Prefatory Note This post is a much modified, updated version of my responses to questions posed Murat Sofuoglu, a Turkish journalist associated with TRT World. The dehistoricizing and decontextualization of the Hamas attack of October 7 was spread around the world by the most influential global media platforms and political leaders of the liberal democracies, and led to widespread sympathy for Israel and some months of tolerance of their response despite its legally and ethically unacceptable character. As such the Israeli response was initially sanitized by regarding Palestinian grievances in Gaza as irrelevent, and also by uncritically accepting Israeli hasbara that its response to the Hamas attack was solely motivated by security and counter-terrorist considerations, and thus disconnected from the Greater Israel priority and preoccupations of the Netanyahu coalition that came to power at the start of 2023 or more than nine months before the attack.]
1. Has the Israeli model to secure Jews a homeland in Palestine failed?
I think it is misleading to refer to the Zionist Project in the singular and by reference to ‘a homeland’ as originally pledged in the Balfour Declaration issued in 1917. The minimum pre-1948 goal of world Zionism was to create a Jewish supremist state in Israel with an unlimited right of returns for Jews from anywhere in the world, and the denial of such an equivalent right to the Palestinians who were the native majority population. The Nakba that accompanied the 1948 War involved the forced expulsion from Palestine and permanent refugee/exile status for of at least 700,000 non-Jewish residents of the portion of Palestine set aside for Israel by the partition resolution of 29 November 1947 UN GA Res. 181. Israeli expulsion politics exhibited the Zionist intention in the fog of war was to ensure a long-term Jewish majority settler population that would enable Israel to claim credibly in its early years to be both Jewish and democratic, the latter proving to become
overwhelmed by the apartheid regime that was convincingly delimited as such over the course of the last decade. The occupation was fully documented as a type of apartheid violating the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. This assessment was validated by comprehensive reports, filled with data, prepared by ESCWA, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Israeli NGO, B’Tselem.
Prefiguring the response of the governments of most liberal democracies was the failure to express any adverse reactions to Israeli apartheid despite their earlier support for the global anti-apartheid movement that exerted so much pressure on the South African government that it pleasantly surprised the world by releasing Nelson Mandela from prison and proceeding rapidly to become a constitutional democracy incorporating legal commitments to racial equality. Why was there no negative international response to Israeli apartheid? At the very least the apartheid assessments should have led to a demand that Israel withdraw from Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem.
Even earlier, the most that the US Government could manage to say about the relentless expansion of unlawful settlements that ‘it was unhelpful.’ At first, Western governments were reluctant to be even mildly critical of Israel because of their own failure to do more by way of opposition to the Holocaust, inducing a debilitating sense of guilt made more potent by Israel’s domination of the public discourse subtly facilitated by a racist dehumaniization of the Palestinian other as an Orientalized inferior people when compared to the rapid modernizing prevailing temperament in the new Jewish state.
The UN contributed to the Palestinian tragedy by initially proposing partition of a previously colonized national entity without bothering to consult the Arab majority population residing in Palestine that would have certainly been opposed to lending legitimacy to such a fracturing of their homeland. But the Palestinians were never given a chance to vote in a referendum on partition, which itself was an ahistorical imposition of UK colonial interest and methods of control by a logic of ‘divide and rule.’
This post-1945 tragedy was compounded and prefigured the future ordeals of the Palestinian people by the failure to at least secure the promised Palestinian state of equal status to Israel before legitimating Israel’s claims to statehood by diplomatic recognition and admission to the UN as a member sovereign state. The 1967 War aggravated Palestinian grievances by. establishing Israeli de facto control by way of conquest over the Palestinian territories of East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza, again given unregulated de facto control by way of the doctrine of Belligerent Occupation, supposedly within a temporary and regulative international law framework set forth in the 4th Geneva Convention and the First Additional Protocol. Israel massively violated its terms of occupation in numerous fundamental ways from Day One. Perhaps, the most flagrant early expression of Israeli territorial unilateralism was its incorporation of East Jerusalem into sovereign Israel as ‘its eternal capital.’ This symbolic and substantive land-grabbing that included Islamic sacred sites has never to this day been accepted by the majority of states, and the Israeli move to establish Jerusalem as the Israeli capital was declared ‘null and void’ in an 2017 Emergency Session General Assembly Resolution (ES-1019) supported by a super-majority of Member states but opposed and then ignored by the US and the main states of NATO [the vote was 129-9-35 (abstentions).
The developments between 1967 and 2024 consolidated Israeli territorial ambitions in occupied Palestine by way of the extensive unlawful settlement movement, a coercive apartheid occupation regime that subjugated Palestinians living under prolonged occupation that culminated in the genocidal and ecocidal assault on Gaza that killed many in real time and totally devastated Gaza as a livable habitat. The settler colonial assessment of Israel disposing the majority native population resembled the pattern of the breakaway British colonials (US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) each of which, although New Zealand less so, implemented their colonial encroachments by genocidal tactics in response to resistance, and succeeded in establishing their flourishing and enduring state.
In retrospect, it seems obvious that Zionism, and since 1948, Israel itself pursued a two-track strategy: first, a public hasbara discourse that claimed moderation and pretended to seek a democratic polity and engage in a search for a political compromise on land rights, democracy, and human rights with the native population; secondly, a political strategy that opportunistically advanced by stages to realize the hard core Zionist Project of restoring Jewish exclusive control over the Biblically ‘promised land’ of Jewish tradition at a given time for what it could get by way of an expansionist vision with respect to Israel itself, neighboring countries, and regional geopolitics. Not only did the shadows cast by the Nazi Holocaust in the early years of Israel’s existence inhibit criticism of the settler colonial aspects of Israel’s approach to the indigenous non-Jewish residents of Palestine but Israel’s first political leader, David Ben Gurion a committed secularist, cynically declared ‘Let the Bible be our weapon,’ and in the process claimed a religious entitlement to all of historic Palestine as ‘the promised land’ of Jewish tradition, which has prevailed over the prime norm of colonial decline, that of the right of sef-determination.
After the 1967 War Israel became itself a partner in ‘colonialism after colonialism’ in the Middle East. There emerged a strategic relationship with the United States and Europe that embraced regional security, safeguarding oil and gas reserves for the West, and cooperating with respect to the containment of political Islam, especially after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). This US led geopolitical limitations imposed on regional autonomy were highlighted by the unprecedented US political commitment to ensure that Israel possessed a military capability to defeat any combination of regional adversaries. Such a willingness to indulge ‘Israeli exceptionalism’ with respect to regional security was dramatized by looking away while Israel covertly, with European active complicity not only became the sole nuclear weapons state in the Middle East but assumed the role of guardian of non-proliferation when it came to Iran. As Israel gained in strength and regional acceptance via the Abraham Accords reached in 2020 during the last months of the Trump presidency it seemed on a path that would end with a one-state solution under its sole and uncontested dominion.
As Israel gained in political acceptance and self-confidence it became less shy about revealing its nationalist agenda. The 2018 Basic Law, with a quasi-constitutional status, was forthright in claiming Israel as a Jewish State, with the Jewish people exclusively entitled to exercise the right of self-determination (ignoring the rights and relevance of the 20% of its population that was non-Jewish, and Hebrew was confirmed as the only official language. Even extreme Israeli apologists seemed reluctant to any longer claim, what was never true, that “Israel was the only democracy in the Middle East.” The net result as of late 2024 is that it is the Palestinians who have become unwelcome strangers in their own historic homeland. Israeli democracy, such as it has become, was clearly in practice and law ‘for Jews only.’ And again the Western patrons of Israel watched from the sidelines as Israel kept enlarging and disclosing its zero-sum vision of conflict resolution, and disregard of the US role as intermediary in the search for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.
2. What is Israel trying to achieve with its ongoing war campaign across the Middle East?
Again, we are challenged to deal with Israel’s mainly undisclosed intentions and what is disclosed is not trustworthy or a small part of the Israeli policy agenda motivating the enlargement of the combat zone. For greater insight we are forced to rely on conjecture to produce some kind of illuminating, yet plausible, interpretation. As with Gaza, Israel claims a right of self-defense. It seeks extra weight by insisting that its enemies are all sponsors or guilty of ‘terrorist’ violence’ and proxy engagements determined to undermine Israeli security, Even if we accept this line of argument Israel’s use of force in Lebanon is disproportional and indiscriminate, self-acknowledged and operationalized as an inflammatory application of the Dahiya Doctrine originally set forth in the Lebanon War of 1982. The Dahiya Doctrine was enunciated by a leading Israeli general, expressing the intention to retaliate disproportionately against security provocations threatening Israeli interests. The Gaza genocide can be viewed as a grotesque and maximal example of Dahiya thinking and practice, although specifically motivated by Israeli extraterritorial security priorities, ethnic cleansing, economic ambitions, regional paranoia, as well as its invariable dismissal of the genuine grievances and armed resistance of adversaries as invariably of a terrorist character.
In certain ethical respects the Dahiya Doctrine is an Israeli adaptation of the logic of deterrence that guided security policy of both US and USSR during Cold War. Its most salient feature was known as Mutual Assured Destruction (or to critics as MAD). Israel’s adaptation consisted of substituting the threat of genocide for that of nuclear retaliation. The core idea of deterrence is a credibly threatened unacceptably disproportionate response to any fundamental threat to strategic interests or to homeland security of the nuclear antagonists and their close allies.
There is no mutuality in Israel’s approach to deterrence, which is a generalized warning to its regional adversaries of dire results if they dare to attack or provoke Israel. Any regional state purporting to balance Israel hegemonic nuclear capabilities is projected as such a threat, which presupposes a geopolitical right to maintain Israel’s regional nuclear supremacy.
3. Do you think with the current campaign, the Netanyahu government aims to resolve once and for all the Jewish question, fixing Israel’s place in the Middle East?
It seems as though Israel has been expanding its combat objectives initially justified as retaliation against Hamas for the October 7 attack by adopting a proclaimed goal of exterminating Hamas. While pursuing this goal Israel engaged in such excessive and indiscriminate violence that its behavior was widely perceived as a transparent instance of genocide committed in real time and including a growing and increasingly activist minority in the civil societies of the Western countries, including many Jews, whose governments most ardently support Israel. Israel has suffered a near total loss of legitimacy as a normal state and is increasingly viewed as a pariah or rogue state to an extent exceeding the condemnation of even overtly racist and oppressive South Africa. This ended when the Pretoria government surprised the world by abandoning apartheid in the mid-1990s, apparently for pragmatic reasons associated with debilitating sanctions that limited South Africa’s participation in world society, including cultural and sporting boycotts that curtailed the freedoms of the ruling white minority.
Israel has handled this international hostility differently and more defiantly than South Africa, partly because it has had the benefit of strong geopolitical support from the governments of the Global West, especially the all-important US. Israel’s security is a matter of strategic importance to the West as a beachhead in the Middle East for the related purposes of ensuring access to oil and gas reserves of the region and containing the spread of political Islam. Thus, the increase of Israel’s war objectives to include Hezbollah, the Houthis, and of course Iran has also become a battleground in the Clash of Civilizations within the region and is a potent source of instability parallel to the incipient Second Cold War with China and Russia. Whether Israel, with Washington’s backing and probable participation will provoke war with Iran is one of the great uncertainties of this historical moment. Part of this uncertainty involves assessing the relevance of Netanyahu’s personal survival agenda and whether the Religious Right in the governing coalition will push these wider objectives to the point of regional war with dangerous geopolitical risks. An ethical imperative is also continues to be present– not to shift attention away from the ongoing acute human catastrophe entrapping the civilian population of Gaza in deliberately induced death threatening traumas of mass hunger and widespread disease.
What Israel does and refrains from doing in the next few weeks will have a major impact on the prospects for a peaceful future responsive to growing ecological challenges. This in turn may reflect the outcome of the US presidential elections, and how the new leadership handles this dangerous, fragile global situation that combines a prolonged humanitarian catastrophe, ethical and legal gross abuses of civilian innocence, and hazardous neglect of heightened risks of geopolitical encounters and ecological collapses.
[Prefatory Note: The text of an interview with an independent Turkish journalist, Naman Bakac, published in Turkey on Sept. 26, 2024. Somewhat modified for this online publication.]
1.Almost all fundamental rights and principles are clearly being violated in the Palestinian territories: from the right of Palestinians living in occupied lands to self-determination, to the right of representation, which leads to the murder, imprisonment, and exile of their freely elected representatives; from the right to shelter as tents are deliberately bombed, to the right to food as Palestinians are deliberately left to starve; from sexual abuse of prisoners to torture, and from there to the right to housing as homes are demolished. However, international law and the community have been unable to prevent these violations to date. What legal texts are missing to stop these systematic violations? Which institutions are absent? If legal texts, legal institutions, and decision-making mechanisms cannot resolve this, what other tools and methods should be activated to prevent these systematic violations of rights?
Response: The Palestinian ordeal is not a consequence of the shortage or inadequacy of legal norms or mechanisms for their enforcement. The primarily obstacle to imposing adverse consequences in reaction to gross and transparent Israeli criminality is one of political will, especially on the part of dominant states in the Global West and to a lesser extent on the part of leading Arab neighbors, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Egypt.
It is only countries from the Global South that have been willing to have recourse to the existing international judicial procedures, the ICJ and ICC. The ICJ, the judicial organ of the UN, has a strong reputation for political independence and persuasive interpretation of international law, and its pronouncements are influential, even if they are procedurally cumbersome, often take years from start to finish., lack enforcement capabilities or mandates, and have a mixed record of compliane.
The ICC is a more recent institution, and nor part of the UN System. It does fill a serious gap in the legal coverage accorded to accountability for individuals accussed of committing serious international crimes. The ICC is further weakened by the failure of several leading states to become parrties to the Rome Statute, which is the legal framework governing ICC activities. The ICC also has never achieved legitimacy in the Global South because of its early image of being mainly preoccupied with crimes of leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, which was responsible for its West-centrric reputation. The ICC has seemed reluctant to hold accountable individuals associated with powerful states in the Global West, which include countries in Westernn Europe, North America, and currently Israel. By recommending the issuance of arrrest warrants to three top Israeli leaders (somewhat offset in political messaging by simultaneously making a reccomendation of arrrest warrants for the three top Hamas leaders, the ICC prosecutor made a gesture to challenge geopolitical impunity. So far the ICC sub-chamber that has the sole responsibility to issue arrest warrants has not yet acted. It has give to suspicion that the ICC is stalling in its treatment of these controversial recommenndations, due to reliable reports of pressure by Israel and allies to delay its decision, or better, reject the prosecutor’s recommendation on a variety of contrived grounds centering of the dual grounds of Israel not being a member of the ICC and it would be wrong to appear to criminalize a reasonable Israeli claim of self-defence.
The secondary obstacle is the degree to which World Order continues to be based on a hybrid arrangement of hybrid and contradictory relations of law to power: the majority of states are subject to international law in the area of peace and security, while a few, including the UN P5 (and their strategic friends) occupy a position that allows such governments to privilege strategic interests if these clash with legal obligations in UN settings. This hierrarchy is indirectly acknowledged by the veto power allowing the most dangerous states in 1945 to paralyze UN responses to their criminality and even to that of their friends and allies.
The Western support for Israeli genocide is itself criminal, as complicity is criminalized in the Genocide Convvention, but it is virtually exempt from critical scrutiny at the UN or elsewhere. A domestic court in the US has had been the cite of a judicial action to stop the Gaza Genocide brought by a çivil society organization, Center for Constitutional Rights, relying on a Universal Jurisdiction rationale. It has been so far been blocked in this legal pursuit by a dubious internal doctrine that views US foreign policy initiatives as not subject to adjudication due to a so-called Political Questions doctrine. This doctrine rests on an anachronistic view of the Separation of Powers that views Foreign Policy as belonging exclusively in the Executive Branch of Government, and therefore is not subject to judicial scrutiny. This overlooks the growth of international legal authority as a constraint on national behavior even if conducted as foreign policy.
2.Despite the world witnessing, in an unprecedented way, one of the most brutal massacres in history, with live footage, after Gaza can we still talk about international humanitarian law, international human rights, or the Pax Americana order established after World War II? Doesn’t the “Rule of Law in the Global Village,” the title of one of your books, come to an end after Gaza? Or should the path of reform regarding the United Nations, international law, and world order, as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been advocating for years, be built?
Response: Although the first-order implementation of international humanitarian law, human rights law, annd Pax Americana failed at the governmental and international institutional level, their existence was important in awakening çivil society to the gross injustices and crimes that have been inflicted on the Palestinian people. Changes in the public discourse are important, as well, branding Israel, Israeli leaders, and complicit governments as perpetrators of genocide in a particularly overt and sadistic manner. By such reasoning Israel should be sanctioned for violating the Genocide Convention, its leaders be criminally proscecuted, and complcit governmentss be at least censured. This should make Israel and its supporters leading candidates for çivil society pressure to impose boycotts, to express moral and legal outrage, and to suspend Israel from participation within the framework of legitimate sovereign states until a dynamic of peace and reconciliation takes the place of war and genocide. Israel is guilty of unspeakable crimes and a defiance of respect for the norms of civilized behavior. Such an assessment is not meant to excuse Hamas, and its allies, for its alleged atrocities, although provoked and of a dramatically smaller impact than Israel’s post October 9th behavior.
Civil society is a court of last resort that becomes relevant, as here, when the established processes of law are unavailable, or worse, defied. In this regard, the established of the Gaza Tribunal Project to express opposition to what Israel and the West have done since October 7 and to give voice to the disappointment of citizens of conscience around the world that the normative structure of world order, including the UN, could not protect the vulnerable, essentially innocent and much abused Palestinian civilian population and respond to Palestinian grievances with respect to basic rights.
3.You have written more than 10 books on world order, global order, and international law. You also served for many years as the North America Director of the “World Order Models Project.” In nearly 100 years since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as you put it, “the genocide is a continuation of the Apartheid in Palestine.” What kinds of gaps has the Palestinian genocide exposed in the world order paradigm? What truth has it revealed about the foundation upon which the world order is built? After Gaza, what kind of world order and international legal order do you foresee to prevent humanity from experiencing genocides like Srebrenica, Rwanda, and Gaza again? What is your belief and hope in this regard?
Response: If world order persists in its present form it seems almost inevitable that gruesome repetitions of genocide and other severe atrocities in the future. To transform the structures of authority now entrusted with the management of global security ensures a continuation of behavioral patterns that produce genocide, apartheid, aggression, and are responsible for many economic and ecological crimes will require an unprecedented movement from below by peoples organized through çivil society activism, insisting on a framework of law that has the capacity and will to enforce compliance on the strong as well as the weak. Such a development, admittedly utopian, alone could do away with geopolitics whose defining characteristic is a manageriall approach to global security that treats law and morality as irrelevant when in conflict with strategic interests of the Great Powers, and is by practice as well as theory iss dedicated to geopolitical rivalry that reduces law and morality to the level of propaganda and a policy instrument in the foreign policy toolbox useful to denounce the behavior of adversaries yet irrelevant as a constraint..
As for alll those books. I have been around a rather long time. The world changes and so do I. It is a matter of listening to others and being attenntive to what is happening. In this period of global interactive intensity it is especially important to learn from those who speak from other cultural spaces. Listening does not means abdicating judgment, but it does require making the effort to respond knowledgeably, which does a constant effort to detect and purge the subtle biases of your educational, discursive, and personal background. This is most difficult for we Americans who are trapped between their ‘exceptionalism’ and a dysfunctional militaritst sense of history. We are now living at a time of radical new technological and ecological challlenges that are being addressed, if at all, without taking accoount of long-term thinking, risks, harns, and solutions. We have entered an historical period of unprecedented species hazard, and most national elites are continuing blandly as if ‘business as usual’ was their job description. In some cases, even worse is to acknowledge in rhetoric the dangers that are intensifying, and then acting as if these fundamental challenges do not necessitate profound changes in how we think, feel, and act both individually and collectively.
As for alll those books. I have been around a rather long time. The world changes and so do I. It is a matter of listening to others, especially those who speak from other cultural spaces, and making the effort to respond, which requires learning to address the subtle biases of your own educational and personal background. I have found this to be most difficult for Americans who are trapped between their claims of ‘exceptionalism’ and a dysfunctional militaritst sense of history. We are now living at a time of radical new technological and ecological challlenges that are being addressed, if at all, without taking accoount of long-term thinking and solutions. This is a time of unprecedented species hazard.
4.As you know, Palestinian territories before 1967 were occupied by Israel. Regarding the occupied territories, the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, Turkey, the United Nations, and some Islamic countries are advocating for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders and for a two-state solution. Does this mean that the lands that Israel seized before 1967 through terror, violence, and Nakba are being accepted? Doesn’t this imply that the forced displacement of Palestinians before 1967, and the massacres and raids carried out by Jewish militias in Palestinian villages, are either ignored or legitimized? How do you assess the period from 1917 to 1967 in terms of international legal principles, the global legal order, and the founding mission of the United Nations? Moreover, since Israel does not accept the two-state solution, how is it that international law, institutions, and countries continue to accept it?
Response: I share your overall assessment of an exceedingly llimited willingness to redress the historic wrongs initially inflicted on the Palestinian people by way of a pre-Holocaust colonialist move on the part of the UK, known to the world as the Balfour Declarration, which was the source of the two original wrongs embedded in the Zionist Project, culminating in the Holocaust and its aftermath: first, an Orientalist disregard of non-Western societal wellbeing. It took the form of solving the problems in Europe caused by antisemitism and Jewish presence by encroaching on the sovereign rights of a non-consenting Muslim majority resident population in Palestine. And secondly, a Zionist resolve based on a politically self-serving biblical interpretation that created a Jewish entitlement to make Palestinians persecuted and unwanted strangers in their existential homeland. By such a logic the surviving native peoples in almost every part of the world dispossessed of their land and sovereignty rights would have an unassailable right to their indigenous pre-modern forms of sovereignty.
Given this background, the UN played its own part in furthering the Western-centric solution in the years after World War II, by way of proposing ‘partition’ of Palestine in a period dominated by the sense of guilt of the liberal democracies and effective propaganda by the Zionnist Movemennt as well as superior military training, weaponry, and tactics in the 1948 War. For the post-1945 period, Israel emerged as as an expansionist nuclear-armed ‘settler colonial state’ that existentially rejected the co-existence, partition, compromise solutions as put forth in a biased framework controlled by the US, a most partisan intermediary. Israel for public relations reasons pretended to go along with this global consensus while acting to undermine it by its settlements, coercion, land-grabbing, and oppressive apartheid regime of control after 1967. During this process liberal Zionism, the UN, Western countries withheld criticism of Israel’s transparently defiant behavior, and continued their stubborn ineffectual adherence to the mantle of internationalism by way of the two-state mantra dismissing Palestinian resistance and even gestures of accommodation as forms of ‘terrrorism’ to be rejected in practice, colliding with the hidden Zionist vision of later became known as ‘Greater Israel.’ In the interim Israel became useful to the West. It lent muscle and diplomacy to the Euro-American regional priorities of retaining access to Gulf energy reserves at acceptable prices and resisting the spread of Islamically oriented nationalism.
The Gaza Genocide was the latest chapter in the struggle revealing political alignments in unexpected ways: the unity of the Western liberal democracies in their complicit response to such criminality; the passive response of Israel’s most prominent Arab neighbors, prompted by fear of Israel, hostility to Iran, and the links between governing elites and non-Middle East geopolitical actors, mainly the US. Given the size and extremism of the Israeli settler movement, especially in the West Bank, it seems politically naive and irrelevant to advocate a two-state solution even if it requires a Palestinian willlingnesss to swallow pre-1967 territorial and resource injustices and land-grabbing. Overall, the story of the West in the Middle East is a shameful chapter in the long narrative of Western encroachment on the most basic rights of non-Western peoples.
5.While reading your book on “Humane Global Governance,” which is still in the idea phase and gives you hope, I couldn’t quite distinguish whether humanity or religion is the central focus of globalization. Despite your claim that globalization and secularism are in crisis, do you believe that religion should be utilized or that a humane globalization should be grounded in religion? Since your book also includes the chapter “Why and to What Extent Religion?” let us ask: Why is religion a dynamic factor in your model?
This question poses one aspect of why prescriptive writing about the geopolitical management of global security and relations among dominant states is so contingent on historical circumstances that evolve over time. In certain times and situations religion seems to have emancipatory potential and in others its theocratic governance and exclusionary policies seems dystopian. The same extremes can be observed in the role of secularity as national and global phenomena, which has given rise to visions of peace and justice but by way of geopolitical ambition and technological innovation has caused widespread conquest, exploitation and corruption in what was widely considered a post-colonial world following a wave of successful anti-colonial struggles. I have written of ‘colonialism after colonialism’ as best capturing the excesses of Western militarism and capitalism in this period between the end of the Cold War and the Gaza Genocide. It raises a new haunting question ‘What comes next for specific nations and for humanity as ideal and reality?’
6.In your book “Globalization and Religion,” you briefly address a very intriguing question as a chapter title. I would like to ask you to elaborate on it. The question in the book, if I may quote directly, is: “Does the Western secular state have a future?” If so, why? If not, why not?
Response: This kind of fundamental question requires a book if I were to attempt a comprehensive assessment. A brief response refers to the anti-democratic and regressive trends toward autocratic governance at home and anti-internationalism in foreign policy. Whereas ecological threats and technological developmentss are posing increasing threats of catastrophic futures, political agendas of leading governmennts are preoccupied with the short-term satisfactions and frustrations of the citizenry in the face of growing inequality and of governing elites in terms of geopoliticall rivalry and a stagnancy or worse for Western middle class life styles and expectations. It amounts to shifting ecological and technological problem-solving to future generations that will only survive if new political agendas are enacted under the influence of strengthened structures of global governance that are neither secular nor theocratic, but normative in a radical values-driven format of global-democacy-to-come. Such a benevolent future would depend on governmental elites renouncing narrow militarized forms of security.
[Prefatory Note: The post below contains modified responses to questions posed by a Brazilian journalist, Rodrigo Creviero on 4/4/2024. It is critical of President Joe Biden’s ‘muscular approach’ to the conduct of foreign policy, specifically in relation to China, Russia, and Israel, as played out at the expense of the peoples of the world, including the real interests of the American people. Biden is guilty of war-mongering, reluctance to engage in peace diplomacy, and complicity crimes of support given to Israel while carrying out a prolonged genocide against the long abused civilian population of Gaza along with demonizing and dehumanizing the resistance leadership exhibited by Hamas. In reactions to past genocides the US has done less to oppose their perpetrators than it should have, but never before has it been an active accomplice, and in the process, undermining the authority of the most widely endorsed norms of international law and demeaned the institutions and procedures internationally available for purposes of interpretation and enforcement.]
1– Biden urged Netanyahu to reach “immediate ceasefire” in Gaza and called on Israel to act in the “next hours and days” in the face of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. How do you see that?
Biden’s call for concrete steps to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches Palestinians in Gaza comes very late, given a geocidal assault on the civilian population that is in its sixth month. Also, the effort to persuade Netanyahu to reach a ceasefire was not elaborated with the same urgency or seriousness as the humanitarian insistence on allowing aid to reach starving Palestinians. A cessation of Gaza violence has long been vital if further devastation of Palestinians is to be minimized, if not avoided, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its January 26 Interim Order decreed in support of South Africa’s plea for Provisional Measures as a response to its preliminary conclusion that it was ‘plausible’ to regard Israel’s violence in Gaza as genocide, the highest international crime that cannot be excused because of claims of self-defense or national security. It is notable that legal absolutism when it comes to genocide is supported by near unanimity among the 17 judges composing the adjudicating panel of jurists, and including judges from the United States, Germany, France, and Australia whose governments had supported Israel’s response to October 7. The ICJ was widely applauded for following the law rather than flags of nationaal allegience, analyzing facts and relevant norms of international law despite the face that the Security Council failed to implement its Interim Order and Israel defied its Interim Order. What the ICJ ordered jnfluenced the symbolic domain of international by legitimating concerns about genocide in Gaza and legitimting the resolve of civil society groups.
Biden’s highly publicized move seems primarily motivated by two developments other than a late surge of empathy for Palestinian suffering: first, shifts in US public opinion away from unconditional support for Israel, which are endangering his prospects for victory in the November presidential election and the fact that Monday’s clearly deliberate attack on the aid convoy of the World Central Kitchen resulted in the death of seven Europeans, sparking media outrage and anger among those governments that had been among Israel’s supporters. No such anger in Washington or hostile media attention were given to prior and worse atrocities responsible for mass casualties among children and women so long as the victims were Palestinians. The surfacing of these concerns, especially in the US, help explain why the public disclosure of the Biden/Netanyahu phone call occurred with official blessings. Such sensitive tensions between previous allies are not normally addressed with such transparency. Such diplomatic moves are considered more effective if carried on secretly, or at least discreetly. Biden evidently was more concerned about winning back Democratic Party voters and reassuring European allies that Western lives should be treated as off-limits for Israel in the future.
Even more disturbing was the explicit support given by Biden to Israel’s recent provocative actions directed at Iran during the 30 minute phone call. The leaders spoke in the aftermath of a targeted attack on April 1st that killed seven Iranian military advisors (including three commanders) while they were present in Iran’s consular building in Damascus, a location entitled by international law to immunity from attack.
Such provocations risk a devastating wider war. Iran has declared its intention to retaliate rather than be passive in the face of Israeli military strikes and assassination of prominent Iranian military commanders, and other violations of Iranian sovereignty by Israel. Given this background, Biden publicized reassurance of support for Israel’s provocations acts as a signal to Netanyahu, facing frustrations in Gaza, rejection by Israelis, and possible imprisonment in Israel on past charges of corruption, to embark upon a wider war with Iran in ways that will exert great pressure on the US to become actively involved in the military operations likely to result and divert attention from policy failures of Israel during these past months.
2—How do you analyze this intensifying of pressure by United States against Israel now?
It seems belated, and partial at best, and easily managed by Tel Aviv without any changes in its approach to Hamas or Palestinian statehood. As suggested, it could tempt Netanyahu to embroil Israel, but also Iran, in a regional war with global dimensions. As suggested, Netanyahu is extremely unpopular among Israelis, with growing protests against his leadership. These factors undoubtedly creates temptations on Netanyahu’s part to divert attention from the failure of Hamas war policy, both as a military operation and in making Israel a pariah or rogue state in the eyes of the peoples of the world, and an increasing number of governments in the Global South.
Given reports of Netanyahu’s defiant response to these ‘pressures’ from the US are coming come too late and even now have an ambiguous impact, taking too abstract a form, not including an arms embargo or international peace force, and not raising even a possibility of support for UN-backed sanctions. I would conclude that Biden’s much publicized warning to Netanyahu presaging a US shift will not have significant humanitarian or peacemaking influence on Israel’s resolve ‘to finish the job’ by an attack on Rafah that produces devastation and many casualties in that beleaguered city giving hazardous shelter to more than ten times its normal population of somewhat more than 100,000. And could, paradoxically make things worse if Netanyahu seizes upon Biden’s apparently unconscious message to Tel Aviv that the time may have come to shift the eyes and ears of the world to a confrontation with Iran.
3- I am preparing a special article on 6 months of war. How do you evaluate the impact of the last 6 months in the efforts of a peace process in the future and in the relations between Israel and Palestinian people?
At this point, there seems no credible positive scenario for future Israel/Palestine relations. An Israeli consensus, not just the government, is deeply opposed to the establishment of a viable Palestinian sovereign state while the world consensus insists on establishing a Palestinian state with international borders and the enjoyment of equal rights in all respects, including security as Israel. The Palestinian people have not been consulted by either side of this nationalist cleavage and seems more and more inclined to opt for a single secular state with equal rights of both peoples as long favored by independent Palestinian intellectuals such as Edward Said.
The UN attempted to impose a two-state solution in 1947 without taking account of the Arab majority indigenous population, and it led to failure, periodic wars, and much suffering. In my view, a sustainable future for both Palestinians and Jews depends on a peace process, with neutral international mediation, and respect for the right of self-determination in the framework of negotiations between legitimate, self-selected representatives of both peoples acting in a unified whole of their own devising.
At present, neither Palestine nor Israel, for differing reasons, is in any position to represent their respective constituencies in a manner that is either legitimate or effective. More specifically, Palestine remains divided between the PLO/Palestine Authority leadership in Ramallah and Hamas in Gaza, with additional elements seeking participation in representing the Palestinian people, including the 7 million refugees and exiles. Israel, in contrast, has had a coherent political elite during most of its existence, but now must act to soften tensions between religious and secular constituencies that have been intensifying in recent years to be a credible partner in the search for a political compromise that clears the path to sustainable peace for both peoples based on coexistence, equality, and effective internal and regional security arrangements jointly administered. Stating these conditions highlights how difficult it will be to make the transition from apartheid/genocide realities to the sort of solution roughly depicted.
The South African case, although vastly different, is instructive. It points to two factors that make what seems impossible happen in circumstances that swwm hopelesss: the release from prison of a unifying leader; a majority recognition that a win/win outcome for both peoples rests on genuine compromise and non-interference by third party governments and international institutions.
Update of 2/25/24 EuroMed Article by Richard Falk:
It is helpful to conceive of the Israeli settler colonial undertaking in Palestine as having reached its decisive phase, and as such concerns in addition to resources, land and people. From an Israeli perspective, ‘more land, less Palestinians’; from a Palestinian perspective, ‘steadfastness and resistance in relation to land and residence rights.’
The latest news pertaining to Gaza as reported in the Western media and government circles is that a six week pause in the onslaught in Gaza is being negotiated in Paris and Doha, and possibly will take effect on March 10th, the beginning of Ramadan. The deal being negotiated centers on the release of women, children, and the elderly among the 99 Israel hostages still held by Hamas, and an exchange that is rumored to lead to the freeing of 300 Palestinians currently held in Israeli prisons, often under abusive conditions.
It is coupled with a continuing announced intention by PM Netanyahu of a planned attack on the southernmost Gaza city of Rafah, which is now sheltering as many as 1.5 million displace Palestinian or more than half of Gaza’s 2.3 million population and more than ten times the number of people normally living in Rafah.
The overall genocidal attack in its fifth month now has resulted in more than 30,000 Palestinian deaths with another 7,000 missing, and over 70, 000 injured many badly. A further estimated 576,000 are coping with imminent famine conditions, 85% of Gaza population is displaced, and 80% of residential housing has been destroyed or seriously damaged, as well as 96% of Gaza agricultural infrastructure destroyed or damaged.
To calibrate the extent of loss and suffering by reference to the current US population of 335 million would mean multiplying the above Palestinian casualty statistics by more 140 times, and many fear that starvation, disease, and the Rafah attack will greatly increase Palestinian losses.
Recall Samuel Huntington’s controversial, yet influential, 1993 Foreign Affairs article, “The Clash of Civilizations,” which ends with the provocative phrase, “The West against the rest.” Although the article seemed far-fetched 30 years ago, it now seems prophetic in its discernment of a post-Cold War pattern of inter-civilizational rivalry. It is rather pronounced in relation to the heightened Israel/Palestine conflict initiated by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israeli territory with the killing and abusing of Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers, as well as the seizure of some 200 hostages.
Clearly this attack has been accompanied by some suspicious circumstances such as Israel’s foreknowledge, slow reaction time to the penetration of its borders, and, perhaps most problematic, the quickness with which Israeli adopted a genocidal approach with a clear ethnic cleansing message. At the very least the Hamas attack, itself including serious war crimes, served quite conveniently as the needed pretext for the 100 days of disproportionate and indiscriminate violence, sadistic atrocities, and the enactment of a scenario that looked toward making Gaza unlivable and its Palestinian residents dispossessed and unwanted.
Despite the worldwide transparency of the Israeli tactics, partly attributable to ongoing TV coverage of the devastating and heartbreaking Palestinian ordeal, what was notable was the way external state actors aligned with the antagonists. The Global West (white settler colonial states and former European colonial powers) lined up with Israel, while the most active pro-Palestinian governments and movements were initially exclusively Muslim, with support coming more broadly from the Global South. This racialization of alignments seems to take precedence over efforts to regulate violence of this intensity by the norms and procedures of international law, often mediated through the United Nations. South Africa broke this pattern by its historic initiative at the ICJ that resulted in a near unanimous Interim Order on January 26, 2024, which seems to have had no impact on Israel military tactics or interference with the delivery of humanitarian aid or support by the Global West.
This pattern is quite extraordinary because the states supporting Israel, above all the United States, have claimed the high moral and legal ground for themselves and have long lectured the states of the Global South about the importance of the rule of law, human rights, and respect for international law. This disregard the manifest of intent of the Genocide Convention to urge compliance with international law and morality by both sides in the face of the most transparent genocide in all of human history. In the numerous global pre-Gaza genocides, the existential horrors that occurred were largely known after the fact and through statistics and abstractions, occasionally vivified by the tales told by survivors or given expression in novels or films. The events, although historically reconstructed, were not as immediately real as these events in Gaza with the daily reports in real time from brave journalists in the Gaza combat zones for more than four months, enduring many deaths..
Liberal democracies failed not only by their refusal to make active efforts to prevent genocide, which is a central obligation of the Genocide Convention, but more brazenly by openly facilitating the continuation of the genocidal onslaught. Israel’s frontline supporters have contributed weapons and munitions, as well as providing targeting intelligence and even assurances of active engagement by ground forces if requested, as well as providing diplomatic support at the U.N. and elsewhere throughout this crisis.
Liberal democracies failed not only by their refusal to make active efforts to prevent genocide, but more brazenly by openly facilitating continuation of the genocidal onslaught
These performative elements that describe Israel’s recourse to genocide are undeniable, while the complicity crimes enabling Israel to continue with genocide remain indistinct, being situated in the shadowland of genocide. For instance, the complicity crimes are noted but remain on the periphery of South Africa’s laudable application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that includes a request for Provisional Measures crafted to stop the genocide pending a decision on the substance of the charges of genocide. The evidence of genocide is overwhelmingly documented in the 84-page South African submission, but the failure to address the organic link to the crimes of complicity is a weakness that could be reflected in what the court decides.
Even if the ICJ does impose these Provisional Measures, including ordering Israel to desist from further violence in Gaza, it may not achieve the desired result, at least not before the substantive decision is reached some three to five years from now. It seems unlikely that Israel will obey Provisional Measures. It has a record of consistently defying international law. It is likely that a favorable decision on these preliminary matters will give rise to a crisis of implementation.
The law is persuasively present, but the political will to enforce is lacking or even resistant, as here in certain parts of the Global West, and the ICJ lacks any independent enforcement authority. The UN leaves, as usual, implementation at the mercy of the veto-burdened Security Council..
The degree to which the U.S. has supplied weaponry with U.S. taxpayer money would be an important supplement to rethinking the U.S. relationship to Israel that is so important and which is underway among the American people—even in the Washington think tanks that the foreign policy elites fund and rely upon. Proposing an arms embargo would be accepted as a timely and appropriate initiative in many sectors of U.S. public opinion. I hope that such proposals may be brought before the General Assembly and perhaps the Security Council. Even if not formally endorsed, such initiatives would have considerable symbolic and possibly even substantive impacts on further delegitimizing Israel’s behavior and stimulating solidarity initiatives..
A third specific initiative worth carefully considering would be timely establishment of a People’s Tribunal on the Question of Genocide initiated by global persons of conscience. Such tribunals were established in relation to many issues that the formal governance structures failed to address in satisfactory ways. Important examples are the Russell Tribunal convened in 1965-66 to assess legal responsibilities of the U.S. in the Vietnam War and the Iraq War Tribunal of 2005 in response to the U.S. and U.K. attack and occupation of Iraq commencing in 2003.
Such a tribunal on Gaza could clarify and document what happened on and subsequently to October 7. By taking testimony of witnesses, it could provide an opportunity for the people of the world to speak and to feel represented in ways that governments and international procedures are unable to enact, given their request for Provisional Measures to stop the ongoing Gaza onslaught, it will increase Global South and civil society pressure on Israel and its supporter governments to comply. As Israel has refused to make even efforts to comply with the near unanimous Interim Order of the ICJ, it has escalated pro-Palestinian solidarity efforts throughout the world and cast Israel into the darkest regions of pariah statehood.
In such an atmosphere, nonviolent activism and pressure for the imposition of an arms embargo and trade boycotts as well as sports, culture, and touristic boycotts will become more viable policy options, and can be given symbolic and substantive reality within the private sector, even among individual consumers. This approach by way of civil society activism proved very effective in the Euro-American peace efforts during the Vietnam War and in the struggle against apartheid South Africa, and elsewhere.
Israel is becoming a pariah state due to its behavior and defiance exhibited toward legal and moral norms. It has made itself notorious by the outrageously forthright acknowledgement of genocidal intent of its highest leaders with respect to Palestinian civilians whom they are under a special obligation to protect as the occupying power.
Being a pariah country or rogue state makes Israel politically and economically vulnerable as never before. At this moment, a mobilized civil society can contribute to producing a new balance of forces in the world that has the potential to neutralize the sway of Western post-colonial imperial geopolitics that has dominated the global management of power since the end of the Cold War more than 30 years ago..
It is also relevant to take note of the startling fact that the anti-colonial wars of the last century were in the end won by the weaker side militarily. This is an important lesson, as is the realization that anti-colonial struggle does not end with the attainment of political independence. It needs to continue to achieve control of national security and economic resources as the recent wave of anti-French coups in former French colonies in sub-Saharan Central Africa illustrate. The most recent of these coups occurred in Niger about a year ago.
In the 21st century weapons alone rarely control political outcomes. The U.S. should have learned this decades ago in Vietnam, having controlled the battlefield and dominated the military dimensions of the war, and yet having failed to achieve control over its political outcome, and correctly perceived as having lost the war..
The U.S. is disabled by its internal political structure from learning the appropriate lessons from such defeats. Such learning would weaken the leverage of the military-industrial-government complex, including the private sector arms industry and the corporatized media. This would subvert the domestic balance in the U.S. and substantially discredit the global geopolitical role being played by the U.S. throughout the entire world.
So, it is. currently an anachronistic situation. Despite knowing what to do. yet well-entrenched special interests preclude rational adjustments, and the military malfunctions and accompanying geopolitical alignments persist, ignoring costly failures along the way.
In effect, experience suggests strongly what should be done, but the political clout does not exist to get the needed job done. Global public opinion is shifting, peace-minded coalitions are forming, and demonstrations globally are building opposition to continuing the war.
Iran
There is a huge U.S./Israel propaganda effort to tie Iran to everything that is regarded as anti-West or anti-Israeli. It has intensified during the Gaza crisis, starting with the October 7 attack by Iran’s supposed proxy Hamas. You notice even the most influential mainstream print media such as The New York Times routinely refers to what Hezbollah or the Houthis do as “Iran-backed.” Such actors are reduced misleadingly to being proxies of Iran. In contrast, references to Ukraine never make explicit the US or NATO backed and materially supported Kyiv government, which is so much more tangible than whatever involvement Iran seems to have with pro-Palestinian initiatives undertaken by non-state actors in the region.
This way of denying agency to pro-Palestinian actors and attributing behavior to Iran is a matter of Israel/US state propaganda trying to promote belligerent attitudes toward Iran to the effect that Iran is our major enemy in the region, while Israel is our loyal friend. At the same time, it suppresses the reality that If Iran is backing countries and political movements, it obscures what the U.S. is doing more overtly and multiple times over throughout the Middle East.
It is largely unknown what Iran has been doing in the region to protect its interests. Without doubt, Iran has strong sympathies with the Palestinian struggle, and is strongly in favor of minimizing US presence and influence.. Those sympathies coincide with its own political self interest, especially its national security, in not being attacked. Additionally, Iran has lots of problems arising from opposition forces within its own society.
But I think dangerous state propaganda is building up this war-mongering hostility toward Iran. It is highly misleading to regard Iran as the real enemy standing behind all anti-Israeli actions in the region. It is important to understand as accurately as possible the complexity and unknown elements present in this crisis situation that contains dangers of wider war in the region and beyond. As far as is publicly known, Iran has had an extremely limited degree of involvement in the direct shaping of the war and Israel’s all-out attack on the civilian population of Gaza.
Hamas and a Second Nakba
While I was special rapporteur for the U.N. on Israeli violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, I had the opportunity to meet and talk in detail with several of the Hamas leaders who are living in Doha and Cairo, as well as in Gaza. In the period between 2010 and 2014, Hamas was publicly and by back channels pushing for a 50-year cease-fire with Israel. It was conditioned on Israel carrying out the unanimous 1967 Security Council mandate in SC Res 242 to withdraw its forces to the pre-war boundaries of “the green line” established after the 1948 War. Hamas had also publicly sought a long-range cease-fire with Israel after its 2006 electoral victory in Gaza of up to 50 years.
Neither Israel nor the U.S. would respond to those diplomatic initiatives. Hamas leader Khalid Machal, the most intellectual of the Hamas leaders with whom I met, told me in some detail that he had personally warned Washington of the tragic consequences for civilians on both sides of the conflict, if it was allowed to go on without a long-term cease-fire sustained and accepted. Machal’s efforts were confirmed by non-Hamas independent sources, which also confirmed that this effort to prevent further violence met with no encouragement in either Tel Aviv or Washington.
entanglement with geopolitical hegemony in relation to international criminal law and structures of global governance.
The South African World Court Case, Pariah State, and Popular Mobilization
The South African initiative is important as a welcome effort to enlist international law and procedures for its assessment and authority in a context of severe alleged criminality. Since the ICJ, the highest tribunal on a supranational level, has responded favorably to South Africa’s highly reasonable and morally imperative
Where can Palestinians go as the population suffers from famine and continued bombing? What is Israel’s goal?
I see the so-called commitment to thinning the Palestinian presence in Gaza as leading deliberately to a functional second Nakba. This is a criminal policy. I don’t know that it has to have a formal name. It is not a policy designed to achieve anything but the decapitation of the Palestinian population, if not in whole, at least in part, explaining the ICJ concern about halting what leaves the strong impression of genocide. Israel is exerting incredible pressure t to move large numbers of Gazans to the Egyptian Sinai, and the Egyptian al-Sisi government has declared that it opposes an influx of Palestinian refugees, yet rumors suggest that elaborate efforts to overcome Egyptian resistance include large-scale debt relief and IMF loans..
This is not a policy. The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are being confronted with a threat of elimination or replacement, which is a characteristic of every settler colonial project. The Israeli campaign after October 7 was not predominantly directed toward Hamas’ terrorism nearly as much as it was focused on the forced evacuation of the Palestinians from Gaza and intent on the related dispossession of most Palestinians from the West Bank, the real prize of this military campaign and the priority of the settler-oriented Netanyahu coalition government..
If Israel really wanted to deal with its security in an effective way, much more efficient and surgical methods would have been relied upon. There was no reason to treat the entire civilian population of Gaza indiscriminately as if it every Gazan was implicated in the Hamas attack, and there was certainly no justification for Israel’s genocidal response. The Israeli motivations seem more related to completing the Zionist Project than to restoring territorial security. All indications are that Israel used the October 7 attack as a pretext for a preexisting master plan to get rid of the Palestinians whose presence blocks the establishment of Greater Israel by finally obtaining sovereign control over the West Bank and at least portions of Gaza.
For a proper perspective we should remember that before October 7, the Netanyahu coalition government that took power at the start of 2023 was known as the most extreme government ever to govern the country since its establishment in 1948. The new Netanyahu government in Israel immediately gave a green light to settler violence in the Occupied West Bank and appointed overtly racist religious leaders to administer those parts of Palestine still occupied. What made it extreme, was its rejection of the pretense of a negotiated end to a struggle between the two peoples that purported to be based on co-existence rather than victory by the stronger side. The UN consensus, with almost universal support, presupposed Palestinian sovereign statehood while many Palestinian intellectuals and activists favored a single possibly confederated secular state guaranteeing ethnic and secular equality.
With the Gaza onslaught ambiguity was removed from Israel’s settler colonial end game , consisting of Israel claiming territorial sovereignty over the whole of the so-called promised land, enabling Greater Israel to come into existence as a Jewish supremacy state in accord with the forthright earlier Basis Law enacted in 2018 long before the Netanyahu coalition and the Hamas attack took place. What the Gaza operation since October is added is a resolve by Israel to defuse the so-called ‘demographic bomb’ by inducing Palestinian death and departure by mounting a sustained campaign of unrelenting state terror, with its heavy reputational costs exacted among the peoples of the world, including even in the long supportive Global West, where in the US and elsewhere pro-Palestinian sentiments become relevant to electoral outcomes scheduled to occur in 2024 and beyond.
The Need for a Different Context
We need to establish a different context than the one that exists now. That means a different outlook on the part of the Western governmental and NGO Jewish networks in the former colonial Europe and settler colonial white governments elsewhere steadfast supporters of Israel even now. This implies a different internal Israeli sense of their own values and security interests, and their own future development. The South African suggestive antecedent shows that it is only when sustained substantive pressure is brought to bear on national governing elites that have gone to these extreme lengths of relying on apartheid or genocide that startling transformative moves away from hegemony in the direction of constitutionally-based coexistence occur.
The lengths that the Israeli government has gone are characteristic of settler colonial states. All of them, including the U.S. and Canada, have acted violently to neutralize or exterminate the resident Indigenous people. That is what this genocidal interlude is all about. It is an effort to realize the goals of maximal versions of Zionism, which can only succeed by eliminating the Palestinians as rightful claimants to live in the coveted land, much less share in its governance. It should not be forgotten that in the weeks before the Hamas attack, including at the U.N., Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was waving a map of “the new Middle East” that had erased the existence of Palestine.
Undoubtedly, one of Hamas’ motivations was to negate the view that Palestine had given up its right to self-determination, and that Palestine could be erased from political consciousness. Recall the old delusional pre-Balfour Zionist slogan: “A people without land for a land without people.” Such utterances of this early Zionist utopian phase literally erased the Palestinians who for generations lived in Palestine as an entitled Indigenous population, and anticipated what became a top priority political project. With the Balfour Declaration of 1917, this settler colonial vision was embodies in the governance of the Palestinians, enjoying the blessings of the leading European colonial powers and the liberal democracies that emerged after the indigenous people of the land no long presented a political obstacle to their replacement.
Given post-colonial realities, the Israeli project is historically discordant than earlier settler colonial undertakings, and hence more extreme. It exposes the reality of Israel’s policies and the inevitable resistance response to Israel as a self-proclaimed racially supremacist state. Israeli state propaganda and management of the public discourse long obscured this maximalist agenda of Zionism and we are yet to know whether this was a deliberate tactic or just reflected the phases of Israel’s development and self-confidence.
This may turn out to be a moment of clarity with respect not only to Gaza, but to the overall prospects for sustainable peace and justice between these two embattled peoples that must reflect the exercise of rights of self-determination and achieve some version of constitutially equal coexistence..
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor is a Geneva-based independent organization with regional offices across the MENA region and Europe
[Prefatory Note: I am re-posting this text because of its relevance to ongoing events and with this new Prefatory Note, partly because illness has kept me from a normal blogging rhythm. The post below is the text of my foreword to Suzanne Hammad’s important book, which explores from an ethnographic perspective, the deep and often hidden roots of resistance to alien occupation, and gives an account based on her lived experience about the specificities of Palestinian resistance in the West Bank town of Bil’in, a place known for public protests against the intrusive presence of Israel’s unlawful separation wall. This tale of resistance is also anguishly relevant to ongoing relevant to the criminal onslaught being carried out by Israel in Gaza, illustrating the extremities of violence relied upon by the Occupying Power to a totally vulnerable entrapped Palestinian population of 2.3 million persons as its regime of apartheid culminates in textbook genocide, a human catastrophe like no other in its transparency accentuated by support received from liberal democracies in the West.]
RAF Foreword to
Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything
Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)
[Prefatory Note: I am re-posting this text because of its relevance to ongoing events and with this new Prefatory Note, partly because illness has kept me from a normal blogging rhythm. The post below is the text of my foreword to Suzanne Hammad’s important book, which explores from an ethnographic perspective, the deep and often hidden roots of resistance to alien occupation, and gives an account based on her lived experience about the specificities of Palestinian resistance in the West Bank town of Bil’in, a place known for public protests against the intrusive presence of Israel’s unlawful separation wall. This tale of resistance is also anguishly relevant to ongoing relevant to the criminal onslaught being carried out by Israel in Gaza, illustrating the extremities of violence relied upon by the Occupying Power to a totally vulnerable entrapped Palestinian population of 2.3 million persons as its regime of apartheid culminates in textbook genocide, a human catastrophe like no other in its transparency accentuated by support received from liberal democracies in the West.]
RAF Foreword to Suzanne Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything
Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)
This fascinating book gives us not only creative ways of grasping the underlying continuities of the Palestinian ordeal but also a truly original conception of why the long arc of resistance and resilience, stretching across time and taking certain distinctive forms, has been sustained for more than a century in the face of assorted trials and tribulations. None of these tests of Palestinian resistance was greater than the double assault on the fundamentals of Palestinian normalcy in the West Bank than that posed by the ever-expanding settlement movement and the connected construction of an encroaching Separation Wall on mostly occupied Palestinian land commencing in 2001.
Suzanne Hammad views the evolving Palestinian reality through an ethnographic lens that complements what the media reports, leaders and intellectuals have to say, and militants achieve by direct confrontation with the daily[MK1] experience of Palestinians living under the heavy boot of Israel’s apartheid regime which pursues with accelerating vigor its own agenda of ethnic cleansing and dispossession of people from their land. To carry out such an exploration led Hammad to conduct her field research for three years in a single West Bank community, the village of Bil’in. The implications of her findings have a broad resonance for Palestinian studies as they illuminate the realities of many similar villages subject to occupation, and indeed inform the situation and consciousness of all Palestinians regardless of whether living under occupation, in Arab refugee camps, or in pre-1967 Israel. In this sense, Bil’in with its population of less than 2000 offers us a rich metaphor by which to decipher the entire Palestinian predicament, and better appreciate the various modes of response that underpin resistance not only to the existential abuses being experienced under occupation but to the foreshadowing of an inevitable liberation that Israel’s state violence is capable of punishing harshly, yet unable so far to destroy. It might even be unable to comprehend such resistance. It is bringing to light these under-appreciated facets of Palestinian sumud or steadfastness that makes this book illuminating reading for all who wish to gain a deeper comprehension of this tragic struggle that remains horizonless as to beginning and end.
Although Bil’in is but one of many West Bank villages, its selection by the author as her main case study is hardly accidental or arbitrary. This village distinguished itself from many other superficially similar villages in at least two important[MK2] ways. First, residents experienced the severe intrusion of the Wall upon its living space, vividly exemplified by the barbed wire, electrified fence passing through Bil’in in ways that cut its residents off from 60% of their agricultural growing and grazing land, as well as the surrounding ‘empty’ areas used for recreation, reflection, and spiritual growth, including gatherings of the whole community during holidays, and even more during the harvesting times, especially of olives. Bil’in’s inhabitants were cut off by a permit system that was required to pass the single gate in the wall that granted them permission to go beyond the mostly residential part of the village, and in some cases, gain access to their own farmland. Secondly, residents reacted through collective anti-Wall protests every Friday for at least 15 years starting in 2005. The continuity and persistence of these protest dramatized Palestinian opposition to the Wall and the resolve of villagers to resist non-violently, yet with courage and resolve. This activism in Bil’in contrasted reliance on peaceful methods with the violent brutality of Israel’s apartheid regime, which imposes Jewish supremacy even in occupied Palestine and in defiance of international humanitarian law. In relation to the Wall, Israeli defiance became overt as Israel rejected the near unanimous (14-1) findings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 2004. Such an authoritative legal endorsement of Bil’in fundamental grievance added legitimacy to the Friday protests by confirming that it was unlawful for Israel to construct a supposed security Wall on Occupied Palestinian Territory, and hence the Wall should be dismantled, and the Palestinians given reparations for the harm sustained. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion was the related idea that Israel’s situating the Wall on Palestinian territory was more a land grab than a genuine security measure.
We ignore the special contribution of Hammad’s inquiry if we are content with this most visible level of interaction, which is to depict both the depth of Palestinian suffering and its transcendence in the lived daily life of the residents of Bil’in. On the one side a deprivation so severe that it prompts inhabitants to pronounce their condition by such sayings as ‘we’re alive only because we are not dead yet” or “if we had the chance we would choose death over living under occupation.” And yet, this is not at all the bleak understanding that Hammad seeks to impart, which is rather a seemingly contradictory sense in Bil’in that our life is not worth living and yet if we will go on living our values, resisting Israel’s encroachments, and transcending their harmful intentions, by nurturing the pride and pleasure associated with sustaining our way of life in the face of hardships, humiliations, and humbling adjustments we will be living the best possible life given the circumstances. To get at this interface between despair and transcendence, Hammad enables us to listen closely to the voices of Bil’in’s people, which dominate the text. This witnessing by Bil’inians decries the pain of profound loss yet seamlessly affirms their pride and meaning of life by maintaining organic connections as best they can with the land and their ancestral homes by doing as much of what they did before the Wall by walking alone or with a friend in the arid wilderness beyond the fertile land or convening the village children and elders to take part in the annual olive harvests that are more than agricultural and livelihood happenings, but are truly sacred rituals that combine work, play, festivals of remembrance, and defiant reaffirmations of a sense of belonging that guns, settlements, and provocations are incapable of damaging, let alone destroying.
Along the way we become privy to many telling details that add credibility to this seeming impossible atmosphere of existential contradiction. For instance, the residents of Bil’in do not waste a moment of regret lamenting their decision to stay in their homes as near as possible to their land on the wrong side of the Wall, come what may in terms of settler violence, encroachment, and Israeli tactics of repression. On the contrary, those Palestinians who departed from their homes and land increased their experience of injustice and suffering associated with Israeli 1948 tactics of dispossession and subsequent reenactments of the nakba; in retrospect, those so coerced, should for their own sake have stayed, resisted, and even accepting death as preferable to displacement, however cruelly induced to attain the Zionist settler colonial goals.
In another telling example, Hammad show us how those Bil’in residents rendered unable to grow their own subsistence food on their diminished farmland, losing the dignity associated with living off the produce yielded from one’s own land as generations before them had done. A further creative initiative undertaken not only for practical reasons, but in the spirit of nonviolent resistance is a food sovereignty movement in Bil’in which seeks to act collectively as a community to maintain local subsistence living standards without outside dependence.
These ways of balancing the ordeal of the occupation against a resolve to live as authentically as possible in traditional ways is what most truly captures the complex truths of life in Bil’in. In other words, the weekly protests that gave Bil’in worldwide prominence are the visible display of stubborn resistance. These marches to the wall opposed by Israel’s active military presence are the front story, but it is the back story of the daily lived life of residents that is the core of a resistance-unto-death that is quietly enacted on an hourly basis by the people of Bil’in. This extended exposure to the voiced experiences of Bil’in’s residents also abandons the conventional reliance of scholarly inquiry on the binary optics of oppressor/victim or victim/resister. This enriches the appreciation that Palestinian life under occupation is not properly interpreted as an either/or reality, but is more truly constituted by a richer interwoven texture of creative adaptation, stubborn revolt, depressing captivity, and liberating defiance.
Suzanne Hammad’s relationship to this account of her experience in Bil’in is at once deeply personal while at the same time managing to uphold the best traditions of academic rigor. She does not obscure her own background whose father left Nablus in the 1967 War for the sake of economic opportunity to start a family outside, taking refuge in an Arab country. She makes no effort to offer a balancing rationale for the Zionist Project or set forth the Israeli security narrative, yet this book came across to me as not only revelatory but entirely trustworthy. Hammad attains her goals by allowing the people of Bil’in to speak about their lives in ways that enlighten readers no matter how familiar they are with the large literature on the Palestine struggle. This study is also a rebuke to those who insist that objectivity requires a total detachment from partisan perspectives by achieving an understanding of Palestinian resistance that has eluded conventional scholarship for more than seven decades.
There are some lingering questions that make me urge Hammad to consider undertaking a sequel.
–Is this attachment to home and place especially strong in Bil’in because the fence/Wall bisects the lived life of the village, or has this sense of loss transcended the physicality of Bil’in to become part of a broader Palestinian imaginary by way of empathy and projection?
–If after a few years, will a renewed immersion in Bil’in after a year or so confirm the persistence of Hammad’s findings, given the heightened Israeli provocations of the extremist leadership that took over the Israel government at the start of 2023, and put the West Bank at the top of its expansionist policy agenda?
–How do the daily lives of city dwellers in Jenin or Nablus exhibit resistance in ways that either resemble or differ from Bil’in and from one other?
–And even more wider afield, is everyday Palestinian resistance, with its pride of place and home attached to sumud unique to the Palestinian reality, or is it paralleled in other national situations of sustained repression of an ethnically distinct people in similar or differing ways? For example, Kashmir, Western Sahara, Catalonia, Tibet, Rohingya (Rakhine State, Myanmar)?
Hammad’s inspiring study has many additional ramifications that invite further study, but as a way of conceiving the Palestinian ordeal this book presents the most convincing, compassionate, and imaginative understanding of just how deep and abiding are the roots of Palestinian resistance. It is a great achievement as well as a loving tribute to the forms of resistance enacted by the village people of Bil’in against the apartheid regime of mighty Israel.
Richard Falk
Rome, July 24, 2023
Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything
Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)
This fascinating book gives us not only creative ways of grasping the underlying continuities of the Palestinian ordeal but also a truly original conception of why the long arc of resistance and resilience, stretching across time and taking certain distinctive forms, has been sustained for more than a century in the face of assorted trials and tribulations. None of these tests of Palestinian resistance was greater than the double assault on the fundamentals of Palestinian normalcy in the West Bank than that posed by the ever-expanding settlement movement and the connected construction of an encroaching Separation Wall on mostly occupied Palestinian land commencing in 2001.
Suzanne Hammad views the evolving Palestinian reality through an ethnographic lens that complements what the media reports, leaders and intellectuals have to say, and militants achieve by direct confrontation with the daily[MK1] experience of Palestinians living under the heavy boot of Israel’s apartheid regime which pursues with accelerating vigor its own agenda of ethnic cleansing and dispossession of people from their land. To carry out such an exploration led Hammad to conduct her field research for three years in a single West Bank community, the village of Bil’in. The implications of her findings have a broad resonance for Palestinian studies as they illuminate the realities of many similar villages subject to occupation, and indeed inform the situation and consciousness of all Palestinians regardless of whether living under occupation, in Arab refugee camps, or in pre-1967 Israel. In this sense, Bil’in with its population of less than 2000 offers us a rich metaphor by which to decipher the entire Palestinian predicament, and better appreciate the various modes of response that underpin resistance not only to the existential abuses being experienced under occupation but to the foreshadowing of an inevitable liberation that Israel’s state violence is capable of punishing harshly, yet unable so far to destroy. It might even be unable to comprehend such resistance. It is bringing to light these under-appreciated facets of Palestinian sumud or steadfastness that makes this book illuminating reading for all who wish to gain a deeper comprehension of this tragic struggle that remains horizonless as to beginning and end.
Although Bil’in is but one of many West Bank villages, its selection by the author as her main case study is hardly accidental or arbitrary. This village distinguished itself from many other superficially similar villages in at least two important[MK2] ways. First, residents experienced the severe intrusion of the Wall upon its living space, vividly exemplified by the barbed wire, electrified fence passing through Bil’in in ways that cut its residents off from 60% of their agricultural growing and grazing land, as well as the surrounding ‘empty’ areas used for recreation, reflection, and spiritual growth, including gatherings of the whole community during holidays, and even more during the harvesting times, especially of olives. Bil’in’s inhabitants were cut off by a permit system that was required to pass the single gate in the wall that granted them permission to go beyond the mostly residential part of the village, and in some cases, gain access to their own farmland. Secondly, residents reacted through collective anti-Wall protests every Friday for at least 15 years starting in 2005. The continuity and persistence of these protest dramatized Palestinian opposition to the Wall and the resolve of villagers to resist non-violently, yet with courage and resolve. This activism in Bil’in contrasted reliance on peaceful methods with the violent brutality of Israel’s apartheid regime, which imposes Jewish supremacy even in occupied Palestine and in defiance of international humanitarian law. In relation to the Wall, Israeli defiance became overt as Israel rejected the near unanimous (14-1) findings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 2004. Such an authoritative legal endorsement of Bil’in fundamental grievance added legitimacy to the Friday protests by confirming that it was unlawful for Israel to construct a supposed security Wall on Occupied Palestinian Territory, and hence the Wall should be dismantled, and the Palestinians given reparations for the harm sustained. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion was the related idea that Israel’s situating the Wall on Palestinian territory was more a land grab than a genuine security measure.
We ignore the special contribution of Hammad’s inquiry if we are content with this most visible level of interaction, which is to depict both the depth of Palestinian suffering and its transcendence in the lived daily life of the residents of Bil’in. On the one side a deprivation so severe that it prompts inhabitants to pronounce their condition by such sayings as ‘we’re alive only because we are not dead yet” or “if we had the chance we would choose death over living under occupation.” And yet, this is not at all the bleak understanding that Hammad seeks to impart, which is rather a seemingly contradictory sense in Bil’in that our life is not worth living and yet if we will go on living our values, resisting Israel’s encroachments, and transcending their harmful intentions, by nurturing the pride and pleasure associated with sustaining our way of life in the face of hardships, humiliations, and humbling adjustments we will be living the best possible life given the circumstances. To get at this interface between despair and transcendence, Hammad enables us to listen closely to the voices of Bil’in’s people, which dominate the text. This witnessing by Bil’inians decries the pain of profound loss yet seamlessly affirms their pride and meaning of life by maintaining organic connections as best they can with the land and their ancestral homes by doing as much of what they did before the Wall by walking alone or with a friend in the arid wilderness beyond the fertile land or convening the village children and elders to take part in the annual olive harvests that are more than agricultural and livelihood happenings, but are truly sacred rituals that combine work, play, festivals of remembrance, and defiant reaffirmations of a sense of belonging that guns, settlements, and provocations are incapable of damaging, let alone destroying.
Along the way we become privy to many telling details that add credibility to this seeming impossible atmosphere of existential contradiction. For instance, the residents of Bil’in do not waste a moment of regret lamenting their decision to stay in their homes as near as possible to their land on the wrong side of the Wall, come what may in terms of settler violence, encroachment, and Israeli tactics of repression. On the contrary, those Palestinians who departed from their homes and land increased their experience of injustice and suffering associated with Israeli 1948 tactics of dispossession and subsequent reenactments of the nakba; in retrospect, those so coerced, should for their own sake have stayed, resisted, and even accepting death as preferable to displacement, however cruelly induced to attain the Zionist settler colonial goals.
In another telling example, Hammad show us how those Bil’in residents rendered unable to grow their own subsistence food on their diminished farmland, losing the dignity associated with living off the produce yielded from one’s own land as generations before them had done. A further creative initiative undertaken not only for practical reasons, but in the spirit of nonviolent resistance is a food sovereignty movement in Bil’in which seeks to act collectively as a community to maintain local subsistence living standards without outside dependence.
These ways of balancing the ordeal of the occupation against a resolve to live as authentically as possible in traditional ways is what most truly captures the complex truths of life in Bil’in. In other words, the weekly protests that gave Bil’in worldwide prominence are the visible display of stubborn resistance. These marches to the wall opposed by Israel’s active military presence are the front story, but it is the back story of the daily lived life of residents that is the core of a resistance-unto-death that is quietly enacted on an hourly basis by the people of Bil’in. This extended exposure to the voiced experiences of Bil’in’s residents also abandons the conventional reliance of scholarly inquiry on the binary optics of oppressor/victim or victim/resister. This enriches the appreciation that Palestinian life under occupation is not properly interpreted as an either/or reality, but is more truly constituted by a richer interwoven texture of creative adaptation, stubborn revolt, depressing captivity, and liberating defiance.
Suzanne Hammad’s relationship to this account of her experience in Bil’in is at once deeply personal while at the same time managing to uphold the best traditions of academic rigor. She does not obscure her own background whose father left Nablus in the 1967 War for the sake of economic opportunity to start a family outside, taking refuge in an Arab country. She makes no effort to offer a balancing rationale for the Zionist Project or set forth the Israeli security narrative, yet this book came across to me as not only revelatory but entirely trustworthy. Hammad attains her goals by allowing the people of Bil’in to speak about their lives in ways that enlighten readers no matter how familiar they are with the large literature on the Palestine struggle. This study is also a rebuke to those who insist that objectivity requires a total detachment from partisan perspectives by achieving an understanding of Palestinian resistance that has eluded conventional scholarship for more than seven decades.
There are some lingering questions that make me urge Hammad to consider undertaking a sequel.
–Is this attachment to home and place especially strong in Bil’in because the fence/Wall bisects the lived life of the village, or has this sense of loss transcended the physicality of Bil’in to become part of a broader Palestinian imaginary by way of empathy and projection?
–If after a few years, will a renewed immersion in Bil’in after a year or so confirm the persistence of Hammad’s findings, given the heightened Israeli provocations of the extremist leadership that took over the Israel government at the start of 2023, and put the West Bank at the top of its expansionist policy agenda?
–How do the daily lives of city dwellers in Jenin or Nablus exhibit resistance in ways that either resemble or differ from Bil’in and from one other?
–And even more wider afield, is everyday Palestinian resistance, with its pride of place and home attached to sumud unique to the Palestinian reality, or is it paralleled in other national situations of sustained repression of an ethnically distinct people in similar or differing ways? For example, Kashmir, Western Sahara, Catalonia, Tibet, Rohingya (Rakhine State, Myanmar)?
Hammad’s inspiring study has many additional ramifications that invite further study, but as a way of conceiving the Palestinian ordeal this book presents the most convincing, compassionate, and imaginative understanding of just how deep and abiding are the roots of Palestinian resistance. It is a great achievement as well as a loving tribute to the forms of resistance enacted by the village people of Bil’in against the apartheid regime of mighty Israel.
[Prefatory Note: I wanted to share a foreword that I wrote to an exceptional ethnographic study of everyday resistance by residents of the Palestinian village of Bil’in, quite near Ramallah, based on the Suzanne Hammad three years of residence and informed observation. It enriches our understanding of core forms of resistance embedded in home and land. It offers a parallel to the commin perception of resistance as distinct protest activity, both violent and non-violent, for which Bil’in was previously international known as a result of its weekly protests that were provoked by the intrusive construction of the Israeli separation wall. This book written well before October 2023 when the genocidal onslaught by Israel on Gaza was published in 2023 by Rowman & Littlefield, and available in a Kindle edition, unfortunately with a high price-tag.]
Suzanne Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything
Starts and Ends with the Land, Foreword by Richard Falk, 2023.
This fascinating book gives us not only creative ways of grasping the underlying continuities of the Palestinian ordeal but also a truly original conception of why the long arc of resistance and resilience, stretching across time and taking certain distinctive forms, has been sustained for more than a century in the face of assorted trials and tribulations. None of these tests of Palestinian resistance was greater than the double assault on the fundamentals of Palestinian normalcy in the West Bank than that posed by the ever-expanding settlement movement and the connected construction of an encroaching Separation Wall on mostly occupied Palestinian land commencing in 2001.
Suzanne Hammad views the evolving Palestinian reality through an ethnographic lens that complements what the media reports, leaders and intellectuals have to say, and militants achieve by direct confrontation with the daily experience of Palestinians living under the heavy boot of Israel’s apartheid regime which pursues with accelerating vigor its own agenda of ethnic cleansing and dispossession of people from their land. To carry out such an exploration led Hammad to conduct her field research for three years in a single West Bank community, the village of Bil’in. The implications of her findings have a broad resonance for Palestinian studies as they illuminate the realities of many similar villages subject to occupation, and indeed inform the situation and consciousness of all Palestinians regardless of whether living under occupation, in Arab refugee camps, or in pre-1967 Israel. In this sense, Bil’in with its population of less than 2000 offers us a rich metaphor by which to decipher the entire Palestinian predicament, and better appreciate the various modes of response that underpin resistance not only to the existential abuses being experienced under occupation but to the foreshadowing of an inevitable liberation that Israel’s state violence is capable of punishing harshly, yet unable so far to destroy. It might even be unable to comprehend such resistance. It is bringing to light these under-appreciated facets of Palestinian sumud or steadfastness that makes this book illuminating reading for all who wish to gain a deeper comprehension of this tragic struggle that remains horizonless as to beginning and end.
Although Bil’in is but one of many West Bank villages, its selection by the author as her main case study is hardly accidental or arbitrary. This village distinguished itself from many other superficially similar villages in at least two important ways. First, residents experienced the severe intrusion of the Wall upon its living space, vividly exemplified by the barbed wire, electrified fence passing through Bil’in in ways that cut its residents off from 60% of their agricultural growing and grazing land, as well as the surrounding ‘empty’ areas used for recreation, reflection, and spiritual growth, including gatherings of the whole community during holidays, and even more during the harvesting times, especially of olives. Bil’in’s inhabitants were cut off by a permit system that was required to pass the single gate in the wall that granted them permission to go beyond the mostly residential part of the village, and in some cases, gain access to their own farmland. Secondly, residents reacted through collective anti-Wall protests every Friday for at least 15 years starting in 2005. The continuity and persistence of these protest dramatized Palestinian opposition to the Wall and the resolve of villagers to resist non-violently, yet with courage and resolve. This activism in Bil’in contrasted reliance on peaceful methods with the violent brutality of Israel’s apartheid regime, which imposes Jewish supremacy even in occupied Palestine and in defiance of international humanitarian law. In relation to the Wall, Israeli defiance became overt as Israel rejected the near unanimous (14-1) findings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 2004. Such an authoritative legal endorsement of Bil’in fundamental grievance added legitimacy to the Friday protests by confirming that it was unlawful for Israel to construct a supposed security Wall on Occupied Palestinian Territory, and hence the Wall should be dismantled, and the Palestinians given reparations for the harm sustained. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion was the related idea that Israel’s situating the Wall on Palestinian territory was more a land grab than a genuine security measure.
We ignore the special contribution of Hammad’s inquiry if we are content with this most visible level of interaction, which is to depict both the depth of Palestinian suffering and its transcendence in the lived daily life of the residents of Bil’in. On the one side a deprivation so severe that it prompts inhabitants to pronounce their condition by such sayings as ‘we’re alive only because we are not dead yet” or “if we had the chance we would choose death over living under occupation.” And yet, this is not at all the bleak understanding that Hammad seeks to impart, which is rather a seemingly contradictory sense in Bil’in that our life is not worth living and yet if we will go on living our values, resisting Israel’s encroachments, and transcending their harmful intentions, by nurturing the pride and pleasure associated with sustaining our way of life in the face of hardships, humiliations, and humbling adjustments we will be living the best possible life given the circumstances. To get at this interface between despair and transcendence, Hammad enables us to listen closely to the voices of Bil’in’s people, which dominate the text. This witnessing by Bil’inians decries the pain of profound loss yet seamlessly affirms their pride and meaning of life by maintaining organic connections as best they can with the land and their ancestral homes by doing as much of what they did before the Wall by walking alone or with a friend in the arid wilderness beyond the fertile land or convening the village children and elders to take part in the annual olive harvests that are more than agricultural and livelihood happenings, but are truly sacred rituals that combine work, play, festivals of remembrance, and defiant reaffirmations of a sense of belonging that guns, settlements, and provocations are incapable of damaging, let alone destroying.
Along the way we become privy to many telling details that add credibility to this seeming impossible atmosphere of existential contradiction. For instance, the residents of Bil’in do not waste a moment of regret lamenting their decision to stay in their homes as near as possible to their land on the wrong side of the Wall, come what may in terms of settler violence, encroachment, and Israeli tactics of repression. On the contrary, those Palestinians who departed from their homes and land increased their experience of injustice and suffering associated with Israeli 1948 tactics of dispossession and subsequent reenactments of the nakba; in retrospect, those so coerced, should for their own sake have stayed, resisted, and even accepting death as preferable to displacement, however cruelly induced to attain the Zionist settler colonial goals.
In another telling example, Hammad show us how those Bil’in residents rendered unable to grow their own subsistence food on their diminished farmland, losing the dignity associated with living off the produce yielded from one’s own land as generations before them had done. A further creative initiative undertaken not only for practical reasons, but in the spirit of nonviolent resistance is a food sovereignty movement in Bil’in which seeks to act collectively as a community to maintain local subsistence living standards without outside dependence.
These ways of balancing the ordeal of the occupation against a resolve to live as authentically as possible in traditional ways is what most truly captures the complex truths of life in Bil’in. In other words, the weekly protests that gave Bil’in worldwide prominence are the visible display of stubborn resistance. These marches to the wall opposed by Israel’s active military presence are the front story, but it is the back story of the daily lived life of residents that is the core of a resistance-unto-death that is quietly enacted on an hourly basis by the people of Bil’in. This extended exposure to the voiced experiences of Bil’in’s residents also abandons the conventional reliance of scholarly inquiry on the binary optics of oppressor/victim or victim/resister. This enriches the appreciation that Palestinian life under occupation is not properly interpreted as an either/or reality, but is more truly constituted by a richer interwoven texture of creative adaptation, stubborn revolt, depressing captivity, and liberating defiance.
Suzanne Hammad’s relationship to this account of her experience in Bil’in is at once deeply personal while at the same time managing to uphold the best traditions of academic rigor. She does not obscure her own background whose father left Nablus in the 1967 War for the sake of economic opportunity to start a family outside, taking refuge in an Arab country. She makes no effort to offer a balancing rationale for the Zionist Project or set forth the Israeli security narrative, yet this book came across to me as not only revelatory but entirely trustworthy. Hammad attains her goals by allowing the people of Bil’in to speak about their lives in ways that enlighten readers no matter how familiar they are with the large literature on the Palestine struggle. This study is also a rebuke to those who insist that objectivity requires a total detachment from partisan perspectives by achieving an understanding of Palestinian resistance that has eluded conventional scholarship for more than seven decades.
There are some lingering questions that make me urge Hammad to consider undertaking a sequel.
–Is this attachment to home and place especially strong in Bil’in because the fence/Wall bisects the lived life of the village, or has this sense of loss transcended the physicality of Bil’in to become part of a broader Palestinian imaginary by way of empathy and projection?
–If after a few years, will a renewed immersion in Bil’in after a year or so confirm the persistence of Hammad’s findings, given the heightened Israeli provocations of the extremist leadership that took over the Israel government at the start of 2023, and put the West Bank at the top of its expansionist policy agenda?
–How do the daily lives of city dwellers in Jenin or Nablus exhibit resistance in ways that either resemble or differ from Bil’in and from one other?
–And even more wider afield, is everyday Palestinian resistance, with its pride of place and home attached to sumud unique to the Palestinian reality, or is it paralleled in other national situations of sustained repression of an ethnically distinct people in similar or differing ways? For example, Kashmir, Western Sahara, Catalonia, Tibet, Rohingya (Rakhine State, Myanmar)?
Hammad’s inspiring study has many additional ramifications that invite further study, but as a way of conceiving the Palestinian ordeal this book presents the most convincing, compassionate, and imaginative understanding of just how deep and abiding are the roots of Palestinian resistance. It is a great achievement as well as a loving tribute to the forms of resistance enacted by the village people of Bil’in against the apartheid regime of mighty Israel.
Welcome, everyone. My name is Dr. Piers Robinson. I’m the research director for the International Center for 9/11 Justice. Today we are holding a symposium on geopolitics and the war on Palestine, titled Genocide and Empire.
Now, IC911, for those of you who aren’t familiar with this organization, is a nonprofit organization which has been set up in order to research and investigate issues surrounding 9/11—the 9/11 event. As you can see on the screen, we are engaged in a variety of activities, including public education—getting information out about what happened on 9/11 in a recent film, Peace, War and 9/11, on the late Graeme MacQueen, which people can view for free.
We’re also engaged in activism—supporting, for example, the Campbell family in their quest to gain a new inquest into the death of Geoff Campbell on 9/11.
And we’re also involved in facilitating and encouraging research into 9/11-related issues.
And we have The Journal of 9/11 Studies, hosted at IC911.
Now, one of our remits is to understand 9/11 better, to educate people about what happened on 9/11, but also to look at the consequences of 9/11. And, obviously, 9/11 itself was a key initiating point for a series of regime-change wars in the international system—in the Middle East primarily.
And you can see there on the slide—just as a little reminder here of the relevance of 9/11 to what we’re seeing today in the Middle East, in Israel and Gaza—these are two documents produced by or released by the Chilcot Inquiry in the UK and the communications between Tony Blair and President George Bush.
At the top there you can see discussion about Syria and Iran and a discussion about when it is optimum to engage each of these countries militarily. The quote there is: Well, if we’re going to topple Sudan, if that’s our priority, then we better do that with Syria and Iran in favor or acquiescing, rather than hitting all three at once.
And what you see there, obviously, is a discussion about the regime-change wars, which we know were being planned prior to 9/11 and which are documented in the Chilcot Inquiry and from other people who’ve spoken out about that. This was the planning that was going on in the immediate aftermath of 9/11—within weeks of that.
You can see below there’s another truth quote from the same document: Tony Blair talking about the Middle East being set for catastrophe—again, immediately in the aftermath of 9/11.
And this really goes to highlight the importance of 9/11, I think, in terms of setting the scene for what we’re seeing now in the Middle East. The conflict and the violence and the potential for escalation we have at the moment is very much part of events which were set in a process, which were set in train, around 9/11.
So, this is highly relevant for us as an organization to be looking at. We want to look at 9/11. We want to look at the consequences and also help people understand events today through an understanding of 9/11.
And so, this is what we have today. Today we’ve brought together a fantastic lineup of experts to speak about the current situation between Palestine and Israel and the situation in the Middle East.
We have Professor Richard Falk, who is an expert on international legal matters. He was UN rapporteur for Palestine in the United Nations.
We will also have Atif Kubursi, who’s a professor of economics—an emeritus professor from McMaster University. [Atif] also worked in the United Nations. He’s going to be talking through some of the resource and economic components of the conflict we see in the Middle East.
We have Kevin Ryan, who is a board member of IC911. He’s a 9/11 whistleblower and currently editor of the Journal of 9/11 Studies. He’s going to be talking about structural deep events and state crimes against democracy.
We’re also going to have Dr. Aaron Good, who runs the American Exceptionpodcast. His thesis, his PhD, was on American Exception, Hegemony and the Tripartite State. And he’s going to be talking about understanding October 7 and the current situation in the Middle East, as it potentially is a deep state event.
And finally, we will have Vanessa Beeley, an independent journalist who has deep and rich expertise on the Middle East. She’ll be talking about the broader geopolitical picture and where things are going in the Middle East.
Now I shall turn straight to Professor Richard Falk, who is going to be talking to us about genocide and self-defense under international law. As I mentioned before, Richard is a renowned international expert, the rapporteur on the Palestine case for the United Nations, and he’s going to talk to us about the question of genocide, what we’re seeing at the moment, the question of self-defense, and where we’re going in terms of the International Court of Justice and the South African attempts.
So, Richard. . .
Professor Richard Falk:
Thank you, Piers. I’m very honored and pleased to be part of this panel, and I think it’s very crucial to link the genocidal events in Gaza—and in a sense in all of occupied Palestine—to the configurations of empire in the post-9/11, post-Cold War international environment. And not forgetting the Ukraine dimension while we focus on the Middle East.
The Hamas attack on October 7 is itself surrounded by suspicious circumstances of Israeli foreknowledge—and therefore allowing these horrific events to unfold and being very slow to respond to the actuality of the attack, and the quickness with which it converted a limited instance of Palestinian resistance under Hamas’ leadership into the pretext for launching this vengeful and genocidal onslaught on the civilian population of Gaza.
That’s a shocking sequence of events on its own. And then, when you consider the magnitude of the violence that’s been inflicted on Gaza and the population—the whole of the population—you have to understand that this is a horrific, transparent, and, in a way, original confrontation with the crime of crimes: genocide.
In the past, genocides have been known mainly in retrospect and indirectly. We have not had the experience unfolding before our eyes on nightly television. The imagery of bombing hospitals and refugee camps, of babies being buried in mass graves, is something grotesque that not only is occurring as a result of Israeli actions, but enjoys the complicity of important countries in what I would call the settler colonial states of the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, plus the main members of NATO, which include Germany, the UK, and France, who are also colonial powers. And so, this has to be seen as part of the post -colonial effort by the global white West to maintain hegemonic control over the whole world system.
If we look at the casualties and the damage that has been done in Gaza up to this point, in the three months that these horrendous events have unfolded, and multiply them proportionately to the population of a country like the United States, which has supported, materially and diplomatically, at every stage so far, the occurrence of such violence, we would multiply the death totals of over 20,000 by 175 to take proportional account of the relative populations. That’s a shocking total and [is] predominantly civilians, and seemingly having only a marginal connection with Israeli security.
If Israeli security was the dominant motive, they would do differently what might prevent some similar act of resistance to take place in the future. They would, first of all, correct the bureaucratic process that led to the so-called “security lapse.” That would probably be sufficient to reestablish their security. They would also try to accommodate the needs of the people of Gaza by lifting the fifteen-year-old blockade and make any acts of resistance seem less like a jail breakout than an isolated instance of violence.
When we look at the Genocide Convention itself, we see that both Israel and the United States and the leading NATO members and those settler colonial states are all parties to that convention, which was viewed as a key element in creating a kind of wall against a repetition of what happened in the Holocaust. And what we’ve seen, not only in Gaza now but elsewhere, in Rwanda, in Myanmar, is an inadequate capacity to implement the intention of the Genocide Convention to prevent its recurrence.
But what is clear is that the facts of bombing so indiscriminately and so persistently and disproportionately, in opposition to international humanitarian law, the civilian population of 2.3 million Gazans creates the factual foundation of the genocidal allegation. That factual allegation is reinforced by the statements of the highest Israeli leaders—Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Herzog, and Minister of Defense Yoav Galant.
All of them have articulated views about the total decimation and devastation of Gaza, the destruction of up to 80% of the housing in northern Gaza, which was part of a deliberate policy of forced evacuation with the evident intention of ethnic cleansing. In other words, all the evidence we have points to the fact that the October 7 Hamas attack served as a pretext for the completion of the Zionist project by the dispossession by Israelis of Palestinians living not only in Gaza, but [also] in the West Bank, which has experienced unrestricted settler violence in this period and has also suffered unusually severe casualties during this time.
So, what we have is a transparently evident instance of genocide that has been defended very weakly and without substantive argument as a case of self-defense. We know from international law that self-defense does not allow the state that claims it to engage in disproportionate and unlimited violence or to commit what would otherwise be crimes under the cover of claiming self-defense.
And, in this instance, the claim of self-defense is particularly weak, because Gaza and the West Bank are occupied territories under the administrative responsibility of Israel as the occupying power since 1967. Israel has not implemented the unanimous Security Council Resolution 242 back in 1967, which called upon it to withdraw to the ’67 borders, and instead has used that period to engage in unlawful territorial encroachments on the occupied territory of the West Bank through its extensive settlement network, which has 650,000 Israelis living there and is really the death warrant of any realistic hope that a two-state solution could be achieved in light of this kind of territorial ambitious expansionism.
So, it’s questionable under any circumstances that a claim of self-defense is appropriate in an occupied territory governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention, because, in effect, self-defense is only tactically available if the combatants are both in some sense political actors of an international status.
You cannot defend yourself against part of what you are administering within your own territory. You can make reasonable claims to establish security or to reestablish security. But, as I’ve suggested, Israel has not tried to do that.
As shocking as these genocidal crimes have been, I find as disturbing the complicity of these countries in the world that have held themselves before international public opinion as models of democracy, as champions of human rights, as supporters of the rule of law. For the United States to undermine its own reputation by supporting this sort of transparent genocide should be shocking to the peoples of the world—and has been, if one takes account of the popular demonstrations all over the world.
These acts of complicity go against the obligations of the Genocide Convention, which require parties to the convention, all of which encompass both Israel and the US as well as the members of NATO and the settler colonial states. All of them are expected, as a matter of law, to take what action is reasonably possible in order to prevent or disrupt the continuation of genocide. They are all perpetrating crimes as an accessory to genocide.
It is an act of shame that they have done little to distance themselves or to actively oppose the continuation of these developments and to use their leverage at the United Nations to disempower the Security Council that sought, by an overwhelming vote of 14-to-1, to establish a ceasefire weeks ago.
This is not only failing to prevent genocide, it’s a matter of facilitating genocide. That should be taken into our political imagination and our moral imagination when we think about accountability for the crimes that are being committed.
South Africa has recently initiated, under Article 3 of the Genocide Convention, its right as a party to the convention to call for the International Court of Justice to impose provisional measures of a character that would instruct Israel, as a matter of International Court of Justice authority, to immediately cease any kind of violent activity that is part of the crime that is being committed and would also consider whether Hamas should fall within the scope of such a crime.
This is a serious challenge both to the complicit countries to stand aside if the rulings that are expected in the coming weeks of the World Court do uphold the South African application that is calling for these immediate measures as a prelude to a decision on whether the allegation of genocide, which is contained in a 94-page document that goes through, in agonizing detail, the facts of genocide that have transpired in this period, starting with the day after October 7.
There is also the question of who will endorse this South African initiative. Turkey, so far, is the only NATO member that has endorsed it. Jordan and Malaysia have joined in that endorsement. And we notice that none of the European colonial powers and none of the settler colonial states have seen fit to uphold a judicial determination of whether action should be taken to prevent this genocide from going on.
So, what is presented to the world is a crisis of implementation and accountability. There’s no doubt that a crime of a high magnitude is being committed and indeed is virtually confessed to be committed, despite Israel’s record of defiance of international law throughout its occupation and its allegations that any criticism, wherever it emanates from, is an instance of antisemitism.
It called the International Criminal Court’s decision to investigate crimes by Israel alleged by Palestine subsequent to 2014, before these recent events—Prime Minister Netanyahu reacted by saying, “This is pure antisemitism,” as if the respected international institution is motivated by such base intentions.
Similarly, they’ve attacked the South African initiative as a blood libel against the Jewish people.
A blood libel was the kind of anti-Jewish allegation made in the early Christian period—that the Jews were guilty of murdering Christian babies. And it was genuine antisemitism of an extreme sort to make these false allegations.
But to contradict what we see before our eyes and call that a blood libel is itself something that suggests an unwillingness of Israel to accept any authority that challenges its policies, however unlawful and criminal.
And it has done that throughout the occupation. It has made life miserable for people like me, who acted as special rapporteurs that were expected to report as honestly as we could on violations of human rights associated with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.
So, we have a situation where the prospects of implementing a favorable International Court of Justice decision against Israel will depend on the willingness of the Security Council to use its authority and to take the steps necessary to implement that decision.
And once again that will hinge on whether the permanent five members of the Security Council will either abstain or at least and thereby suspend their right of veto or actually vote in favor of implementing the findings and the orders of the International Court of Justice.
In the longer run, there seems to be a need for some kind of accountability procedure to address these crimes—both the crime of genocide as perpetrated by Israel and the crimes of complicity as led by the US and supported in various ways by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
So this is a crisis of not only conscience but of law and the protection of vulnerable people in a world that is beset by a variety of challenges, including the ongoing Ukraine War, and is seeking a new kind of managing the very power and security that doesn’t depend on the unipolar imperial authority that has been exercised by the United States since the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union. A new phase of international relations will emerge out of this crisis.
In bringing my remarks to a close, I would also say there’s a great danger that Israel will seek to widen the war in the region, because it will be cornered politically, which is beginning to be evident in some of the violence beyond the borders of Gaza itself.
And it’s cornered because it can neither prevail and convincingly declare some kind of victory that is credible nor can it afford to lose, given the investment it’s made in terms of its own law, the lives of Israeli soldiers and citizens, and the damage it’s done to its global reputation.
It’s no longer a legitimate state after this form of sustained behavior. It is condemned almost universally. The peoples of the governments that are condemning it are seeking to exert pressure for some sort of implementation. So, there is this moment of crisis and appeal to the peoples of the global West to rise in a way that exerts pressure on their own governments to take international law seriously, to promote, at this late toxic stage, justice for the Palestinian people.
Let me stop there.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you, Richard, for that forensic and unequivocal assessment of what is happening at the moment in relation to the question of genocide. We’ll also have many questions at the end in the panel discussion. It just strikes me that the weaponization of the term “antisemitism” I think is wearing thin given what we’re seeing in the Middle East at the moment.
That was a fantastic presentation. Before we turn to Atif Kubursi—for me to introduce him—I just want to send a quick reminder. People can ask questions for the panelists, and we will try to include some questions in the panel discussion at the end. And there’s an email link on the website showing where you can send the questions to. So please do feel free to send questions and we’ll try to field some of them at the end.
Oil, Canals and Trade Routes: Economic Factors Underlying the Ongoing Genocide
Now, we turn to Professor Atif Kubursi, who is emeritus McMaster professor and an expert on economics.
We’ve had an extremely detailed and careful analysis of the legal situation, and Atif is going to talk to us about the economic underbelly of this conflict, trying to understand what we’re seeing at the moment in terms of questions of resources and so on.
To keep on time, I won’t go into too long an introduction to Atif. He’s a very renowned international expert in economics. As I said before, he’s worked in a United Nations capacity.
He has great expertise. We look forward to what you have to tell us now, Atif, about the economics of the situation.
Atif.
Professor Atif Kubursi:
Thank you very much, Piers, for your kind introduction. I’m delighted to be part of this distinguished panel here, and I see that my presentation is quite complimentary to what Professor Falk had presented.
The issue here is that the events that happened on October 7 and the justification and the reactions call into question some of these events in a way that asks why they happened—why did they happen the way they did. How a country that has such sophisticated, advanced technology and that is very concerned about security would allow something like this to happen. And for the reaction to take so long to come forward. And then the scale of the reaction and the onslaught—the incredible toll of the civilians—particularly children and women and all people.
The issue, as Professor Falk mentioned, is part of the Zionist attempt to try, as much as possible, to complete, so to speak, the Greater Israel project and to expand and to grab more land. And then the declared objective is that we have to dismantle Hamas for the sake of the security of Israel and we have to liberate the hostages and we have to make sure that no future scale attempt of this sort would ever happen.
These are the declared objectives. But then, how would you explain this incredible carpet bombing, this huge reaction, this heavy toll, the likes of which we have never seen. Even Dresden did not suffer what Gaza has suffered. And the number of deaths and wounded. And the scale of transferring people from one side to the other is unbelievable.
But what’s more important are the undeclared objectives. What seems to be the case here is that there is an attempt to make Gaza unlivable. That there is really a way, in which Professor Mearsheimer, on December 12, has claimed that the objective here is to flatten, erase, destroy, make Gaza unlivable, transfer the population of Gaza, empty Gaza of its people.
But why would Israel seek this type of objective? The story here is that it’s only presented as if it’s part of that Greater Israel—the Zionist project that would not be completed until Israel is from the Euphrates to the Nile, as it has been expressed in many areas.
But the story is, there are a number of very credible and very substantive reasons that would make this project to be also in pursuit of the colonial economic advantages. I’m going to mention three major objectives and three major projects that would point out that Israel is seeking some economic gains here. The colonial advantage that has always been part of any colonial project is at play here.
The first and foremost objective is the control of gas in—where you see in the map—the Levant Basin. This Levant Basin is now home to about 122 trillion cubic feet of gas. And this is from the US Geological Survey. This has become extremely valuable, particularly in the aftermath of the destruction of Nord Stream 2 and the withdrawal of any supply coming from Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine-Russian War.
And this area has also about 1.7 billion barrels of oil. It’s a shared resource. It’s shared between, as you can see, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus. And in this respect, one would have expected that this shared resource would be one that would be managed collectively and in the interest of the collective number of countries that are riparian to this.
There are some very important characteristics about gas and oil and about energy that are really quite serious and fundamental. First and foremost, oil [and] gas as fossil fuels are nonrenewable, which means that any time you exploit them today you’re denying, forfeiting the right of future generations to exploit them.
The second, that because they are shared resources, it means, given that they are finite, nonrenewable, that if one party exploits this resource, less is available for the rest of us. And there is no question about it. This seems to be at play here, as I will show what happened with Israel exploiting the Meged oil fields in Area C in the West Bank.
And the other thing is that it’s a fugitive type of resource. Especially gas. It doesn’t stay in one place. The other thing: Being basically underwater, there is no guarantee that there is any consistency of the existence of the resource in terms of the political borders. It straddles all these borders, and they are shared things, in the sense that there was an agreement between Israel and Lebanon about the Karish and Qanaa. And many people felt that this was not really a very good agreement, because there is no way Lebanon, which would become able to produce and lift some of this gas and oil in five years’ time, would find anything. Because if these are really shared resources and Israel is using it now, by the time the Lebanese are able to lift, there would be probably nothing left. There’s no way you can prevent a party to use its only share.
The United States has the same similar situation in Oklahoma and Texas, where oil was found under the ground of many farmers and [other] parties. What they really found to be important—and this really was according to a great economist, Ronald Koz, who got Nobel Prize for it—is that you have to unitize. Unitize: By this we mean that no party is allowed to lift or to use this resource without the acquiescence and sharing with the rest.
And what would you do is you allow one party, on behalf of the collective, to exploit it in the most efficient way. Because if each one were to pierce a hole and lift it, it would dissipate the natural flow and become extremely expensive to do that. There would be basic, major reasons for conflict. Unitization would mean that it would be exploited on behalf of all. All the resources are now exploited by one party and representing everybody, and it would exploit it in the most efficient way. It would lift all the resource and sell it and put it in a kitty, in an escrow fund that would be divvied up among the different parties.
This is not what Israel is doing. Israel is trying to basically and fundamentally make sure that the Lebanese are not getting their fair share and making sure that Gaza is not getting any of its share.
And this is exactly what we see here. It is a situation in which Gaza . . . there are [see map] Marine 1 and Marine 2, and there is an incredible amount of gas, and it’s about only 20 nautical miles from Gaza. Also, in the Oslo II Accord, the Palestinians were given the right to exploit in their economic zone all the way, as you see in this picture, to the very end of that triangle. That should really be the amount that the Palestinians would use.
There were negotiations once it was discovered in 1999. The Ehud Baruch government tried to see that maybe there would be a way in which we could take this gas from the Palestinian wells and send it to Israel—to the Israeli electric company. And the contract was signed with the parties. At one time, Arafat took a group and there was a Lebanese group called CCC—the Consolidated Contractors Company—who invested money to build this pipeline. They would send it to Israel, and this would be put as part of the money that the Palestinian National Authority would use.
Then Sharon came and said, “No way, we’re not going.” And there was a very evident group of Israeli companies that had lobbied the government, [paraphrasing], “You should not allow them to produce anything, because the money they’re going to get would be used to fund terrorism against us. No country should allow a pipeline of wealth that would be used against it.”
This was at the time where the Oslo Agreement was with the Palestinian National Authority, and they had already arrived at some arrangement. The story of the negotiations—they are detailed in my paper, and I can make it available for anybody to look at—suggests that Israel was trying basically, fundamentally, to deny the Palestinians any use of this resource, in much the same say it denied the Palestinians the use of their oil, which was in Area C of the West Bank. Many residents of the area near Meged said that houses were shaking and were damaged because Israel was literally drilling for oil, siphoning this oil that should really be legitimately used for the economic development of the Palestinians.
And this is in contravention, as Dr. Falk has written and explained, that the occupier has no right to use the resources of the occupied people, only if it will be used to benefit the people under occupation. But here is Israel taking, siphoning all this oil for its own interest at the expense of the Palestinians’ ability to use this resource.
If this was not sufficient, there are other reasons, and these reasons are incredibly becoming now important and becoming very substantive.
At one time in the 1960s, the US had underwritten a project and got an American company to study the development of an alternative to the Suez Canal. At the time, Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal and there were troubles from the French and British, who had attacked in 1956. But the story was that the Americans felt that there is no way they can live, accept, and feel comfortable about a very important canal such as the Suez Canal, to be in a way that would be totally outside the command and control and the full exercise of sovereignty of the Egyptians.
The Suez Canal is only 196 kilometers [in length], only 100 meters wide, 50 meters—sometimes less—deep, and allows only one-way traffic. If the traffic is going from south to north, from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, then there would be no chance for ships to come from the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea.
And there was a big problem—the problem being that it needs dredging very often, because it’s in a sandy geological situation and any sandstorm will really fill it up. It needs to be dredged, and it’s becoming quite costly to do that. As you can remember, just a few months back, a very important ship ran aground, and it took days and weeks and big losses, estimated at 10 billion dollars, to clear the canal. 12% to 15% of the world trade goes through this canal. And about 30% of the total container traffic goes through this canal. A bit of the oil that comes from the Middle East, particularly from the Gulf of Saudi Arabia, from Kuwait, from Iran and other countries in the Gulf, goes through the canal as it goes to Europe. And it saves three weeks of travel. I mean the area from Mumbai in India—or take it to China—all the way to London is about 17,000 nautical miles if you go around Africa, but if you go through the canal, you will find that there is really a major saving in time. You will be saving around literally 4,000 nautical miles, which would be about literally three weeks, as I mentioned.
And this is really a major saving in terms of the cost of transporting all these products and energy from the Gulf or from India or from China or from Japan or anything that world trade would be in a very substantive way impacted in the course [inaudible]. Some people are really saying that now, with the Yemenis trying to interfere into the free flow of these commodities going through the canal, are basically and fundamentally imposing a very high cost for the rest of the world. Most people are saying that prices of oil that had dropped to a very low level, now below 70 dollars, may really start to rise—and rise in a significant way.
The Ben Gurion Canal that was conceived in the ’60s, then lay dormant, and then, all of a sudden, the Israelis now are saying, Look, we’re going to build this Ben Gurion Canal, and it’s going to be 200 meters wide, which would allow two-way traffic. It’s going to be deeper by about 10 to 15 and some people say another 50 meters deep, and this would allow much larger, the largest ships that are now unable . . . particularly for the Americans and the Imperial West to have a free flow of their aircraft carriers going through.
Now this is a situation where, if you really build it, which would completely compromise the ability of Egypt to take advantage of it, Egypt derives about 9.7 billion dollars a year, 2% of the Egyptian GDP, and this is not a small amount, and the absence of other alternative, important economic drivers, Egypt would be hurt in a very fundamental way.
The story here is that, if you look at this map that I have, the original plan was to go from Eliat, which is on the Red Sea, all the way to Ashkelon. But it is still within the reach of weapons in Gaza. And the best and most efficient way you could get this canal would be to go to a straight line, which is the shortest distance, and this would have to go through Gaza.
To a great extent some people are saying, “Okay, what does it really do?” It would save about 40 to 50 kilometers in space. But more important, if you go through the Negev, you’re going through sand. If you go directly through Gaza, the geological structure of the canal would be primarily into a rocky area, which would save all this incredibly cost of dredging, which would be continuous and would allow also to have a wider canal, a deeper canal.
In this respect, there is really a very serious threat that would be presented by this canal. And this canal could really be the most optimal geologically and the shortest distance, which is a straight line, to go directly to the north and Gaza or even southern Gaza, but this would require emptying Gaza.
So, emptying Gaza has now two dimensions:
One, you prevent anybody from Gaza ever claiming gas that would now be totally exploited by Israel in a very serious situation where now gas has become three to four times more valuable than it was a few years back because of the incredible need. Europeans are all coming to Israel in a way they never really came [before] in the hope of laying claim to some of this to replace the gas that they have missed because of the destruction [of Nord Stream], which raises the question of who destroyed Nord Stream and who will benefit from this destruction.
The other one is that this canal would become really optimal and would be a real substitute for the Suez Canal to the extent that it is in that rocky area that would allow two-way traffic that would be deep and would not be requiring all this dredging on a continuous basis.
If these two [dimensions] are not enough to empty Gaza and to explain why the Israelis have been very adamant about making Gaza unlivable, destroying all the housing infrastructure . . . I mean, one of the ministers has suggested that now when we finish, we should not allow the Gazans to get to a single commodity that would be required for reconstruction. We should make sure they cannot reconstruct, because what we really want is for them to leave. And it would be—this is the farce—a voluntary departure. Of course, they don’t have any homes. But, hey, when you control the borders, you control access to everything coming in. That is really the genocide that Professor Falk was talking about.
This is basically—the intent of the Israelis is to make Gaza an empty space, to make it unlivable, to make sure that people are driven out. They have already . . . the day before yesterday, Israeli delegations went to Rwanda and went to Chad trying to persuade these two countries to accept massive transfers of Palestinians to them, promising them money, promising them weapons, promising support in any shape or form that would allow these to accept this transfer.
The Israelis are still bent on emptying Gaza—emptying Gaza by destruction of the people continuously. Every day you see this violent onslaught of killing en masse—a huge number of children and women.
One would wonder if this attack of “self-defense” is to prevent future events from happening. There is no question this violence is sowing the seeds of future violence. The only one certain aspect about violence is, it breeds violence. What you do today is likely to come back at you in the future. History is rife with examples.
If these two projects are not sufficient reasons to explain why the Israelis—though they have not declared it—have continued to be adamant about occupying Gaza, emptying Gaza, erasing Gaza, making it unlivable so that it would become a very safe place for the Israelis, to prevent them from using their gas, to prevent them from obstructing the most efficient possible way to replace the Suez Canal, there is the third one that’s coming also.
[This third project] is also playing into the hands of the American Empire. The Americans are adamant about creating an alternative to the Silk Road. The Silk Road is a project that China has sponsored and has invested heavily in and has devoted literally billions if not trillions of dollars to create this route that would take it from China all the way to Europe and the Middle East and Africa in a way that will allow the Chinese to sell their goods and services unimpeded and in no way to be subject to any control of the seas.
Iran was also one of the hubs on this Silk Road that would go from China through Asia, Pakistan, and then Iran and then Syria. These are the countries that the United States does not want to get any benefit from. And they persuaded, in some sense they succeeded, but they [inaudible] some doubts about this, that there will be now a multimodal connection between India. It goes all the way to Dubai, from Dubai to Israel, Israel to Europe, bypassing Iran, bypassing Syria, bypassing Egypt, bypassing many of the Arab countries in this.
And why would the Israelis go on such an expensive one? It’s because it’s underwritten by the Americans. The Americans seem to completely have an open hand when it comes to Israel.
At one time, and if you think I’m exaggerating, our friend, Mr. Biden, said that investing 3.6 billion dollars — this is only the amount of money that’s given to the military — is a gilt-edged investment and is purely a good investment. Good in terms of what? Investment is cost. But then it’s really returns. What are the returns America is expecting? They’re basically funding and using Israel as a hegemonic power in the Middle East that would serve to suppress and to contain and to emasculate any possible group that might really work with the Russians or Chinese or any contending and contesting power.
This is part of the hegemonic exercise of the empire and unipolar world. And they find in Israel and the UAE a very willing partner. And some people said that this alternative to the Silk Road has worked in the past few weeks. There are now some concerns that UAE has been sending multiple trucks with fresh food and everything to Israel that goes from Dubai into Saudi Arabia and into Jordan and then into Israel.
The other parties have denied this, but to some extent, the Israelis have been very adamant that this is happening. And now we’re seeing that this route, this alternative, is not an imaginary one but that they are basically, fundamentally implementing it and taking the benefits that could come from it.
What does this all mean? What it really means is that this war is definitely motivated by Zionist ideology and Zionist aims and designs. But that’s not mutually exclusive with some of the arguments I’m presenting. There are colonial economic and material advantages that Israel is seeking as a return on its investment in this war. And, in addition to eliminating any competition or action from the Palestinian people in Gaza, there would be returns. And these returns are very lucrative.
There is no question. The total value of the Levant Basin: The oil prices of 2019 were about 350 billion dollars. And if Israel prevents Lebanon — or makes it wait and they can siphon it and slant the drilling — and if they can prevent the Palestinians from exploiting their own natural resources and if the Israelis can use them and if they would get their hands on a very lucrative bundle here and the amounts that are some people really saying with the rise of the price of gas due to the Ukraine-Russian War that these values have risen more than three to four times and then the oil that you will get.
That’s not only energy sufficiency but creating Israel as a petro-state or a gas state with an empire and an important, lucrative investment that would return a huge amount of rents to the Israelis. And if this was not sufficient then add to it the alternative of the Suez Canal, and that may be about 10-to-20 billion dollars in terms of shipping fees and the control on being a major power that would connect the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.
And if these two are not sufficient, let’s go to the third one, which is the alternative to the Silk Road, undermining the capacity of the Chinese to supply routes all the way through Asia, to Europe, and to Africa. In a way, Israel has positioned itself by emptying Gaza as a major economic driver and hegemonic control over trade routes that would serve the empire.
I’ll stop there. Thank you.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you very much, Atif. Economic or resource analysis of what’s going on is so particularly essential because so much of the mainstream popular discussion of these conflicts is purely in terms of identity and so on, and the economics is always hidden from view, certainly for a large section of the public. So, I think that’s extremely useful.
Thank you, Atif, for that presentation.
Identifying Structural Deep Events and State Crimes Against Democracy in Real Time
We’ve had a discussion, we’ve looked closely at legal issues, we’ve looked at the resource economic underbelly of the conflict, and we’re now going to move with Kevin Ryan into thinking a little bit more about some of the other hidden, deep state, deep event aspects of this—the question of deception, the question of instigation or exploitation of events, for various purposes.
Kevin is a whistleblower from the 9/11 event. He is a board member of International Center for 9/11 Justice, editor of the Journal of 9/11 Studies, and author of Another Nineteen, looking at suspects regarding 9/11.
He’s going to be talking to us for about 20 minutes, looking at, in a sense, some wider conceptual theoretical ideas about structural deep events, state crimes against democracy.
I’d like to welcome you and hand it over to you, Kevin.
Kevin Ryan:
I’m very grateful to be here among such distinguished company. And as Dr. Robinson said, I’m a member of the board of the International Center for 9/11 Justice that’s sponsoring the symposium along with UK Column. The International Center is dedicated to, among other things, establishing an accurate account of the crimes of September 11, 2001. We’re also committed to identifying and studying similar events. If anyone listening is not aware of the evidence that 9/11 was a deception, please go to our website, IC911.org, where you can find much information about that.
I’d like to begin the day, though, with a quote from a physicist. Paul Davies is a quantum theorist who said: “It’s a new perspective, not a new piece of information, that leads to intellectual revolutions.” Many of us have found that studying 9/11 and the crimes of 9/11 provides that sort of new perspective. But it’s not comfortable.
One way to describe part of this new view is that the oligarchy that rules us terrorizes us on occasion to facilitate its own objectives. And this leads to the questioning of every new narrative that we receive from the mainstream media and from government.
After 9/11, I began to question every terrorist act that occurred over a period of twenty years. For example, in 2015, I evaluated all of the terrorist acts across the world, including in France and Denmark and Australia and the United States. I found that there was a pattern to these terrorist acts that included the fact that the evidence for the official account was very weak and very convenient, that any other evidence that didn’t support the official account was ignored, [that] the suspects were of course dead immediately, and [that] there was an immediate attempt to associate them with Islam. There had been military or law enforcement exercises that mimicked the events, either coinciding with the events or preceding them, and, of course, there were very quick actions in response, without thorough investigation.
So, what I found is that 9/11 and the other terrorist events during the global war on terror fit this pattern. They’re called “false flag events,” which are acts committed with the intent of hiding the true culprits and blaming others.
Now, false flags are a subset of something called “state crimes against democracy,” which are a subset of what are called “deep events.” But I’ll generally call them “state crimes” in this talk. Or, as with 9/11, I might call them “global state crimes.”
My question is: Can we detect a false flag, a state crime against democracy, or a deep event as it’s happening? It’s important for peace and security to do so, as well as for our own personal safety and liberty. We also don’t want to be part of the harm that’s being caused by any state crime.
And for these purposes, this is not just an academic exercise. But we do have to define the terms involved in order to detect state crimes. So, I’ll begin with state crimes against democracy, which was defined by Lance deHaven-Smith, a professor from Florida State University who coined the term. He said that they are concerted actions or inactions by government insiders, intended to manipulate democratic processes and undermine popular sovereignty.
Two things jump out to me in this definition. First of all, they can be actions or inactions. So, things that should have happened but did not happen can be state crimes. An example might be the fact that the Roosevelt Administration knew that the Pearl Harbor attack would occur before it did and allowed it to happen. So, inactions—not preventing that attack or preventing the people from being killed—are an example of a state crime against democracy.
And government insiders are involved, according to Professor deHaven-Smith. There’s a fine line between government insiders, government officials, and people who go through a revolving door. We’ll keep that in mind.
Professor deHaven-Smith listed about two dozen of these SCADs, or state crimes against democracy, in his writings and in his talks. For him, all of them were US-based. They included assassinations of public figures, like JFK and RFK and Martin Luther King. They included provocations to drive war, like 9/11. They also included election-related crimes.
One more thing Dr. deHaven-Smith did was, he categorized them into what he called highly confirmed SCADs, mid-level SCADs, or low-level SCADs.
He did categorize them as high-level confirmation of being a SCAD if there were confessions or documents of admission. So, documentation or confessions that stated they were, in fact, state crimes made them highly confirmed.
If they were circumstantial, but also included a cover-up, then he would potentially call them a mid-level confirmed SCAD. That would include, for him, both JFK and the 9/11 crimes.
But I think it’s important to note that we will not likely get confessions in a timely manner for the next state crime or the latest state crime. But my point is that it makes sense to maintain a skeptical view of any new narrative if the current perspective suggests it might be a state crime. A useful, practical perspective, or view, does not require nailing down every fact. It should be continually reevaluated, of course, as new evidence is obtained.
One thing many of us have heard is that such perspectives are not within the limits of what’s called the spectrum of acceptable opinion. So, we have to be willing to withstand being smeared as a conspiracy theorist if we might consider such perspectives.
The “conspiracy theorist” term is used to deter others from investigating historic events. It implies that criminal conspiracies among the rich and powerful are impossible or absurd. It takes some imagination to buy into that usage.
Professor Peter Dale Scott defined “deep events” and “structural deep events.” He said a deep event is one of hidden or underappreciated relevance to deep politics. Now, deep politics is the business of deep states, and deep states are covert groups that seek to exercise control over governments or nations. Also, deep events are never presented clearly by the media. “Structural” means the event impacts the whole fabric of society. So, a “structural deep event” impacts all of society.
I’ve noticed that many people can accept the idea of an American deep state—the US deep state. But some people cannot transfer that idea to other countries or to an international or a supranational deep state. Professor Scott was not one of those. He mentioned a number of times a supranational deep state in his writings and in his interviews. He mentioned several organizations that he felt were representative of an international or a supranational deep state, including the Council on Foreign Relations, Cercle Pinay, the Safari Club, and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).
Professor Scott also identified common modalities of structural deep events. These included the instant identification of the designated culprits, the fact that the suspects had hidden intelligence backgrounds and that they were protected by intelligence agencies. This is all very true for the 9/11 crimes.
But one drawback to the deep event definition is that it’s a retrospective vision, meaning some of these modalities are not seen until years later. We can’t see, of course, what’s hidden or falsified, so we may not be able to call something a structural deep event yet at the same time still have enough perspective to see that it’s likely to be a state crime.
In 2020 I was working as the head of quality control for a gene therapy company, and our laboratories were experiencing what’s called “false positive results” for a test technique called RT-qPCR. This is a form of PCR. It’s a nucleotide testing for analytes such as viruses.
And so, it became interesting to me when I read that a Chinese journal of epidemiology had published a peer-reviewed paper saying that in China the testing for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, experienced 50% false positives. That’s quite a bit. It means that every other test that says somebody is infected with SARS-CoV-2 was false. Further confirmatory testing showed that they were not infected.
This led me to look into the test kit being manufactured for the US CDC. I noticed reports in the news that the state laboratories using this kit were experiencing a lot of false positives. So, I looked into the details of the reagents used in the kits—the nucleotide sequences and so forth—and found that they were unable to identify a unique coronavirus. The primers and probes were based on parts of the coronavirus which were highly conserved across different coronaviruses, of which there were already seven common coronaviruses, including the common cold. So, the kit was not testing for a unique coronavirus.
Coupled to this was the fact that there were policy changes in many places that led to the misattribution of death. Anyone who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 and happened to die,
whether they died of heart disease or cancer or being in a motorcycle accident, COVID was listed if they tested positive for it. COVID was listed on their death certificate. This obviously inflated the numbers that people used.
There was also a redefinition of terms. The terms “pandemic” and later “vaccine” were redefined for the purposes of supporting this agenda that appeared to be being implemented. There were oppressive mandates like lockdowns and mandatory vaccinations and so forth implemented. And soon it became clear to me and many others that COVID was also a global state crime—not just an individual state crime, but a coordinated global state crime.
In September 2020, I gave a presentation on parallels between COVID crimes and 9/11 crimes, and I listed eleven features and outcomes that were shared among the COVID crimes and the 9/11 crimes.
I noted that there was media saturation of fear-based messaging.
There was insider trading in both instances.
There were exercises that preceded the events that mimicked what was going to happen, similar to the false flag terrorist exercises.
There was a failure to investigate the origins of the threat.
There was an abuse of science and a widespread censorship of dissent.
It was clear that the response would kill far more people than the original threat.
There were increased mechanisms of population control.
And, of course, there was a huge transfer of wealth and a centralization of power.
Both the 9/11 crimes and the COVID crimes shared these commonalities. And there was a similar formula for the terrorism events during the global war on terror.
So, my question is: Can we use a pattern like this to more quickly identify when a state crime is being committed?
We don’t need confessions before we can identify a state crime for our own purposes. What we also don’t need is to convince 100% of our fellow citizens, or even a majority. We need to be able to take measures in our own best interests—for example, rejecting narratives or sources of misinformation or declining oppressive state measures like experimental injections.
Let’s use the Hamas attack on October 7th as an example of a narrative that can be evaluated as a state crime as well.
I noticed that the Israeli ambassador to the UN called these attacks “Israel’s 9/11.” That raised my attention—I’m sure it did for many people—because that means something quite different to me.
But we can ask: Do these attacks match the pattern?
Was there fear-based messaging? I think that’s fair to say. And even more so, it was in the form of atrocity propaganda. You know, babies having their heads chopped off and people being dismembered and burned alive. All of these stories, it was found out recently, originated with the Netanyahu administration, and many, if not all, appeared to be false.
Were there rapid actions taken that facilitated a preexisting agenda? It’s fair to consider that, I think.
Did the response kill more people? Obviously, the response has killed twenty times more, as Professor Falk stated. This is genocidal in response.
Were there exercises beforehand? There were, in fact, exercises conducted by Hamas in July of 2020 that mimicked what would happen on October 7th. These exercises were monitored by Israeli intelligence. Some of them have said that the exercises reflected the attacks fairly well.
Was there insider trading? Recently, law professors at New York University and at Columbia University published a peer-reviewed article that indicated there was short-selling, a form of insider trading, on Israeli companies related to the October 7th events.
We could go on. Was there censorship? Population control? Transfer of wealth?
Professor Kubursi made several remarks related to transfer of wealth, natural resources, and land. The next two speakers will likely shed more light on the details.
Also note that Al Qaeda was a creation of US defense and intelligence agencies going back to Operation Cyclone in the 1970s. And, similarly, Hamas was at least in part created by Israel. So, there are some similarities there as well.
I would just say at this point our current perspective should include the possibility that the State of Israel was involved somehow in the crimes related to October 7th and that they could be considered state crimes.
In any case, we need to know when state crimes are being committed and we need to know as soon as possible, as they’re occurring, to avoid harming ourselves and others.
A pattern does exist for state crimes, maybe not the exact pattern that I’ve described. But whatever the pattern or the set of characteristics is, people need to understand it in order to move to more quickly and reliably evaluate future crises for deception.
If we want to maintain our lives and liberties, we must examine every new alleged crisis, using criteria based on a pattern reflective of the events we know were state crimes.
So, thank you for your attention. I’ll turn it over back over to Dr. Robinson at this time.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you very much, Kevin. It’s very interesting. Obviously, this question of structural deep events, the question of deception, and so on, is, in the same way as Atif’s presentation, looking at areas and processes that people don’t understand properly. In that case, the economics. In this case, the question of the deep state, the question of these elements of government which are hidden from view. And, really, this central idea that deception, especially with empires, is a central way in which they conduct themselves, how they exercise power—particularly for liberal empires, or empires that like to see themselves as liberal democracies. You have to mislead the public, ultimately, in order to do the necessary dark deeds of empire. So an absolutely essential research area.
Hegemonic Panic: October 7 as a Deep Event
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Really picking up on this, we will now turn to Dr. Aaron Good, who is going to, I think, be looking at some of the questions and some of the evidence in more detail about deception, about instigation, exploitation, etc., in relation to October 7. Aaron is agreed to do this. As I said, he runs the American Exception podcast. He is also author of a fantastic book, which is based on his PhD, which I’m eagerly reading at the moment, I’m pleased to say. And Aaron’s going to talk to us for about 30 minutes on the issue of deep state and empire in relation to both October 7 and what’s going on at the moment, following that in the Middle East.
Aaron.
Dr. Aaron Good:
Thank you very much, Piers. I have called this “Hegemonic Panic.” And I have a lot here. Some of it is overlapping with Kevin, so I’ll try to skip through some of that, which is actually helpful, because I have more here than I can get through easily, but a lot of it is just data points.
We talk about deep events. These do come from the clandestine state. They’re events that are mysterious, and they seem to come from the covert action apparatus of the government and that we know we’ll never get to the bottom of them. We can ascertain that we are immersed in this because we see a pattern again, where something strange happens, it is politically impactful, it overlaps with at least practices and objectives and aims of the national security state—of imperialism, generally speaking. So, as Kevin was suggesting, we at least reason to suspect that something is a covert operation. If it’s aimed at the US population, it’s a state crime against democracy, and we can identify these.
Now this was deHaven-Smith’s and Scott’s definition of state crimes against democracy, which Kevin just discussed [see slide].
My own academic work was in part based on trying to form a synthesis between Peter Dale Scott and Lance deHaven-Smith’s work, because I had befriended Lance and got to collaborate with him at a number of conferences and helped him with manuscripts and everything.
And his loss is really devastating for me personally. It was a great thing to be able to talk about these issues and try to work on them in a scholarly way. That was really what I dedicated my PhD to.
In terms of synthesizing these two perspectives, Peter Dale Scott conceded that the SCAD construct, or the idea of state crimes against democracy, was good but that it should be amended to say that it involves other elements that are subvert, that are submerged and not visible. So, it could be like a deep state crime against democracy, essentially. Lance himself said that what he had done with SCAD theory was still lacking a theory of the state or a role in any theorization on the role of economic elites, so corporate power. And so, I set about trying to address these things with my own dissertation, which eventually got published as American Exception: Empire and the Deep State, published by Skyhorse.
Now, there’s another academic here named Willem Bart de Lint. I have not been able to contact him, but it would be good to talk to him. He wrote this book Blurring Intelligence Crime: A Critical Forensics. And he talks about an “apex crime” [as] “a watershed event involving government in the support of a contested political and social order and its primary opponent as the obvious offender, which is then subject to a confirmation bias.”
We have examples of that in US history, where an apex crime takes place: the assassination of JFK. And who did it? The communists, okay? And then the more we learn about Oswald, it seems that he was pretending to be a communist on behalf of elements connected to the US government when he defected to the Soviet Union and when he was pretending to be a communist in New Orleans.
Later, notably, when a presidential candidate was going to reinvestigate the JFK assassination—that’s Robert Kennedy—he was killed. And the patsy, in this case, was Sirhan Sirhan, a Palestinian who could not have shot Robert Kennedy because Robert Kennedy was shot from point-blank range from behind, from right to left, at an upward angle. Sirhan was standing in front of him. The use of the Palestinian patsy is very significant. It’s no coincidence.
I’m just going to run through these [points]. I don’t have deep knowledge about them, but I noticed them myself, because I always think in terms of these patterns now when I see an event like this.
Kevin mentioned some of these—and I’m not going to go into detail about them, but there’s a lot of evidence that:
Israel knew about this plan quite a while ago and that such an attack would be hard to keep totally secret. So, people suspect they had foreknowledge.
People have documented suspicious insider trading—evidence that points to insider trading, which indicates foreknowledge as well.
The friendly fire aspect. How much of the death count of the Israeli civilians actually came from the Israeli military response, which is a very open question.
A related question is, was this not just friendly fire, but was it actual policy? Was it the Hannibal directive, wherein the Israeli military does not want Hamas—or Palestinian groups at all—to be able to have Israeli hostages, especially Israeli military hostages. They will kill them [the hostages] when they are fleeing rather than allow them to have [Israeli] hostages. So, was that the calculation made on the night of October 7—that they would rather them not have the hostages, and a high death count, they could just blame it on Hamas, and it will allow them to pursue a preexisting agenda.
A lot of false reports in the media of atrocities: the decapitated babies, etc., etc. A lot of propaganda and disinformation and it’s all slanted, typically in one direction.
The treatment of the hostages does not suggest that Hamas would have slaughtered all of these people and sexually tortured and mutilated people. The reports from the hostages are that they were treated very well. That doesn’t seem to make sense. Nor does it make sense that [Hamas] would commit those atrocities, given that hostage-taking has certain political objectives that we can discern and that would be undermined by wanton atrocities.
There’s the tricky problem of the fact that Hamas seems to be generally a creation of Israel—that they were backed and boosted by Israel. It’s not that the members of Hamas don’t have genuine, legitimate, deep-seated grievances towards Israel, but Israel seems to have created this group. There’s documentation of this. It’s been written about by mainstream people, such as Mehdi Hasan, who is as corporate and mainstream as it gets. But he has written that Hamas is useful as a foil for Israel, it’s a way to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state, it creates an unsympathetic actor, and it undermined the PLO. That was the thinking at the time.
Additionally, we know that they wanted to expel the Palestinians beforehand. An Israeli official leaked a think tank paper that was commissioned by Israeli intelligence. It looked at different options to handle the Palestinian problem. But the one that they end up saying is good is Option C: evacuation of the civilian population from Gaza to Sinai.
There’s the longstanding opposition to Palestinian statehood. The fact that many people like Netanyahu are on the record saying, “Support Hamas, because that will keep a Palestinian state from forming” or “It’s been good that we have supported Hamas, it’s been good that we have done these things to keep a Palestinian state from being formed.” They are hellbent on this. They believe in the Greater Israel, which cannot but be created only with massive war crimes tantamount to genocide, which we are seeing now.
Now, this issue of war and the deception that creates it, this is a recurring theme in imperialism, especially Western imperialism. It just happens again and again. There’s all these cliches about “the fog of war” and “the first casualty [of war] is truth” and all of this. Typically, these wars are fought because one side wants to fight a war, and typically they need a pretext as well.
So, I just want to run through some of these pretexts of modern Western imperialism. I’m going to focus on the US side—but others as well.
The Thornton Affair [1845]. This is how we were able to steal California from Mexico. This is the pretext used to launch the Mexican-American War—a very dubious war. Even Abraham Lincoln questioned it at the time, when he was a Whig congressman.
The assassination of Queen Min [1895]. This takes place in Korea. This was when the Japanese had adopted Western imperialist tactics. Basically, they’d become as vicious as us. They studied our industry and they studied our imperialism and they had what was something of an intelligence outfit: This Black Ocean group pretend to be Koreans and they kill the Queen of Korea. This is a colonial war. They’re trying to set up a colonial empire, just like the West.
The USS Maine, of course, gets blown up [1898]. This is infamous. It helps to fuel America’s desire to fight the Spanish-American War and get its first overseas colonies.
The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand sparks World War I [1914]. The Serbian group, Black Hand: People have suggested or found evidence that points to them being related to the British Empire. Was this some sort of pretext or event or a catalyst that was staged by the British? It’s quite possible, to me. I wouldn’t put anything past the British.
The Mukden incident in Manchuria [1931] is used by the Japanese imperialists—the fascists, basically, running Japan—to have an excuse to intervene more heavily in Manchuria.
The Reichstag Fire [1933] is infamous, of course. The Nazis used this to seize absolute control in Germany. It’s worth noting that at Nuremberg it was established that the Nazis had done this. And then, after the fact, because some of the people that were probably responsible for this were in the government, it was embarrassing. And so there was this new history contrived, wherein the communist patsy, Marinus van der Lubbe, had really set the fire himself. But Peter Dale Scott has a good dossier on this that he’s compiled over the years. It’s just not the case. Now notice Jacobin. This is a good example of how feckless the left is in the United States—the establishment left, the left that has any institutional support. The headline, “How the Nazis Exploited the Reichstag Fire to Launch a Reign of Terror.” Well, at Nuremberg, they found that the Nazis set the Reichstag Fire, but this is something that the left defers to authority. We have the most docile left in the United States. Whatever the state tells them is the truth: “OK, yes, sir.”
The Gleiwitz incident in Germany [1939]. This is Germany with the Nazis, who had their own particular ethos, right? But even they need to have a false flag to be able to invade Poland, because you need a pretext. No matter how vicious you are, it seems you need at least an excuse to go to war. So, they had people dress up as people attacking the Germans, so the Germans could go into Poland. We know this pretty well.
Pearl Harbor [1941]. Of course, there’s no need to go into that. Foreknowledge: how much was there? That is the event that leads to US entry into the war, US victory in the war, dropping the bombs on Japan, and then the US becomes the global hegemon of the so-called free world.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident [1964]. A very dubious event, of course.
[Suharto’s US-backed coup in Indonesia, 1965]. A major, major massacre overseas, which I think is worth mentioning—because it involves a mass slaughter—is the massacre in 1965, which followed this bungled coup attempt. The more you look at the coup attempt—especially if you look at the work of Peter Dale Scott or Greg Poulgrain . . . Peter’s work in 1985, this paper, this essay in Pacific Affairs journal, which is Canadian. He couldn’t get it published in the American one; it was too sensitive. He found that the CIA and one of its backers with this Lockheed bribery scandal began shifting payments months before this strange coup that failed. Months before this happened, the CIA had shifted its funding—these bribes—[given] to a backer of Sukarno to [instead] a backer of Suharto, who would be used to basically depose Sukarno and afterwards murder half a million, one million, three million. We don’t even know how many people were tortured to death in Indonesia. I recommend watching Joshua Oppenheimer’s “The Act of Killing,” if you haven’t seen that documentary on this subject. But notice, again, Jacobin—the establishment lefty scholar that says here—Michael Vann is interviewed, and he says, “Some of the American-focused scholarship in a way denies Indonesian agency and underplays the Indonesian role in these events.” So, this is a trope among what passes for the left in the United States. With these covert actions and deception operations, they don’t want to accept that these things happen. And one of the excuses they use with a covert operation is, if you say that was a covert operation, then you’re taking away the agency of the Indonesian people. Somehow, it’s the nice thing to do—to say it wasn’t the CIA. I don’t understand how this logic takes root in the academy, but I think it has to do with the hegemony of the empire and how covert action is so delegitimizing. That’s why they make it covert. They want to say they’re not doing it because it’s usually something very sinister. So, this is something we’ve got to deal with. The academics are not going to help us, because they’re part of the establishment.
The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is a strange war when you stop and think about it because the two sides, the Saudis and the Israelis, were basically on the US side by that point more firmly. You had these gas shortages at the time—because of this war. And the price of oil explodes. This is a pretext for a massive increase of oil that people like Henry Kissinger had already been trying to orchestrate, according to no less an authority than the Saudi Minister of Oil at the time. He said the price increases were desired by Henry Kissinger. It does say that it shores up the dollar after [the] Vietnam [War] had brought down Bretton Woods.
Now, another aspect that we should look at in this chronology, which takes us up to the present day and which has made me rethink . . . all of these things have made me rethink the role of Israel in US foreign policy. George H. W. Bush in 1992 ran afoul of the Israel lobby. There’s an article on it in The Times of Israel. He lost 24% of his Jewish backing after confronting Israel over settlements—”a lesson that US leaders since have taken to heart.”
One of the most controversial moments is when he delayed Israel loan guarantees until it halted its settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza and entered into a peace conference [with the Palestinians], which would later become known as the Madrid Peace Conference.
This is George H. W. Bush saying: The US will cut off aid to you if you do not return to these negotiations for a Palestinian state. He was looking to solve the Palestinian problem and the Israel-Palestine crisis at the end of the Cold War, because he saw it as antithetical to US long-term interests in the region, just like Eisenhower did when he intervened in the Suez Canal crisis. There’s always been a balance that the US tried to strike for geopolitical reasons. And H. W. Bush is no hero or great humanitarian or anything, believe me. I’m totally aware of how sinister he is. And so this makes this all the more remarkable that this person, this nexus of the American deep state, the Yankee oil people, and then the Western cowboy military-industrial complex faction, he seemed to unite both of those. But he still had problems with this Israel contingency, and it may have contributed to—it may have been decisive in—having him lose his reelection. So, he made clear the cost. His case makes clear what happens to you, that if you fight all these pro-Israel groups, you could go down. He had a 70% approval rating, and then he ends up losing. It’s really remarkable.
Now, at the same time, we have this other big issue, which is the emergence of a move for multipolarity. This article is written in 2009.
[Technical difficulties. Dr. Good returns momentarily.]
Okay, I’m not sure what happened there, but what I want to talk about here is multipolarity and the way that this became a geopolitical issue, beginning in the early years after the Cold War.
This woman [Susan Turner] is writing about it here [in Asian Perspective, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2002, pp. 159-184] and you can see:
“Since the late 1990s, the concept of multipolarity has gained prominence around the globe. Russia and China [. . .] have included it or alluded to it in nearly all of their joint declarations, statements, and treaties dating from the mid-1990s to the present.”
So, what is the US response to this?
Well, I think that you can look at what the US is trying to do. They are using jihadis throughout the ’90s. So, after the Cold War ends, those networks that were used to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan are repurposed and used all over the place in the 1990s. This is called McJihad. A political scientist [Benjamin R. Barber] tried to write about this in the ’90s. He wrote the book Jihad vs. McWorld, and it said: Oh, jihadis are reacting to Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, and they want to hold on to their old ways. What’s going to happen here?
Another author, whose name I don’t recall, wrote about this shortly afterwards and said: It seems the US is actually fueling this. This is actually McJihad. This is the West that creates its own villains and then it can either use them as shock troops somewhere or use them as an excuse to intervene somewhere.
So, this is important when you think of 9/11.
Additionally, in Israel at this time you have the “Clean Break” document: “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” prepared by a think tank called The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. It’s commissioned by a “Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000 . . . led by Richard Perle for Benjamin Netanyahu, then Prime Minister of Israel.” It included other Bush administration officials from the future, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser. This document said: “. . . removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq” is “an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right.”
So, we see that the people that were Bush administration officials for the Iraq War were making these arguments on behalf of Israel at the time—I mean, in the years leading up to this. At the same time, [you have] the more establishment forces in the United States—Zbigniew Brzezinski represents them. There’s a study commissioned by the Council on Foreign Relations, which is the Wall Street think tank that planned the US Empire in the first place. They commissioned him to write this book on US geopolitics after the Cold War. He calls it The Grand Chessboard, and he basically calls for controlling Eurasia and making sure that they prevent the rise of a counterhegemonic bloc, especially that would include Iran, China, and Russia. So, he’s talking about how we don’t want to have this.
This is a direct response to China and Russia saying: How about multipolarity? The US response is: How about we make sure multipolarity doesn’t happen. And that’s from Brzezinski, who is, generally speaking, if anything, a couple degrees to the left of the neocons. These are people dedicated to American domination über alles.
The American neocon response to this situation is The Project for a New American Century, and they’re calling for full spectrum dominance over the world forever. They’re also saying that it’s going to be hard to get the US to commit to what needs to be done without a new Pearl Harbor. This study [“Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century”] comes out in 2000.
And then a new Pearl Harbor happens with 9/11 and the anthrax letters. In terms of being able to adjudicate these crimes, there’s cause for pessimism, as we probably all know. Because even if they get caught red-handed more or less, even if some part of the state does its job and they are allowed to investigate things properly and they find out it points back to the state, they’ll just contrive some other cover story.
The cover story for the anthrax letters after it was found that the anthrax was from a US laboratory was that, oh, it was just some random guy who just did this for some reason—pretended to be a Muslim because he had some weird crush on a cheerleader, or something like that. It was a very strange case. That was after they had another guy they tried to pin it on who fought that charge off. Very strange.
The point is: The state will not investigate itself. If it’s an apex crime, if apex controls the investigation, we won’t get to the bottom of it.
— Iraqi WMD [2002 onward]. We don’t need to say any more about that, probably.
— In 2007, this is, I think, important, and people have not remarked on this as much, the War on Terror stalls. Brzezinski goes in front of Congress and says [paraphrasing]: We need to be careful. There’s going to be some sort of terror attack, and it’ll be blamed on Iran, and it’ll be used to start a war that’ll be a disaster for the US and the whole [Middle East] region.
— You also had John Kiriakou’s torture fiasco, his terrible journey, his whistleblowing on the issue of CIA torture, which may have been related to this, as a way to publicly chasten the Bush Administration and hold back the neocons.
So now, fast forward a couple of years, or right before—really months before—the Arab Spring. You have Zbigniew Brzezinski. He had been putting the brakes on the whole War on Terror, 9/11 Wars agenda. Then he speaks at, I think it’s a Chicago CFR meeting or dinner or something, and he says [paraphrasing], “There’s going to be a global awakening. The whole world is waking up to injustice. They’re all connected at the same time.”
I remember this at the time because [. . . around the same time] I saw Alex Jones [. . . and] he’s saying, “They’re going to try to wake you up. They’re cooking something up.” [. . . It] didn’t occur to me until later, but this was right before the Arab Spring. I think Brzezinski may have been kicking off the revival of this whole anti-counter-hegemonic campaign. [. . . It was] this whole way of trying to continue this agenda to make sure the US had control over Eurasia, because you get these Arab Spring wars.
And then it eventually comes out that the US had helped nurture some of these groups. It’s all very strange when you look at it in retrospect. It seems like it was really just the continuation of that whole agenda. The Arab Spring wars stall, as well, in part because of Russia, and interestingly, the naval base that would have given them access to the Mediterranean into Syria is in Ukraine, and you have the destabilization of Ukraine from a Russian perspective.
You have Victoria Nuland passing out poisonous cookies to kill protesters. Not really, she had them killed with snipers. But she did pass out cookies there, which was not quite a respectable thing for a diplomat to do to an opposition group like this, but that’s how it goes. The US hand in this was really obvious. It was a coup that put in a threat to Russia right on its doorstep.
You have Russiagate in the United States, which was a very strange event and made sure the US had a bellicose posture towards Russia at the time. It was a total distraction from the failure that led to Trump being elected. Instead, it was just a way to blame Russia. We don’t know where those emails came from, where the leaks came from. Some people think it was Seth Rich. That’s a strange murder case. The internet angle was also exaggerated. It was very strange. Those “Buff Bernie” memes were not really history-changing, in my opinion. So that was a hoax.
We have COVID, which I’m not going to say much about, except that it came from US bioweapons research, apparently, and it had a major impact, and it seems to have been used either opportunistically or by design as a structural deep event.
Ukraine War is, of course, a huge disaster, along with the Nord Stream pipeline crimes, but you’re not really going to get to the bottom of them.
Al-Aqsa Flood, as we’ve talked about, and this Gaza genocide—these seem to be related also to all of those issues that Atif was talking about earlier, that are economic and geopolitical motives, but also the fact that US hegemony is really crumbling. And I think that Israel feels like its window of opportunity for a final solution with Palestine is running out, perhaps. So, they’re going farther than people would’ve thought they would’ve gone—farther than they’ve ever gone before—in terms of just slaughtering the people in Gaza.
I want to talk about SCAD versus deep events and ways academics can think about these and how useful they are. SCAD is useful as an academic or forensic heuristic. It’s a way to put these things into a certain category so you know what you’re looking at and you can talk about it. Deep events, or the way that Peter Dale Scott approaches these, might be more useful for making detached observations about things after the fact and gaining historical insights and then thinking about how you can apply these. So, these are very similar academic ideas.
Now, in terms of what we should do, in terms of thinking about justice, given the criminality that we see in the state when we study these things, Lance had a different idea than Peter. Lance basically thought: Hey, I’m a public administration person. You solve crimes and you “Hang the bastards.” Peter thought there could be a cultural revolution of the mind eventually and a Truth and Reconciliation process of some kind, eventually. But he thought that people really had to be prepared—or he thinks this now, increasingly, that people need to be prepared for this revolution before it can happen. He has some hope that civil society groups, along the lines of the Civil Rights movement, could be useful in this regard.
The synthesis of these two lines of thinking—well, I’ve tried to do that a little bit. The proximate root of the problem is that there’s no lawful sovereign over the domestic state and over the international system. Therefore, whenever we have these problems, these crimes we identify, we are reduced to hysterically shouting into the void and not having any way to have the rule of law apply, domestically or internationally.
But, as with every empire, these people are hanging themselves. I think nemesis really comes from outside. The non-West right now embodies humanity’s desire to be free from exploitation and domination. They’re really doing the heavy lifting to fight this despotism that we’re seeing. I think its ultimate embodiment is in Gaza right now. It seems to be the perfect encapsulation, in a horrific way, of so much that we have done for hundreds of years in the West. But we are not able to take power, so we can just post protest emojis and have Zoom conferences and try to raise awareness and raise consciousness.
The good news is I do think this empire that’s been around for hundreds of years is now on its way out. And that is exciting, although it’s a little frightening because we don’t know what they have up their sleeves to try to hold on to power.
I have other slides here, but I don’t want to go any further than this.
So, I think I’ll leave it at that and say that really the problem is the despotism that’s at the top of the state and the fact that this continues over the international realm. There is no lawful sovereign, domestically and internationally. There’s no way to adjudicate disputes according to the rule of international law in any sort of fair way because of the US, by and large.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you, Aaron, for a fascinating discussion, rich and detailed.
Containing Escalation: How the Resistance axis is sabotaging US intent to escalate the conflict beyond Palestine
Dr. Piers Robinson:
We’re going to move now to our final talk for 20 minutes before we go to the panel discussion. And we have, last but by no means least, Vanessa Beeley, who’s going to talk about the current geopolitical situation. And I think a little bit, the sort of perspective of groups within the region, countries within the region as they resist empire and where she sees it as going at the moment.
Over to you, Vanessa.
Vanessa Beeley:
Thank you so much, Piers. I feel extremely privileged to be in such a good company. I’m going to cross over definitely with Aaron on the “Clean Break,” so I’ll skip over that a little bit, and I’ll probably complement what Atif and Richard were saying.
So, basically, what I’m going to look at is Washington and London’s long war against the Middle East or, rather, West Asia, the rise of BRICS, global South independence, the emergence of a neo-Pan-Arabism, and, of course, the multipolar world that has been mentioned by many people.
Now, I’m going to start off with a direct quote from Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., which he gave during an interview—I think in the last month or so. And I think, for me, it encapsulates exactly what Israel represents to the US. It’s quite rare for any American politician to be quite so overt in their opinion.
I’ll start the quote:
“Israel is critical, and the reason it’s critical is because it is a bulwark for us in the Middle East. It is almost like having an aircraft carrier in the Middle East. It’s our oldest ally. It’s been our ally for 75 years. It’s been an incredible ally for us in terms of the technology exchange, and building the Iron Dome, which we have paid a lot for, has taught us enormously about how to defend ourselves against missile attacks. [Of] that military expenditure, 75% goes to US companies under the agreement, under the MOU. If you look at what’s happening in the Middle East now, the closest allies to Iran are Russia and China. Iran also controls all of Venezuela’s oil. Hezbollah is in Venezuela. They’ve propped up the Maduro regime, and so they control that oil supply.
“BRICS: Saudi Arabia is now joining BRICS, so those countries will control 90% of the oil in our world. If Israel disappears, [there will be a] vacuum in the Middle East. Israel is our ambassador, our beachhead, in the Middle East. It gives us ears and it gives us eyes in the Middle East. It gives us intelligence, the capacity to influence affairs in the Middle East. If Israel disappeared, Russia and China would be controlling the Middle East and would control 90% of the world’s oil supply, and that would be cataclysmic for US national security.”
Pretty much says it all right there. And so therefore that really shapes what I’m going to continue saying in the presentation. Basically, it’s about the reshaping of the Middle East, which has been an ongoing colonial project for more than a century, including the French-British Sykes-Picot partitioning of the territory—the British creation of the Zionist colonialist settler state after the Balfour Treaty in 1917, which facilitated the European settler land grab from Palestinians until the UN partitioning of Palestine in 1947 in favor of the Zionists. And then, of course, the 1948 Nakba—the ethnic cleansing of more than 750,000 Palestinians from their land with no right to return.
In 1996, as Aaron mentioned, there was the “Clean Break” doctrine—a new strategy for securing the realm. Now, interesting elements of that doctrine included working closely with Turkey and Jordan to contain, destabilize, and roll back some of its most dangerous threats, which included Syria.
Israel should seize the strategic initiative along the northern border by engaging Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran as the principal agents of aggression in Lebanon, according, of course, to Israel. Direct attack would be enabled on Syrian territory and against Syrian targets in Lebanon.
A move to contain Syria and to curtail its alleged weapons of mass destruction program. Plans included the removal of Saddam Hussein, as Aaron mentioned, to weaken Syria’s position in the region, and to strengthen Jordan as Israel’s ally.
As special consultant to US Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan, Pat Buchanan, put it: “In the documents, in the strategy, Israel’s enemy remains Syria, but the road to Damascus runs through Baghdad.”
Then we have the map of the new Middle East. This map was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters and published in the Armed Forces Journal in June 2006, and it was made widely available to the public.
The term “New Middle East” was introduced to the world in June 2006 in Tel Aviv by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who was credited by the Western media for coining the term in replacement of the older and more imposing term, the “Greater Middle East.”
Renowned author and historian Mahdi Nazemroaya said, “This announcement was a confirmation of an Anglo-American-Israeli “military roadmap” in the Middle East. This project, which has been in the planning stages for several years, consists in creating an arc of instability, chaos, and violence extending from Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria to Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Iran, and the borders of NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan.”
An article in June 2023 in Jerusalem Post is headlined “Israel is well-positioned in the new Middle East.” Israel announced a massive success in defense exports—a record 12.5 billion with Abraham Accord countries accounting for nearly a quarter of those deals. Those countries at the time being include Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, which is effectively a normalization of relations with Israel.
There’s also an important reference, which I think Atif mentioned, to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor—the IMEC—which is designed to compete with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. And we can see the map, which, as I said, links Mumbai through Dubai, Riyadh, Al-Haditha, Haifa, and into Europe through Piraeus in Athens, in Greece.
And then of course we have the infamous Oded Yinon Plan for Greater Israel, the Israel of Theodore Hertz in 1904 and of Rabbi Fischmann in 1947.
To a large degree we’ve entered a new stage in the 75-to-100-year Zionist plan for Palestine: appropriation of the entire territory and final ethnic cleansing of what appears to be all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, resettlement in the Sinai in Egypt and elsewhere, as we heard also—I think from Atif.
In January 2023, Netanyahu said, “These are the basic lines of the national government headed by me, the Jewish people having exclusive and unquestionable right to all areas of the land of Israel. The government will promote and develop settlements in all parts of the land of Israel—in the Galilee, in the Negev, in the Jolan [Golan Heights], Judea, and Samaria.”
The Greater Israel Project is an integral part of US foreign policy, the New Middle East, to expand US unipolar supremacy through the fracturing and balkanization of the Middle East. It is supported by NATO and largely by Saudi Arabia.
In March 2023, Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, caused regional uproar when he presented the map of Greater Israel at a conference in Paris, during which he also claimed, “There is no such thing as Palestinian people.” The map showed Jordan and the West Bank within Israel’s borders. The timing of the October 7th events in relation to the imminent normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is also important to note.
From Netanyahu’s perspective, this rapprochement was a means to increasing Israel’s foothold in the Middle East and confronting Iran. It would also have been a mortal wound for Palestinian justice and resistance movements.
Under Trump in 2017, Washington declared support of the Zionist illegal settlements, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and Israeli sovereignty over the Syrian Jolan territories unlawfully annexed in 1967. Under Biden, there has been some shift in the narrative—that Washington endorses the Israeli annexation of the entire Jordan River Valley and the illegal settlements gradually consuming the West Bank.
The Oded Yinon Plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel must, first of all, become an imperial regional power, and, two, must effect the division of the whole area into small states by the dissolution of all existing Arab states. The Zionist strategy is that sectarian states would become incorporated into Israel’s sphere of influence and would provide Israel with regional and moral legitimation.
Very recently, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant made it very clear that Israel has no choice but to pursue victory in order to survive. He said, “The feeling that we will soon stop is incorrect. Without a clear victory, we will not be able to live in the Middle East.” So this has become effectively an existential battle for survival between the Palestinian people and Israel and in the larger picture in the region.
Netanyahu, of course, needs victory in order to ensure his personal political survival and to avoid prosecution for corruption.
Bearing all this in mind, we can better understand the reaction of the region to the events that began on October the 7th. It is fully understood by the countries of the resistance axis, which include Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, that the US and Israel are seeking escalation in order to achieve their goal of destabilization and balkanization of the enemy states—to protect, of course, as Kennedy describes, the military garrison, which is Israel in the Middle East.
So, I’m going to look now at the escalation and provocation by US and Israel since December 2023. Of course, it’s been ongoing since October the 7th, particularly in the northern occupied territories on the border with Lebanon, but also in multiple aggressions against Syria by Israel.
On December the 25th, the house of the Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria, Brigadier-General Razi Mousavi, was targeted by Israel in the residential area of Sayeda Zeinab south of Damascus. It’s also a busy pilgrimage area for Shia Muslims and at that time, on Christmas Day, was packed with civilians. One of the longest-serving IRGC officers and a close friend of General Qasem Soleimani, assassinated in January 2020 under the Trump Administration, Mousavi was responsible for supporting the resistance front in Syria and the training of Palestinian resistance factions inside Syria.
Israel regularly targets Syrian Arab Army positions. We are actually expecting an attack tonight, so if you hear anything incoming, there’s nothing I can do about it if they do come in relatively close to me. And they have attacked artillery and air defense positions in Syria and targeted the civilian airports of Aleppo and Damascus multiple times in 2023 under the pretext of eliminating Iranian forces or influence inside Syria. It is a clear attempt to reduce Syrian defense and even offense capability in the event of escalation—rarely reported in Western media.
On the 2nd of January, targeting Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, Israel assassinated Hamas deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri, who was also instrumental in the creation of the Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas. This was the first strike in Dahiyeh, in southern Beirut, since the 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah.
Now, before Christmas, the Zionist regime officials had been increasing the threats against Lebanon and Hezbollah. Netanyahu had threatened publicly to turn Beirut into Khan Younis, which is in the south of Gaza, if Hezbollah refused to withdraw north of the Litani River. Israel invoked UN Resolution 1701, which was introduced after the 2006 War to guarantee no weapons or militants south of the Litani River in the hope of bringing the US into conflict, which has failed. Hezbollah has always refused to withdraw from the south, and their long-range and short-range weapons are not clustered only in the south but throughout Lebanon. So, this is largely an exercise in escalating the conflict with Hezbollah.
After the strike in the capital city of Beirut, Secretary-General of Hezbollah Syed Hassan Nasrallah has vowed to retaliate to the point where sufficient deterrence is reinstated against further Israel attacks on Beirut.
Yesterday sixty-two missiles were fired at Meron air base in the northern occupied territory. Meron base is responsible for all air operations towards Syria, Lebanon, and the northern part of the eastern Mediterranean. It also constitutes the major center for electronic jamming operations in these zones and it’s believed to be the base that would’ve directed the strikes on al-Arouri in Beirut. This is considered to be only phase one of the retaliation by Hezbollah.
Lebanon itself has filed a complaint with the UN Security Council over the killing of al-Arouri, calling it the most dangerous phase of Israeli attacks on the country.
A local journalist writing for the Cradle Media, Hassan Illaik: “Tel Aviv’s assessment of a war with Lebanon is based on its reading that Hezbollah wishes to prevent a major confrontation at any cost. Not only is this calculus wrong, but it has also muddled Israeli minds to the point where this may itself lead to the outbreak of a destructive war between the two sides.”
Illaik also points out that we’ve had three stages so far of Zionist aggression against Gaza, but I would also say against West Bank.
Stage one is the obliteration of northern Gaza, which Atif has referred to, and the slower destruction of the West Bank.
Stage two is the occupation of strategic areas in southern Gaza, which is supposedly in the safe zone, where more than one million displaced Palestinians have been forced to gather in appalling conditions and still under Zionist bombardment.
The IOF [Israeli Occupation Forces] withdrawal from Gaza does not signal the end of the war on Gaza. Many regional analysts believe that reducing the pace of the ground war on Gaza is a prelude to an Israeli war on Lebanon. And we’re certainly seeing an escalation on the northern occupied Palestine front, where an estimated 230,000 Zionist settlers have been forced to flee the settlements on the border with Lebanon.
There’s a belief that Israel is implementing a US decision to push the war into a third phase before the end of January 2024.
This requires the war to be lowered in intensity to distract from the mass slaughter and brutal ethnic cleansing of civilians in Gaza and of course coincides with the case that’s being brought into the ICJ by South Africa.
On the 3rd of January a terrorist attack was carried out in Tehran, in Iran, targeting civilians at the burial place of Qasem Soleimani on the fourth anniversary of his assassination.
More than 173 were injured and 84 killed in the attack. ISIS has officially taken responsibility, but as it’s well documented that the terrorist group is a proxy both of the US and an asset for Israel in the region to a large degree, it does raise the question as to whose hands were actually behind the attack.
Finally, on the 4th of January, the US targeted the deputy head of operations of the Popular Mobilisation Forces [also known as Popular Mobilisation Units], the PMU, in Baghdad. Mushtaq Taleb al-Saeedi was killed in the strike on PMU headquarters in eastern Baghdad. One other was killed in the attack and six injured in the drone strike.
The US claimed it was in retaliation for the Islamic resistance of Iraq’s attack on US military bases in Iraq and Syria. The bases in Syria, of course, are illegal under international law.
There have been 118 attacks by the Islamic resistance since October the 7th. So, in ten days, the US-Israeli alliance has struck targets in Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, and Iran.
I’m just going to bring back the map of Syria. It’s a relatively old map—probably about a month old. But I just wanted to point out that Syria’s position in the resistance axis is particularly fragile. With the US triggering attacks by ISIS from the Al-Tanf base, which is in the southeastern section of Syria, these attacks have intensified since October the 7th, particularly against Syrian Arab Army positions in the central desert area of Syria. The northwestern area of Idlib is effectively under the control of armed groups dominated by Al Qaeda, who have also intensified their attacks on civilian areas of northern Hama, but also against Syrian Arab Army positions in northern Latakia and western Aleppo. All of these attacks, again, have increased since October the 7th.
What Syria has done is to open up its territory to Palestinian resistance factions and to the Islamic resistance to carry out attacks against US or Israeli targets—Israeli targets predominantly, of course, in the occupied Jolan territories.
And it’s worth noting that Russia is increasing its observation posts on the border with the occupied Jolan territories.
It’s also worth noting that the emergency Arab League summit that was called very early on into the Israeli aggression against Gaza—the proposal that was put forward by Syria, Yemen, Palestine, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and Qatar was vetoed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. The primary elements of that proposal were:
(1) preventing the use of American and other military bases in Arab countries to supply Israel with weapons and ammunition,
(2) freezing Arab diplomatic economic security and military relations with Israel,
(3) threatening to use oil and Arab economic capabilities to pressure to stop the aggression for preventing Israeli civil aviation from flying in Arab airspace.
So, that very strong proposal was effectively vetoed and watered down by the countries that have [normalized] or are on the verge of normalization with Israel.
Finally, I want to come to Yemen, where there is also an area of increased tension, bringing the US alliance closer to conflict with Iran and closer to confrontation with Yemeni forces, or Ansarullah, a coalition resistance movement and the de facto government of Yemen, often described in Western media rather euphemistically as the Houthis.
What I describe as “the coalition of the unwilling” put out a joint statement. The coalition now consists of the US, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and, of course, the UK.
In the wording of part of their statement, they made it very clear what their priority actually is here. It’s [concern over] the loss of 15% of global seaborne trade, which passes through the Red Sea, including 8% of global grain trade, 12% of seaborne-traded oil, and 8% of the world’s liquefied natural gas trade. International shipping companies continue to reroute their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant costs and weeks of delayed delivery of goods, and ultimately jeopardizing the movement of critical food, fuel, and humanitarian assistance throughout the world. 15% of world trade passes through the Suez Canal.
The Africa route around the Cape of Good Hope is 60% more expensive, according to some analysts, and two weeks longer or three weeks, as Atif mentioned. The inevitable knock-on effect will be an increase in energy prices, already hiked as a result of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. And there’s also predicted to be a shortage in energy and grain supply.
The northern sea route, of course, is controlled by Russia, which currently is effectively at war with NATO and the EU in Ukraine.
As with Ukraine, the impact will be greatest on the EU. As a result, EU Commission Foreign Minister Josep Borrell has been trying to negotiate a settlement with Hezbollah to prevent escalation with Israel, to no avail, as Hezbollah is not prepared to withdraw north of the Litani River to comply with Israel’s demands.
From the Yemeni standpoint, as millions poured onto the streets of the capital of Sanaa to protest the genocide in Gaza, they are effectively fulfilling their responsibility under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, which again, Richard mentioned—which is the obligation to prevent genocide, and even to punish genocide to some degree. The blockade of occupied Palestine-bound ships in the Red Sea will end when the genocide or campaign against Palestinian ends and the siege is lifted on Gaza.
Now, the map that I’m showing here shows the conglomeration of the coalition ships, the US ships, the Iranian warships that are now entering—even Chinese ships. And I think here is where I would identify—and a few people have agreed with me—there is a potential for a false flag, the potential of seeing an event which might facilitate some kind of escalation, particularly against Yemen and potentially, of course, against Iran, which is seen very much as being the backer of the Ansarullah activities.
All members of the resistance axis are responding to extreme provocation with restraint in order to draw Israeli deeper into the quagmire of a failed ground war in Gaza and the multiple-front war currently being waged without overt US involvement. Of course, they are providing the bombs: 65,000 tons of explosives to date have been dropped on Gaza. They are helping with logistics and with funding. Delta forces have been identified as operating alongside the IOF. And, of course, they’ve given a tacit green light for Israel’s criminal military adventurism and genocide in Palestine, while actively involved in the targeting of resistance commandos and the triggering of proxies, including ISIS and Iraq in Syria and the increase of their own military footprint in Israel—particularly in the Negev Desert, in Iraq, and in Syria.
Lebanon-based journalist Sharmine Narwani has recently written about the fact that Arab perceptions have shifted dramatically over Israel’s war on Gaza, with popular sentiment gravitating to those states and actors perceived to be actively supporting Palestinian goals and away from those who are perceived to support Israel.
She says:
“But if the confrontation between the two axes escalates, Arab perceptions will almost certainly continue to tilt away from the old hegemons towards those who are willing to resist this assault on the region.
“There will be no relief for Washington and its allies as the war expands. The more they work to defeat Hamas and destroy Gaza, the more they lob missiles at Yemen, Iraq, and Syria and besiege the resistance axis, the more likely Arab populations are to shrug off the Sunni versus Shia, Iran versus Arab, secular versus Islamist narratives that have kept the region divided and at odds for decades . . .”
— which is where I come back to this emergence of a neo-Pan-Arabism we’ve seen in the last twelve months.
She also says:
“The swell of support that is mobilizing due to a righteous confrontation against the region’s biggest oppressors is unstoppable. Western decline is now a given in the region, but Western discourse has been the first casualty of this war.”
I will end there with some positive news, I hope.
Dr. Piers Robinson:
Thank you, Vanessa, for that fascinating overview of what is happening—well, not really an overview. There’s a lot of detail in there. Clearly, we’re at a very, very dangerous juncture at this point in time, which we’ll possibly come back to.
[Prefatory Note: the following interview with an Iranian journalist was completed on 1/9/24, during the week when South Africa puts forth its legal argument before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, seeking ‘provisional measures’ designed to stop the Israeli genocide in Gaza. Even if Israel refuses to comply should the World Court respond favorably to this emergency request as I expect it will, the decision will have an historic importance: drawing the West into the orbit of legal accountability by indirectly implementing its complicity with the Israeli attack, by an almost certain escalating effect on pro-Palestinian solidarity initiatives around the world, and by conferring on Israel the labels of ‘rogue state’ or ‘pariah state.’]
At first, there’s a need to contextualize for our readers Israel’s urge to silence pro-Palestinian voices and the voices of the critics of Israel, both in the US and globally. As someone who has experienced it firsthand, can you please explain that urge?
Israel is very sensitive to international criticism, especially by critics associated with its base of support in the colonial settler and European colonial states, which together comprise the White Global West. It is also sensitive to pro-Palestine lawfare associated with international institutions, especially the UN, International Court of Jusstice (ICJ), International Criminal Court, and the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) because its legitimacy as sovereign state partly rests partly claim to be the only democratic state in the Middle East, a (mis)perception reinforced by US at the highest levels of governments pointing to ‘shared values’ that were at the core of ‘the special reliationship,’ overlooking the crimes against the indigenous majority Arab population of Palestine involving massive expulsion in 1948 and exploitative dominance since at least 1967 over the Occupied Palestinian Territories of East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza.
I was the target of Israeli smears and defamatory attacks during the period I served as Special Rapporteur on Israeli Violations of Human Rights in Occupied Pallestine in the period of 2008-2014. The attacks involved slanderous accusations of antisemitism on my part, and also sharp criticism of the UN as biased due to its disproportionate attention given to alleged Israeli wrongdoing. The UN responded defensively doing whatever it could to distance itself from me, especially during the time that Ban Ki Moon was Secretary General. He explained my remaining as Special Rapporteur by reminding Israel and the world that I, as an unpaid appointee of the Human Rights Council, was not part of the UN civil service and hence beyond his disciplinary reach. This was a virtuall admission that the Israel defamatory criticism were justified. Attacking its critics became a policy tool used by Israel and its Zionist support structure in Global West countries with increasing frequency for two reasons: the weakness of Israel’s substantive position creating an incentive to shift the conversation from a focus on its severe violations of law and morality to the credibility of the critics a process that I have called ‘the politics of deflection’ in which the attention of the media is diverted to the messenger rather than the substantive message about Israel’s violations, and the related intimidation directed at activists and others who dare promote nonviolent solidarity initiatives such as BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions). No comparable effort was made to stifle such criticism or activism of South Africa during the apartheid period even though the governments of the US and UK were strategically aligned with apartheid South Africa during the Cold War years. The presence of a pro-Israeli Zionist network that shields Israel from criticism by ‘weaponizing antisemitism’ in varying ways that cause imbalances in the media and infringements upon academic freedom within educational institutions of the West.
How can we explain Israel’s tight grip on public discourse on Israel-Palestine issue for so long? How could it accumulate so much power and influence within different states and international entities? If there is a financial aspect to it, how powerful is it?
This is a complex, fundamental question. Israel established its legitimacy as a new state shortly after World War II in the twilight of the European colonial order, imposing its sovereign claim on a resident majority Arab majority that identified as belonging to the nation of the Palestinian people. The Zionist project of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine was a dream of a small dedicated movement in late 19th century Europe that became a political project when the UK pledged its support in the Balfour Declaration (1917) for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, a purely colonial interference with the self-determination rights of people. The statehood of Israel became an attainable goal during the British mandate period in which the UK administered Palestine as an International Mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, and encouraged Jewish immigration, a process accelerated in response to the rise of fascism in Europe, climaxism of lethal antisemitism in the Holocaust that put to death as many as six millions Jews in Europe, and caused a sense of guilt on the part of Western liberal democracies for their meager efforts to oppose such genocidal behavior.
The British ended their mandate, partly in reaction to Zionist anti-British terrorism dumping on the newly formed UN the daunting challenge of finding a solution to the surging internal conflict in Palestine between settler Jews and indigenous Arabs. The UN relied on British experience with its divide and rule style of colonialism. It established a commission that made recommendations centering on a proposed partition of Palestine into two states with Jerusalem as both their common capital and an international city. The Zionist Movement accepted partition, the representatives of the Palestinian people rejected it. Against this background Israel was established in the aftermath of a war internal to Palestine between Jewish militia forces and the armed forces of neighboring Arab countries, ending with an agreed ‘green line’ that was treated as a provisional internal boundary between the two peoples that enlarged Israel beyond the UN partition territorial allocations, giving the Jewish state 78% of Palestinian territory rather than the 45% contained in the UN plan, and dividing Jerusalem between the two peoples, leaving the control of Palestinian side of the green line to Jordan and Gaza to Egypt.
Even with its military victory and Western diplomatic and economic support, Israel was founded in a context that contained challenges to its legitimacy as a state from its region and indeed from most of the Global South. From the outset Israel realized that its security and status in international life would be greatly helped if it could control the public discourse that shaped international public opinion. Its fragile security was highlighted by the fact that in its early years it was surrounded by hostile larger states that perceived the establishment of Israel in their midst as a territorial, racial, and religious intrusion, a colonialist solution of a European problem at the expense of the Islamic, Arab bloc of countries.
Israel’s success in discourse control was greatly aided by the extent of Jewish influence in the large media platforms of the West, especially in the US and UK, as facilitated by the wealth of Diaspora Jews mobilized after Hitler to support the establishment and development of a Jewish state as a place of secure sanctuary in the event of future outbreaks of lethal antisemitism. This propaganda tool was used in sophisticated ways to create great admiration for Israel as liberal democracy in the Western mold and a modernizing success in contrast to the supposedly backward, stagnant, impoverished Palestinian society. In contrast, Israel was portrayed as socially progressive, economically successful, and even managed to make ‘the desert bloom.’ At first, there were tensions in the West between support for Israel and maintaining reliable access to the huge oil and gas reserves of the region. Israel was able to resolve these tensions with its victory over its Arab adversaries in the 1967 War, as well as occupying the territories allocated to the Palestinians in 1948. And most symbolically important it unilaterally incorporating Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel, an initiative that to this day is not accepted by many governments. After 1967 Israel shifted its relationship to the US from that of strategic burden to strategic partner, and became a militarily significant actor throughout the region. Israel was allowed to acquire nuclear weapons in defiance of the non-proliferation treaty arrangements. After the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 Israel becaame even more valuable as the fall of the Shah meant the loss of the only other strategic ally of the West in a region strategically important for energy and control of major trade routes.
At the same time as Israel’s apartheid regime engaged in dehumanizing modes of controlling Palestinian resistance and Israel became increasingly clear about its unwillingness to reach a political compromise achieved by bilateral negotiations, resulting in new assaults on its legitimacy became more widely questioned even in Western societies, but not by governments. This process was recently further intensified when the Netanyahu coalition government with Regligious Zionism party took over in January 2023, and immediately greenlighted settler violence on the West Bank, violated the sanctity of Muslim sacred sites (especially Al Aqsa Mosque), and displayed maps at the UN and elsewhere with only Israel present between ‘the river and the sea.’ Throughout this period Israel’s control of the discourse, reinforced by the Zionist well funded network in the Global West used its discourse dominance to demonize its critics. It was helped by the adoption of the IHRA (International Holocaust Remembrance Asssociation) definition of antisemitism, which treated any sharp criticism of Zionism or Israel, however justified by evidence and reasonable, as antisemitism. With possibly tragic irony such false branding seems to be producing real antisemitism in the world in its authentic form of hatred of Jews as an expression of hostility towards the behavior Zionism and Israel.
We hear or read a lot these days about the fact that Israel is an apartheid regime; what is apartheid, and how does Israel qualify as an apartheid state?
Most understandings of the nature of apartheid accept the definition set forth in Article II of the 1973 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, which reads as follows:
Article II
For the purpose of the present Convention, the term “the crime of apartheid”, which shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them:
(a) Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups of the right to life and liberty of person:
(i) By murder of members of a racial group or groups;
(ii) By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups of serious bodily or mental harm, by the infringement of their freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of a racial group or groups;
(b) Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part;
(c) Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a group or groups, in particular by denying to members of a racial group or groups basic human rights and freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognized trade unions, the right to education, the right to leave and to return to their country, the right to a nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association;
d) Any measures including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups, the prohibition of mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or to members thereof;
(e) Exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group or groups, in particular by submitting them to forced labour;
(f) Persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms, because they oppose apartheid.
It was made clear in the understanding of the crime that although South African racial system of exploitative subjugation of the African indigenous population was the model for declaring apartheid to be a Crime Against Humanity, it is applicable to any arrangement that satisfies the treaty definition. It is so regarded by the International Criminal Court, see Article VII(1)(j). In Article VII(2)(h)) the nature of the crime is clarified: (h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime”;
In the years since 2017 a series of reports sponsored by the UN and issued by widely respected human rights NGOs have confirmed the credibility of earlier allegations that the treatment of Palestinians qualifies in various ways as apartheid. (See detailed reports of UN ESCWA; Human Rights Watch; Amnesty International; B’Tselem). To some extent, the criminality of Israeli apartheid has been temporarily subordinated to allegations of genoicide following the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023. If Israel’s falls short of its current genocidal effort to coerce Palestinians to leave their homeland, then concerns about Israel’s policies and practices of apartheid would undoubtedly be renewed.
Given the recent momentum that the pro-Palestinian movement has gained, especially in the US, do you see any chance for a change in the essence or form of the US support for Israel in the short-term?
There has definitely been a shift in public opinion among the citizenry in Global West countries, but the governments, above all the US and UK continue their support of Israel despite spreading opposition to the devastation of the civilian population of Gaza, making the small crowded region totally unlivable without a massive reconstruction and relief effort.
The governments that continue to support Israel even after its recourse to genocide are influenced by a mixture of strategic interests and what might be called identity politics. The strategic and identity issues converge in relation to Israel as it combines strong military capabilities with a civilizational identity as a high-tech modern society with principal ties to the West, and having a series of hostile Islamic countries and non-governmental movements as its adversaries. If a wider war breaks out it will be viewed as ‘a clash of civilizations’ recalling Samuel Huntington’s 1993 prediction of the world after the end of the Cold War. Part of this overall picture of stability of Israel’s relationship with the liberal democracies of the West despite its unabashed endorsement of genocide in addressing the Palestinian people is best explained by the effectiveness of Zionist funding of political opponents of elected officials critical of Israel, and financing of Israel friendly politicians in these countries where donor leverage that remains strong at the national level. Also important, is the absence of organized Palestinian lobbying capabilities in the West that could somewhat diminish pro-Israeli foreign policy biases.
If Israel succeeds in implementing its population transfer scenario in Gaza, forcing surviving Palestinians to become refugees in the region, ethnic cleansing will be added to the criminality of genocide in the form of a Crime Against Humanity. This would almost surely lead to mobilization of anti-Western forces throught the Middle East, adding dangerous new stresses to the fraying bond tying the Global West to Israel. Also, uncertainties as to Israels reaction to being treated as ‘a pariah state’ subject to boycotts and even sanctions, and surging militancy among global solidarity groups dedicated to a humane future for the Palestinian people, including the 7+ million refugees and exiles living nearby and around the world.
As you’ve mentioned in your preface to the book, ‘We Will Not be Silenced’, in Israel’s war against Gaza, “’the people’ become the enemy,” and, therefore, to legitimize such a war, one has to dehumanize that people. How has Israel gone on about doing so from 1948 onwards?
As Edward Said pointed out in his book, Orientalism, the colonial intellectual portrayal of the Arab is a prelude to dehumanization and a sense of Western civilization superiority, especially as assessed through an optic of technocratic modernity. As earlier discussed, Israel was established as the European colonial order was collapsing and in the aftermath of a monstrous genocide that the liberal democratic countries in the West did little to stop until Germany and Japan committed aggression imperiling their overall global hegemony. The early Zionist anticipated the current attempts to erase the Palestinians from their homeland as expressed by the dehumanizing saying: “a land for a people without land for a land without people.”
What has complicated life for Israel is that the indigenous nationalism of the Global South as well as the defeat of European colonialism created a sense of the legitimacy of resistance, even armed resistance that has been incorporated to a controversial extent into contemporary international law. The recognition of the inalienable right of a people to national self-determination results in the settler colonial authority movements as being lawless undertakings, the overt enemy of indigenous populations as denigrated as backward or non-existent. If such tactics do not remove such obstacle, then the settler colonialist move by stages until reaching the genocidal conclusion that unless the indigenous population is utterly marginalized, exterminated, or expelled it will prevail over time. In this sense the settle colonial failed projects of South Africa and Algeria are instructive on the central point that superior military capabilities will not bring the settler regime reliable security, nor will its cruelty and exploitative policies exhibited by its imposed dominance. Despite the darkness of the skies over Palestine at present, it has never been closer to an achieving some kind of victory and liberation that was unimaginable just a few months ago.
As my last question, I want to know, in your opinion, what hope is left for Palestinians? They are witnessing, on a daily basis, what seems to be a deadlock, created by the US’s unconditional support for Israel, and they have no recourse to the international law.
The best hope for Palestine at this time is the escalation of civil society activism to stop the genocide, as sought by South African application to International Court of Justice, and to isolate Israel in meaningful ways through cultural, sports, and all types of boycotts. Within the foreign policy of the Global West and in relation to Israel itself there is no basis for a just and sustainable peace being promoted diplomatically and strategically by leading governments or effectively by the UN. Geopolitical primacy in situations of strategic priority, as is the case for the US and Israel, overrides the guidance of international law and the morality of inter-governmental co-existence. This, short of geopolitical reassessment there is no realistic prospect for any sufficient change in the commitment of the West to Israel’s security as it seeks to pursue it.
As mentioned above, only civil society activism can change the calculus of strategic interests in the West and Israel in the short run of 5-10 years. As the transformation of South Africa made clear, the impacts of becoming a pariah state in a variety of international arenas made it willing to transform the state from an apartheid regime to a constitutional democracy that facilitated transition by outstanding African leadership, a sympathetic world public opinion, and a focus on racial issue and political rights, which respecting the economic rights and social status of the displaced white settler elite. While Israel for all sorts of reasons cannot be compared to South Africa, there exists a zone of uncertainty that may generate some comparable solution that is above all able to find a framework based on racial/religious equality and a coexistence based on respect for the rule of law and human rights for all.
[Prefatory Note: What follows is a Declaration of Conscience of Global Intellectual on Gaza Genocide prepared by Ahmet Davutoglu and myself, with the assistance of Abudllah Ahsan and Hilal Elver. It sought to enlist an initial list of signatories from around the as representative as possbile, and gender balance. We invite others to join by sending their endorsement to <change.org> listed under the heading of Declaration of Conscience. I will post a link as it is available. We view the virtual annihilation of Gaza as a societal grouping and its people as an imminent possibility. As of 12/20.23 it is reported that 88% of the population has insufficient food, and potable water is 90% less that minimum needs for sustainable health.]
On November 30, the Government of Israel resumed the genocidal onslaught it inicted on Palestinians in Gaza after a much overdue but brief “humanitarian pause.” In doing so, Israel has ignored the worldwide protests of people as well as the fervent pleas of moral, religious, and political authority gures throughout the world to convert the hostage/prisoner exchange pause into a permanent ceasere. The overriding intention was to avert the worsening of the ordeal of the Gazan population. Israel was urged to choose the road to peace not only for humanitarian reasons but also for the sake of achieving real security and respect for both Palestinians and Israelis. Yet now the bodies are again piling up, the Gaza medical system can no longer offer treatment to most of those injured, and threats of widespread starvation and disease intensify daily.
Under these circumstances, this Declaration calls not only for the denunciation of Israel’s genocidal assault but also for taking effective action to permanently prevent its repetition. We come together due to the urgency of the moment, which obliges global intellectuals to stand against the ongoing horric ordeal of the Palestinian people and, most of all, to implore action by those who have the power, and hence the responsibility, to do so. Israel’s continuing rejection of a permanent ceasere intensies our concerns. Many weeks of cruel devastation caused by Israel’s grossly disproportionate response to the October 7 attack, continues to exhibit Israel’s vengeful fury. That fury can in no way be excused by the horrendous violence of Hamas against civilians in Israel or inapplicable claims of self-defense against an occupied population.
Indeed, even the combat pause seems to have been agreed upon by the Israeli government mainly to ease pressures from Israeli citizens demanding greater efforts to secure the release of the hostages. The United States government evidently reinforced this pressure as a belated, display to the world that it was not utterly insensitive to humanitarian concerns. Even this gesture was undercut before the pause started by the deant public insistence of Prime Minister Netanyahu to resume the war immediately after the pause. It is more appropriate to interpret these seven days without combat as a pause in Israel’s genocidal operations in Gaza rather than as a humanitarian pause. If truly humanitarian, it would not have crushed hopes of ending the genocide and conjointly resuming efforts to negotiate the conditions for an enduring and just peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
The revival of this military campaign waged by Israel against the civilian population of Gaza amounts to a repudiation of UN authority, of law and morality in general, and of simple human decency. The collaborative approval of Israel’s action by the leading liberal democracies in the Global
West, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, accentuates our anguish and disgust. These governments pride themselves on adherence to the rule of law and yet have so far limited their peacemaking role to PR pressures on Israel to conduct its exorbitant actions in a more discreet manner. Such moves do little more than soften the sharpest edges of Israel’s genocidal behavior in Gaza. At the same time continuing to endorse Israel’s false rationale of self-defense, which is inapplicable in a Belligerent Occupation framework established by the UN in the aftermath of the 1967 War, shielded this brazenly criminal conduct from legal condemnation and political censure at the UN and elsewhere.
We deplore the reality that these governments continue to lend overall support to Israel’s announced intention to pursue its combat goals, which entail the commission of severe war crimes that Tel Aviv does not even bother to deny. These crimes include the resumption of intensive bombing and shelling of civilian targets, as well as reliance on the cruel tactics of forced evacuation, the destruction of hospitals, bombings of refugee camps and UN buildings that are sheltering many thousands of civilians and the destruction of entire residential neighborhoods. In addition, Israel has been greenlighting settler-led violence and escalating ethnic cleansing efforts in the West Bank. Given these developments we urge national governments to embargo and halt all shipments of weapons to Israel, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, which should also withdraw their provocative naval presences from the Eastern Mediterranean; we urge the UN Security Council and General Assembly to so decree without delay.
We also support the Palestinian unconditional right as the indigenous people of the land to give or withhold approval to any proposed solution bearing upon their underlying liberation struggle.
The deteriorating situation poses an extreme humanitarian emergency challenging the UN system to respond with unprecedented urgency. We commend UNICEF for extending desperately needed help to wounded children as well as to children whose parents were killed or seriously injured every continuing effort. We also commend WHO for doing all in its power to help injured Palestinians, especially pregnant women and children, and to insist as effectively as possible on the immediate reconstruction and reopening of hospitals destroyed and damaged by Israeli attacks. We especially commend UNRWA for continuing the sheltering of many thousands of Palestinians in Gaza displaced by the war and for providing other relief in the face of heavy staff casualties from Israeli repeated bombardment of UN buildings. Beyond this, UNESCO should be implored to recognize threats to religious and cultural sites and give its highest priority to their protection against all manner of violation, especially the Masjid al-Aqsa; the Israeli government should be warned about its unconditional legal accountability for protecting these sites.
We also propose that the UN Human Rights Council should act now to establish a high-profile expert commission of inquiry mandated to ascertain the facts and law arising from the Hamas attack and Israel’s military operations in Gaza since October 7, 2023. The commission should offer recommendations in its report pertaining to the responsibility and accountability of principal perpetrators for violations of human rights and humanitarian norms that constitute war crimes and genocide.
We also view the desperation of the situation to engage the responsibility of governments, international institutions, and civil society to act as well as to speak, and use their diplomatic and economic capabilities to the utmost with the objective of bringing the violence in Gaza to an end now!
As signatories of this Declaration, we unequivocally call for an immediate ceasefire and the initiation of diplomatic negotiations under respected and impartial auspices, aimed at terminating Israel’s long and criminally abusive occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. This process must be fully respectful of the inalienable right to self-determination of the Palestinian people and take proper account of relevant UN resolutions.
SIGN THE PETITION
Declaration of Conscience and Concern of Global Intellectuals on Gaza Genocide
Signatories
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Türkiye;
Richard Falk, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967 (2008-2014), Professor of International Law Emeritus, Princeton University;
Dr. Moncef Marzouki, Former President of Tunisia;
Mahathir Mohamed, Former Prime Minister of Malaysia;
Georges Abi-Saab, Professor Emeritus, Graduate Institute Geneva and Cairo University, Former UN Advisor to the Secretary Generals of the UN; Former Judge of the International Court of Justice, Egypt;
Mairead Maguire, Nobel Peace Laureate (1976), Member of Russell Tribunal, Northern Ireland;
Amr Moussa, Former Secretary General of the Arab Leauge, Former Foreign Minister, Member of the UN’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change for International Peace and Security, Egypt;
M. Javad Zarif, Professor, University of Tehran, Former Foreign Minister, Iran;
Hamid Albar, Former Foreign Minister, First Chancellor of the Asia e University, Malaysia;
Brigette Mabandla, Former Minister of Justice and anti-Apartheid Activist, South Africa;
Judith Butler, Professor, University of California at Berkeley; Feminist Studies, USA;
ChrisHedges,Pulitzer-prizeWinningReporterandFormerMiddleEastBureau Chief for The New York Times, USA;
TuWeiming,MemberofUNGroupofEminentPersonsfortheDialogueAmong Civilizations, Professor Emeritus, Harvard University, USA; Founding Director of the Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies, Peking University, China;
JohnEsposito,ProfessorofInternationalRelationsandtheFoundingDirectorofthe Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University; Member of High Level Group of the UN Alliance of Civilizations, USA;
Arundhati Roy, Author of God of Small Things, Human Rights Activist, India;
Abdullah Ahsan, Professor of History International Islamic University Malaysia and Istanbul Şehir University, USA;
Phyllis Bennis, Journalist, Author and Social Activist, Institute of Policy Studies, USA;
Noura Erakat, Activist and Professor, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, Co-founder of Jadalliyah, USA;
Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Former UN Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development; Deputy Director UN FAO, Malaysia;
Victoria Brittain, Former Foreign Editor of the Guardian, worked closely with anti-Apartheid Movement, Founder of the annual Palestine Festival of Literature, UK;
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak FBA, Professor, Columbia University, received Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy 2012, India;
Ali Bardakoğlu, Professor of Theology, Former President of Directorate of Religious Affairs, Türkiye;
Mustafa Ceric, Grand Mufti Emeritus of Bosnia, President of the World Bosniak Congress, co-recipient UNESCO Felix Houphouet-Bougny Peace Prize, Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Maung Zarni, Human Rights Activist, Member of the Board of Advisors of Genocide Watch, Co-founder of Free Burma Coalition, Free Rohingya Coalition and Forces of Renewal Southeast Asia, Myanmar;
David Swanson, Author, Executive Director of World BEYOND War, USA;
Radmila Nakarada, Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade; Spokesperson of the Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Committee, Serbia;
Fredrick S. Heffermehl, Lawyer and Author, Norway;
Anis Ahmad, Emeritus Professor and President Riphah International University Islamabad, Pakistan;
Lisa Hajjar, Professor, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA;
Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed, President Emeritus , Islamic Society of North America, USA;
Muhammed al-Ghazzali, Professor, Judge Supreme Court of Pakistan, Pakistan;
Syed Azman Syed Ahmad, Former Member of Malaysia Parliament, Chairman of Asia Forum for Peace and Development (AFPAD), Malaysia;
Osman Bakar, Al-Ghazali Chair of Epistemology and Civilisational Renewal, International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, Malaysia;
Engin Deniz Akarlı, Professor of History Emeritus, Brown University, Türkiye;
Francesco Della Puppa, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; Italy;
Julio da Silveira Moreira, Professor, Federal University of Latin-American Integration, Brazil;
Nabeel Rajab, Founder and former president of the Gulf Center for Human Rights; Former Deputy Secretary-General of the International Federation for Human Rights, Recipient of the Ion Ratiu Award for Democracy and Human Rights, Bahrain;
Feroz Ahmad, Emeritus Professor of History and Internatiıonal Relations, Harvard University, USA, India;
Serap Yazıcı, Professor of Constitutional Law, MP, Turkish Parliament, Türkiye;
Natalie Brinham, Genocide and Statelessness Scholar, UK;
Ayçin Kantoğlu, Author, Türkiye;
Dania Koleilat Khatib, ME Scholar and President of RCCP TrackII Organisation, UAE;
Imtiyaz Yusuf, Assoc. Prof. Dr., Non-Resident Research Fellow Center for Contemporary Islamic World (CICW), Shenandoah University, USA/Vietnam;
Kamar Oniah Kamuruzaman, Former Professor of Comparative Religion, International Islamic University, Malaysia;
Ümit Yardım, Former Ambassador of Türkiye to Tehran, Moscow and Vienna, Türkiye;
Ahmet Ali Basic, Professor, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Kani Torun, Former Ambassador of Türkiye to Somalia, Former Head of Doctors Worlwide, Member of Parlament, Türkiye;
Ermin Sinanovic, Center for Islam in the Contemporary World at Shenandoah University, USA/ Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Nihal Bengisu Karaca, Journalist, Türkiye
Alkasum Abba, Emeritus Professor of History, Abuja, Nigeria;
Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, Professor of History and Civilization, Former Dean, Faculty of Arts, University of Khartoum, Sudan;
Anwar Alrasheed, Khiam Rehabilitation Center, The victims of Torture (KRC), Representative of the International Council for Fair Trials and Human Rights in the State of Kuwait and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, Kuwait;
Richard Falk is an international law and international relations scholar who taught at Princeton University for forty years. Since 2002 he has lived in Santa Barbara, California, and taught at the local campus of the University of California in Global and International Studies and since 2005 chaired the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He initiated this blog partly in celebration of his 80th birthday.