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The Gaza Tribunal: Law, Conscience, and Compassion

5 Nov

[Prefatory Note: The Gaza Tribunsl of which I am President had a successful Launch meeting with many of its members of its Advisory Policy Council. As the article below  in the Palestine Chronicle notes, the aim of the Tribunal is or legitimize and encourage civil society solidarity initiatives around the world such as BDS. It does make the underlying argument that when the intergovernmental structures of world order fail to implement the UN Charter and international law, then the peoples of the world have the responsibility and opportunity to do so. This is an appeal for citizen engagement on behalf of humanity, and in this instance, in support of the Palestinian struggle for basic. We seek and need the support of persons of conscience and concern everywhere!]  

‘Court of Humanity and Conscience’ – Gaza Tribunal Launched in London 

November 5, 2024 News

A group of people sitting at a table

Description automatically generatedThe Gaza Tribunal was launched in London. (Design: Palestine Chronicle)

By Palestine Chronicle Staff  

“Why establish a People’s Tribunal despite the International Court of Justice’s involvement? Because the international order has failed its duty—the ICJ, even after defining Israel’s actions as genocide, cannot enforce its rulings.”

A group of renowned intellectuals, jurists, artists, human rights advocates, and representatives from the media and civil society organizations gathered in London last week, to launch the Gaza Tribunal – an independent initiative serving as a “court of humanity and conscience.”

“Gaza represents a breaking point in the historical journey of humanity, where a global system based on power, not justice, prevails,” the Gaza Tribunal website states. “Based on this perspective, the need to address what is happening in Gaza through its historical, political, philosophical, and legal dimensions is becoming an urgent, necessary duty for humanity.”

Led by Richard Falk, a distinguished international law expert and former UN special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, the tribunal is taking an alternative route to international justice, aiming to spotlight voices from civil society in the examination of abuses following the conflict that escalated after the October 7 Resistance operation.

Why the Need?

Despite the genocide case against Israel currently underway at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the initiative is seen as a People’s Tribunal.

“The international order’s failure in fulfilling its duty is exactly why a people’s tribunal is needed. The International Court of Justice, despite designating Israel’s current war as a genocide, is unable to enforce its rulings,” the website states.

The Gaza Tribunal, which convened for two days of initial preparatory meetings in London, brought together around 100 participants.

Who is Involved?

Some who attended the London meeting include Ilan Pappe, Jeff Halper, Ussama Makdisi, Ayhan Citil, Cornel West, Avi Shlaim, Naomi Klein, Aslı Bali, Mahmood Mamdani, Craig Mokhiber, Hatem Bazian, Mehmet Karlı, Sami Al-Arian, Frank Barat, Hassan Jabareen, Willy Mutunga, Victor Kattan, and Victoria Brittain.

Among the participating organizations were Law for Palestine, the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network, the Arab Network for Food Sovereignty (APN), Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Palestinian human rights organization Al-Haq, BADIL, Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, the prisoner support and human rights group Addameer, and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR).

What are Its Objectives?

The Gaza Tribunal has two main objectives: one particular and one universal. The particular goal is to assist in bringing the tragic events to an end as soon as possible and to hold the perpetrators accountable in the public conscience.

The universal aim is to issue a decision grounded in humanity’s intellectual and moral values, one that can serve as a reference to prevent future atrocities worldwide.

Dwelling on the multi-dimensional underpinnings of the fact that such grave events can, have, and still occur at this point in human history, the Tribunal aims to explain why humanity has been unable to put a stop to such atrocities/how humanity can put a stop to such atrocities.

According to the website, the Tribunal’s “legitimacy comes from addressing the long-standing wounds of the Palestinian issue, with a focus on the ongoing tragedy in Gaza.”

The Outcome

The comprehensive document to be created by the Tribunal after all these investigations and evaluations will fill a critical gap that the nations have realized and will serve as a guiding document for all the world’s nations, states the website.

How Tribunal Operates

According to its website, the Gaza Tribunal mainly consists of the Presidential Committee, the Grand Chamber and 3 Specialized Chambers and six Administrative and Supportive Units.

Acting as a jury of conscience, the Grand Chamber of the Tribunal will consist of all committees’ members and around ten invited people as well. Additionally, jurists, academicians, artists, and intellectuals who have been recognized but have not served on these chambers may also be included in the Public Session Members. The Public Sessions make decisions by a majority rule. Having each member’s opinion be reflected in the decision is essential, and each member has the right to write positive, negative, or differing opinions to be appended to the decision.

Each chamber will consist of five to six members. These members will be among the renowned people in their respective fields. The chambers will discuss and arrive at decisions within their specific areas of discussion, including International Law Chamber, International Relations and World Order Chamber and  History, Ethics, and Philosophy Chamber.

Given the Tribunal’s purpose of drawing attention to the genocide happening in Gaza, the aim is to have the physical sessions of each chamber be broadcast live on such international media channels as TRT World, Associated Press and Al Jazeera.

It will also be comprised of Administrative and Supportive Units.

Administrative Units ensure the efficient and proper functioning of the Tribunal and provide the necessary conditions for fair decision-making. Supportive Units, created at the discretion of the Presidential Committee, facilitate steps that contribute to the achievement of the Tribunal’s objectives.

Inclusivity and Accessibility

In a statement, the tribunal emphasized its commitment to inclusivity and accessibility, inviting Palestinian civil society groups and individuals directly affected by the conflict to submit evidence and testimony, the Anadolu news agency reported.

This body, organizers said, aimed to fill a gap by focusing on the human impact of Israel’s policies and actions on Palestinian civilians.

Beyond addressing recent events, the tribunal’s legal framework will integrate themes of settler-colonialism and apartheid, contextualizing its findings within the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict and historic events such as the 1948 Nakba and Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories post-1967.

According to the organizers, the Gaza Tribunal “derives its power and authority not from governments but from the people in general and Palestinians in particular, that uses the intellectual and conscientious accumulation of humanity, with which anyone with common sense can agree and that can produce judgments and documents to which one can refer regarding future problems.”

Second Phase

According to organizers, the Gaza Tribunal’s second phase is scheduled for May 2025 in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where prepared reports, witness statements, and draft declarations will be shared with the public.

Representatives of affected communities and expert witnesses are expected to speak at the Sarajevo session.

The tribunal’s main hearing, a crucial part of the initiative, is planned for October 2025 in Istanbul, Türkiye.

In Istanbul, an expert panel will present a draft of the tribunal’s findings and decisions, incorporating testimonies from witnesses and statements from Palestinian civilians and organizations affected by the crisis.

Ongoing Genocide

Flouting a UN Security Council resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire, Israel has faced international condemnation amid its continued brutal offensive on Gaza.

Currently on trial before the International Court of Justice for genocide against Palestinians, Israel has been waging a devastating war on Gaza since October 7.

According to Gaza’s Ministry of Health, 43,391 Palestinians have, to date, been killed, and 102,347 wounded.

Moreover, at least 11,000 people are unaccounted for, presumed dead under the rubble of their homes throughout the Strip.

Israel says that 1,200 soldiers and civilians were killed during the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation on October 7. Israeli media published reports suggesting that many Israelis were killed on that day by ‘friendly fire’.

Millions Displaced

Palestinian and international organizations say that the majority of those killed and wounded are women and children.

The Israeli war has resulted in an acute famine, mostly in northern Gaza, resulting in the death of many Palestinians, mostly children.

The Israeli aggression has also resulted in the forceful displacement of nearly two million people from all over the Gaza Strip, with the vast majority of the displaced forced into the densely crowded southern city of Rafah near the border with Egypt – in what has become Palestine’s largest mass exodus since the 1948 Nakba.

Later in the war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians began moving from the south to central Gaza in a constant search for safety.

(PC, Anadolu)

ONUMA-san’s WORLD

27 May

 

[Prefatory Note: The following text was published in May 2018 in the Yale Journal of International Law. Professor ONUMA’s text is the best comprehensive treatment of international law, and additionally raises crucial questions about the legitimating impact of a transcivilizational approach, which implies dewesternization as international law up to this point evolved as an instrument for regulating relations among Western sovereign states and exerting hegemonic control over the non-Western members of international society. An indispensable book.]

 

 

International Law in a Transcivilizational World. By ONUMA Yasuaki. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

 

 

A Transivilizational Perspective?

 

Professor ONUMA Yasuaki, long considered among the most eminent of international law scholars of our time, has made a clarion call in recent years for what he calls “a transcivilizational approach” to the study and appreciation of international law. Onuma san[*]is judicious in balancing the contributions of international law to a more humane world order against its limitations in regulating behavior from the perspective of peace, sustainability, and equity or justice. What Onuma san has given us in the book under review is a magisterial treatise that provides the best available pedagogic foundation currently available for the study of international law as a discipline. Although clearly written, it is demanding because of its jurisprudential sophistication, historically grounded doctrinal assessments, and comprehensive treatment of the major legal issues on the current global policy agenda.

 

A few years ago, in an apparent effort to reinforce his Japanese identity, Onuma san wrote to friends and colleagues, requesting that they address him as “ONUMA (or Onuma) san” in accord with Japanese protocol, and even if closely associated, refrain from the Western habit of calling friends by their first names, that is, “Yasuaki.” I suspect that this outstanding scholarly contribution is also an outgrowth of such a maturing of Onuma san’s psycho-political consciousness, resting on an insistence that the future legitimacy and effectiveness of international law will depend on whether it can overcome what Onuma san calls its West-centric bias and orientation.

 

For many years I worked rather closely with another leading, now deceased, Japanese scholar, Yoshikazu Sakamoto, in a multi-civilizational project, the World Order Models Project.[1]  What makes this reference relevant is that Sakamoto’s preoccupation, alone among the dozen or so participating scholars from around the world representing a wide range of legal traditions and policy priorities, was focused on “identity” as the prime world order challenge of the late twentieth-century post-colonial world. It makes me wonder now whether there is something about Japanese cultural sensitivity in the period since the end of World War II that seeks to find a distinctive path into the “lifeworld” (Habermas) that is authentically faithful to the Japanese national circumstance, yet (i) maintains its intellectual and emotional distance from the United States/Europe and China and (ii) possesses the transnational tools and accompanying outlook needed to solve the challenges facing what Onuma san calls “humankind,” which seems an apparent move in the direction of feminist political correctness, scrapping the more familiar terminology of “mankind.”

 

Onuma san appears somewhat anguished, not only by a keen awareness of the inherent “impossibility” of achieving a genuine transcivilizatonal approach, given the dominance of Euro-American civilization in the evolution of international law and world order, but also by his own intellectual formation. In his words, “I am just one of many modern persons whose intellectual personality has been constructed by modern European civilization.” He adds, “I am a hybrid being, only part of which is an Asian or Japanese” (p. 7). In another passage Onuma san, almost in a confessional idiom writes, “We are all children of Grotius, Kant and Marx, and therefore ‘Europeans’ in the figurative sense”(p. 13).[2]

 

He does modify this assertion by the observation that “contemporary members of humankind are also children of Buddha, Confucius, Mohammad, and many other non-Western thinkers.” (p. 13). I really do have some doubts about this unsubstantiated claim, which would seem to suggest that we are all, to some extent, transcivilizational without even realizing it. As a sympathetic reader, I find these non-Western influences hard to find either in Onuma san’s treatment of international law or in my own thinking about comparable issues. To be sure, there is presently a disposition toward humane solutions of global problems and the encouragement of peaceful approaches to international disputes and conflict situations, but such views seem similarly rooted in Western humanist traditions of thought and not necessarily a reflection the influence of non-Western philosophical wisdom.

 

One feature of Onuma san’s approach that cuts across the grain of typical international law theorizing is his insistence on understanding present reality by adopting a historical approach to international legal doctrine and norms. Onuma san lets us know rather starkly that he has “learned far more from modern European works published from the sixteenth century to the early twentieth century than from post-World War II theories” (p. 13). He does not engage directly with contemporary international law theorizing in the course of his seven-hundred-plus page book, which is somewhat puzzling, since Onuma san’s perspective focuses on the impact of recent events, especially the collapse of European colonialism, followed by the international participation and economic growth of the non-West, especially of Asian countries.  Onuma san strongly believes that these altered material conditions in the character of international relations must make some fundamental adjustments to the nature of international law if it is to gain the global legitimacy required to be effective (p. 53).

 

Such a concern seems particularly timely in view of the helplessness of the international order to bring peace and stability to the Middle East or to overcome the legal nihilism of a new crop of political leaders, highlighted by the lawlessness of the Trump presidency.

 

Reflecting personally on such concerns, I realize that I am less hybrid than Onuma san, although I completely agree with his aspirational insistence on transcivilizational authenticity for both historical and practical reasons. I suspect that I am less hybrid because my Western embeddedness takes for granted questions of identity and perspective, which has led my critical energies to express themselves as an internal critic of Western civilization. I am sure that this non-self-consciousness, when it comes to civilizational identity, also follows from the way international law is studied in the United States and Europe, employing an ahistorical jurisprudence rooted in Western values and universalizing pretensions, as well as resting on similar conceptions of the international political context. Although I have been a critic of the way Western policymakers continue to manipulate international law to rationalize a belligerent foreign policy, I have not thought of these dangerous shortcomings as projections of civilizational values but rather as a matter of indulging an insatiable geopolitical appetite.[3]

 

Turning to substance, Onuma san’s treatment of international law is convincingly grounded in the sociopolitical realities of our time, making it hard to dissent from the lessons he draws. Onuma san places stress on the fact that ninety percent of the world’s peoples are non-Western, and that power relations are changing in ways that favor Asia and diminish the political and economic dominance of the West on a materiallevel. Yet—and here is where Onuma san’s call for change in approach and content becomes most relevant—he anticipates (in a rather complex and somewhat confusing manner) that there will be a continued dominance of Western ideationalinfluence, which he believes will persist deep into the twenty-first century, even in the likely event that China becomes the world’s largest economy. Whether Onuma’s prediction will hold in the event that Trump’s policy of relinquishing global leadership persists is quite uncertain.

 

 

Conceptualizing International Law

 

Onuma san is very clear about how he understands basic issues bearing on the nature and effectiveness of international law. He blames what he calls “domestic model thinking” for a frequent underestimation of the effectiveness and importance of international law to the maintenance of an orderly world. In effect, the weak institutionalization of authority and lack of enforcement capabilities overlook the degree to which State actors and a variety of non-State actors benefit from a stable normative environment that encourages compliance, reliability, and moderation. Onuma san makes the frequently overlooked point that violations of domestic law are common without drawing into question the reality of the legal order. We must learn to evaluate international law in relation to the specific functions it performs given its State-centric modes of operation.

 

Unlike domestic law, international law is less focused on regulating behavior than in a series of other undertakings that Onuma san enumerates as “prescriptive, adjudicative, justificatory, legitimating, communicative, rule declaratory, and constructive (or constitutive)” (pp. 30, 585). These functions have more to do with the conduct of statecraft, civic activism, and policy planning than they do with governmental adherence to rules. In this vein, Onuma san is critical of the parallel tendency of international jurists to emphasize adjudication in their presentation of the field. This emphasis exaggerates the relevance that tribunals and judicial decisions have to the diverse modes by which international law fulfills its various functions.

 

Not surprisingly, Onuma san credits this more existentially-grounded appreciation of international law to his work outside the classroom and library, mentioning specifically his work as “a human rights activist and as an advisor to a member of the Japanese cabinet” (p. 8). In effect, Onuma san wants us to understand that it is in these non-judicial settings of advocacy and advising that the guidelines associated with international law often make their most significant contribution. What Onuma san proposes for the study of international law is a less academically oriented understanding and more of a practitioners’viewpoint.

 

Again I am struck by the tensions between Onuma san’s erudition and reliance on political philosophy (especially, Hobbes, Kant, Machiavelli, Karl Schmitt, even Marx), as well as early modern juridical works (especially, Grotius), which stand in contrast to his experiential unbookish insistence on comprehending the scope and functioning of international law by contact with the doingrather than by parsing the nuances of doctrineas enunciated by the judges of the International Court of Justice or the elaborate pontifications of leading jurists. In a similar spirit, Onuma san downplays the constraining role of international law, particularly relating to the behavior of major States, insisting that if a legal system works well, disputes are generally avoided, and behavioral guidelines are invisibly respected as a matter of course or to satisfy national interests.

 

Another feature of Onuma san’s approach is the avoidance of idealism and legalism in his assessment of what to expect with respect to the links between international law and justice: “[T]he work of international law is in an irrational world where voices seeking justice are often ignored. It is sad to recognize such a reality, but one should not escape from it” (p. 28). In this spirit, which seems more in keeping with a variety of skeptical twentieth-century European thinkers than with a manifestation of non-Western thinking, Onuma san describes himself as “a pessimist in approach” whose advice is “to doubt everything, including one’s own sense, intuitions, premises, and understandings, based on his or her past study and experience”(pp. 28-29).[4]

 

There are many thoughtful reflections offered by Onuma san as to the development of international law over time—and particularly the emergence of the territorially-oriented European system of sovereign states and its globalization in the past several decades. This transformation of international law reflects both the success of the anti-colonial movement—the greatest pushback ever experienced by the West as a global system—and the essential acceptance of this European way of organizing international relations by the newly independent States of Asia and Africa. This erosion and extension of Euro-centricism has made international law “less imperialistic, racist, male-centric” and hence more globally legitimate (p. 85). At the same time, there is much more to be done in the ideational sphere to attain Onuma san’s transcivilizational goals. He is acutely aware that most writings on international law continue to be reflections predominantly of the Western mentality. This civilizational provincialism will not be overcome until “global discursive space” exhibits a greater responsiveness to the civilizational outlook of the new demographic and normative balances that are heavily weighted in favor of non-Western peoples.

 

Onuma san’s views here do encourage greater self-reflection and self-criticism by those of us who are representative of the West, and this is good. In some ironic sense, for this reason I find Onuma san’s treatise potentially more valuable for Western readers than for others. I suspect that the Asian scholarly community, especially after twenty years of anti-Western critiques asserting the relevance of “Asian values,” needs no coaching by Onuma san as to the desirability of a transcivilizational perspective.

 

I also find that some confusion surrounds the post-Cold geopoliticalappropriation of human rights, narrowly understood in the West as civil and political rights and invoked as a pretext for military interventions in such non-Western countries as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. In other words, in the post-colonial and post-Cold War world, the West has sought to retain its global role by claiming the high moral ground, creating an entitlement to override non-intervention and self-determination norms that are given priority by most non-Western states.

 

This development raises two relevant concerns. First, the West claims that the human rights discourse is transcivilizational in character, by its linkage of rights to the generic quality of being “human,” even though its formulations are beholden to Western liberalism. Secondly, the relevance of the continued Westernized dominance of force projection, a salient material reality largely under the aegis of the United States, seems not sufficiently appreciated by Onuma san in his long final chapter on the strenuous efforts of international law—as set forth most authoritatively in the UN Charter—to restrict recourse by States to force. It would appear that this central feature of the global security system raises some serious unanswered questions about the materialdecline of the West. We still live in a world where all debates and practice pertaining to intervention continue to be discussions about whether the West should intervene in the non-West, and never the reverse.[5]

 

 

A Concluding Assessment

 

There are thoughtful and analytically rigorous chapters on the main themes of international law, each of which warrants extensive comments beyond the limits of this review. In general, rather than a transcivilizational view, what I find more consistently present is an interpretation of the substance of international law from a global perspective that privileges the humaninterest, yet is restrained by Onuma san’s form of pessimistic realism that is sensitive to the primacy of a State-centric world order that rests on the interaction of egoistic nationalinterests.

 

To illustrate the accelerating pace of history, Onuma san’s treatise was published before the world was gripped by a populist backlash in politics that has reversed prior democratizing trends. This has produced a surge of chauvinistic nationalisms and a series of elected leaders with autocratic governing styles in some of the world’s most influential countries, including Russia, India, Japan, Brazil, Turkey, and the United States. In addition, the worst nuclear crises in fifty years have threatened catastrophe on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the Middle East with respect to Iran. Beyond this, the Trump presidency has deprived the world of leadership with respect to major issues requiring global cooperation, such as climate change, global migration and treatment of refugees, and famine conditions in several countries. These issues call for what might be considered a meta-civilizational approach that addresses current global challenges on the basis of shared human interests. In my view, Onuma san provides the outlook and understanding that would encourage such enlightened behavior, but it is only presented as a sub-text and is perhaps overshadowed by the less substantiated claim that this treatise provides a transnationalized approach to international law traditions that still prevail under the ideationalhegemony of the West despite its partial loss of materialistleverage due to the rise of the non-West.

 

Despite my quibbles here and there, this is a great book that deserves study by all those concerned about the past, present, and future of international law. Every serious student of the subject can hardly get along without meeting the various challenges posed and interpretations offered by Onuma san in the course of this all-encompassing treatise.

 

Onuma makes a stirring final appeal that is worth pondering: “International law is an indispensable meansfor people to realize the material and spiritual well-being of humanity. As such, people should constantly press national governments, international organizations, and other subjects to respect and abide by it” (p. 666). I find this kind of profession of faith in the importance of international law to be a compelling conclusion, including its unexplained yet resonant reference to “spiritual well-being.” This may be the most indispensable element of all!

 

 

 

 

 

 

[*]Professor ONUMA Yasuaki has requested that his name appear, in keeping with Japanese tradition, as ONUMA or Onuma san.

[1]See On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990s(Saul H. Mendlovitz ed., 1975).

[2]Elsewhere, Onuma san suggests that his intellectual personality was also formed by Buddhist and Confucian thought operating on an “unconscious level” (p. 7). I am puzzled by what is meant in this regard with respect to the concrete pattern of opinions and judgments offered in the course of this most comprehensive study of international law.

[3]My own approach to these issues is most recently set forth in Richard Falk, Power Shift: On the New Global Order(2016).

[4]Perhaps, as a gesture to a transcivilizational approach, Onuma san concludes this line of thought with the following quotation of Confucius: “[I]t should be a pleasure to learn and review constantly and repeatedly” (p. 29). I read such advice as not an expression of pessimism or wisdom from the East but, on the contrary, the near-universal view that learning should be a satisfying lifelong activity that allows ideas and opinions to remain alive so long as they do not become dogma.

[5]This persistence of Western dominance in the security domain does not alter my belief that the unlearned lesson of the Vietnam War is the declining capacity of Western military superiority to control the political outcomes in non-Western contexts. For discussion, see Revisiting the Vietnam War: The Views and Interpretations of Richard Falk (Stefan Andersson ed., 2017).