Professor Kubursi made several remarks related to transfer of wealth, natural resources, and land. The next two speakers will likely shed more light on the details.
Also note that Al Qaeda was a creation of US defense and intelligence agencies going back to Operation Cyclone in the 1970s. And, similarly, Hamas was at least in part created by Israel. So, there are some similarities there as well.
I would just say at this point our current perspective should include the possibility that the State of Israel was involved somehow in the crimes related to October 7th and that they could be considered state crimes.
In any case, we need to know when state crimes are being committed and we need to know as soon as possible, as they’re occurring, to avoid harming ourselves and others.
A pattern does exist for state crimes, maybe not the exact pattern that I’ve described. But whatever the pattern or the set of characteristics is, people need to understand it in order to move to more quickly and reliably evaluate future crises for deception.
If we want to maintain our lives and liberties, we must examine every new alleged crisis, using criteria based on a pattern reflective of the events we know were state crimes.
So, thank you for your attention. I’ll turn it over back over to Dr. Robinson at this time.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you very much, Kevin. It’s very interesting. Obviously, this question of structural deep events, the question of deception, and so on, is, in the same way as Atif’s presentation, looking at areas and processes that people don’t understand properly. In that case, the economics. In this case, the question of the deep state, the question of these elements of government which are hidden from view. And, really, this central idea that deception, especially with empires, is a central way in which they conduct themselves, how they exercise power—particularly for liberal empires, or empires that like to see themselves as liberal democracies. You have to mislead the public, ultimately, in order to do the necessary dark deeds of empire. So an absolutely essential research area.
Hegemonic Panic: October 7 as a Deep Event
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Really picking up on this, we will now turn to Dr. Aaron Good, who is going to, I think, be looking at some of the questions and some of the evidence in more detail about deception, about instigation, exploitation, etc., in relation to October 7. Aaron is agreed to do this. As I said, he runs the American Exception podcast. He is also author of a fantastic book, which is based on his PhD, which I’m eagerly reading at the moment, I’m pleased to say. And Aaron’s going to talk to us for about 30 minutes on the issue of deep state and empire in relation to both October 7 and what’s going on at the moment, following that in the Middle East.
Aaron.
Dr. Aaron Good:
Thank you very much, Piers. I have called this “Hegemonic Panic.” And I have a lot here. Some of it is overlapping with Kevin, so I’ll try to skip through some of that, which is actually helpful, because I have more here than I can get through easily, but a lot of it is just data points.
We talk about deep events. These do come from the clandestine state. They’re events that are mysterious, and they seem to come from the covert action apparatus of the government and that we know we’ll never get to the bottom of them. We can ascertain that we are immersed in this because we see a pattern again, where something strange happens, it is politically impactful, it overlaps with at least practices and objectives and aims of the national security state—of imperialism, generally speaking. So, as Kevin was suggesting, we at least reason to suspect that something is a covert operation. If it’s aimed at the US population, it’s a state crime against democracy, and we can identify these.
Now this was deHaven-Smith’s and Scott’s definition of state crimes against democracy, which Kevin just discussed [see slide].
My own academic work was in part based on trying to form a synthesis between Peter Dale Scott and Lance deHaven-Smith’s work, because I had befriended Lance and got to collaborate with him at a number of conferences and helped him with manuscripts and everything.
And his loss is really devastating for me personally. It was a great thing to be able to talk about these issues and try to work on them in a scholarly way. That was really what I dedicated my PhD to.
In terms of synthesizing these two perspectives, Peter Dale Scott conceded that the SCAD construct, or the idea of state crimes against democracy, was good but that it should be amended to say that it involves other elements that are subvert, that are submerged and not visible. So, it could be like a deep state crime against democracy, essentially. Lance himself said that what he had done with SCAD theory was still lacking a theory of the state or a role in any theorization on the role of economic elites, so corporate power. And so, I set about trying to address these things with my own dissertation, which eventually got published as American Exception: Empire and the Deep State, published by Skyhorse.
Now, there’s another academic here named Willem Bart de Lint. I have not been able to contact him, but it would be good to talk to him. He wrote this book Blurring Intelligence Crime: A Critical Forensics. And he talks about an “apex crime” [as] “a watershed event involving government in the support of a contested political and social order and its primary opponent as the obvious offender, which is then subject to a confirmation bias.”
We have examples of that in US history, where an apex crime takes place: the assassination of JFK. And who did it? The communists, okay? And then the more we learn about Oswald, it seems that he was pretending to be a communist on behalf of elements connected to the US government when he defected to the Soviet Union and when he was pretending to be a communist in New Orleans.
Later, notably, when a presidential candidate was going to reinvestigate the JFK assassination—that’s Robert Kennedy—he was killed. And the patsy, in this case, was Sirhan Sirhan, a Palestinian who could not have shot Robert Kennedy because Robert Kennedy was shot from point-blank range from behind, from right to left, at an upward angle. Sirhan was standing in front of him. The use of the Palestinian patsy is very significant. It’s no coincidence.
I’m just going to run through these [points]. I don’t have deep knowledge about them, but I noticed them myself, because I always think in terms of these patterns now when I see an event like this.
Kevin mentioned some of these—and I’m not going to go into detail about them, but there’s a lot of evidence that:
Israel knew about this plan quite a while ago and that such an attack would be hard to keep totally secret. So, people suspect they had foreknowledge.
People have documented suspicious insider trading—evidence that points to insider trading, which indicates foreknowledge as well.
The friendly fire aspect. How much of the death count of the Israeli civilians actually came from the Israeli military response, which is a very open question.
A related question is, was this not just friendly fire, but was it actual policy? Was it the Hannibal directive, wherein the Israeli military does not want Hamas—or Palestinian groups at all—to be able to have Israeli hostages, especially Israeli military hostages. They will kill them [the hostages] when they are fleeing rather than allow them to have [Israeli] hostages. So, was that the calculation made on the night of October 7—that they would rather them not have the hostages, and a high death count, they could just blame it on Hamas, and it will allow them to pursue a preexisting agenda.
A lot of false reports in the media of atrocities: the decapitated babies, etc., etc. A lot of propaganda and disinformation and it’s all slanted, typically in one direction.
The treatment of the hostages does not suggest that Hamas would have slaughtered all of these people and sexually tortured and mutilated people. The reports from the hostages are that they were treated very well. That doesn’t seem to make sense. Nor does it make sense that [Hamas] would commit those atrocities, given that hostage-taking has certain political objectives that we can discern and that would be undermined by wanton atrocities.
There’s the tricky problem of the fact that Hamas seems to be generally a creation of Israel—that they were backed and boosted by Israel. It’s not that the members of Hamas don’t have genuine, legitimate, deep-seated grievances towards Israel, but Israel seems to have created this group. There’s documentation of this. It’s been written about by mainstream people, such as Mehdi Hasan, who is as corporate and mainstream as it gets. But he has written that Hamas is useful as a foil for Israel, it’s a way to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state, it creates an unsympathetic actor, and it undermined the PLO. That was the thinking at the time.
Additionally, we know that they wanted to expel the Palestinians beforehand. An Israeli official leaked a think tank paper that was commissioned by Israeli intelligence. It looked at different options to handle the Palestinian problem. But the one that they end up saying is good is Option C: evacuation of the civilian population from Gaza to Sinai.
There’s the longstanding opposition to Palestinian statehood. The fact that many people like Netanyahu are on the record saying, “Support Hamas, because that will keep a Palestinian state from forming” or “It’s been good that we have supported Hamas, it’s been good that we have done these things to keep a Palestinian state from being formed.” They are hellbent on this. They believe in the Greater Israel, which cannot but be created only with massive war crimes tantamount to genocide, which we are seeing now.
Now, this issue of war and the deception that creates it, this is a recurring theme in imperialism, especially Western imperialism. It just happens again and again. There’s all these cliches about “the fog of war” and “the first casualty [of war] is truth” and all of this. Typically, these wars are fought because one side wants to fight a war, and typically they need a pretext as well.
So, I just want to run through some of these pretexts of modern Western imperialism. I’m going to focus on the US side—but others as well.
The Thornton Affair [1845]. This is how we were able to steal California from Mexico. This is the pretext used to launch the Mexican-American War—a very dubious war. Even Abraham Lincoln questioned it at the time, when he was a Whig congressman.
The assassination of Queen Min [1895]. This takes place in Korea. This was when the Japanese had adopted Western imperialist tactics. Basically, they’d become as vicious as us. They studied our industry and they studied our imperialism and they had what was something of an intelligence outfit: This Black Ocean group pretend to be Koreans and they kill the Queen of Korea. This is a colonial war. They’re trying to set up a colonial empire, just like the West.
The USS Maine, of course, gets blown up [1898]. This is infamous. It helps to fuel America’s desire to fight the Spanish-American War and get its first overseas colonies.
The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand sparks World War I [1914]. The Serbian group, Black Hand: People have suggested or found evidence that points to them being related to the British Empire. Was this some sort of pretext or event or a catalyst that was staged by the British? It’s quite possible, to me. I wouldn’t put anything past the British.
The Mukden incident in Manchuria [1931] is used by the Japanese imperialists—the fascists, basically, running Japan—to have an excuse to intervene more heavily in Manchuria.
The Reichstag Fire [1933] is infamous, of course. The Nazis used this to seize absolute control in Germany. It’s worth noting that at Nuremberg it was established that the Nazis had done this. And then, after the fact, because some of the people that were probably responsible for this were in the government, it was embarrassing. And so there was this new history contrived, wherein the communist patsy, Marinus van der Lubbe, had really set the fire himself. But Peter Dale Scott has a good dossier on this that he’s compiled over the years. It’s just not the case. Now notice Jacobin. This is a good example of how feckless the left is in the United States—the establishment left, the left that has any institutional support. The headline, “How the Nazis Exploited the Reichstag Fire to Launch a Reign of Terror.” Well, at Nuremberg, they found that the Nazis set the Reichstag Fire, but this is something that the left defers to authority. We have the most docile left in the United States. Whatever the state tells them is the truth: “OK, yes, sir.”
The Gleiwitz incident in Germany [1939]. This is Germany with the Nazis, who had their own particular ethos, right? But even they need to have a false flag to be able to invade Poland, because you need a pretext. No matter how vicious you are, it seems you need at least an excuse to go to war. So, they had people dress up as people attacking the Germans, so the Germans could go into Poland. We know this pretty well.
Pearl Harbor [1941]. Of course, there’s no need to go into that. Foreknowledge: how much was there? That is the event that leads to US entry into the war, US victory in the war, dropping the bombs on Japan, and then the US becomes the global hegemon of the so-called free world.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident [1964]. A very dubious event, of course.
[Suharto’s US-backed coup in Indonesia, 1965]. A major, major massacre overseas, which I think is worth mentioning—because it involves a mass slaughter—is the massacre in 1965, which followed this bungled coup attempt. The more you look at the coup attempt—especially if you look at the work of Peter Dale Scott or Greg Poulgrain . . . Peter’s work in 1985, this paper, this essay in Pacific Affairs journal, which is Canadian. He couldn’t get it published in the American one; it was too sensitive. He found that the CIA and one of its backers with this Lockheed bribery scandal began shifting payments months before this strange coup that failed. Months before this happened, the CIA had shifted its funding—these bribes—[given] to a backer of Sukarno to [instead] a backer of Suharto, who would be used to basically depose Sukarno and afterwards murder half a million, one million, three million. We don’t even know how many people were tortured to death in Indonesia. I recommend watching Joshua Oppenheimer’s “The Act of Killing,” if you haven’t seen that documentary on this subject. But notice, again, Jacobin—the establishment lefty scholar that says here—Michael Vann is interviewed, and he says, “Some of the American-focused scholarship in a way denies Indonesian agency and underplays the Indonesian role in these events.” So, this is a trope among what passes for the left in the United States. With these covert actions and deception operations, they don’t want to accept that these things happen. And one of the excuses they use with a covert operation is, if you say that was a covert operation, then you’re taking away the agency of the Indonesian people. Somehow, it’s the nice thing to do—to say it wasn’t the CIA. I don’t understand how this logic takes root in the academy, but I think it has to do with the hegemony of the empire and how covert action is so delegitimizing. That’s why they make it covert. They want to say they’re not doing it because it’s usually something very sinister. So, this is something we’ve got to deal with. The academics are not going to help us, because they’re part of the establishment.
The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is a strange war when you stop and think about it because the two sides, the Saudis and the Israelis, were basically on the US side by that point more firmly. You had these gas shortages at the time—because of this war. And the price of oil explodes. This is a pretext for a massive increase of oil that people like Henry Kissinger had already been trying to orchestrate, according to no less an authority than the Saudi Minister of Oil at the time. He said the price increases were desired by Henry Kissinger. It does say that it shores up the dollar after [the] Vietnam [War] had brought down Bretton Woods.
Now, another aspect that we should look at in this chronology, which takes us up to the present day and which has made me rethink . . . all of these things have made me rethink the role of Israel in US foreign policy. George H. W. Bush in 1992 ran afoul of the Israel lobby. There’s an article on it in The Times of Israel. He lost 24% of his Jewish backing after confronting Israel over settlements—”a lesson that US leaders since have taken to heart.”
One of the most controversial moments is when he delayed Israel loan guarantees until it halted its settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza and entered into a peace conference [with the Palestinians], which would later become known as the Madrid Peace Conference.
This is George H. W. Bush saying: The US will cut off aid to you if you do not return to these negotiations for a Palestinian state. He was looking to solve the Palestinian problem and the Israel-Palestine crisis at the end of the Cold War, because he saw it as antithetical to US long-term interests in the region, just like Eisenhower did when he intervened in the Suez Canal crisis. There’s always been a balance that the US tried to strike for geopolitical reasons. And H. W. Bush is no hero or great humanitarian or anything, believe me. I’m totally aware of how sinister he is. And so this makes this all the more remarkable that this person, this nexus of the American deep state, the Yankee oil people, and then the Western cowboy military-industrial complex faction, he seemed to unite both of those. But he still had problems with this Israel contingency, and it may have contributed to—it may have been decisive in—having him lose his reelection. So, he made clear the cost. His case makes clear what happens to you, that if you fight all these pro-Israel groups, you could go down. He had a 70% approval rating, and then he ends up losing. It’s really remarkable.
Now, at the same time, we have this other big issue, which is the emergence of a move for multipolarity. This article is written in 2009.
[Technical difficulties. Dr. Good returns momentarily.]
Okay, I’m not sure what happened there, but what I want to talk about here is multipolarity and the way that this became a geopolitical issue, beginning in the early years after the Cold War.
This woman [Susan Turner] is writing about it here [in Asian Perspective, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2002, pp. 159-184] and you can see:
“Since the late 1990s, the concept of multipolarity has gained prominence around the globe. Russia and China [. . .] have included it or alluded to it in nearly all of their joint declarations, statements, and treaties dating from the mid-1990s to the present.”
So, what is the US response to this?
Well, I think that you can look at what the US is trying to do. They are using jihadis throughout the ’90s. So, after the Cold War ends, those networks that were used to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan are repurposed and used all over the place in the 1990s. This is called McJihad. A political scientist [Benjamin R. Barber] tried to write about this in the ’90s. He wrote the book Jihad vs. McWorld, and it said: Oh, jihadis are reacting to Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, and they want to hold on to their old ways. What’s going to happen here?
Another author, whose name I don’t recall, wrote about this shortly afterwards and said: It seems the US is actually fueling this. This is actually McJihad. This is the West that creates its own villains and then it can either use them as shock troops somewhere or use them as an excuse to intervene somewhere.
So, this is important when you think of 9/11.
Additionally, in Israel at this time you have the “Clean Break” document: “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” prepared by a think tank called The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. It’s commissioned by a “Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000 . . . led by Richard Perle for Benjamin Netanyahu, then Prime Minister of Israel.” It included other Bush administration officials from the future, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser. This document said: “. . . removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq” is “an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right.”
So, we see that the people that were Bush administration officials for the Iraq War were making these arguments on behalf of Israel at the time—I mean, in the years leading up to this. At the same time, [you have] the more establishment forces in the United States—Zbigniew Brzezinski represents them. There’s a study commissioned by the Council on Foreign Relations, which is the Wall Street think tank that planned the US Empire in the first place. They commissioned him to write this book on US geopolitics after the Cold War. He calls it The Grand Chessboard, and he basically calls for controlling Eurasia and making sure that they prevent the rise of a counterhegemonic bloc, especially that would include Iran, China, and Russia. So, he’s talking about how we don’t want to have this.
This is a direct response to China and Russia saying: How about multipolarity? The US response is: How about we make sure multipolarity doesn’t happen. And that’s from Brzezinski, who is, generally speaking, if anything, a couple degrees to the left of the neocons. These are people dedicated to American domination über alles.
The American neocon response to this situation is The Project for a New American Century, and they’re calling for full spectrum dominance over the world forever. They’re also saying that it’s going to be hard to get the US to commit to what needs to be done without a new Pearl Harbor. This study [“Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century”] comes out in 2000.
And then a new Pearl Harbor happens with 9/11 and the anthrax letters. In terms of being able to adjudicate these crimes, there’s cause for pessimism, as we probably all know. Because even if they get caught red-handed more or less, even if some part of the state does its job and they are allowed to investigate things properly and they find out it points back to the state, they’ll just contrive some other cover story.
The cover story for the anthrax letters after it was found that the anthrax was from a US laboratory was that, oh, it was just some random guy who just did this for some reason—pretended to be a Muslim because he had some weird crush on a cheerleader, or something like that. It was a very strange case. That was after they had another guy they tried to pin it on who fought that charge off. Very strange.
The point is: The state will not investigate itself. If it’s an apex crime, if apex controls the investigation, we won’t get to the bottom of it.
— Iraqi WMD [2002 onward]. We don’t need to say any more about that, probably.
— In 2007, this is, I think, important, and people have not remarked on this as much, the War on Terror stalls. Brzezinski goes in front of Congress and says [paraphrasing]: We need to be careful. There’s going to be some sort of terror attack, and it’ll be blamed on Iran, and it’ll be used to start a war that’ll be a disaster for the US and the whole [Middle East] region.
— You also had John Kiriakou’s torture fiasco, his terrible journey, his whistleblowing on the issue of CIA torture, which may have been related to this, as a way to publicly chasten the Bush Administration and hold back the neocons.
So now, fast forward a couple of years, or right before—really months before—the Arab Spring. You have Zbigniew Brzezinski. He had been putting the brakes on the whole War on Terror, 9/11 Wars agenda. Then he speaks at, I think it’s a Chicago CFR meeting or dinner or something, and he says [paraphrasing], “There’s going to be a global awakening. The whole world is waking up to injustice. They’re all connected at the same time.”
I remember this at the time because [. . . around the same time] I saw Alex Jones [. . . and] he’s saying, “They’re going to try to wake you up. They’re cooking something up.” [. . . It] didn’t occur to me until later, but this was right before the Arab Spring. I think Brzezinski may have been kicking off the revival of this whole anti-counter-hegemonic campaign. [. . . It was] this whole way of trying to continue this agenda to make sure the US had control over Eurasia, because you get these Arab Spring wars.
And then it eventually comes out that the US had helped nurture some of these groups. It’s all very strange when you look at it in retrospect. It seems like it was really just the continuation of that whole agenda. The Arab Spring wars stall, as well, in part because of Russia, and interestingly, the naval base that would have given them access to the Mediterranean into Syria is in Ukraine, and you have the destabilization of Ukraine from a Russian perspective.
You have Victoria Nuland passing out poisonous cookies to kill protesters. Not really, she had them killed with snipers. But she did pass out cookies there, which was not quite a respectable thing for a diplomat to do to an opposition group like this, but that’s how it goes. The US hand in this was really obvious. It was a coup that put in a threat to Russia right on its doorstep.
You have Russiagate in the United States, which was a very strange event and made sure the US had a bellicose posture towards Russia at the time. It was a total distraction from the failure that led to Trump being elected. Instead, it was just a way to blame Russia. We don’t know where those emails came from, where the leaks came from. Some people think it was Seth Rich. That’s a strange murder case. The internet angle was also exaggerated. It was very strange. Those “Buff Bernie” memes were not really history-changing, in my opinion. So that was a hoax.
We have COVID, which I’m not going to say much about, except that it came from US bioweapons research, apparently, and it had a major impact, and it seems to have been used either opportunistically or by design as a structural deep event.
Ukraine War is, of course, a huge disaster, along with the Nord Stream pipeline crimes, but you’re not really going to get to the bottom of them.
Al-Aqsa Flood, as we’ve talked about, and this Gaza genocide—these seem to be related also to all of those issues that Atif was talking about earlier, that are economic and geopolitical motives, but also the fact that US hegemony is really crumbling. And I think that Israel feels like its window of opportunity for a final solution with Palestine is running out, perhaps. So, they’re going farther than people would’ve thought they would’ve gone—farther than they’ve ever gone before—in terms of just slaughtering the people in Gaza.
I want to talk about SCAD versus deep events and ways academics can think about these and how useful they are. SCAD is useful as an academic or forensic heuristic. It’s a way to put these things into a certain category so you know what you’re looking at and you can talk about it. Deep events, or the way that Peter Dale Scott approaches these, might be more useful for making detached observations about things after the fact and gaining historical insights and then thinking about how you can apply these. So, these are very similar academic ideas.
Now, in terms of what we should do, in terms of thinking about justice, given the criminality that we see in the state when we study these things, Lance had a different idea than Peter. Lance basically thought: Hey, I’m a public administration person. You solve crimes and you “Hang the bastards.” Peter thought there could be a cultural revolution of the mind eventually and a Truth and Reconciliation process of some kind, eventually. But he thought that people really had to be prepared—or he thinks this now, increasingly, that people need to be prepared for this revolution before it can happen. He has some hope that civil society groups, along the lines of the Civil Rights movement, could be useful in this regard.
The synthesis of these two lines of thinking—well, I’ve tried to do that a little bit. The proximate root of the problem is that there’s no lawful sovereign over the domestic state and over the international system. Therefore, whenever we have these problems, these crimes we identify, we are reduced to hysterically shouting into the void and not having any way to have the rule of law apply, domestically or internationally.
But, as with every empire, these people are hanging themselves. I think nemesis really comes from outside. The non-West right now embodies humanity’s desire to be free from exploitation and domination. They’re really doing the heavy lifting to fight this despotism that we’re seeing. I think its ultimate embodiment is in Gaza right now. It seems to be the perfect encapsulation, in a horrific way, of so much that we have done for hundreds of years in the West. But we are not able to take power, so we can just post protest emojis and have Zoom conferences and try to raise awareness and raise consciousness.
The good news is I do think this empire that’s been around for hundreds of years is now on its way out. And that is exciting, although it’s a little frightening because we don’t know what they have up their sleeves to try to hold on to power.
I have other slides here, but I don’t want to go any further than this.
So, I think I’ll leave it at that and say that really the problem is the despotism that’s at the top of the state and the fact that this continues over the international realm. There is no lawful sovereign, domestically and internationally. There’s no way to adjudicate disputes according to the rule of international law in any sort of fair way because of the US, by and large.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you, Aaron, for a fascinating discussion, rich and detailed.
Containing Escalation: How the Resistance axis is sabotaging US intent to escalate the conflict beyond Palestine
Dr. Piers Robinson:
We’re going to move now to our final talk for 20 minutes before we go to the panel discussion. And we have, last but by no means least, Vanessa Beeley, who’s going to talk about the current geopolitical situation. And I think a little bit, the sort of perspective of groups within the region, countries within the region as they resist empire and where she sees it as going at the moment.
Over to you, Vanessa.
Vanessa Beeley:
Thank you so much, Piers. I feel extremely privileged to be in such a good company. I’m going to cross over definitely with Aaron on the “Clean Break,” so I’ll skip over that a little bit, and I’ll probably complement what Atif and Richard were saying.
So, basically, what I’m going to look at is Washington and London’s long war against the Middle East or, rather, West Asia, the rise of BRICS, global South independence, the emergence of a neo-Pan-Arabism, and, of course, the multipolar world that has been mentioned by many people.
Now, I’m going to start off with a direct quote from Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., which he gave during an interview—I think in the last month or so. And I think, for me, it encapsulates exactly what Israel represents to the US. It’s quite rare for any American politician to be quite so overt in their opinion.
I’ll start the quote:
“Israel is critical, and the reason it’s critical is because it is a bulwark for us in the Middle East. It is almost like having an aircraft carrier in the Middle East. It’s our oldest ally. It’s been our ally for 75 years. It’s been an incredible ally for us in terms of the technology exchange, and building the Iron Dome, which we have paid a lot for, has taught us enormously about how to defend ourselves against missile attacks. [Of] that military expenditure, 75% goes to US companies under the agreement, under the MOU. If you look at what’s happening in the Middle East now, the closest allies to Iran are Russia and China. Iran also controls all of Venezuela’s oil. Hezbollah is in Venezuela. They’ve propped up the Maduro regime, and so they control that oil supply.
“BRICS: Saudi Arabia is now joining BRICS, so those countries will control 90% of the oil in our world. If Israel disappears, [there will be a] vacuum in the Middle East. Israel is our ambassador, our beachhead, in the Middle East. It gives us ears and it gives us eyes in the Middle East. It gives us intelligence, the capacity to influence affairs in the Middle East. If Israel disappeared, Russia and China would be controlling the Middle East and would control 90% of the world’s oil supply, and that would be cataclysmic for US national security.”
Pretty much says it all right there. And so therefore that really shapes what I’m going to continue saying in the presentation. Basically, it’s about the reshaping of the Middle East, which has been an ongoing colonial project for more than a century, including the French-British Sykes-Picot partitioning of the territory—the British creation of the Zionist colonialist settler state after the Balfour Treaty in 1917, which facilitated the European settler land grab from Palestinians until the UN partitioning of Palestine in 1947 in favor of the Zionists. And then, of course, the 1948 Nakba—the ethnic cleansing of more than 750,000 Palestinians from their land with no right to return.
In 1996, as Aaron mentioned, there was the “Clean Break” doctrine—a new strategy for securing the realm. Now, interesting elements of that doctrine included working closely with Turkey and Jordan to contain, destabilize, and roll back some of its most dangerous threats, which included Syria.
Israel should seize the strategic initiative along the northern border by engaging Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran as the principal agents of aggression in Lebanon, according, of course, to Israel. Direct attack would be enabled on Syrian territory and against Syrian targets in Lebanon.
A move to contain Syria and to curtail its alleged weapons of mass destruction program. Plans included the removal of Saddam Hussein, as Aaron mentioned, to weaken Syria’s position in the region, and to strengthen Jordan as Israel’s ally.
As special consultant to US Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan, Pat Buchanan, put it: “In the documents, in the strategy, Israel’s enemy remains Syria, but the road to Damascus runs through Baghdad.”
Then we have the map of the new Middle East. This map was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters and published in the Armed Forces Journal in June 2006, and it was made widely available to the public.
The term “New Middle East” was introduced to the world in June 2006 in Tel Aviv by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who was credited by the Western media for coining the term in replacement of the older and more imposing term, the “Greater Middle East.”
Renowned author and historian Mahdi Nazemroaya said, “This announcement was a confirmation of an Anglo-American-Israeli “military roadmap” in the Middle East. This project, which has been in the planning stages for several years, consists in creating an arc of instability, chaos, and violence extending from Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria to Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Iran, and the borders of NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan.”
An article in June 2023 in Jerusalem Post is headlined “Israel is well-positioned in the new Middle East.” Israel announced a massive success in defense exports—a record 12.5 billion with Abraham Accord countries accounting for nearly a quarter of those deals. Those countries at the time being include Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, which is effectively a normalization of relations with Israel.
There’s also an important reference, which I think Atif mentioned, to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor—the IMEC—which is designed to compete with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. And we can see the map, which, as I said, links Mumbai through Dubai, Riyadh, Al-Haditha, Haifa, and into Europe through Piraeus in Athens, in Greece.
And then of course we have the infamous Oded Yinon Plan for Greater Israel, the Israel of Theodore Hertz in 1904 and of Rabbi Fischmann in 1947.
To a large degree we’ve entered a new stage in the 75-to-100-year Zionist plan for Palestine: appropriation of the entire territory and final ethnic cleansing of what appears to be all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, resettlement in the Sinai in Egypt and elsewhere, as we heard also—I think from Atif.
In January 2023, Netanyahu said, “These are the basic lines of the national government headed by me, the Jewish people having exclusive and unquestionable right to all areas of the land of Israel. The government will promote and develop settlements in all parts of the land of Israel—in the Galilee, in the Negev, in the Jolan [Golan Heights], Judea, and Samaria.”
The Greater Israel Project is an integral part of US foreign policy, the New Middle East, to expand US unipolar supremacy through the fracturing and balkanization of the Middle East. It is supported by NATO and largely by Saudi Arabia.
In March 2023, Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, caused regional uproar when he presented the map of Greater Israel at a conference in Paris, during which he also claimed, “There is no such thing as Palestinian people.” The map showed Jordan and the West Bank within Israel’s borders. The timing of the October 7th events in relation to the imminent normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is also important to note.
From Netanyahu’s perspective, this rapprochement was a means to increasing Israel’s foothold in the Middle East and confronting Iran. It would also have been a mortal wound for Palestinian justice and resistance movements.
Under Trump in 2017, Washington declared support of the Zionist illegal settlements, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and Israeli sovereignty over the Syrian Jolan territories unlawfully annexed in 1967. Under Biden, there has been some shift in the narrative—that Washington endorses the Israeli annexation of the entire Jordan River Valley and the illegal settlements gradually consuming the West Bank.
The Oded Yinon Plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel must, first of all, become an imperial regional power, and, two, must effect the division of the whole area into small states by the dissolution of all existing Arab states. The Zionist strategy is that sectarian states would become incorporated into Israel’s sphere of influence and would provide Israel with regional and moral legitimation.
Very recently, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant made it very clear that Israel has no choice but to pursue victory in order to survive. He said, “The feeling that we will soon stop is incorrect. Without a clear victory, we will not be able to live in the Middle East.” So this has become effectively an existential battle for survival between the Palestinian people and Israel and in the larger picture in the region.
Netanyahu, of course, needs victory in order to ensure his personal political survival and to avoid prosecution for corruption.
Bearing all this in mind, we can better understand the reaction of the region to the events that began on October the 7th. It is fully understood by the countries of the resistance axis, which include Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, that the US and Israel are seeking escalation in order to achieve their goal of destabilization and balkanization of the enemy states—to protect, of course, as Kennedy describes, the military garrison, which is Israel in the Middle East.
So, I’m going to look now at the escalation and provocation by US and Israel since December 2023. Of course, it’s been ongoing since October the 7th, particularly in the northern occupied territories on the border with Lebanon, but also in multiple aggressions against Syria by Israel.
On December the 25th, the house of the Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria, Brigadier-General Razi Mousavi, was targeted by Israel in the residential area of Sayeda Zeinab south of Damascus. It’s also a busy pilgrimage area for Shia Muslims and at that time, on Christmas Day, was packed with civilians. One of the longest-serving IRGC officers and a close friend of General Qasem Soleimani, assassinated in January 2020 under the Trump Administration, Mousavi was responsible for supporting the resistance front in Syria and the training of Palestinian resistance factions inside Syria.
Israel regularly targets Syrian Arab Army positions. We are actually expecting an attack tonight, so if you hear anything incoming, there’s nothing I can do about it if they do come in relatively close to me. And they have attacked artillery and air defense positions in Syria and targeted the civilian airports of Aleppo and Damascus multiple times in 2023 under the pretext of eliminating Iranian forces or influence inside Syria. It is a clear attempt to reduce Syrian defense and even offense capability in the event of escalation—rarely reported in Western media.
On the 2nd of January, targeting Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, Israel assassinated Hamas deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri, who was also instrumental in the creation of the Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas. This was the first strike in Dahiyeh, in southern Beirut, since the 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah.
Now, before Christmas, the Zionist regime officials had been increasing the threats against Lebanon and Hezbollah. Netanyahu had threatened publicly to turn Beirut into Khan Younis, which is in the south of Gaza, if Hezbollah refused to withdraw north of the Litani River. Israel invoked UN Resolution 1701, which was introduced after the 2006 War to guarantee no weapons or militants south of the Litani River in the hope of bringing the US into conflict, which has failed. Hezbollah has always refused to withdraw from the south, and their long-range and short-range weapons are not clustered only in the south but throughout Lebanon. So, this is largely an exercise in escalating the conflict with Hezbollah.
After the strike in the capital city of Beirut, Secretary-General of Hezbollah Syed Hassan Nasrallah has vowed to retaliate to the point where sufficient deterrence is reinstated against further Israel attacks on Beirut.
Yesterday sixty-two missiles were fired at Meron air base in the northern occupied territory. Meron base is responsible for all air operations towards Syria, Lebanon, and the northern part of the eastern Mediterranean. It also constitutes the major center for electronic jamming operations in these zones and it’s believed to be the base that would’ve directed the strikes on al-Arouri in Beirut. This is considered to be only phase one of the retaliation by Hezbollah.
Lebanon itself has filed a complaint with the UN Security Council over the killing of al-Arouri, calling it the most dangerous phase of Israeli attacks on the country.
A local journalist writing for the Cradle Media, Hassan Illaik: “Tel Aviv’s assessment of a war with Lebanon is based on its reading that Hezbollah wishes to prevent a major confrontation at any cost. Not only is this calculus wrong, but it has also muddled Israeli minds to the point where this may itself lead to the outbreak of a destructive war between the two sides.”
Illaik also points out that we’ve had three stages so far of Zionist aggression against Gaza, but I would also say against West Bank.
Stage one is the obliteration of northern Gaza, which Atif has referred to, and the slower destruction of the West Bank.
Stage two is the occupation of strategic areas in southern Gaza, which is supposedly in the safe zone, where more than one million displaced Palestinians have been forced to gather in appalling conditions and still under Zionist bombardment.
The IOF [Israeli Occupation Forces] withdrawal from Gaza does not signal the end of the war on Gaza. Many regional analysts believe that reducing the pace of the ground war on Gaza is a prelude to an Israeli war on Lebanon. And we’re certainly seeing an escalation on the northern occupied Palestine front, where an estimated 230,000 Zionist settlers have been forced to flee the settlements on the border with Lebanon.
There’s a belief that Israel is implementing a US decision to push the war into a third phase before the end of January 2024.
This requires the war to be lowered in intensity to distract from the mass slaughter and brutal ethnic cleansing of civilians in Gaza and of course coincides with the case that’s being brought into the ICJ by South Africa.
On the 3rd of January a terrorist attack was carried out in Tehran, in Iran, targeting civilians at the burial place of Qasem Soleimani on the fourth anniversary of his assassination.
More than 173 were injured and 84 killed in the attack. ISIS has officially taken responsibility, but as it’s well documented that the terrorist group is a proxy both of the US and an asset for Israel in the region to a large degree, it does raise the question as to whose hands were actually behind the attack.
Finally, on the 4th of January, the US targeted the deputy head of operations of the Popular Mobilisation Forces [also known as Popular Mobilisation Units], the PMU, in Baghdad. Mushtaq Taleb al-Saeedi was killed in the strike on PMU headquarters in eastern Baghdad. One other was killed in the attack and six injured in the drone strike.
The US claimed it was in retaliation for the Islamic resistance of Iraq’s attack on US military bases in Iraq and Syria. The bases in Syria, of course, are illegal under international law.
There have been 118 attacks by the Islamic resistance since October the 7th. So, in ten days, the US-Israeli alliance has struck targets in Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, and Iran.
I’m just going to bring back the map of Syria. It’s a relatively old map—probably about a month old. But I just wanted to point out that Syria’s position in the resistance axis is particularly fragile. With the US triggering attacks by ISIS from the Al-Tanf base, which is in the southeastern section of Syria, these attacks have intensified since October the 7th, particularly against Syrian Arab Army positions in the central desert area of Syria. The northwestern area of Idlib is effectively under the control of armed groups dominated by Al Qaeda, who have also intensified their attacks on civilian areas of northern Hama, but also against Syrian Arab Army positions in northern Latakia and western Aleppo. All of these attacks, again, have increased since October the 7th.
What Syria has done is to open up its territory to Palestinian resistance factions and to the Islamic resistance to carry out attacks against US or Israeli targets—Israeli targets predominantly, of course, in the occupied Jolan territories.
And it’s worth noting that Russia is increasing its observation posts on the border with the occupied Jolan territories.
It’s also worth noting that the emergency Arab League summit that was called very early on into the Israeli aggression against Gaza—the proposal that was put forward by Syria, Yemen, Palestine, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and Qatar was vetoed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. The primary elements of that proposal were:
(1) preventing the use of American and other military bases in Arab countries to supply Israel with weapons and ammunition,
(2) freezing Arab diplomatic economic security and military relations with Israel,
(3) threatening to use oil and Arab economic capabilities to pressure to stop the aggression for preventing Israeli civil aviation from flying in Arab airspace.
So, that very strong proposal was effectively vetoed and watered down by the countries that have [normalized] or are on the verge of normalization with Israel.
Finally, I want to come to Yemen, where there is also an area of increased tension, bringing the US alliance closer to conflict with Iran and closer to confrontation with Yemeni forces, or Ansarullah, a coalition resistance movement and the de facto government of Yemen, often described in Western media rather euphemistically as the Houthis.
What I describe as “the coalition of the unwilling” put out a joint statement. The coalition now consists of the US, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and, of course, the UK.
In the wording of part of their statement, they made it very clear what their priority actually is here. It’s [concern over] the loss of 15% of global seaborne trade, which passes through the Red Sea, including 8% of global grain trade, 12% of seaborne-traded oil, and 8% of the world’s liquefied natural gas trade. International shipping companies continue to reroute their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant costs and weeks of delayed delivery of goods, and ultimately jeopardizing the movement of critical food, fuel, and humanitarian assistance throughout the world. 15% of world trade passes through the Suez Canal.
The Africa route around the Cape of Good Hope is 60% more expensive, according to some analysts, and two weeks longer or three weeks, as Atif mentioned. The inevitable knock-on effect will be an increase in energy prices, already hiked as a result of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. And there’s also predicted to be a shortage in energy and grain supply.
The northern sea route, of course, is controlled by Russia, which currently is effectively at war with NATO and the EU in Ukraine.
As with Ukraine, the impact will be greatest on the EU. As a result, EU Commission Foreign Minister Josep Borrell has been trying to negotiate a settlement with Hezbollah to prevent escalation with Israel, to no avail, as Hezbollah is not prepared to withdraw north of the Litani River to comply with Israel’s demands.
From the Yemeni standpoint, as millions poured onto the streets of the capital of Sanaa to protest the genocide in Gaza, they are effectively fulfilling their responsibility under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, which again, Richard mentioned—which is the obligation to prevent genocide, and even to punish genocide to some degree. The blockade of occupied Palestine-bound ships in the Red Sea will end when the genocide or campaign against Palestinian ends and the siege is lifted on Gaza.
Now, the map that I’m showing here shows the conglomeration of the coalition ships, the US ships, the Iranian warships that are now entering—even Chinese ships. And I think here is where I would identify—and a few people have agreed with me—there is a potential for a false flag, the potential of seeing an event which might facilitate some kind of escalation, particularly against Yemen and potentially, of course, against Iran, which is seen very much as being the backer of the Ansarullah activities.
All members of the resistance axis are responding to extreme provocation with restraint in order to draw Israeli deeper into the quagmire of a failed ground war in Gaza and the multiple-front war currently being waged without overt US involvement. Of course, they are providing the bombs: 65,000 tons of explosives to date have been dropped on Gaza. They are helping with logistics and with funding. Delta forces have been identified as operating alongside the IOF. And, of course, they’ve given a tacit green light for Israel’s criminal military adventurism and genocide in Palestine, while actively involved in the targeting of resistance commandos and the triggering of proxies, including ISIS and Iraq in Syria and the increase of their own military footprint in Israel—particularly in the Negev Desert, in Iraq, and in Syria.
Lebanon-based journalist Sharmine Narwani has recently written about the fact that Arab perceptions have shifted dramatically over Israel’s war on Gaza, with popular sentiment gravitating to those states and actors perceived to be actively supporting Palestinian goals and away from those who are perceived to support Israel.
She says:
“But if the confrontation between the two axes escalates, Arab perceptions will almost certainly continue to tilt away from the old hegemons towards those who are willing to resist this assault on the region.
“There will be no relief for Washington and its allies as the war expands. The more they work to defeat Hamas and destroy Gaza, the more they lob missiles at Yemen, Iraq, and Syria and besiege the resistance axis, the more likely Arab populations are to shrug off the Sunni versus Shia, Iran versus Arab, secular versus Islamist narratives that have kept the region divided and at odds for decades . . .”
— which is where I come back to this emergence of a neo-Pan-Arabism we’ve seen in the last twelve months.
She also says:
“The swell of support that is mobilizing due to a righteous confrontation against the region’s biggest oppressors is unstoppable. Western decline is now a given in the region, but Western discourse has been the first casualty of this war.”
I will end there with some positive news, I hope.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you, Vanessa, for that fascinating overview of what is happening—well, not really an overview. There’s a lot of detail in there. Clearly, we’re at a very, very dangerous juncture at this point in time, which we’ll possibly come back to.
Richard Falk is an international law and international relations scholar who taught at Princeton University for forty years. Since 2002 he has lived in Santa Barbara, California, and taught at the local campus of the University of California in Global and International Studies and since 2005 chaired the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He initiated this blog partly in celebration of his 80th birthday.