Tag Archives: international law

Resisting Genocide in a Geopolitical World Order

2 May

[Prefatory Note: The post below was originally published by the Qods News Agency in English and Farsi versions in later April 2025. It is here republished in modified form, although the initial questions are retained. The central issue considered is the primacy of geopolitics in relation to international law, global justice, and universal morality. Consideration is given to the role of international law in activating civil society by legitimating resistance in the face of severe instances of direct and indirect criminal wrongdoing—humanitarian intervention, civic solidarity initiatives, peoples tribunals]

  1. As you know, Israel resumed its relentless bombing of Gaza and has shattered the Gaza ceasefire with Hamas adopted on 19 January. Israel has resumed weaponizing starvation in Gaza by its decision to break the ceasefire agreement. Israel has broken international law by blocking aid to Gaza. What’s your opinion? What should we do to stop the Israeli crimes against Palestinians?  How can the international community help Palestinians get rid of the Israeli occupation?

Response: A useful starting point is the realization that despite the views of a strong majority of governments representing most peoples of the world are opposed to the post-October 7 criminality of Israel in Gaza. And despite this, the organized international community as centered in the UN has proved helpless to enforce the basic provisions of the UN Charter and international law in this situation even in the face of a humanitarian emergency that urgently needs to be stopped, not just for the sake of the Palestinian victims, but for the credibility of humanity with respect to upholding the basic elements of the right to life. These conditions making international action imperative are reinforced by near unanimous interim rulings of the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court that have been angrily rejected by Israel, and arrogantly regarded as ‘without legal merit’ by Israel’s strongest supportive, complicit governments in North America and Europe.

What has become clear in this process is that the UN was not designed to be effective whenever, as here, adherence to international law (and morality) clashes with the strategic interests and geopolitical role of one or more of the five permanent membersof the Security Council, UN’s the only organ with enforcement authority. Each of these five, known as the P5, enjoys a right of veto that legally nullifies majoritarian preferences, and introduces an anti-democratic component into the core functioning of the UN. It is instructive to realize that when it comes to peace, security, and fundamental human rights the UN was never intended to be a new framework for world order.

The UN from the start was a winners’ framework based, as earlier in what was regarded as an ‘anarchic society in which the prevalence of power in relation to law in contexts of clash was taken for granted and seen to be ingrained in international practice. To appease public opinion this underlying reality was somewhat disguised by the lofty idealistic language of the Preamble to the Charter.  If this was not the intention of the founders of the UN it would make no sense to give the winners in 1945, the world’s most dangerous political actors, a path to total impunity for all that they might undertake, however destructive of a global rule of law, to promote national interests in war/peace and conflict situations. If as some have argued, the intention was to recognize inequality or civilizational diversity as architectural features of world order, then it made no sense not to give India and Brazil seats at the table or Indonesia (the most populous Islamic state) or Nigeria (for Africa) and Brazil (for Latin America). The failure to institutionalize these other criteria of inequality exhibited both ‘a winner.takes all approach to global order’ in combination with taking steps to assure the enduring dominance of global order by the Global North.

In light of this, if the peoples or governments of the world seriously seek the enforcement of international law as pronounced by the ICJ in the face of a P5 SC veto, we must turn to civil society activism. What the near unanimous interim rulings of the ICJ on 26 March 2024 and its strong Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 establish beyond any reasonable doubt is the existence of a crippling enforcement gap with respect to the implementation of international law. Past instances, including the anti-war movement that challenged the US-initiated Vietnam War and the anti-apartheid campaign that struggle against South African racism, suggest that the mobilization of civil society in relation to law and justice can contribute to closing this gap in situation that find international institutions and governments paralyzed, or worse, are to varying degrees complicit.

There is a creative interaction present in relation to Israel’s criminal course of action in Gaza. Despite the enforcement gap judicial institutions are influential sources of legitimacy that lend credibility to a variety of global solidarity initiatives, including BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions), pressuring governments to enact arms embargoes, mass protests, declarations by organized labor and faith community, civil disobedience and self-immolation, and others. Such a mobilization on a global scale is already spontaneously happening to some extent and may have already reached a tipping point that exerts decisive pressure, especially on Israel and United States, although not yet with discernable behavioral results that bring closure to the Palestinian ordeal. The cruel repression of protest activity in the US and Israel is both a reactive demonstration of the growing effectiveness and of the shameless refusal of liberal democracies to coordinate their behavior with their self-righteous claims to be champions of international human rights norms, benevolently guiding ‘a rules-governed world’ that brings stability to international political and economic life.

I am personally associated with the Gaza Tribunal Project that seeks to encourage civil society nonviolent action to be undertaken in a spirit of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle for basic rights, above all the inalienable right of self-determination. The GTP does not seek to be a substitute for the ICJ when it comes to identifying authoritative legal guidelines for the peoples of the world. This civil society tribunal was formed and dedicated to overcoming the enforcement gap. It is also committed to delimiting the accountability, complicity, and information gaps as well as to the establishment and maintenance of a permanent archive and permanent record of the Gaza Genocide, including its spillover effects in the West Bank and elsewhere in the Middle East.  

  • Ansarullah (known in the Western media as ‘the Houthis’) said that Yemen will not back down from continuing its support operations for the Palestinian people until the Israeli aggression on Gaza stops and the siege is lifted. Ansarullah officials affirmed that Yemen’s stance on Palestine stems from religious, national, and moral principles. Ansarullah vowed to continue their military operations against Israel and US forces in the region. How do you evaluate the Yemeni people and Ansarullah stance in support of innocent Palestinian people.

Response: Ansarullah (‘helpers of God’ in Arabic; a reference to Houthis in Yemen; an ongoing party in the long unresolved civil war for unified control of Yemeni governance) assertions declarative of the Houthi commitment to solidarity with the Palestinian liberation is an admirable example of an ethnic group acting in a self-sacrificing, brotherly manner in the face of continuing genocide victimizing a kindred long repressed ethnicity. It strikes both substantive and symbolic blows against the criminal actions of Israel and the complicity of the US and other supporters of this transparent genocide enacted in real time, consummated by the commission of daily atrocities brought to the eyes and ears of the world’s peoples in the digital age.

It is a sad commentary on contemporary world order that so few governments and ethnicities, express by their words and even more by their deeds, a comparable passion to that of Yemeni Houthis. It is further revealing that those few governments that do exhibit some visible degree of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle are all situated in the Global South. It suggests that even after the formal collapse of colonialism, the US Government continues to project western imperial power through its political and economic leverage, and militarism. These domineering characteristics of post-Cold War global order are sustained by a worldwide network of military bases, regime-changing interventions, and navies in every ocean.

The result since the end of the Cold War is a new unified form of geopolitical governance of the planet. This US-led dominance is an alternative to either the moderate decentralism of sovereign states or a more centralized world order system administered by democratic regional and global institutions. A third possibility, not yet tested or legitimated, although glimpsed in the warnings of Samuel Huntington, first set forth in 1992, that the sequel to the Cold War would not be a peaceful world order, but a clash of civilizations. This would amount to some sort of hybrid arrangement bonding regional or civilizational political orders with global institutions on one side and sovereign states on the other. At this time, such a form of hybridity is dramatized by the fate of the Palestinian people, with several white western states aligned with Israel while diverse Islamic political forces actively support the Palestinian struggle by forcible resistance..  

  • Israel is coming under increasing international criticism over its handling of the    war in Gaza. Millions of people around the world have taken part in protests against Israel’s war crimes. Protesters voiced outrage over what they described as war crimes committed by Israel in the besieged Gaza Strip and demanded immediate international action. What’s your opinion that Israel is becoming more and more isolated due to its genocide?

Response: I think it is true that this last post-ceasefire resumption of the genocidal assault on the people of Gaza, cruelly implemented by Israel’s weaponization of food shortages, polluted water, and medical supplies, facilities, and personnel has isolated Israel as a toxic rogue state among the peoples of the world. It has also posed the greatest moral/political/legal challenge of the 21st Century to the entire world of states, institutions, and peoples.

The ICJ in its authoritative Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 as overwhelmingly endorsed by the UN General Assembly in one of the most important acts of the long existence of the GA expressed by a vote of 124 in favor, 14 opposed, and 43 abstentions. This judicial action put a reasoned end to the lawfulness of the further administration of Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) by Israel during the 1967 War. [A/RES/ES-1024; revealingly, the original request with the closer vote came on 11 November 2022, that is before October 7, 2023 while the latter vote in September 2024 (or 11 months after the attack on Gaza) by the GA to the ICJ for an AO on the OPT enjoyed only a narrow margin of support with a vote of 87-26(opposed)-53(abstentions)] The resolution in the GA after ICJ’s judgment ordering Israel to end its ‘unlawful presence’ in OPT, including East Jerusalem no later than 12 months from the date of the GA Resolution on 19 September 2024. This was a clear sign that even among governments, Israel had a lower reputational standing in view of carry out its Gaza policy in the interval between the two GA actions. Equally significant was the ICJ pronouncement that the UN as an organization as well as member states in their individual capacity had a legal obligation to implement the legal findings in the Advisory Opinion. In effect, it was not just ‘advice’ from the ICJ but ‘mandatory guidance’ as interpreted and pronounced by the ICJ. Of course, it remains doubtful that either the ICJ or GA possesses the political traction to overcome the enforcement gap even in the face of this strong appeal by the most respected international institution, confirming even in relation to transparent and prolonged genocide that geopolitics retains its primacy in international relations..

Whether this isolation of Israel will be facilitated by militant civil society initiatives is a currently unanswerable question. The legal and moral foundations for such militancy exist. It is now a matter of whether a sufficient political will exists to prompt sufficient action along these solidarity lines. Also relevant is whether governments in the non-West are prepared to take a greater role in sheltering such civic action and activists from various forms of backlash organized by Israel and implemented by the formidable Zionist network of support that exerts considerable direct and indirect influence, especially in the US and parts of Europe, not only as a junior partner to the US effort to be a regional hegemon in the Middle East, but through reviving memories of Jewish victimization during the Holocaust and a more wide ranging ‘weaponization of antisemitism.’.

The Death of Francis Boyle: A Great Progressive International Law Scholar and Practitioner

6 Feb

[Prefatory Note: The following post represents my reflections on the outstanding progressive international law expert of our time, and takes notes of both pardonable faults and eternal gratitude for a courageous life well spent.

Francis Boyle: In Memoriam; RIP

It is with sadness that I take note of the sudden unexpected death of one of the few consistently progressive international Law scholars in the academic ranks of the US on January 30, 2025 at the age of 74. Boyle was active until he was pronounced dead due to undisclosed causes.

Despite being born in Chicago Boyle maintained his primary national identity was Irish. Francis was fond of asserting that he was ‘born Irish,’ and not as a white North American. Throughout his productive life Francis associated himself with many neglected struggles for justice, with especial attention given to opposing the Israel’s treatment of the Palestinian people, which he termed genocidal as early as 2009. He acted as a legal advisor to the Palestinian Authority and to the Palestinian negotiating team. He also acted as counsel representing several tribal communities seeking to redeem their legal rights as indigenous peoples and several other causes involving vulnerable or abused communities.  

Among those deserving praise for their courage in speaking truth to power, no

one among international law experts since the end of World War II, so exemplified this crucial virtue of engaged and progressive citizenship than Francis Boyle. He spoke bluntly, and often insultingly, about those who invoked international law to rationalize the foreign policy of the US Government.  His published writing was informed by a deep knowledge of his varied subjects, always expressing himself lucidly and uncompromisingly, most energetically when condemning US and Israeli lawlessness. His views were set forth in a self-confident style and his interpretations of law invariably placed him on what progressive persons agree is the right side of history. In keeping with this posture of radical dissent, Boyle’s heroes were unsurprisingly academicians and public figures who shared his outlook and public engagement, most notably Noam Chomsky and Ramsey Clark, and the less well known, the respected Harvard Law professor, Clyde Ferguson. Francis had an elite education, that included earning a magna cum laude degree from Harvar Law School. Nevertheless, Francis never attained the front ranks of those recognized as public intellectuals as were Edward Said, Howard Zinn, Daniel Ellsberg, and Susan Sontag.

As is often the case with radical dissenters, unless first tier scholars, they pay a price for their civic integrity and engagement, and there is little doubt in my mind, that Francis was informally blacklisted in many prestigious centrist venues, including the American Society of International Law and the Council of Foreign Relations. He clearly merited election to the Board of Editors of the American Journal of International Law on the basis of his scholarly stature, but it never happened during his 41 years as a faculty member of the College of Law at the University of Illinois. His many books on controversial issues were rarely reviewed in mainstream journals or appeared on the syllabi or recommended reading lists of international law courses. Despite being spurned at home, Francis was well known internationally as a skilled lawyer who would provide his services to causes unpopular or unknown in the West.

Francis managed to do many bold and valuable things in his own way over the years. He believed in using juridical frameworks to expose the wrongdoing of the powerful with an awareness that winning in court made the claim legitimate, but did not assure enforcement, which he correctly understood to be a political rather than a legal project.

Francis supported in courts of law claims of justifiable civil disobedience by young Americans during the Vietnam War, served as a lead prosecutor for a high profile Malaysian civil society tribunal condemning the role of the US in the Iraq War, he advised Palestinian negotiators seeking a just peace with Israel, provided services as a lawyer on behalf of indigenous rights, and represented Bosnia and Herzegovina in the International Court of Justice in their legal action against Serbia, charging genocide.

Yet not all that glitters is gold. Francis was stubborn and dogmatic, unyielding in articulating his controversial views, and had an annoying habit of invariably proclaiming his own importance that diverted attention from the substantive issues to be addressed. I believe Francis brought on some of the unfair blacklisting in academic circles by a kind of obsessive and unabashed narcissism that diverted attention from his great talents as jurist and lawyer with an unwavering commitment domestically and internationally to the rule of law as a source of justice and core element of a genuine democracy, which helps his affinities with the powerless and vulnerable.

In the end, we should celebrate the achievements and ethical heroism of Francis Boyle, and forgive those all-too-human shortcomings when it comes to matters of humility.  Too few of us who profess progressive have the courage of our convictions that put our ideas and beliefs in the public square. Maybe we should express gratitude to the Irish genes, which seems to have guided Francis Boyle to be the foremost progressive international law specialist of our time. Unfortunately, he has left us when we need his thought and action as never before in the history of this republic that had at least revered the Constitution even as it broke its own laws and supposed value from the moment is broke from the British Empire but not from imperialism, and even slavery for Africans and genocidal policies toward native Americans. We who benefited from Francis’s presence bemoan his absence.  

How Can the UN be Liberated from Geopolitics

8 Nov

[Prefatory Note: What follows is an interview conducted by Daniel Falcone withHans von Sponeck and myself on our collaborative book Liberating the UN: Realism with Hope (Stanford University Press, 2024). This interview was previously published in CounterPunch in late October. Since the interview Donald Trump has been elected the next President of the US, which would augur bad news for the UN, particularly in the areas of peace and security, and human rights.]

The United Nations: Failure by Design, Reform by Demand

By Richard Falk, Hans von Sponeck and Daniel Falcone

Former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied, Richard Falk, and former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Hans von Sponeck, are the authors of Liberating the United Nations: Realism with Hope (Stanford University Press, 2024). In this question and answer with Daniel Falcone, they break down the main arguments of their book along with the relevance of the UN Summit of the Future as well as the prospects for neoliberalism and the impacts of the western world’s rightward drift. Falk and von Sponeck complicate the term geopolitical term realism and discuss the ramifications for how global governance can move forward with hope. 

Daniel Falcone: Can you discuss the general thesis or main arguments of the book and how they connect to, take say, the specific UN failures in making a difference in Ukraine and Gaza, along with the respective reasons for their failures? 

Richard Falk: From our perspective there were several interlocking themes that induced us to write this book: 

1) UN exhibits an increasing marginality with respect to the maintenance of global security in relation to political conflicts and ecological stability at an historical moment where institutional guidance and multilateral cooperation was most needed to address urgent present and future challenges. 

2) The world needs global venues most legitimately provided by the UN to facilitate multilateral cooperation on a series of planetary challenges—war prevention, climate change, nuclear disarmament, genocide, and regulation of AI; a strengthened UN is the best hope for mitigating the current manner by which geopolitical centralized management of power and security and the more decentralized primacy accorded national interests exert control over conflict, diplomacy, ecological resilience. 

3) Although the UN has been disappointing to peace-minded and justice inclined sectors of public opinion, it has been a force for human betterment in such domains of international life as health, childcare, development, financial assistance, cultural heritage, environment protection, labor, disaster relief, and human rights, making it clarifying to distinguish between a war/peace UN and a functional UN. 

4) To perform in an effective manner that responds to the global public interest, the UN urgently needs structural and procedural reforms, including an expanded and more independent funding base, and more empowerment for the General Assembly, Secretary General, and International Court of Justice. 

5) As the well-intentioned SG’s September initiative ‘Summit for the Future’ made evident, political traction for a benevolent reform agenda does not presently exist at the level of the P5 nor as a priority of media or public opinion in the West, making the future of the UN and the protection of longer-term human interests and ecological resilience depend on the transnational activism of civil society.

Overall, despite the declining interest in the UN throughout the global West, especially the US, the UN currently plays an important role in promoting the daily betterment of tens of millions of human lives throughout the world. To strengthen its relevance to situations such as presented by the Ukraine War and the Gaza Genocide requires fundamental reforms as noted and a strengthening of UN capabilities to offset, and even overcome, the role of current forms of geopolitics in the management of global power and security, which has taken hegemonic, and militarist turns since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago.   

Hans von Sponeck: I consider three issues discussed in the book as of major importance:

  1. We reviewed in our book the cooperation of the executive/operational UN of specialized agencies, funds and programmes over time and concluded that this system has come a long way during the past eighty years – from ’splendid isolation’ in the early years, when individual UN entities executed their programmes without any outreach to their UN counterparts to broad-based inter-agency integration in recent years. The result: One UN system programme, headed by one UN official, the UN Resident Coordinator, working with one budget, and being housed in one building – a pattern which has been adopted by more and more UN country teams. This, we argue, should become the mandatory approach wherever the UN system has programmes.
  • There is another level of ‘link-up’ which is significantly more complex: the cooperation between the UN‘s political and peace-keeping missions concerned with conflict prevention and peacebuilding and the UN country teams involved in economic and social development. As we indicate, only recently has the red line between the Security Council and the General Assembly and the operational UN become less red allowing integrated UN approaches. We consider this a valuable and far-reaching accomplishment and a milestone  on the UN’s road to liberation. We would hope that the UN Pact for the Future, the UNGA has started to debate, will lead to structural coherence and coordination in multi-lateral circumstances.
  • The third major area of concern, we have addressed, has to do with the financing of the UN. The budget at the disposal of the UNSG has been pitifully inadequate at all times. In 2022 it amounted to $3.1 billion, or less than 45 cents /pp on the planet. We have recognized three serious financing issues: i. the perennial annual cash shortfall and the aggravating late payments by many member government; ii. the absence of alternative sources of finance which could provide much needed additional resources and also help to protect the organisation against financial blackmail; iii. the de-funding threats by some governments to influence UN policies, UN work content and the appointment of senior UN officials.

Daniel Falcone: What do you think will be the tone and approach for the upcoming UN Summit of the Future based on the findings you present in the book?

Richard Falk: As suggested, the UN Summit of the Future prepared documents and held meetings of governments that set forth in comprehensive and ambitious frames what needs to be done by sovereign states and the UN to address presently perceived principal global challenges. This provides both desirable policy guidelines, positive world order agendas and goals, and markers of progress. It also will determine whether there is sufficient political traction to lessen corporate and nationalist short-termism, promote respect for Charter values including enhanced respect for international law, and induce governments to align their behavior and advocacy with global and human interests. To achieve such results also would benefit from an improved UN pedagogy, which our book hopes to encourage, on the benefits of a more autonomous UN more endowed with the capabilities need to perform along the lines pledged by the Preamble to the UN Charter. The realist narrative that best tell the UN story from time of creation is one of realism without hope to realism with hope as reinforced by moral, ecological, and survivalist imperatives.

Despite such reasoning, there is little reason to be hopeful in the present atmosphere of distrust and enmity, especially so long as the US insists on coercively managing global security and Western hegemony within a framework alliance politics that is no longer able to enjoy the confidence or even the acquiescence of most countries in the Global South. What is more probable in reaction to these anarchic and hegemonic features is the increasing formation of likeminded deWesternizing coalitions in the Global South that seek to balance Global West ambitions and strategic concerns, especially with respect to trade, finance, investment. energy, and environmental protection.   

Hans von Sponeck: The UN General Assembly has passed a resolution on a ‘Pact for the Future’ (GA/12641 of 2 October 2024). In 52 action points which include such key reform issues as the adoption of an ‘inclusive process to adapt international cooperation to the realities of today and the challenges of tomorrow’ and ‘ the most progressive and concrete commitment to Security Council reform’ and  ‘the representation of  the SC redressing  the historical underrepresentation of Africa’. This can only be welcomed. As there is no reference in this resolution of the ‘how’, the ‘who’ and the ‘when’, the GA has taken no more than a small step in what is undoubtedly going to be a long and complicated reform process. What is most disconcerting is that member countries were not given an opportunity to debate the draft resolution but only asked to react to a draft. This explains the decision by seven countries, including the P5 member Russia, which have voted against this resolution. The reform debate has thus started on a confrontational note.

Daniel Falcone: How can the United Nations regain its footing in terms of its effectiveness and legitimacy in your view without succumbing to the dangers of a global rightward drift?

Richard Falk: I believe that the Global South with the support of China should focus on the need for Charter reform that reflects the will of governments sensitive to the material needs, as well as social protection and equitable distributions of wealth that benefit the great majority of the world’s peoples. With the collapse of European colonialism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as well as the developmental progress of many countries, the political landscape of 1945 is hopelessly out-of-date if one objective of the UN is to reflect contemporary realities, priorities, and challenges. The UN must be empowered to play a much greater role with respect to war mitigation and genocide/atrocity prevention. 

The current largely voluntaristic approach to respect for international law also must end and be replaced by an ethos of obligatory respect. Such changes could take various forms, above all, placing restrictions on the P5 right of veto in the Security Council, lessoning of limitations on General Assembly authority by allowing the passage of binding recommendations, enhancing the role of the  International Court of Justice (ICJ) by way of decisions, submission of international legal disputes between states, the absence of assured enforcement of decisions due to a dependence on the Security Council for implementation, and the designation of international law guidance in response to UN requests for clarification as authoritative for legal issues now labeled as ‘Advisory Opinions.’  

The existing UN Charter does not situate international law in such a way as to give its legal assessments the force of law in the manner of a well-ordered national society. Such a framework of international law as the UN has embodied up to this point could be satirized by humorists as an Orwellian trope that strains the limits of language usage.

This ambivalence toward international law is what has made the UN as a political actor compatible with a behavioral code within the UN acknowledging the primacy of geopolitics in relation to the management of security and power in international relations. In effect, during the Cold War, this geopolitical dimension of the UN was most significantly exhibited by the standoff between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact that formed the basis of mutual deterrence, respect for geopolitical fault lines, and the self-limitations of Great Power conflict to ideological hostility and peripheral warfare (as in Korea, Vietnam, East Europe), combined with a mutual commitment to avoid escalation in the context of geopolitical confrontations. 

When Russia replaced the Soviet Union with reduced global political leverage and China stayed out of the costly game of geopolitical rivalry, the US-led Western rivalry took over geopolitical space, arming the world and accepting the expense of constructing a non-territorial ‘global state.’ Even before the Ukraine War, which among other things represented a Russian attempt to reenter geopolitical space, and the Gaza Genocide that illustrated how far the Western alliance would go in violating the global public interest in upholding minimal morality and its own supposed ethical values as well as respecting certain outer limits on the internal uses of political violence, it became obvious that this post-Cold War period of international relations was coming to an end in a manner that gave no positive edge to the behavior of the most liberal democracies as compared to the more internationally engaged autocracies.

This meant that UN would swallow its institutional pride and accept its continued marginality when it came to global security and relations among the centers of military and economic power. Or the UN and its membership must challenge such an identity in a coherent and persuasive way with rising support from deeply worried and aroused civil society forces that seeks to tame both geopolitics and its corporate and finance beneficiaries. Already there are signs, especially in relation to the world economy, that if the UN is not de-Westernized considering its post-colonial identities, then forms of inter-governmental institutional cooperation will be increasingly relied upon to achieve the sort of reforms reflective of the changed realities. Both the increasingly active BRICS and the Chinese cooperative development frameworks are illustrative of how the role of the UN is being addressed by an awakening Global South.

Meanwhile, an American bipartisan political elite is entrapped in a delusional trance, believing that ‘the world’ welcomes and needs US global leadership of the kind that evolved in the post-Cold War era, which hastened another kind of retreat from earlier claims of establishing a UN for the peoples of the world. The Clinton, G.W. Bush, and Biden efforts to connect the American model of capitalist democracy with peace, justice, restraint, and internationalism was not even convincing to half of its own citizenry, nor can it can it be said that the non-Western formal democracies, such as India, Indonesia, and China were more disposed to sacrifice national sovereignty than were the leading Western democracies that themselves gave few signs of any willingness to make the scale of reforms that would allow the UN to become more effective. 

Such a portrayal of the UN in crisis needs some modification. During the Gaza Genocide the forces of the Global South were more inclined to rely on international law and public opinion to end the Israeli onslaught on Palestinians and shame the complicit Western supporters of Israel that failed to use their political leverage even to gain a permanent ceasefire agreement, combined with hostage release and IDF withdrawal. Although ICJ performed its role in a highly professional manner that enhanced its global reputation by issuing interim orders in the opening months of 2024 that ordered Israeli restraints in its Caza campaign with the objective of mitigating the growing humanitarian catastrophe until a final decision on genocide could be reached. The tangible results of the ICJ rulings were minimal so far as the Palestinians are concerned. Israel was defiant. The complicit governments somewhat toned down their explicit support for Israel but refrained from exerting available forms of leverage to induce compliance such as imposing an arms embargo. 

This pattern of an authoritative delimitation of international law with respect to Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian Territories followed by Israel’s defiance that included Netanyahu’s denunciation of the UN from the podium of the General Assembly as “the swamp of antisemitic bile,’ ‘the anti-Israel flat-earth society,’ ‘the shredding of the UN Charter by Israel’s ambassador from the GA podium, and the formal decree declaring the UN Secretary General as ‘persona non grata’ in Israel were part of unprecedented anti-UN defamation by a UN Member, a country that Biden kept bonding with as sharing Western democratic values. Such defamation of the UN did not even lead to criticism from the liberal democracies, reinforcing the impression that a democratic internal structure lent no assurance of behavior supportive of UN values or positive institutional reform.

In my judgment, rescuing the UN in the peace and security area will not happen in a peaceful manner without a pedagogical interlude in which the US and other Western countries by way of their foreign policy elites recalculate their own interests in light of international realities of the 21st Century. Should governments with the support of their citizenries conclude that a stronger, more law-governed world order would serve the interests of their citizenries better than the militarized control system that has evolved since its mid-17th century Westphalian origins it would undoubtedly include a policy agenda for drastic UN reform. I think such a welcome dynamic would have relatively little to do with whether Western-style democracy prevailed in the states leading the way toward a stronger UN. More significant by far would be the willingness of political elites and leaders to give sufficient weight to longer term behavioral adjustments and policy goals. 

Hans von Sponeck: There is no ‘global’ rightward drift. Such drift exists in west-oriented countries. The western and non-western worlds, however, have two things in common, a trend towards extremism within individual countries and polarisation in their international relations. The 52 action points for reforms included in the UN Pact for the Future, if being tackled in earnest, will start a process of ‘democratization’ of the ‘political’ United Nations (SC &GA) replacing unipolar power politics with multipolar decision making. It would be an illusion, to assume that structural UN reforms will commence during the current confrontational geopolitical reality. The ongoing wars will have to end first, and new leadership of major powers must become convinced that cooperation is for everyone the better alternative to confrontation. Groups of countries, joined by civil society, will have to be the engine for such a profound pivot.

Daniel Falcone: I’m particularly interested in how you incorporate neoliberal globalization and the Washington consensus into the various themes of the book. The definition of these terms and their consequences seem crucial. How would define them and assess their respective impacts? 

Richard Falk: The role of private sector influence is both direct and indirect in the functioning of the UN exerting influence over the allocation of budgets and using monetary contributions to discourage criticism and to allow corporate concerns to condition especially the declarations and programs of the functional UN where economic approaches are prominent. This includes health (and its relation to property rights of ‘big pharma’; oligopolistic control of ‘industrial agriculture’ (with its biasing of policy toward ‘smart agriculture’ and away from ‘agro-ecology,’ ‘resilient agriculture,’ and traditional forms of ‘small-holder farming.’) This corporate influence over UN health and food activities, entrusted within the UN system mainly to the WHO and FAO allows this behavior to slip by almost unnoticed even by UN observers and the media. And when, for instance, in the work of the Human Rights Council, the harm to humans and animals from the excessive use of pesticides is reported objectively, the corporate wrongdoers hire investigators to discredit experts who prepared the damning reports.

As part of his presidential campaign in 1988, George H.W. Bush, agreed to use American influence to dissolve the UN Center of Information on Multilateral Corporations, and he delivered. Nothing subsequently has been established. In effect, in the last decade of the Cold War and the first decade of the post-Cold War where neoliberal globalization and the Washington Consensus dominated political consciousness signaling the geopolitical triumph of capitalism as legitimated by adherence to constitutionalism and free elections. It was George W. Bush who in 2002 articulated the prevailing view in the West that market forces plus constitutionalism was the only legitimate form of government in the 21st century and that it was the US that would look after global security by force projection on a global scale. The earlier American national security doctrine as revised by the 9/11 attacks advised China to concentrate on trade, investment, and economic development, and not waste its time or money in challenging US leadership with respect to upholding global security.

The UN reflected this two-phase US led approach to world order, with the first phase dominated by the triumph of neoliberal globalization, and a post-Cold War economistic preoccupation with trade, investment, development, and a unipolar global world economic order. The second phase involved the re-securitization of US foreign policy in purported reaction to the 9/11 attacks, generating a counter-terrorism assault on various countries in the Global South. The Iraq War of 2003, launched by US/UK regime-changing, state-building, and punitive armed intervention in Iraq despite the UN Security Council rejecting an appeal for authorization to use force outside the scope of self-defense, represented a post-Cold War reaffirmation of the previously degraded war prevention role of the UN. Bush, US president at the time, predicted that the UN would become ‘irrelevant’ in war/peace situations if it failed to give its green light to the US/UK Iraq War scenario of aggression, regime change, and long-term occupation. 

The war went ahead without UN authorization, and the Bush prediction has been confirmed by subsequent UN practice. The realities of neoliberal globalization as embodied in the Washington consensus has fallen out of favor as descriptive of capitalist ideology or US leadership, but many destructive features of contemporary capitalist remain, including growing patterns of inequality squeezing the middle classes when it comes to health, education, and family size, ecologically unsustainable energy policies, short-termism, and worker insecurity due to automation and AI. 

Hans von Sponeck: Neoliberalism, capitalism, and de-regulation have their origin in the west. The consensus was reached not in Moscow but in Washington! The impact of their existence has been documented throughout the book as part of the west-centric policy tool kit used to control the current global order.  We support the view that a ‘NIEO’, a new international economic order, following the failure of the Doha round of trade talks, is a pre-condition for more equitable playing fields globally. International financial policies have been determined until recently by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury, with the US$ as the only reserve currency. Even though the IMF and the WB are two UN agencies, they have unfailingly represented western interests, thereby contributing to global distortions disadvantageous to   the rest of the world. We therefore consider the reform of the international financial architecture as one of the prime UN reform issues. We note in this regard that the UN Pact for the Future has referred to the need to ‘strengthen…the representation of developing countries’ in such reformed financial structures.

Daniel Falcone: I’m interested in your subtitle, Realism with Hope. I assume this refers to forms of left realism in certain capacities. Does this phrasing refer to how policy and academia can complement one another? Or, in other words, another challenge for the UN seems to be how it balances its commitments to a top-down NGO institutional framework versus a more focused bottom-up approach of confronting real-life situations without legalistic terminology in guiding discussions and solutions. Is the UN overwhelmed with technocrats at the expense of activists? 

Richard Falk: Your question here raises several complex issues. At least my understanding of the use of ‘realism’ in this context is not concerned with ‘legal realism’ but rather with ‘political realism’ that continues to exert decisive influence over the foreign policy of dominant states. Such realism tends to be dismissive of international law if these constraints clash with strategic national interests involving security concerns, alliance relations, geopolitical ambitions, and internal sovereign rights.

The dominant state in the post-Cold War period has been the US, backstopped by the NATO alliance and the Israeli partnership, with China in the double role of moderating influence and rising rival, and Russia since the Ukraine War as the chief challenge to this structure of global security as managed almost exclusively by and for the Global West.

So far, the UN is mainly preoccupied by the interaction between the geopolitical P3 (of the P5 status SC members) and the rest of its 193 Member States. It has made gestures to include civil society representatives of NGOs in the functional side of its undertakings where advisory and informal guidance may be helpful, especially to least developed and smaller states. To date, the UN has given almost no direct role to populist forms of activism. Its most objective and respected political organ is the International Court of Justice, which in 2024 demonstrated its apolitical, professional character in addressing both the Gaza Genocide and the prolonged unlawfulness of Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories of West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. The ICJ is limited, again as recent proceedings confirm, by its lack of independent enforcement authority or capabilities, and it is totally dependent when it comes to implementation by recourse to the veto-prone Security Council.

The hope expressed in our title is both a recognition of the manifest inadequacy of realism as the foundation for the geopolitical management of global security and relations among the leading states and, furthermore, a growing awareness that alternative structures are possible and not necessarily intrusive when it comes to territorial sovereignty. The UN has limped along on a design that was imposed on the Organization by the winners of World II, which was never entirely appropriate or up to it assigned tasks. Over the 79 years since established, the UN has become less and less reflective of the political

[Prefatory Note: What follows is an interview conducted by Daniel Falcone with

Hans von Sponeck and myself on our collaborative book Liberating the UN: Realism with Hope (Stanford University Press, 2024). This interview was previously published in CounterPunch in late October. Since the interview Donald Trump has been elected the next President of the US, which would augur bad news for the UN, particularly in the areas of peace and security, and human rights.]

The United Nations: Failure by Design, Reform by Demand

By Richard Falk, Hans von Sponeck and Daniel Falcone

Former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied, Richard Falk, and former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Hans von Sponeck, are the authors of Liberating the United Nations: Realism with Hope (Stanford University Press, 2024). In this question and answer with Daniel Falcone, they break down the main arguments of their book along with the relevance of the UN Summit of the Future as well as the prospects for neoliberalism and the impacts of the western world’s rightward drift. Falk and von Sponeck complicate the term geopolitical term realism and discuss the ramifications for how global governance can move forward with hope. 

Daniel Falcone: Can you discuss the general thesis or main arguments of the book and how they connect to, take say, the specific UN failures in making a difference in Ukraine and Gaza, along with the respective reasons for their failures? 

Richard Falk: From our perspective there were several interlocking themes that induced us to write this book: 

1) UN exhibits an increasing marginality with respect to the maintenance of global security in relation to political conflicts and ecological stability at an historical moment where institutional guidance and multilateral cooperation was most needed to address urgent present and future challenges. 

2) The world needs global venues most legitimately provided by the UN to facilitate multilateral cooperation on a series of planetary challenges—war prevention, climate change, nuclear disarmament, genocide, and regulation of AI; a strengthened UN is the best hope for mitigating the current manner by which geopolitical centralized management of power and security and the more decentralized primacy accorded national interests exert control over conflict, diplomacy, ecological resilience. 

3) Although the UN has been disappointing to peace-minded and justice inclined sectors of public opinion, it has been a force for human betterment in such domains of international life as health, childcare, development, financial assistance, cultural heritage, environment protection, labor, disaster relief, and human rights, making it clarifying to distinguish between a war/peace UN and a functional UN. 

4) To perform in an effective manner that responds to the global public interest, the UN urgently needs structural and procedural reforms, including an expanded and more independent funding base, and more empowerment for the General Assembly, Secretary General, and International Court of Justice. 

5) As the well-intentioned SG’s September initiative ‘Summit for the Future’ made evident, political traction for a benevolent reform agenda does not presently exist at the level of the P5 nor as a priority of media or public opinion in the West, making the future of the UN and the protection of longer-term human interests and ecological resilience depend on the transnational activism of civil society.

Overall, despite the declining interest in the UN throughout the global West, especially the US, the UN currently plays an important role in promoting the daily betterment of tens of millions of human lives throughout the world. To strengthen its relevance to situations such as presented by the Ukraine War and the Gaza Genocide requires fundamental reforms as noted and a strengthening of UN capabilities to offset, and even overcome, the role of current forms of geopolitics in the management of global power and security, which has taken hegemonic, and militarist turns since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago.   

Hans von Sponeck: I consider three issues discussed in the book as of major importance:

  1. We reviewed in our book the cooperation of the executive/operational UN of specialized agencies, funds and programmes over time and concluded that this system has come a long way during the past eighty years – from ’splendid isolation’ in the early years, when individual UN entities executed their programmes without any outreach to their UN counterparts to broad-based inter-agency integration in recent years. The result: One UN system programme, headed by one UN official, the UN Resident Coordinator, working with one budget, and being housed in one building – a pattern which has been adopted by more and more UN country teams. This, we argue, should become the mandatory approach wherever the UN system has programmes.
  • There is another level of ‘link-up’ which is significantly more complex: the cooperation between the UN‘s political and peace-keeping missions concerned with conflict prevention and peacebuilding and the UN country teams involved in economic and social development. As we indicate, only recently has the red line between the Security Council and the General Assembly and the operational UN become less red allowing integrated UN approaches. We consider this a valuable and far-reaching accomplishment and a milestone  on the UN’s road to liberation. We would hope that the UN Pact for the Future, the UNGA has started to debate, will lead to structural coherence and coordination in multi-lateral circumstances.
  • The third major area of concern, we have addressed, has to do with the financing of the UN. The budget at the disposal of the UNSG has been pitifully inadequate at all times. In 2022 it amounted to $3.1 billion, or less than 45 cents /pp on the planet. We have recognized three serious financing issues: i. the perennial annual cash shortfall and the aggravating late payments by many member government; ii. the absence of alternative sources of finance which could provide much needed additional resources and also help to protect the organisation against financial blackmail; iii. the de-funding threats by some governments to influence UN policies, UN work content and the appointment of senior UN officials.

Daniel Falcone: What do you think will be the tone and approach for the upcoming UN Summit of the Future based on the findings you present in the book?

Richard Falk: As suggested, the UN Summit of the Future prepared documents and held meetings of governments that set forth in comprehensive and ambitious frames what needs to be done by sovereign states and the UN to address presently perceived principal global challenges. This provides both desirable policy guidelines, positive world order agendas and goals, and markers of progress. It also will determine whether there is sufficient political traction to lessen corporate and nationalist short-termism, promote respect for Charter values including enhanced respect for international law, and induce governments to align their behavior and advocacy with global and human interests. To achieve such results also would benefit from an improved UN pedagogy, which our book hopes to encourage, on the benefits of a more autonomous UN more endowed with the capabilities need to perform along the lines pledged by the Preamble to the UN Charter. The realist narrative that best tell the UN story from time of creation is one of realism without hope to realism with hope as reinforced by moral, ecological, and survivalist imperatives.

Despite such reasoning, there is little reason to be hopeful in the present atmosphere of distrust and enmity, especially so long as the US insists on coercively managing global security and Western hegemony within a framework alliance politics that is no longer able to enjoy the confidence or even the acquiescence of most countries in the Global South. What is more probable in reaction to these anarchic and hegemonic features is the increasing formation of likeminded deWesternizing coalitions in the Global South that seek to balance Global West ambitions and strategic concerns, especially with respect to trade, finance, investment. energy, and environmental protection.   

Hans von Sponeck: The UN General Assembly has passed a resolution on a ‘Pact for the Future’ (GA/12641 of 2 October 2024). In 52 action points which include such key reform issues as the adoption of an ‘inclusive process to adapt international cooperation to the realities of today and the challenges of tomorrow’ and ‘ the most progressive and concrete commitment to Security Council reform’ and  ‘the representation of  the SC redressing  the historical underrepresentation of Africa’. This can only be welcomed. As there is no reference in this resolution of the ‘how’, the ‘who’ and the ‘when’, the GA has taken no more than a small step in what is undoubtedly going to be a long and complicated reform process. What is most disconcerting is that member countries were not given an opportunity to debate the draft resolution but only asked to react to a draft. This explains the decision by seven countries, including the P5 member Russia, which have voted against this resolution. The reform debate has thus started on a confrontational note.

Daniel Falcone: How can the United Nations regain its footing in terms of its effectiveness and legitimacy in your view without succumbing to the dangers of a global rightward drift?

Richard Falk: I believe that the Global South with the support of China should focus on the need for Charter reform that reflects the will of governments sensitive to the material needs, as well as social protection and equitable distributions of wealth that benefit the great majority of the world’s peoples. With the collapse of European colonialism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as well as the developmental progress of many countries, the political landscape of 1945 is hopelessly out-of-date if one objective of the UN is to reflect contemporary realities, priorities, and challenges. The UN must be empowered to play a much greater role with respect to war mitigation and genocide/atrocity prevention. 

The current largely voluntaristic approach to respect for international law also must end and be replaced by an ethos of obligatory respect. Such changes could take various forms, above all, placing restrictions on the P5 right of veto in the Security Council, lessoning of limitations on General Assembly authority by allowing the passage of binding recommendations, enhancing the role of the  International Court of Justice (ICJ) by way of decisions, submission of international legal disputes between states, the absence of assured enforcement of decisions due to a dependence on the Security Council for implementation, and the designation of international law guidance in response to UN requests for clarification as authoritative for legal issues now labeled as ‘Advisory Opinions.’  

The existing UN Charter does not situate international law in such a way as to give its legal assessments the force of law in the manner of a well-ordered national society. Such a framework of international law as the UN has embodied up to this point could be satirized by humorists as an Orwellian trope that strains the limits of language usage.

This ambivalence toward international law is what has made the UN as a political actor compatible with a behavioral code within the UN acknowledging the primacy of geopolitics in relation to the management of security and power in international relations. In effect, during the Cold War, this geopolitical dimension of the UN was most significantly exhibited by the standoff between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact that formed the basis of mutual deterrence, respect for geopolitical fault lines, and the self-limitations of Great Power conflict to ideological hostility and peripheral warfare (as in Korea, Vietnam, East Europe), combined with a mutual commitment to avoid escalation in the context of geopolitical confrontations. 

When Russia replaced the Soviet Union with reduced global political leverage and China stayed out of the costly game of geopolitical rivalry, the US-led Western rivalry took over geopolitical space, arming the world and accepting the expense of constructing a non-territorial ‘global state.’ Even before the Ukraine War, which among other things represented a Russian attempt to reenter geopolitical space, and the Gaza Genocide that illustrated how far the Western alliance would go in violating the global public interest in upholding minimal morality and its own supposed ethical values as well as respecting certain outer limits on the internal uses of political violence, it became obvious that this post-Cold War period of international relations was coming to an end in a manner that gave no positive edge to the behavior of the most liberal democracies as compared to the more internationally engaged autocracies.

This meant that UN would swallow its institutional pride and accept its continued marginality when it came to global security and relations among the centers of military and economic power. Or the UN and its membership must challenge such an identity in a coherent and persuasive way with rising support from deeply worried and aroused civil society forces that seeks to tame both geopolitics and its corporate and finance beneficiaries. Already there are signs, especially in relation to the world economy, that if the UN is not de-Westernized considering its post-colonial identities, then forms of inter-governmental institutional cooperation will be increasingly relied upon to achieve the sort of reforms reflective of the changed realities. Both the increasingly active BRICS and the Chinese cooperative development frameworks are illustrative of how the role of the UN is being addressed by an awakening Global South.

Meanwhile, an American bipartisan political elite is entrapped in a delusional trance, believing that ‘the world’ welcomes and needs US global leadership of the kind that evolved in the post-Cold War era, which hastened another kind of retreat from earlier claims of establishing a UN for the peoples of the world. The Clinton, G.W. Bush, and Biden efforts to connect the American model of capitalist democracy with peace, justice, restraint, and internationalism was not even convincing to half of its own citizenry, nor can it can it be said that the non-Western formal democracies, such as India, Indonesia, and China were more disposed to sacrifice national sovereignty than were the leading Western democracies that themselves gave few signs of any willingness to make the scale of reforms that would allow the UN to become more effective. 

Such a portrayal of the UN in crisis needs some modification. During the Gaza Genocide the forces of the Global South were more inclined to rely on international law and public opinion to end the Israeli onslaught on Palestinians and shame the complicit Western supporters of Israel that failed to use their political leverage even to gain a permanent ceasefire agreement, combined with hostage release and IDF withdrawal. Although ICJ performed its role in a highly professional manner that enhanced its global reputation by issuing interim orders in the opening months of 2024 that ordered Israeli restraints in its Caza campaign with the objective of mitigating the growing humanitarian catastrophe until a final decision on genocide could be reached. The tangible results of the ICJ rulings were minimal so far as the Palestinians are concerned. Israel was defiant. The complicit governments somewhat toned down their explicit support for Israel but refrained from exerting available forms of leverage to induce compliance such as imposing an arms embargo. 

This pattern of an authoritative delimitation of international law with respect to Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian Territories followed by Israel’s defiance that included Netanyahu’s denunciation of the UN from the podium of the General Assembly as “the swamp of antisemitic bile,’ ‘the anti-Israel flat-earth society,’ ‘the shredding of the UN Charter by Israel’s ambassador from the GA podium, and the formal decree declaring the UN Secretary General as ‘persona non grata’ in Israel were part of unprecedented anti-UN defamation by a UN Member, a country that Biden kept bonding with as sharing Western democratic values. Such defamation of the UN did not even lead to criticism from the liberal democracies, reinforcing the impression that a democratic internal structure lent no assurance of behavior supportive of UN values or positive institutional reform.

In my judgment, rescuing the UN in the peace and security area will not happen in a peaceful manner without a pedagogical interlude in which the US and other Western countries by way of their foreign policy elites recalculate their own interests in light of international realities of the 21st Century. Should governments with the support of their citizenries conclude that a stronger, more law-governed world order would serve the interests of their citizenries better than the militarized control system that has evolved since its mid-17th century Westphalian origins it would undoubtedly include a policy agenda for drastic UN reform. I think such a welcome dynamic would have relatively little to do with whether Western-style democracy prevailed in the states leading the way toward a stronger UN. More significant by far would be the willingness of political elites and leaders to give sufficient weight to longer term behavioral adjustments and policy goals. 

Hans von Sponeck: There is no ‘global’ rightward drift. Such drift exists in west-oriented countries. The western and non-western worlds, however, have two things in common, a trend towards extremism within individual countries and polarisation in their international relations. The 52 action points for reforms included in the UN Pact for the Future, if being tackled in earnest, will start a process of ‘democratization’ of the ‘political’ United Nations (SC &GA) replacing unipolar power politics with multipolar decision making. It would be an illusion, to assume that structural UN reforms will commence during the current confrontational geopolitical reality. The ongoing wars will have to end first, and new leadership of major powers must become convinced that cooperation is for everyone the better alternative to confrontation. Groups of countries, joined by civil society, will have to be the engine for such a profound pivot.

Daniel Falcone: I’m particularly interested in how you incorporate neoliberal globalization and the Washington consensus into the various themes of the book. The definition of these terms and their consequences seem crucial. How would define them and assess their respective impacts? 

Richard Falk: The role of private sector influence is both direct and indirect in the functioning of the UN exerting influence over the allocation of budgets and using monetary contributions to discourage criticism and to allow corporate concerns to condition especially the declarations and programs of the functional UN where economic approaches are prominent. This includes health (and its relation to property rights of ‘big pharma’; oligopolistic control of ‘industrial agriculture’ (with its biasing of policy toward ‘smart agriculture’ and away from ‘agro-ecology,’ ‘resilient agriculture,’ and traditional forms of ‘small-holder farming.’) This corporate influence over UN health and food activities, entrusted within the UN system mainly to the WHO and FAO allows this behavior to slip by almost unnoticed even by UN observers and the media. And when, for instance, in the work of the Human Rights Council, the harm to humans and animals from the excessive use of pesticides is reported objectively, the corporate wrongdoers hire investigators to discredit experts who prepared the damning reports.

As part of his presidential campaign in 1988, George H.W. Bush, agreed to use American influence to dissolve the UN Center of Information on Multilateral Corporations, and he delivered. Nothing subsequently has been established. In effect, in the last decade of the Cold War and the first decade of the post-Cold War where neoliberal globalization and the Washington Consensus dominated political consciousness signaling the geopolitical triumph of capitalism as legitimated by adherence to constitutionalism and free elections. It was George W. Bush who in 2002 articulated the prevailing view in the West that market forces plus constitutionalism was the only legitimate form of government in the 21st century and that it was the US that would look after global security by force projection on a global scale. The earlier American national security doctrine as revised by the 9/11 attacks advised China to concentrate on trade, investment, and economic development, and not waste its time or money in challenging US leadership with respect to upholding global security.

The UN reflected this two-phase US led approach to world order, with the first phase dominated by the triumph of neoliberal globalization, and a post-Cold War economistic preoccupation with trade, investment, development, and a unipolar global world economic order. The second phase involved the re-securitization of US foreign policy in purported reaction to the 9/11 attacks, generating a counter-terrorism assault on various countries in the Global South. The Iraq War of 2003, launched by US/UK regime-changing, state-building, and punitive armed intervention in Iraq despite the UN Security Council rejecting an appeal for authorization to use force outside the scope of self-defense, represented a post-Cold War reaffirmation of the previously degraded war prevention role of the UN. Bush, US president at the time, predicted that the UN would become ‘irrelevant’ in war/peace situations if it failed to give its green light to the US/UK Iraq War scenario of aggression, regime change, and long-term occupation. 

The war went ahead without UN authorization, and the Bush prediction has been confirmed by subsequent UN practice. The realities of neoliberal globalization as embodied in the Washington consensus has fallen out of favor as descriptive of capitalist ideology or US leadership, but many destructive features of contemporary capitalist remain, including growing patterns of inequality squeezing the middle classes when it comes to health, education, and family size, ecologically unsustainable energy policies, short-termism, and worker insecurity due to automation and AI. 

Hans von Sponeck: Neoliberalism, capitalism, and de-regulation have their origin in the west. The consensus was reached not in Moscow but in Washington! The impact of their existence has been documented throughout the book as part of the west-centric policy tool kit used to control the current global order.  We support the view that a ‘NIEO’, a new international economic order, following the failure of the Doha round of trade talks, is a pre-condition for more equitable playing fields globally. International financial policies have been determined until recently by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury, with the US$ as the only reserve currency. Even though the IMF and the WB are two UN agencies, they have unfailingly represented western interests, thereby contributing to global distortions disadvantageous to   the rest of the world. We therefore consider the reform of the international financial architecture as one of the prime UN reform issues. We note in this regard that the UN Pact for the Future has referred to the need to ‘strengthen…the representation of developing countries’ in such reformed financial structures.

Daniel Falcone: I’m interested in your subtitle, Realism with Hope. I assume this refers to forms of left realism in certain capacities. Does this phrasing refer to how policy and academia can complement one another? Or, in other words, another challenge for the UN seems to be how it balances its commitments to a top-down NGO institutional framework versus a more focused bottom-up approach of confronting real-life situations without legalistic terminology in guiding discussions and solutions. Is the UN overwhelmed with technocrats at the expense of activists? 

Richard Falk: Your question here raises several complex issues. At least my understanding of the use of ‘realism’ in this context is not concerned with ‘legal realism’ but rather with ‘political realism’ that continues to exert decisive influence over the foreign policy of dominant states. Such realism tends to be dismissive of international law if these constraints clash with strategic national interests involving security concerns, alliance relations, geopolitical ambitions, and internal sovereign rights.

The dominant state in the post-Cold War period has been the US, backstopped by the NATO alliance and the Israeli partnership, with China in the double role of moderating influence and rising rival, and Russia since the Ukraine War as the chief challenge to this structure of global security as managed almost exclusively by and for the Global West.

So far, the UN is mainly preoccupied by the interaction between the geopolitical P3 (of the P5 status SC members) and the rest of its 193 Member States. It has made gestures to include civil society representatives of NGOs in the functional side of its undertakings where advisory and informal guidance may be helpful, especially to least developed and smaller states. To date, the UN has given almost no direct role to populist forms of activism. Its most objective and respected political organ is the International Court of Justice, which in 2024 demonstrated its apolitical, professional character in addressing both the Gaza Genocide and the prolonged unlawfulness of Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories of West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. The ICJ is limited, again as recent proceedings confirm, by its lack of independent enforcement authority or capabilities, and it is totally dependent when it comes to implementation by recourse to the veto-prone Security Council.

The hope expressed in our title is both a recognition of the manifest inadequacy of realism as the foundation for the geopolitical management of global security and relations among the leading states and, furthermore, a growing awareness that alternative structures are possible and not necessarily intrusive when it comes to territorial sovereignty. The UN has limped along on a design that was imposed on the Organization by the winners of World II, which was never entirely appropriate or up to it assigned tasks. Over the 79 years since established, the UN has become less and less reflective of the political landscape. Major shifts have occurred throughout its history, including the collapse of the European colonial empires, the ending of the Cold War, the health, food, and supply chain disruptions associated with the COVID pandemic and its inflationary impact that particularly strained the world’s least developed countries. Related disruptions associated with armed combat also illustrated limits on the capabilities of the UN to help societies in need. The UN has never really been staffed by technocrats or shaped by the goals of activists. It has, especially when it comes to the war/peace agenda, been dealt with by diplomats representing Member States as facilitated by UN civil servants, and if events were of concern to activists, by demonstrations and side events at UN headquarters in New York and Geneva.

Hans von Sponeck: In a paper entitled ‘Liberating the UN to Serve the Global Public Good’, we recommend a ‘rethinking’ of realism as a policy guide for those involved in the process of reforming the UN to become an organisation based on ‘human, and ecologically sensitive realism’ that benefits humanity world-wide. Cooperation between UN policy and academia in this respect would be of benefit for both. I would argue that such cooperation should be based on synergy rather than complementarity. The assumption, of course, is that there is an interest in cooperation in the first place. The UN University in Tokyo and the operational UN of specialized agencies, funds and programmes is a perfect example of inadequate cooperation even though both are devoted to the Charter objectives of peace and progress. In recognition of the value-added for both of such cooperation, the UN reform process must make serious efforts to define concrete steps that create the necessary linkages. UN civil servants – technocrats or activists? There is an oath of office all staff must make. It includes work must be carried out ‘in all loyalty, discretion and conscience…with the interests of the UN only in view’.

This means, at least in theory, that staff at all levels are ‘activists’ in the pursuit of ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’ and ‘for harmonizing…actions in the attainment of these common ends.’ As I participate in debates of the global order, my views and positions are often equated with being a ‘leftist’. My reaction to this classification is that anyone who is working for the UN and has taken Charter principles and purpose seriously, is, by definition, reflecting ‘leftist’ philosophy.

Militarism and Genocide in Gaza: The Bloody Signature of Western Decline

9 Oct

[Prefatory Note: The text of an interview with an independent Turkish journalist, Naman Bakac, published in Turkey on Sept. 26, 2024. Somewhat modified for this online publication.]

1.Almost all fundamental rights and principles are clearly being violated in the Palestinian territories: from the right of Palestinians living in occupied lands to self-determination, to the right of representation, which leads to the murder, imprisonment, and exile of their freely elected representatives; from the right to shelter as tents are deliberately bombed, to the right to food as Palestinians are deliberately left to starve; from sexual abuse of prisoners to torture, and from there to the right to housing as homes are demolished. However, international law and the community have been unable to prevent these violations to date. What legal texts are missing to stop these systematic violations? Which institutions are absent? If legal texts, legal institutions, and decision-making mechanisms cannot resolve this, what other tools and methods should be activated to prevent these systematic violations of rights?

Response: The Palestinian ordeal is not a consequence of the shortage or inadequacy of legal norms or mechanisms for their enforcement. The primarily obstacle to imposing adverse consequences in reaction to gross and transparent Israeli criminality is one of political will, especially on the part of dominant states in the Global West and to a lesser extent on the part of leading Arab neighbors, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Egypt.

It is only countries from the Global South that have been willing to have recourse to the existing international judicial procedures, the ICJ and ICC. The ICJ, the judicial organ of the UN, has a strong reputation for political independence and persuasive interpretation of international law, and its pronouncements are influential, even if they are procedurally cumbersome, often take years from start to finish., lack enforcement capabilities or mandates, and have a mixed record of compliane.

The ICC is a more recent institution, and nor part of the UN System. It does fill a serious gap in the legal coverage accorded to accountability for individuals accussed of committing serious international crimes. The ICC is further weakened by the failure of several leading states to become parrties to the Rome Statute, which is the legal framework governing ICC activities. The ICC also has never achieved legitimacy in the Global South because of its early image of being mainly preoccupied with crimes of leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, which was responsible for its West-centrric reputation. The ICC has seemed reluctant to hold accountable individuals associated with powerful states in the Global West, which include countries in Westernn Europe, North America, and currently Israel. By recommending the issuance of arrrest warrants to three top Israeli leaders (somewhat offset in political messaging by simultaneously making a reccomendation of arrrest warrants for the three top Hamas leaders, the ICC prosecutor made a gesture to challenge geopolitical impunity. So far the ICC sub-chamber that has the sole responsibility to issue arrest warrants has not yet acted. It has give to suspicion that the ICC is stalling in its treatment of these controversial recommenndations, due to reliable reports of pressure by Israel and allies to delay its decision, or better, reject the prosecutor’s recommendation on a variety of contrived grounds centering of the dual grounds of Israel not being a member of the ICC and it would be wrong to appear to criminalize a reasonable Israeli claim of self-defence.

The secondary obstacle is the degree to which World Order continues to be based on a hybrid arrangement of hybrid and contradictory relations of law to power: the majority of states are subject to international law in the area of peace and security, while a few, including the UN P5 (and their strategic friends) occupy a position that allows such governments to privilege strategic interests if these clash with legal obligations in UN settings. This hierrarchy is indirectly acknowledged by the veto power allowing the most dangerous states in 1945 to paralyze UN responses to their criminality and even to that of their friends and allies.

The Western support for Israeli genocide is itself criminal, as complicity is criminalized in the Genocide Convvention, but it is virtually exempt from critical scrutiny at the UN or elsewhere. A domestic court in the US has had been the cite of a judicial action to stop the Gaza Genocide brought by a çivil society organization, Center for Constitutional Rights, relying on a Universal Jurisdiction rationale. It has been so far been blocked in this legal pursuit by a dubious internal doctrine that views US foreign policy initiatives as not subject to adjudication due to a so-called Political Questions doctrine. This doctrine rests on an anachronistic view of the Separation of Powers that views Foreign Policy as belonging exclusively in the Executive Branch of Government, and therefore is not subject to judicial scrutiny. This overlooks the growth of international legal authority as a constraint on national behavior even if conducted as foreign policy.

2.Despite the world witnessing, in an unprecedented way, one of the most brutal massacres in history, with live footage, after Gaza can we still talk about international humanitarian law, international human rights, or the Pax Americana order established after World War II? Doesn’t the “Rule of Law in the Global Village,” the title of one of your books, come to an end after Gaza? Or should the path of reform regarding the United Nations, international law, and world order, as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been advocating for years, be built?

Response: Although the first-order implementation of international humanitarian law, human rights law, annd Pax Americana failed at the governmental and international institutional level, their existence was important in awakening çivil society to the gross injustices and crimes that have been inflicted on the Palestinian people. Changes in the public discourse are important, as well, branding Israel, Israeli leaders, and complicit governments as perpetrators of genocide in a particularly overt and sadistic manner. By such reasoning Israel should be sanctioned for violating the Genocide Convention, its leaders be criminally proscecuted, and complcit governmentss be at least censured. This should make Israel and its supporters leading candidates for çivil society pressure to impose boycotts, to express moral and legal outrage, and to suspend Israel from participation within the framework of legitimate sovereign states until a dynamic of peace and reconciliation takes the place of war and genocide. Israel is guilty of unspeakable crimes and a defiance of respect for the norms of civilized behavior. Such an assessment is not meant to excuse Hamas, and its allies, for its alleged atrocities, although provoked and of a dramatically smaller impact than Israel’s post October 9th behavior.

Civil society is a court of last resort that becomes relevant, as here, when the established processes of law are unavailable, or worse, defied. In this regard, the established of the Gaza Tribunal Project to express opposition to what Israel and the West have done since October 7 and to give voice to the disappointment of citizens of conscience around the world that the normative structure of world order, including the UN, could not protect the vulnerable, essentially innocent and much abused Palestinian civilian population and respond to Palestinian grievances with respect to basic rights.

3.You have written more than 10 books on world order, global order, and international law. You also served for many years as the North America Director of the “World Order Models Project.” In nearly 100 years since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as you put it, “the genocide is a continuation of the Apartheid in Palestine.” What kinds of gaps has the Palestinian genocide exposed in the world order paradigm? What truth has it revealed about the foundation upon which the world order is built? After Gaza, what kind of world order and international legal order do you foresee to prevent humanity from experiencing genocides like Srebrenica, Rwanda, and Gaza again? What is your belief and hope in this regard?

Response: If world order persists in its present form it seems almost inevitable that gruesome repetitions of genocide and other severe atrocities in the future. To transform the structures of authority now entrusted with the management of global security ensures a continuation of behavioral patterns that produce genocide, apartheid, aggression, and are responsible for many economic and ecological crimes will require an unprecedented movement from below by peoples organized through çivil society activism, insisting on a framework of law that has the capacity and will to enforce compliance on the strong as well as the weak. Such a development, admittedly utopian, alone could do away with geopolitics whose defining characteristic is a manageriall approach to global security that treats law and morality as irrelevant when in conflict with strategic interests of the Great Powers, and is by practice as well as theory iss dedicated to geopolitical rivalry that reduces law and morality to the level of propaganda and a policy instrument in the foreign policy toolbox useful to denounce the behavior of adversaries yet irrelevant as a constraint..

As for alll those books. I have been around a rather long time. The world changes and so do I. It is a matter of listening to others and being attenntive to what is happening. In this period of global interactive intensity it is especially important to learn from those who speak from other cultural spaces. Listening does not means abdicating judgment, but it does require making the effort to respond knowledgeably, which does a constant effort to detect and purge the subtle biases of your educational, discursive, and personal background. This is most difficult for we Americans who are trapped between their ‘exceptionalism’ and a dysfunctional militaritst sense of history. We are now living at a time of radical new technological and ecological challlenges that are being addressed, if at all, without taking accoount of long-term thinking, risks, harns, and solutions. We have entered an historical period of unprecedented species hazard, and most national elites are continuing blandly as if ‘business as usual’ was their job description. In some cases, even worse is to acknowledge in rhetoric the dangers that are intensifying, and then acting as if these fundamental challenges do not necessitate profound changes in how we think, feel, and act both individually and collectively.

As for alll those books. I have been around a rather long time. The world changes and so do I. It is a matter of listening to others, especially those who speak from other cultural spaces, and making the effort to respond, which requires learning to address the subtle biases of your own  educational and personal background. I have found this to be most difficult for Americans who are trapped between their claims of ‘exceptionalism’ and a dysfunctional militaritst sense of history. We are now living at a time of radical new technological and ecological challlenges that are being addressed, if at all, without taking accoount of long-term thinking and solutions. This is a time of unprecedented species hazard.    

4.As you know, Palestinian territories before 1967 were occupied by Israel. Regarding the occupied territories, the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, Turkey, the United Nations, and some Islamic countries are advocating for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders and for a two-state solution. Does this mean that the lands that Israel seized before 1967 through terror, violence, and Nakba are being accepted? Doesn’t this imply that the forced displacement of Palestinians before 1967, and the massacres and raids carried out by Jewish militias in Palestinian villages, are either ignored or legitimized? How do you assess the period from 1917 to 1967 in terms of international legal principles, the global legal order, and the founding mission of the United Nations? Moreover, since Israel does not accept the two-state solution, how is it that international law, institutions, and countries continue to accept it?

Response: I share your overall assessment of an exceedingly llimited willingness to redress the historic wrongs initially inflicted on the Palestinian people by way of a pre-Holocaust colonialist move on the part of the UK, known to the world as the Balfour Declarration, which was the source of the two original wrongs embedded in the Zionist Project, culminating in the Holocaust and its aftermath: first, an Orientalist disregard of non-Western societal wellbeing. It took the form of solving the problems in Europe caused by antisemitism and Jewish presence by encroaching on the sovereign rights of a non-consenting Muslim majority resident population in Palestine. And secondly, a Zionist resolve based on a politically self-serving biblical interpretation that created a Jewish entitlement to make Palestinians persecuted and unwanted strangers in their existential homeland. By such a logic the surviving native peoples in almost every part of the world dispossessed of their land and sovereignty rights would have an unassailable right to their indigenous pre-modern forms of sovereignty.

Given this background, the UN played its own part in furthering the Western-centric solution in the years after World War II, by way of proposing ‘partition’ of Palestine in a period dominated by the sense of guilt of the liberal democracies and effective propaganda by the Zionnist Movemennt  as well as superior military training, weaponry, and tactics in the 1948 War. For the post-1945 period, Israel emerged as as an expansionist nuclear-armed ‘settler colonial state’ that existentially rejected the co-existence, partition, compromise solutions as put forth in a biased framework controlled by the US, a most partisan intermediary. Israel for public relations reasons pretended to go along with this global consensus while acting to undermine it by its settlements, coercion, land-grabbing, and oppressive apartheid regime of control after 1967. During this process liberal Zionism, the UN, Western countries withheld criticism of Israel’s transparently defiant behavior, and continued their stubborn ineffectual adherence to the mantle of internationalism by way of the two-state mantra dismissing Palestinian resistance and even gestures of accommodation as forms of ‘terrrorism’ to be rejected in practice, colliding with the hidden Zionist vision of later became known as ‘Greater Israel.’ In the interim Israel became useful to the West. It lent muscle and diplomacy to the Euro-American regional priorities of retaining access to Gulf energy reserves at acceptable prices and resisting the spread of Islamically oriented nationalism.

The Gaza Genocide was the latest chapter in the struggle revealing political alignments in unexpected ways: the unity of the Western liberal democracies in their complicit response to such criminality; the passive response of Israel’s most prominent Arab neighbors, prompted by fear of Israel, hostility to Iran, and the links between governing elites and non-Middle East geopolitical actors, mainly the US. Given the size and extremism of the Israeli settler movement, especially in the West Bank, it seems politically naive and irrelevant to advocate a two-state solution even if it requires a Palestinian willlingnesss to swallow pre-1967 territorial and resource injustices and land-grabbing. Overall, the story of the West in the Middle East is a shameful chapter in the long narrative of Western encroachment on the most basic rights of non-Western peoples.   

5.While reading your book on “Humane Global Governance,” which is still in the idea phase and gives you hope, I couldn’t quite distinguish whether humanity or religion is the central focus of globalization. Despite your claim that globalization and secularism are in crisis, do you believe that religion should be utilized or that a humane globalization should be grounded in religion? Since your book also includes the chapter “Why and to What Extent Religion?” let us ask: Why is religion a dynamic factor in your model?

This question poses one aspect of why prescriptive writing about the geopolitical management of global security and relations among dominant states is so contingent on historical circumstances that evolve over time. In certain times and situations religion seems to have emancipatory potential and in others its theocratic governance and exclusionary policies seems dystopian. The same extremes can be observed in the role of secularity as national and global phenomena, which has given rise to visions of peace and justice but by way of geopolitical ambition and technological innovation has caused widespread conquest, exploitation and corruption in what was widely considered a post-colonial world following a wave of successful anti-colonial struggles. I have written of ‘colonialism after colonialism’ as best capturing the excesses of Western militarism and capitalism in this period between the end of the Cold War and the Gaza Genocide. It raises a new haunting question ‘What comes next for specific nations and for humanity as ideal and reality?’

6.In your book “Globalization and Religion,” you briefly address a very intriguing question as a chapter title. I would like to ask you to elaborate on it. The question in the book, if I may quote directly, is: “Does the Western secular state have a future?” If so, why? If not, why not?

Response: This kind of fundamental question requires a book if I were to attempt a comprehensive assessment. A brief response refers to the anti-democratic and regressive trends toward autocratic governance at home and anti-internationalism in foreign policy. Whereas ecological threats and technological developmentss are posing increasing threats of catastrophic futures, political agendas of leading governmennts are preoccupied with the short-term satisfactions and frustrations of the citizenry in the face of growing inequality and of governing elites in terms of geopoliticall rivalry and a stagnancy or worse for Western middle class life styles and expectations. It amounts to shifting ecological and technological problem-solving to future generations that will only survive if new political agendas are enacted under the influence of strengthened structures of global governance that are neither secular nor theocratic, but normative in a radical values-driven format of global-democacy-to-come. Such a benevolent future would depend on governmental elites renouncing narrow militarized forms of security.    

October 7: A Grim Anniversary

6 Oct

[Prefatory Note: Anadolu Agency RAF text on Oct 7; further reflections] 

October 7: A Grim Anniversary

Israel has long been renowned for its ability to shape public discourse

pertaining to its behavior toward the Palestinians, particularly in the West.

Its greatest triumph is undoubtedly the manner with which it managed the

media treatment of its response to October 7 in North America and Europe. Israel’s response was depicted as purely a matter of defensive security against Palestinian terrorists who staged an unprovoked and barbaric surprise attack by Hamas. This public distortion of the event gave the Western governments the political space needed to justify their closed eyes military, diplomatic, and intelligence support of Israel while genocide daily unfolded in Gaza.

This political manipulation of this incident in the long struggle between Israel and Palestine has several different dimensions. Above all, it absolutizes October 7 to create the false impression that peace and quiet prevailed in Gaza until ruptured by this vicious Hamas attack on Israeli villages and civilians gathered for a dance festival. The actual context from a Palestinian point of view couldn’t have been more different, and more objective.

The entire population of Gaza was living under a repressive occupation since the 1967 War as abetted by a punitive blockade imposed in 2007 that caused a steady and deliberate deterioration in the quality of Gaza civilian life that was already one of hardship, danger, and abuse. It is also worth remembering that Hamas was cajoled by Washington to give up armed struggle and pursue its goals by political means to avoid the stigma of its terrorist listing. In this spirit Hamas took part in the Gaza elections of 2006, which it was expected to lose. When it surprised Israel and the US by its success in these internationally monitored elections the result was not welcomed in Tel Aviv, which used its influence in Washington, to keep Hamas in a terrorist box, and the rest is history culminating in the genocidal assault of the past year.

But the history might have been different. Hamas for its part after its electoral success, reinforced by ousting Fatah from its leadership role in Gaza, resorted to diplomacy, seeking a political compromise with Israel reinforced by a long-term ceasefire of up to 50 years, which Israel refused to consider, much less take seriously. This gave Hamas little choice but to surrender its political rights, above all the right to self-determination, or resume its earlier posture of resistance by the means at its disposal.  

Further, from the first day that the extremist Netanyahu far right coalition took over the governance of Israel at the start of 2023 it proclaimed a ‘new Middle East’ which in a map exhibited by Netanyahu just weeks before October 7 erased Palestine. Even then, its main tactic in Gaza was the 2018 nonviolent ‘right of return’ movement, which Israel met at its borders with lethal violence again narrowing Hamas’ choices to surrender or armed struggle. This was a poignant moment when we take account of the fact that 75% of Gaza’s 2.3 milllion inhabitants were refugees or their descendants of the 1948 Nakba.

This course of development is consistent with the Western management of the October 7 event.  First, the early Israeli news releases that greatly exaggerated the atrocities attributed to Hamas were dutifully spread around the world by political leaders and echoed by a compliant media. But more than this, the complete absence of self-scrutiny involving the obvious lapse of Israeli border security helped shift exclusive responsibility to the attackers. This pattern gave rise to suspicions because of widespread reports of reliable warnings given personally to Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders in the days and months before October 7. In light of this it seems highly improbable that the impending Hamas attack was unknown to Israeli intelligence, likely supplemented by surveillance capabilities that could not have missed the training and rehearsals that almost openly preceded the attack.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that in the background of October 7 was the flagrant official greenlighting of settler violence that became part of the West Bank foreground after the attack. In the last days of August Israel unleashed a devastating Gaza-style military campaign so far focused on the West Bank cities of Jenin and Tulkarm.

When October 7 is contextualized, Israeli motivations for a genocidal response become

more plausible. The Hamas attack provided Israel with a pretext for genocide, and increasingly supported an interpretation of this severe violence as ethnic cleansing that should be understood as a prelude to land-grabbing, which helps us understand that the West Bank was always part of the theater of Israel’s military operation. In this sense, interpreters should take a hard look at October 9 (the day that Israel’s response began) if they want to grasp the significance of October 7. Currently, this exposure of ethnic cleansing realities is obscured by an obsessive Western media focus on the tragic fate of Israeli hostages while the larger scenario of Netanyahu extremism evolves beneath the radar.

All along Israel could not have addressed the Hamas challenge as one of pure terrorism without unwavering US and European support, no matter what the human costs and the reputational damage to Western global leadership. To the extent countered, it has been from Islamic sources, centering on Iran but including Hezbollah and the Houthis as active allies of Hamas. October 7 so perceived activated the larger conflict between the West and political Islam, with the Palestinian squeezed between, and for the last year victimized by the worst genocide since the Holocaust.

Among the many unfortunate consequences of the past year has been to weaken gravely the war and genocide prevention reputations of the UN. By ignoring the near unanimous rulings of the juridically respected International Court of Justice, the West showed its contempt for the authority of international law if it clashed with strategic interests. The contrast between insisting on the sanctity of international law in the Ukraine context and its complicity in the Gaza genocide exhibited both double standards and moral hypocrisy. A positive development, including in the Western countries supporting Israel, has been the civil society pro-Palestinian activism that is challenging the disregard of international law and human decency by the Western governments.

Let us hope that the year ahead brings peace and justice to the Palestinian people, the entire region, and the other 50 armed combat realties around the world. 

ISRAEL/IRAN TENSIONS: PROVOCATION, RETALIATIONS, WIDER WAR OPTION/FEARS

25 Apr

OPTION/DANGERS

[Prefatory Note: Questions posed by Mohammad Ali Haqshenas on

behalf of International Quran News Agency and responses of

Richard Falk, April 19, 2024; this text is slightly modified. The

focus is on the Israeli April I attack on Iran’s Damascus consular, and the

international law implications of Iran’s retaliation against Israeli targets on April 13, followed a week later a by Israel’s second drone attack on a military base not far from Isfahan, which both countries somewhat

downplayed. Israel seemed to have given up the wider war option

at least for the present in response to diplomatic pressures from allies to

deescalate regional tensions. The future remains uncertain, especially,

if Israel goes ahead with the threat of a major military operation in

Rafah].

  1. What do international laws and conventions say when it comes to targeting a country’s diplomatic mission?

The immunity of consular facilities from international attack is one of the most widely respected, useful, uncontroversial commitments of international law since its inception. It was formalized and details specified in the Vienna Convention on Consular Immunity. Even without this Convention Israel would be bound by a similar body of constraints that are considered part of ‘customary international law’ that enjoy the status of ‘jus cogens’ norms, that is, standards of behavior binding on all sovereign states whether or not a treaty exists. When as here a widely ratified treaty does exist, then disputes about obligatory behavior are decides by reference to the treaty, with an optional Protocol conferring compulsory jurisdiction on International Court of Justice to adjudicate. From the above it follows that being a non-party does not relieve a government of a sovereign state from the obligation to comply with the legal framework.

In this instance such arguments are superfluous as both Israel and Iran are parties to the Vienna Convention as are another 180 states.

Although Israel is widely assumed to have launched the attack on the Damascus concular facility located within the larger Iran embassy compound in Syria. In a strange twist the US State Department spokesperson refuses as if April 24 to confirm that targeted facility was indeed a consular facility entitled to immunity from hostile action. It is strange as the build struck has been uniformly assumed to deserve treatment as Iran’s consular facility. The US continues to contend three week after the attack that the location and identity the building in question is still ‘under investigation.’

  • Following the Israeli strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Tehran urged the UN Security Council to condemn the strike but the Council failed to do that due to the US support for Israel. What does this inaction mean when we take into account the responsibilities of the UN to maintain international peace?

Such action in the UNSC by the USA to insulate Israel from its obligation to comply with international law with regard to consular and embassy immunity is a reminder that when it comes to enforcing international law, the UN was designed to be weak, unmistakably intended to allow the P5 in the Security Council to  by giving an unrestricted right of veto to the five countries victorious in World War II. The veto is arguably the UN’s greatest deficiency when it comes to achieving the paramount war prevention goals of the UN. In effect, the 1945 architects of the UN subordinated upholding international law to strategic primacy for these five geopolitical actors in relation to enforcement or even interpretation of relevant legal obligations. Although only five countries are accorded a right of veto in the UN Charter, it has been used, especially by the US to thwart the will of overwhelming majorities among Member governments by being extended to shield ‘friends’ and allies from accountability.

Some years ago the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called critical attention to this situation with the pithy phrase ‘the world is greater than five.’ The world is certainly greater, but regretably the UN is not. There are many situations of this kind concerned with securing compliance with international law by UN members who cannot veto a proposed UN decision but enjoy a sufficient special relationship with one of the five that suffices to block any UN enforcement initiative taken against it. In the 1999 Kosovo War, for instance, NATO avoided seeking authorization from the UNSC because it anticipated a Russian veto.

  • What are the long-term implications for international law if such attacks go unchecked?

The implications for international law are what they have always been in modern times. When the obligations of law clash with the strategic interests of powerful states, geopolitical policies prevail, and the core obligation of the rule of law (treating equals, equally) is ignored. This generalization applies to the pre-UN history of international relations. A good example is the war crimes trials conducted at Nuremberg and Tokyo in 1945 where the crimes of the victors were exempted from legal scrutiny while the crimes of the losers were the subject of indictment, prosecution, and punishment. More concretely, the atomic bombings of Japanese cities and the strategic bombing of German cities were accorded impunity. A double standard highlighted by being described as ‘victors’ justice,’ but an ideological defeat for advocates of law-governed behavior as shaping behavior among sovereign states and in the relation of states to the rights of peoples.

It is a mistake to conclude that international law is useless because of this subordination to geopolitics. For one thing, an effective international legal order is essential to sustain the stability of relations in most areas of interaction among sovereign states. Trade, investment, finance, communications, travel and tourism, diplomacy are among the areas of international life that depend on mutuality of interests and the practice of equality when it comes to enforcement and implementation. Beyond this, ‘responsible statecraft’ by dominant states (‘dominance’ does not necessarily refer to the same political actors that possess veto rights at the UN) can unilaterally exercise restraint in the use of the veto or in pursuing conflictual behavior. Many would insist that the US has weakened the UN by its ‘irresponsible statecraft.’ The extent to which the US has managed relations between the UN and Israel in an excessively indulgent manner, illustrated by its complicity with genocide is illustrative.  Unconditional support for Israel is also as much of a reflection of domestic political considerations in the US and Western Europe as it is of the international conflictual context.

Even when international law is flagrantly violated as it was in the Damascus attack, and Israel is protected against a punitive response at the UN, the impact on world opinion, global solidarity initiatives, and the clarification of legitimacy ensure that international law plays a role in the behavior of states and the outlook of global public opinion. Populist action often influences the policies and behavior of leading geopolitical actors. In the post-1945 anti-colonial wars the weaker side militarily generally prevailed politically, in part because international law and the flow of history seemed to everywhere on their side. Transnational activism in the form of boycotts and sanctions often is vindicated by assessments that the targeted country is violating international law in serious and obvious ways. In short, international law, even if not implemented by the inter-governmental order of states or by the UN, is helpful in mobilizing civil society to take a variety of nonviolent coercive actions. This dynamic contributed to the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa 30 years ago and it is mounting ever stronger pressure on Israel in light of its Gaza genocide, further justified by its defiance of international law.   

  • Iran said it used its legitimate right to self-defense by launching strikes against Israel. What do international laws say about this?

There are several issues present. Does a single attack of this nature, however unlawful, engage the right of self-defense as specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. This Charter definition is linked to “a prior armed attack” as distinct from an act of aggression, but given the paralysis in the UN, it might be deemed reasonable in view of the frequency of past lethal violations of Iran’s sovereign rights and the failure by the UN to take any punitive action, or even a resolution of censure, against Israel’s defiant attitude in shaping national policy in the security domain.

A further international law issue concerns matters of proportionality and discrimination. Estimates vary as to the scale of the Iranian attack involving 170 or more drones, 120 ballistic missiles, and 30 cruise missiles seems both disproportionate and indiscriminate, and yet little damage resulted, and no one killed. As Iran gave some notice of its planned retaliation to the US and other governments, it may have intended, as some commentators have suggested, that its retaliation for Israel’s responsibility in relation to the Damascus attack, to be symbolic and performative, rather than a full-scale attack as suggested by the array of drones and missiles.

To some extent, because of enforceability issues, what a state does in retaliation for such one-off violations of its sovereignty is assessed and judged in relation to precedents reflecting past practice. If deemed to be consistent with such practice it is legitimized and widely viewed as acceptable, whereas if not, it is regarded as unacceptably provocative. Israel has reacted to the Iranian attack of April 13 as an unacceptable provocation, despite its own prior attack causing high-profile Iranian deaths and the paucity of damage inflicted by Iran’s retaliation. Israel is proposing a retaliation to Iran’s retaliation. If Israel has carried out its threat in a way that causes death and destruction in Iran it is almost certain to have escalated the conflict in dangerous ways. When acting in these grey sectors of law, such as is the law governing international retaliation, the criterion of reasonableness offers some guidance to both actor and responder, and affects public discourse and media treatment. Of course, perceptions of reasonableness may vary greatly, and often make assessments based on alignments rather than. the characteristics of behavior.

In my judgment the sequence of events is revealing, a highly provocative attack on Iran’s diplomatic facilities in Syria, killing seven Revolutionary Guards, including a leading general with command responsibility for Iran’s role in Lebanon and Syria, followed by Iran’s ambiguous retaliation that could be viewed as a failure to inflict major damage in Israel or a successful symbolic display of capabilities programmed to avoid substantive damage, and a similarly ambiguous second Israeli retaliation, this time against an Air Base near Isfahan that was not highly provocative. Overall, Netanyahu in the Damascus attack was exploring the wider war option, backed off after the US and other regional and supporting governments insisted upon not elevating the tensions with Iran to overt combat, and possibly a regional war.

  • Some analysts believe that the Israeli regime targeted the consulate to escalate tensions with Iran and use this as a cover to continue its massacre of Palestinians in Gaza. What is your take on this and how can Tel Aviv be held accountable for its crimes in Gaza?

As suggested above, Netanyahu has failed to achieve the goals of Israel’s massively destructive and inhumane response to October 7, seeming to leave his last best option, the widening of the war in ways that make Iran the main antagonist of Western interests in the Middle East. The backgrounding of the Ukraine War in light of the events in Gaza lend plausibility to this kind of ‘politics of deflection.’ Israel is a master of shifting public attention from its crimes to its critics or to quite different objects of concern that better suit its national interests..

Achieving accountability in a legal sense is almost impossible so long as the Global West, especially the US, supports Israel. Any attempt to impose accountability through the UN would almost certainly be blocked by casting a veto in the Security Council, which the US has not been reluctant to do. Accountability in its political dimensions could be achieved if Israel is treated by many governments in the Global South and civil society activism as ‘a pariah state’ as was the experience of apartheid South Africa; solidarity initiatives rooted in civil society activism combined with resistance to apartheid seemed to explain the radical moves of the Pretorria regime, releasing Nelson Mandela from prison and negotiating a peaceful transition to constitutional democracy and racial equality. Accountability in a moral sense is exhibited by public expressions of outrage on the part of peoples the world over as well as by the frustrations caused by unenforceability of ICJ decisions and General Assembly activism in reaction to the unlawfulness of apartheid. 

  • What do you think about the efforts of the ICJ to hold Israel accountable for its genocide in Gaza, especially given that the regime is planning an attack on Rafah where more than 1.5 million displaced have taken refuge?

This question raises complicated issues. The initiative in the ICJ has been greatly important for passing judgment on Israel’s moral and political wrongdoing with respect to the Gaza genocide yet limited in effectiveness as to behavior. The ICJ has been unable to implement the persuasive legal pronouncements of its Interim Orders of January and March instructing Israel to take actions to mitigate further suffering of the Palestinian people while the Court ponders the allegations of genocide. Israel has refused compliance with the Provisional Measures requested in the South African ICJ initiative. Israe backed by the US, and seems poised to go ahead with its threatened attack on grossly overcrowded Rafah, despite expectations of shockingly high casualties.

The ICJ and the UN generally are neutralized by ‘a crisis of implementation.’ In the face of stubborn geopolitical resistance it lacks the mandate, will, and capabilities to enforce international law, let alone promote global justice. If the UN became more robustly endowed, an obvious undertaking would be to form an International Protection Force that would give meaning to the UN Responsibility to Protect norm adopted with much fanfare by the Security Council 20 years ago, and then deceptively invoked a little over a decade ago to justify a regime-changing intervention in Libya. As things presently are, a justifiable coercive and punitive response to genocide in Gaza is unthinkable, which tells us a lot about why so many people are disappointed by or frustrated with the UN, not realizing that it was structurally designed to vest control over international security issues, broadly defined, in the P5, the winners in World War II, and the last stand of a world order based on a dying European colonialism and an ascendant America.

Pursuing Justice Through Law: Edward Said, the Gaza ‘War,’ and Advocacy Jurisprudence

9 Mar

[Prefatory Note The post below is long. The article is devoted to several of my recent central concerns. It was initially published in Global Community:Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, superbly edited by Giuliana Ziccardi (Oxford, 2023). Comments and conversation warmly invited. Adapted from annual Edward W Said Memorial Lecture entitled “The Enduring Legacies of Edward Said,” The American University in Cairo, Nov. 4, 2023]

Pursuing Justice Through Law: Edward Said, the Gaza ‘War,’ and Advocacy Jurisprudence

Richard Falk

Abstract

An exploration of forms of interaction bearing on the assessment of advocacy jurisprudence. This entails underlying reflections on relations between

scholarly identity and public engagement as contextualized by Israel’s military response in Gaza. to the October 7 Hamas attack, featuring a comparison between partisanship in legal inquiry and in the interpretation of literature. It also involves a jurisprudential orientation that presupposes the inevitability of partisanship and favors an explicit acknowledgement rather than pretensions of objectivity, which implies my bias against legalism and its replacement by a disciplined insistence that political and moral contexts be brought into the open. The overall rationale for such an approach is to seek a better alignment between law as practice with justice as the embodiment of humane values exhibiting universal criteria. Although these considerations apply to any legal system, the preoccupation of the article is with conceptions and applications of international law.

Pursuing Justice Through Law: Edward Said, the Gaza ‘War,’ and Advocacy Jurisprudence*

Richard Falk**

Prelude

My career as a teacher and writer on international law has been devoted to realigning law with justice, which involved identifying and deconstructing Orientalist biases that reflected early European tendencies to use law to advance geopolitical interests while simultaneously promoting a llegitimating ideology of civilizational and racial superiority with countries associated with the Global West.[1] Of notable prominence in this regard, was the use of international law to accord legal respectability to European colonialism, including settler colonial offshoots in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Jurists played their part by validating colonial relationships and obscuring the cruelties of colonialist behavior in many settings, including the acceptance of practices and policies now proscribed as ‘genocide’ but were treated neutrally as falling into the domain of conflictual politics, that is, beyond the limits of legal accountability so long as the perpetrators were white Christains and the victoms were persons of color. Only when the victims were ‘European’ as with the Armenians (1915) and later, the Jews, was the idea of criminalizing such behavioral patterns given a name and taken seriously as ‘the crime of crimes.’ Yet the racist/civilizational elements have not been fully eradicated as the political violence in Gaza illustrates where the Palestinian victims are dehumanized and the Israeli perpetrators are given legal cover by speciously inapplicable claims of self-defense.

In the course of seeking concretely to align law with justice I often found greater inspiration and kinship less with my law colleagues in the Global West, with some notable exceptions, and more  with what we now identify as dissenting public intellectuals in such cognate disciplines as cultural studies, history, humanities, and social science. In this personal professional trajectory I found Edward Said’s work and public life to be inspirationally congenial as well as motivated by similar humanistic goals that I loosely associate with justice, an admittedly subjective category that needs to be explicated in concrete circumstances.[2]

There are admittedly unsettling features of such a jurisprudential standpoint. The epistemology underlying such a viewpoint adopts certain juridical points of light while rejecting others and interprets them in context, such as the prohibitions imposed on genocide, apartheid, and ecocide, or the Charter llimitations on the use of force in international relations. In almost every concrete instance there is room for contradictory interpretations of what the law prescribes, suggesting that all assertions of unlawfulness or humanistic claims of justice involve advocacy, either for or against fand seek distance from the artificial clarity insisted upon in mainly prevailing legal traditions that strive for an ideals of objectivity.[3] Those that do government lawyering, perhaps motivated by ideology, ethical conceptions, or notions of stability and balance, are similarly selective in interpreting facts and law so as to ensure that international law conforms to their preferred foreign policy commitments. Law functions in such settings as a source of justification, and the articulation of intellectual support in scholarly or journalistic settings is also premised on advocacy jurisprudence, although typically disguised for the sake of persuasiveness. Such work is performed by what might be called ‘assenting public intellectuals’ who characteristically have access to the most influential media platforms as well are welcomed in the corridors of government. To reverse the slogan of dissenters, it is a matter of ‘power talking truth,’ which perceived by oppositional tendencies in civil society as legal cover for state propaganda.

It is my intention here is to discuss law and geopolitics in the inflamed atmosphere of the ongoing high intensity violence taking place in Gaza, alleged to be a response to the Hamas attack in a series of Israeli border communities on October 7, 2023. Edward Said’s life and work as a Palestinian public intellectual living in America seems highly relevant to gain insight into my underlying objective of achieving a better alignment of law and justice. Justice is here conceived in a first approximation as overcoming the hegemomic, hierarchical, and racializing nature of international law in its historical, cultural, and political roles as validating the civilization behavior and biased of the Global West/ A second approximation by reference to contemporary instruments of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, as well as the Nuremberg Principle and certain provisions of the UN Charter.[4] A third approximation occurs when a judicial tribunal issues a judgment that draws conclusions as to the law on the basis of considering the positions advocated by the contending parties. A fourth approxiximation occurs at levels of enforcement and accountability.  

Without the strong support of Proofessor Giuliana Ziccardi, as the exceptional veteran editor of the Yearbook I would not have had the courage to attempt to link what was originally a lecture on the life and legacy of a great public intellectual in conjunction with my efforts to align law with justice in international public discourse and even more so in the behavior of sovereign states. 

Edward Said’s relevance

It would be insensitive to any remembrance of Edward to frame my reflections on his legacy without also highlighting the uncertain, presently unknowable significance of the extreme gravity of the historic tragedy deeply afflicting the entire, previously long abused civilian population of Gaza explained and now justified by Israel as a response to the Hamas attack of Oct 7th. With each passing day of devastation and atrocity associated with Israel’s military attack, the Hamas provocation, terrible as in its own way it was, it seems increasingly detached from Israel’s extended response. Israel tries to keep the connection to the attack relevant to its disproportionate response by stressing the plight of an estimated 240 or more hostages being held by Hamas, itself a distinct war crime, and by media reports about the deep fissures in Israeli confidence that they were living in a secure atmosphere.[5] Yet as far as public disclosure so far reveals, Israel’s government fails to negotiate a prisoner exchange, and engages in an an unlimited attack that does not seem to offer much of value in exchMy attempt is to reflect on Edward’s amazing legacy while contextualizing these remarks in the current agonizing encounter that are darkening the storm clouds that have long haunted the future of the Palestinian people.

A Few Words on Edward’s Life

When thinking about what aspects of Edward’s varied, vivid personality and wide range of valuable writings I first felt overwhelmed. I took the easy way out by deciding to speak somewhat generally about Edward’s extraordinary legacy that makes his life, ideas, and perspectives more relevant 20 years after his death than when he was alive. Few scholars gain by their publications Edward’s influential intellectual afterlife.

It is difficult to talk about Edward without understanding what he meant to convey in his praise for a dissenting ‘public intellectual.’ Edward’s wished to affirm those for whom their signature trait was truth-telling and bearing witnessing to performative evil, especially embodying the public authority and the power of the modern sovereign state.

In a revealing interview with Tariq Ali not long before Edward’s death he acknowledged some related worries particularly by what he called ‘the commodification’ of public intellectuals in the US, personified by the then media stardom of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, two smart persons who clearly antagonized him by using their screen time to advance an imperial agenda on behalf of their preferred American foreign policy. More generally, Said felt that the think tanks in Washington were stealing the thunder of progressive thought and the high quality of debate that he hoped to engender in university settings and academic writing. It is my sense that that we as citizens are daily exposed to a post-truth public discourse currently deployed, and relied upon, by many world leaders that is far more regressive and alienating than the deteriorating role of public intellectuals that had so concerned Said while he was still alive. Part of what makes this discourse historically now so menacing is that it is rarely challenged by high tech media even in the constitutional democracies that continue to proclaim their political virtues of welcoming debate and tolerating dissent, now best constued as an Orwellian trope that obscures more than it reveals.

It is impossible to consider Edward’s legacy without venturing comments on the experience and contents of his breakthrough book, Orientalism.[6] It was this book that brought Edward fame but also several (mis)readings that bothered him deeply. Edward’s culturally grounded erudite approachto the relations of the West to the Arab world was always nuanced, pointing to the diversities and cultural failings on both sides of the civilizational divide. This made reductive interpretations of such dualisms as speaking of ‘the Orient’ or generalizing about ‘the Orientalist’ deeply misleading. Of course, Edward may have contributed to the confusion by his hostility to Bernard Lewis and his Arabist acolytes’ presentations of the Islamic world. He found such cultural stereotypes well-suited to adoption by imperialists in the post-colonial West as a policy tool, but more because of their policy agenda than their embrace of negative stereotypes about the Arab world and its behavior. There were other scholarly voices in the West whose academic assessments Said found desrving of attention, and often congenial even if containing criticisms of various aspects of Arab behvior. In other words, not all who studied and wrote about the Arab world were guilty of the sins of Orientalism.

Said was most convincing when arguing that the literary works in colonial Europe gave a moral underpinning to colonizing mentalities. These works brilliantly analyzed by Said did, perhaps unwittingly, serve indirectly the dark designs of imperial activists, and still do. It was a major contribution of Orientalism to make many aware of the Orientalizing tendencies of those seeking to exploit the resources and manipulate the strategic outlook of Islamic World elites in the Middle East.

It is such an implicit framing of the Zionist movement of forced displacement and subjugation of the native resident population of Palestine that underpinned Said’s profound critique of Israel’s 1948 celebratory self-righteous narrative. This narrative for Palestinians will be forever memorialized as the nakba, of catastrophe and exclusion that was not only something that happened in 1948 but describes a process that has continued ever since, and is now is in the midst of one of its most traumatizing iterations. It is this Israeli sense of imperial destiny that is currently continuing the gruesome work of justifying forced displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian people living in northern Gaza, an undertaking done with distressing ferocity. The rationalizations emanating from Tel Aviv are situational, but the impact on Palestinian normalcy are similar, reawakening the nightmare of 1948. Yet in Orientalist centers of power of the West what shocks and angers most of the non-Western world as genocide is claimed to be permissible because characterized as a response to ‘terrorism.’[7] By the use of this word alone Israel frees itself from any need to claim it was acting within the law. Supposedly, the T-label confers on Israel a legal entitlement to forego any pretense that its response to the October 7 attack is proportional and properly restricted to military targets. Israel’s hasbara fictionalizes and distorts the realities of what is happening that either disseminates falsehoods or deflects attention from unpleasant truths.

In contrast, the Palestinians, and the Arab street and peoples of the Global Souh spread throughout the world, including many less educated people than the pro-Israeli policymakers in the West are not fooled. They are moved to take spontaneous action by fiery images of huge bombs dropped on crowded refugee camps and on hospitals filled to capacity with wounded or dead infants, children, and severely injured adults. The peoples of the world, including many in the Global West, are smart enough to believe what they see and put aside the propaganda that they hear, becoming enraged by the steady flow of lame excuses for atrocities put forward by apologists and genocidal ideologues in Israel and their powerful allies in the Global West.

As with Orientalism it would be perverse to address Edward’s legacy without revisiting his approach to Israel/Palestine struggle. The special resonance at this time is certainly worse than what Edward’s darkest imaginings anticipated when contemplating what was the future of Palestine and its people twenty years ago.

While Edward was alive, the unresolved conflict involving Palestine increasingly defined his identity as a public intellectual. As well, the sufferings of the Palestinian people caused him great personal anguish. Edward came to possess one of the few keys that if properly turned decades ago might have avoided much of the ensuing misery for both peoples, allowing Jews and Arabs, despite their historic missteps to learn to live together peacefully and justly, rather than engage in what has become a macabre death dance. Edward’s humanistic vision of what should and could have been now seems as remote as the most distant star in the galaxy.

The horrifying events of recent weeks in Gaza account for this less comprehensive treatment of Edward’s legacy, but is not meant to detract from the pertinence of Said’s legacy to the Palestinian fate. These days it would be escapism, indeed denialism, to downplay the preoccupying bloody atrocities occurring in Gaza. In my view, it is not only Palestinians that are the victims. By its recourse to overt genocidal behavior Israel and Zionism have also irreparably tarnished their reputation, and that of Jews generally, overshadowing the prior historic horrifying experiences of victimization endured by the Jewish people and modernizing successes of Israel. Critical observers long have understood that Israel’s gains were achieved at a great human cost. Israel is now putting itself at risk of being perceived the world over as the most disreputable pariah state of our time.

The catastrophic events daily unfolding in Gaza also encourage a departure from standard academic ways of remembering a cherished scholarly friend from a safe aesthetic distance. Previously I might have mentioned a few anecdotes that displayed Edward’s joie de vivre and essentially comic sense of life. He was great fun to be with despite frequently teasing friends and colleagues in challenging ways, especially expecting friends to do better, whether it was on a tennis court or by an engagement with the Palestinian struggle.

It was my good fortune that our lives touched one another at several levels. Such contacts were apart from the convergence of our shared political commitment to a just and sustainable peace between Israel and Palestine, and elsewhere. To begin with, we both had close ties to Princeton University (Edward thrilled my graduate seminar by taking over the class each year for one session, which had its downside as I had to teach those same students the following week). Edward’s political mentors, Eqbal Ahmad and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod were separately my close friends and the four of us formed a kind of braintrust on Palestine/Israel that met periodically in Edward’s Columbia office. Beyond this, we both over-indulged racquet sports pretending that their value in our lives was partly free psychotherapy. In addition, our children became friends. My first secret adolescent crush was inspired by the daughter of my father’s closest friend who mfany years later she married Edward’s PhD advisor at Harvard with whom he became a lifelong friend, with droll side effect of reconnecting me with this lapsed romantic phantasy of my youth.

Of course, there were also fundamental differences in our lives and identities, which seem relevant to the nature of Edward’s particular worldview and ways of ‘being-in-the-world’:

–Edward’s birth in Palestine, childhood in Egypt, and adulthood in America gave him that ‘out of place’ sense of exile that his early memoir made famous, an image which puzzled others who regarded him as a role model of super-success in academic America. Yet as his enticing autobiography makes plain his sense of not fully belonging anywhere, while emotionally confusing for him at times, allowed him to feel somewhat at home everywhere. This hybridity was integral to his envisioning of reality as combining an intense national outlook associated with his ethnicity to a high culture brand of humanist cosmopolitanism.

In contrast, I was spatially exclusively rooted in the American experience from birth, but as I grew to maturity, so much so as to tempt me to say that I was ‘out of place, in place.’ Gradually I became more marginalized almost to a point that could be labeled a form of voluntary ‘inner exile.’ This strange identity became even stranger when combined with a later sense of being a partial expatriate (mainly thanks to my Turkish wife and the time we annually spend together in Turkey);

–To summarize, Edward and I, in our different ways, despite our different life trajectories, were both inside/outsiders, never rejected by our surroundings but neither were we fully accepted or accepting; although ironically Edward increasingly nurtured and clarified his sense of belonging almost exclusively to the torments and dreams of the Palestinian nation, while I continuously diluted my taken-for-granted childhood sense of belonging to the American nation (and even more so to the American nation-state);

–undoubtedly the biggest difference between us was that Edward wrote Orientalism, with its worldwide persisting influence and impact, while I wrote books on international law that few read unless they were forced to do so by the few idiosyncratic progressive law teachers, always an endangered species in corridors of legal studies, at least in white settler colonial societies.

 Israel’s War Against the People of Gaza  

Despite the extreme grimness of the topic, as indicated, there is no responsible way to evade further commenting upon the horrifying Israeli response to the Hamas attack of October 7 as it relates to Edward’s legacy. This response dangerously reinforced by crucial diplomatic cheerleading and funding support by the United States, climaxing so far in the provocative movement of two aircraft carrier groups into the Eastern Mediterranean. Leading EU members along with the UK went out of their way to lend Israel a helping hand. In view of the ongoing genocidal saga in Gaza this is such a deeply disturbing and dangerous set of developments as to shape the present political consciousness of almost everyone. It has become as the bombs continue to fall in Gaza, especially in Middle Eastern venues, to consider anything other than this unfolding multi-dimensional crisis transparently and vividly portrayed day and night on TV, making the events in Gaaz the most globally transparent instance of genocide in all of human history.

I believe this change of emphasis from what I had originally intended is faithful to the personality, character, and commitment of Edward Said. He possessed remarkable gifts of merging analytical mastery with a passionate ethical/political immersion in the historical present. Confronting what is happening in Gaza, and how it illuminates what is wrong with Israel and the Global West would have certainly aroused in Edward the most intense response of outrage, not only directed at the genocidal policies animating Israel’s leaders cruelly carried out a series of massacres against a totally vulnerable and captive civilian population of Gaza. This ordeal is epitomized by the death, maiming, and traumatizing of every child of Gaza, an outcome of the documented bombing of hospitals, medical convoys, refugee camps, schools, UN buildings. This extreme devastation is further aggravated by the official blood curdling Israeli decree issued by Israel’s Minister of Defense a month ago that totally cut off all deliveries of food, electricity, and fuel to the already impoverished Gazan population, a community already heavily burdened by the world’s highest unemployment and poverty rates, a consequence of 16 years of an economy-crippling blockade. If this were not enough, the Israel attack was waged in a manner that accentuated these terrifying conditions, most unacceptably by the impossible forced evacuation ordering 1.1 million Palestinians in the northern half of Gaza Strip to abandon their homes and livelihoods to go South with no place to go, no safe way to get there, and once there with no place to live and no prospect of a job. This was a fiendish mandatory directive that could neither be followed nor ignored, a nightmare in real life beyond even Kafka’s darkest imagining.

I am quite sure that if Edward was addressing an audience anywhere in the world he would also vent his rage at the complicity of the US government and the refusal of the corporate media to fulfill its commitment to approach world news as if truth and reality were truly its mission. What we find in much of the top tier media in the West is a style of news coverage that is generally faithful to the biases of government policy that has been energetically promoting the dissemination of a pro-Israeli narrative throughout the ‘war’ on Gaza. These views are backed by belligerent government spokespersons and think tanks in Washington that continue even now to present the crime of ‘genocide’ as if it is an instance of justifiable ‘self-defense.’ Instead of giving some attention to responsible critics of Israel’s behavior, even realist mainstreamers like John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Anatol Lieven, the most respected TV news channels, such as CNN, repeatedly invite as their guests IDF spokesmen or leaders, and an endless stream of generals and Washington foreign policy experts in the West who tend to dwell on the tactical obstacles facing Israel’s unquestioned alleged mission of destroying Hamas as an organization and killing as many of its leaders as it can find. The commentary rarely complicates the portrayal of Hamas as ‘terrorists’ although it often meaninglessly and disingenuously cautions a defiant Israel to conduct its future operations within the limits set by international law and with due regard to the protection of civilians. This is a ridiculous bit of guidance given the complete failure to criticize Israel’s ongoing reliance day after day on Israel’s lawless tactics and decrees from its leaders that lend unquestioning support to the toxic action of its military forces, seem intent on inflicting devastating damage on the person and property of Gazan civilians with no established link to Hamas, and utterly contemptuous of critical voices.

If we are to gain a measure of objectivity it is necessary to deconstruct the main items of state propaganda that has muddied the waters of understanding Gaza violence throughout the Global West, while as noted not fooling the street protests throughout most of the rest of the world. Five points stand out in this regard:

     –first of all, the reductive presentation of Hamas as a terrorist organization when in fact it is the elected government of an Occupied Territory subject to the 4th Geneva Convention which outlines the obligations of the Occupying Power, with a special emphasis on the duty to protect the civilian population.

     –secondly, the manipulative identification of Hamas as nothing other than October 7 attack, which if it is as it seems to be, is certainly an undertaking, however provoked, fraught with extreme criminality and patent cruelly. The Hamas attack even if as barbaric in its execution as being portrayed, and on the basis of past reportage there is reason to be suspicious of Israeli battlefield justifications, overlooks other facts that more adequately delineate the true identity of Hamas. Hamas after being elected and taking control of the Gaza Strip from a corrupt and passive Fatah leadership associated with the Palestinian Authority has been administering Gaza since 2007 despite it being controlled by Israel as the world’s largest open air prison, its inmates further victimized by a punitive blockade years ago described by Israeli official advisors as explicitly implemented to keep all Gazans on a subsistence diet. Whatever else, Hamas is an elected political actor that since 2006 has been representing the people of Gaza, and as such is entitled to exercise rights of resistance although subject to limits set by international law.[8] Hamas earned legitimacy and Pa;estinian respect as a continuing and leading source of active resistance, something that has at least since Arafat’s death in 2004 eluded the international representation of the Palestinian people by the Palestinian Authority despite its well-known collaborative security relationship with Israel, especially resented in the West Bank in recent years.

It should be appreciated that the commission of a war crime, however heinous does not reduce a political actor to such an isolated act that make its reality reducible to an embodiment of terrorism. If this logic prevailed Israel would have been a terrorist movement from the early days of the Nakba in 1948, and many times over before and since.[9] Extreme crimes of a non-state and state actors were perpetrated by the Zionist movement before 1948, and by Israel subsequently. These documented crimes included ‘collective punishment’ (Article 33, Geneva IV) and ‘apartheid.’[10]

In the midst of the Israeli retaliatory fury the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, tried his best to overcome the good versus evil dualism of Israeli hasbara, as propagated in the West, by telling the assembled governments at the UN that the Hamas Attack, which he joined in strongly condemning, did not occur in a vacuum, which indirectly references Israeli crimes of oppression and Palestinian rights of resistance. For daring to speak truth to power Guterres was pilloried by Israel for suggesting, however mildly and indirectly, that Israel had severely provoked the people and Hamas leadership of Gaza for so long and cruelly that violent acts of resistance were the almost inevitable response, and as such called for self-scrutiny rather than a self-blinding orgy of vengeance. Once more Israel greeted criticism with an angry exaggerated response, demanding the resignation of Guterres and calling this self-evident truth a blood libel against the Jewish people. In this feverish pushback, it fortunately failed in its declared objective, and yet it achieved its most serious intended result of repudiating truth-telling and debate and shifting attention from the message to the messenger. What is remembered is not reminding governments of the context of the Hamas attack, but rather whether the call for the resignation of the Secretary-General was justified or not.

     –thirdly, even those seeking a post-Hamas role for the PLO and PA in Gaza with the status of being the sole continuing international representative of the Palestinian people, acknowledge an unspecified need for what is described as the ‘reconstituting’ of the PA. In coded language relying upon the abused word ‘moderate,’ it seems widely understood by Israel’s supporters as implying zero tolerance for the assertion of internationally certified legal rights of armed resistance and a low-profile advocacy of legal rights of Palestinians including the muting of objections to West Bank settlements and their further expansion. Such restrictions on Palestinian reactions to unlawful Israeli settlement expansion, land grabbing in the West Bank, and settler crimes against the occupied native population being carried out in an atmosphere of impunity and further often facilitated by the greenlighting of Israeli security forces to refrain from offering protection to Palestinians in the face of violent harrassment. Security restrictions imposed on West Bank political activity disappear when it is the Jewish settlers rather than the Palestinian residents that embark on a violent rampage that kills and wounds even those Palestinians who have sullenly adapted to their fate as a permanently oppressed people living according to the whims of an apartheid regime. It is instructive to compare Israel’s middle of the night terrorizing arrests carried out against stone-throwing children or their predatory attacks on Palestinian rituals associated with the harvesting of olives with the forbearance exhibited toward the lethal violence of the Jewish settlers;

     –fourthly, this settler phenomena, itself a direct, defiant, continuous, and massive violation of Article 49(6) of Geneva IV, is the current combat front line of Zionist militants who have long sought sovereign control over the West Bank, and its encouragement is directly subversive of any prospect of a two-strate solution, which despite this, remains the international mantra of advocates of a peaceful solution. One is led to wonder whether this advocacy is a cynical recogniztion of the futility of exerting real pressure on Israel or an example of evasive and naïve wishful thinking. In this sense, as with a skilled magician, some Israeli leaders seem content to have public attention preoccupied with Gaza rather than paying critical attention to the real endgame of Zionist maximalism, which centers on achieving Israeli sovereign control over the West Bank, the only part of ‘the promised land’ yet to be reabsorbed into the Jewish supremist, apartheid state of Israel. While we rightly weep over the acute suffering of the Gazans, we should also be taking a hard look at the simultaneous tolerance, more accurately interpreted as encouragement, by Israel’s leaders of escalating settler lethal violence and ethnic cleansing politics in the West Bank.

As with Gaza, the Israeli settlers are not shy about revealing their goals by way of menacing threats directed at the Palestinians. It went almost unnoticed in the Western media that after a recent violent settler demonstration in the West Bank, leaflets were affixed to Palestinian cars in the neighborhood with a simple chilling message ‘leave or we will kill you;’

     –fifthly, it needs to be stressed that the present unity government in Israel is put before the world as a temporary ‘war’ response to Oct. 7.  It was intended to underscore the war narrative, and the need to overcame earlier sharp divisions among Jews about the nature of the Israeli Jewish state. It seems true that the current unity government reflects a broad ethnic consensus among Israeli Jews that ‘vengeance’ without restraint was justified in response to the Hamas attack, and indeed alleged necessary if Israel was to avoid future attacks. More tangibly this meant for those so believing, finding an alternative to Hamas to administer Gaza in ways that curbed Palestinian militancy, whether from Hamas or other Palestinian groups of which Islamic Jihad is best known but not the only one. Liberal Zionists tend to argue that such a policing approach has almost no chance of succeeding on its own in restoring Israeli security unless tied to a peace proposal. To have any chance it needs to be combined with giving the Palestinian people a collective belief that a fair peace can be peacefully achieved within the framework of a two-state solution. Such an envisioned future presumes that Israel is finally prepared ‘to walk the walk’ of a two-state solution comprising at the very least inclusion of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as the capital of the new Palestinian state, as well of course as Gaza. As of now, such a future is the stuff of dreams, and lacks a grounding in the realities of either Israel or the US to be a viable political project.

I find this moderate option to be a totally dubious day after tomorrow scenario—most of all because the Netanyahu-led government emphatically doesn’t want it, and never has; it has almost been erased in our collective memory that the Netanyahu coalition that took control at the beginning of 2023 was generally described even in Washington as the most extremist government when it came to the Palestinians during the entire history of Israel. If Tel Aviv has its way, and now may have more latitude than in the past to establish ‘Greater Israel’ under the smokescreen of Gaza and geopolitical worries about a wider war further damaging the world economy and destructive of fragile regional stability. I firmly believe that this total rejection of Palestinian territorial grievances and rights under international law is at the core of Israel’s real Peace Plan.[11]

Even in the highly unlikely event that Netanyahu is forced to resign for his responsibility in the Oct 7 intelligence/security failure, and the Netanyahu extremist coalition government collapses, this kind of future for Israel/Palestine seems a non-starter. Over half a million settlers in the West Bank will fight Tel Aviv rather than having their expansionist ambitions thwarted by implementing any kind of agreement that requires a durable and humane accommodation with the Palestinians. At minimum a sustainable peace presupposes a Palestinian governing authority that has credibility with most Palestinians and a freeze on further settlement construction or more radically, arrangements for a coerced settler withdrawal to within Israel’s pre-1967 Israel borders. It would also necessitate an Israeli willingness to dismantle apartheid within its own state and implement rights of return for long languishing Palestinian refugees in neighboring countries. Even mentioning the magnitude of these adjustments suggests that liberal Zionists living around the world in secure diaspora conditions have little insight into Israel’s resolve to complete the Zionist Project on its terms, and to accept a variety of political costs associated with such an ambition.

As of now the most probable morning after tomorrow setting is likely to produce Israeli victory claims in Gaza, Hamas nominally replaced by a secular grouping of moderate secular Gazans Israel thinks it can rely upon, and a continuing Israeli effort to secure sovereign control in the West Bank, which implies further measure of ethnic cleansing and is virtually certain to produce a new cycle of Palestinian resistance. The Palestinian response if faced with such prospects will undoubtedly shape new modes and styles of resistance reinforced by a greatly increased global solidarity movements at the grassroots level of people, with the UN essentially silent, and even Western governments wary of continuing unconditional support of Israel. If resistance is sustained in effective initiatives, and complemented by greatly increased support from the region and world, it might signal moves among Israeli elites of the type that produced the South African transformative response to the growing pressure from internal resistance and external solidarity initiatives to dismantle apartheid and constitute a new government based on inclusive human rights, including a long deferred Palestinian right of self-determination.

The outcomes in Gaza and West Bank, although weakening Israel’s standing regionally and globally may have the perverse effect of stiffening the Israeli willingness to risk everything by mounting a final campaign to erase the Palestinian challenge, and not primarily in Gaza, once and for all, even if this means a consummated genocide. It will be up to the mobilized peoples of the region, of the Islamic state, and of the Global West to rise up sufficiently to prevent the fulfillment of such a scenario. At present, there is no sign of this happening, but if the present onslaught in Gaza continues much longer and is accompanied by rising violence in the West Bank such an outcome cannot be ruled out.

Geopolitical Ramifications of Israel’s Campaign in Gaza

A first line of reflection in reaction to this series of alarming developments, is to step back from the immediacy of Gaza, and to suggest the relevance of the global context within which these events have occurred. Before Oct 7 and after the Feb 24, 2022 Russian attack on Ukraine some thoughtful persons began to be conscious that a contested geopolical transition was underway that could affect drastically the world order that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union. The outcome of such a transition could be something that either mitigated or aggravated the dangers of major warfare that were evident before Oct 7.

In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, there was a burst of enthusiasm in the West, not only for victory over the Soviet Union and what it stood for, but for a more peaceful and prosperous world order. Hopes were invested in a new kind of economistic global setting in which market forces associated with trade and investment would create a benevolent future for the whole world, geopolitical rivalries and militarism would recede, with peace and security anchored in the diplomatic and defensive military capabilities of the United States, given credibility by the war-prone foundation of ‘full-spectrum dominance.’ This sequel to the Cold War, often labeled ‘neoliberal globalization’ was preoccupied with the financialization of the world economy, with government responsibility for the wellbeing of people diminished, while a growing need to meet an ominous ecological challenge caused by the modern carbon-based economy and known to the public by the soothing words ‘climate change,’ a situation best handled by multilateralism, that is, cooperative problem-solving on a global scale.[12]

The real breakdown of this Global West vision came by way of a series of profound order-challenging developments: the spectacular rise of China between 1980 and 2020, the Russian return to the geopolitical stage, and the unresolved conflict between the Islamic world and the West playing out in the Middle East, with oil and Israel being the core issues. In these respects, the Ukraine War and the Gaza War are parallel pivotal developments in these confrontations between the forces of order and those of change that few persons remain reluctant to talk about. Those that champion a  post-colonial reenactment of Western world hegemony as the best attainable framework for peace and security that humanity tend to be advocates of victory over Russian designs in Ukraine,  restraint of China in relation to the future of Taiwan, and wish for Israeli success in overcoming Palestinian resistance the completion of the Zionist Project by way of the formal establishment of Greater Israel.

In effect, this is an argument in favor of a transition to a revival of a world order dominated by the interests, political rhetoric, and economic priorities of the Global West as presided over by a US-led coaltion. The was the case in the aftermath of the other two global transformations of the past century: the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall, each of which coincided with defeats of fascism and communism, rival ideologies with their own conflictual world order agendas.

If considered from this wider perspective, the current Gaza/West Bank ordeal should be viewed as a conflict that is not just about Israel and Palestine. It is a conflict about the stability and structure of the region upon which many countries in the Global West continue to depend in meeting their energy needs. It also showcases Western fears and hostilities toward Islamic pressures whether from migration or anti-Western radical forms of nationalism.

This may help explain why, beyond the influence of Zionism, the U.S. has so blindly and unconditionally thrown its support to Israel despite its aggressive and discrediting behavior that undermines trust in the quality of US world order leadership. Israel has managed so far to retain the visible assurance of Western support no matter what it does to the Palestinian people and however arrogantly it flouts international law and the UN Charter. This reflects its strength as a strategic asset of the West and also its extraordinary influence on the domestic political life of the US and UK.

Looked at from the opposite angle, Hamas struck on Oct 7 not only to remind Tel Aviv and the world that the Palestinians were not going to stand by quietly as their presence was being publicly erased. Erasure is what Netanyahu seemed to boast about when he flashed before the UNGA in September 2023 a map of ‘the new Middle East’ with Palestine erased as a territorial presence in the region. This ethnic erasure was given further concreteness at the muddying of the waters at the G20 in September 9-10, 2023 meeting in Delhi that projected a Middle East corridor from India to the Arab World. Such an undertaking was widely interpeted to assume normalization of relations with Israel and the removal of Palestinian grievances from any relevance to this new policy agenda of the region.

The Middle East role in this transition from the post-Cold War reality has been openly ideologized as a new and latest phase of the West’s historic struggle against a reconstituted ‘axis of evil’ which the French leader, Emmanuel Macron, advocated within the framework of anti-terrorism. He put forward this controversial interpretation of world political trends while on a solidarity October visit to Israel during the attack on Gaza, in effect an anti-Islamic coalition of the willing was so overtly proposed in mid-October. He sought to downplay his openly civilizational initiative as an ‘anti-Hamas coalition,’ claiming resemblances to the anti-Daesh (or ISIS) coalition that emerged as a reaction to the US/UK invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, which included the dismantling of Iraqi armed forces. Macron seemed to magnify the already terrible drama of good and evil playing out in Gaza by referencing the connections with Hezbollah and Houthis, but also Syria, and above all Iran. Perhaps, also, it was Macron’s way of ingratiating himself to his Israeli hosts by deflecting attention away from the terrible happenings in Gaza to a wider conflict in which Israel was managing the conflict zone on behalf of the West.

This recourse to a systemic explanation of the Hamas attack recalls the once fashionable ideas of Samuel Huntington who in 1993 alerted the world to an anticipated post-Cold War reconfiguration of world politics as ‘a clash of civilizations.’ Huntington expressed his doubts that peace would follow the end of the Cold War, believing rather in the emergence of a new cast of adversaries hostile to the Global West.[13] Such a civilizational encounter would reconfigure militarized conflict rather than promoting peace, justice, development, and ecological prudence to form the basis of post-1989 world order. If we step back from the transparent immediacy of horror generated by Israel’s targeting of hospitals, refugee camps, and UNRRA buildings in Gaza, and interpret the wider reaches of this violent drama our picture of what is strategically at stake is considerably enlarged. Taking account of the relevance of Hezbollah, Houthi, Syrian, and above all Iranian solidarity with Gaza, as reinforced by the persisting large protest rallies in the city streets in Islamic countries, and indeed throughout the Global South, Huntington’s expectations of 30 years ago seem to be a prophetic prelude to Macron’s initiative as well as to the 9/11 attacks. Huntington’s words resonate anew as they formerly did when articulated just after the Cold War “[n]ation-states remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts will occur between nationals and groups of different civilizations…The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”[14]

Others have elsewhere observed that the conflict between Western civilization and  Islam has a lineage that goes back 1300 years. Huntington’s ideological ally at the time was none other than Bernard Lewis who introduced an Orientalist twist by demeaning the whole of Islam as “a culture of rage” portraying those of Islamic faith, in Edward Said’s words, as nothing other than “a neurotic sexualized being.”

In a further twist, the Hamas leadership rationalized its attack on Oct 7 as a necessary way of conveying to Israel that the Palestinians were not going to consent to erasure. Further, in an inversion of the Western images of the Arab as responding only to force [see Raphael Patel, The Arab Mind (1973, updated 2007], Hamas argues with apparent plausibility that Israel only responds to force, and that Palestinian were led to mount an attack to awaken Israelis to the resolve of the Palestinians to resist erasure.

These contrary images of this clash of civilizational mentalities serves as an illuminating, if unconscious, backdrop for Israel’s Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, disgusting language describing the battle against Gazans in words that will be long remembered in the annals of genocidal rhetoric: “We are fighting against human animals, and we will act accordingly.” To so overtly dehumanize Palestinians, as well as  its demeaning negation of animals, could make the often insurmountable challenge of establishing genocidal intent easy for prosecutors to meet. Of course, the quoted phrase is further incriminating as its role seemed a public explanation of why food, electricity, and fuel would be totally cut off from any form of transmission to Gaza. All in all Gallant’s notorious decree is fully consonant with Israel’s practices during this past month of violence. It also gains relevance by the failure of Netanyahu or other Israeli officials to modify or in any way soften Gallant’s self-incriminating language. What Galant said is consistent with other statements by Israeli leaders including Netanyahu and by IDF tactics and public rationales confirming such attitudes toward the whole of the Palestinian people.

There is little doubt that the outcome of these two ongoing ‘wars’ will deeply influence the prospects for the stability and acceptance of Western worldwide post-colonial and post-Cold War economic, political, and cultural patterns of hegemony. The hawkish interpretation insightfully, if indirectly, regards the active and undisguised complicity of the Western governments in relation to Gaza as a matter of grand strategy rather than as a testimonial to Zionist influence. This is important to understand, although in light of the rising chorus of moral/legal objections to Israel’s behavior in Gaza, it is rarely publicly acknowledged.

What is new with respect to Samuel Huntington sense of ‘the West against the rest’ was his failure to take note of the Islamic challenge being spearheaded by non-state actors adopting the pre-modern means of combat at their disposal and largely focused on resisting further Western penetration rather than through violence overseas as was the onetime tactic of Al-Qaeda. What 9/11 and later Islamic jihadism added was a religious rationale to resistance and conflict with the West whose identity took largely non-state forms. In effect, the  geopolitically phrased assessments of Huntington acquired a moral fervor.

Instead of waging a geopolitical war to determine global power alignments, the war against Hamas can be, as Macron intimated, also internalized giving a fresh stimulus to European Islamophobia and anti-migrant politics. Even during the Cold War the Russians were never demonized as a people or was their civilization demeaned, partly because they were after all white Christians not ‘human animals.’

A politics of demonization, although used in an inflammatory way by Biden in relation to Ukraine, was confined to the person of Vladimir Putin. The main argument consisted of self-serving legalistic rationalizations for defending Ukraine, while excluding from consideration such contextual issues as prior internal violence against the Russian-oriented minority in the Donbas oblasts along with Kyiv’s repudiation of the Minsk 2014-15 agreements, and NATO’s increased engagement with the country’s security policies after the Maidan Coup in 2015.

There are revealing similarities in the Global West responses to these two violent conflicts that are bound to have transformative influences on the future of peace and security in the world. Those who favor a strong material and diplomatic commitment to Ukraine, as with those showing unconditional support of Israel, become hysterical if provocations of Russian aggression or the pre-history of the Hamas attack are taken seriously into account. This is because a fair appraisal of these two contexts subverts the high ground of moral purity and political justification implicit in the militarist modes of response, as well as rendering ambiguous the presume clarity of the claimed legal right of self-defense in the two instances.

The supposedly humanistic President of Israel,  Isaac Herzog, adopted the good versus evil framework of Netanyahu that refuses to make the slightest concession to the realities witnessed by the peoples of world. Herzog’s entire effort was to draw the sharpest possible distinction between Israel as the agent of a humane future for all and the Palestinians as the exemplification of the worldview of their barbaric adversary. His words featured as a guest opinion piece in the NY Time are an example of the one-eyed crusading civilizing vision that a broad spectrum of Israelis endorse:

Against our will, we in Israel find ourselves at a tipping point for the Middle East and for the world and at the center of what is nothing less than an existential struggle. This is not a battle between Jews and Muslims. And it is not just between Israel and Hamas. It is between those who adhere to norms of humanity and those practicing a barbarism that has no place in the modern world.[15]

It would seem, at this point, that what is being endorsed in the West, is a second coming of the ‘clash of civilizations’ worldview as further embellished by invoking the dualism of good and evil. It is blended with a last-ditch effort to sustain the unipolar geopolitical alignment that emerged after the Cold War amid a world beset by ecological instabilities as never before. Biden made a lame effort to ideologize the latter stages of the post-Cold War atmosphere by describing the current era as an epic global struggle between ‘democracies’ and ‘autocracies,’ but it was largely ignored as the claim was beset by obvious empirical contradictions of inclusion and exclusion.

The outcome in Gaza for Israel also has major implications for the region and world, including possibly inducing a normalizing diplomacy with Iran, and greater respect for the norms of non-intervention in internal societies, especially Muslim majority countries in closer conformity to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. All things considered, the world will be safer and more secure if the politics of self-determination are managed nationally rather than by a US-led NATO directorate. As well, a positive reappraisal of conflict-avoiding invisible geopolitical fault lines such as were the pragmatic contribution of World War II diplomats at Yalta and Potsdam, and their renewal in the present altered circumstances of seeking conflict management.

Some Alternative Futures for Israel/Palestine

Against this geopolitical background, it seems now appropriate to make conjectures about what sort of future will emerge the violence in Gaza and how it might shape the destiny of Palestinians and Israelis, including the roles will be played by regional and global forces.

As the bombs continue to fall and rockets fill the air in Gaza, some reaching Israel, various ideas are being advanced by outsiders about probable and desirable futures. Three future patterns emerge at this from the rubble and the rising death toll:

–the pessimist’s future: Israel despite alienating people throughout the world retains sufficient hard power leverage to win the peace, establishing a Greater Israel that incorporates the West Bank, reconstitutes the governance of Gaza under a Palestinian Authority leadership to serve as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, possibly even looking to recognize a Gaza micro-state as ‘Palestine.’ I think that this outcome would not satisfy internal or international demands for an acceptable Palestinian solution, and would not end or even mitigate the apartheid nature of present Israeli governance or inhibit resistance activities on the Palestinian side;

–utopian envisioning: holding Israel responsible for the criminality of its Gaza campaign, requiring accountability of the main perpetrators for their crimes and imposing reparations for damage done to Palestinians homes and property; acknowledgement by the Israeli President and Prime Minister of the historic wrongs done to the Palestinian people by the Nakba and subsequent abuses, a point stressed by Edward Said and others with the accompanying sentiment ‘There will never be peace until there is such an acknowledgement is made.” Democratic secularism in a unified or co-existing states based on no ethnic nor religious criteria, featuring democratic elections, and human rights. A right of return of all Palestinian refugees and their descendants. Zionism would revert to the Balfour ethnic pledge of a Jewish ‘homeland’ but no state. The fact that something analogous along these lines happened in South Africa suggests that it could happen in Israel/Palestine, but it seems far beyond the reach of practical politics at present, although the Israeli NGO, International Committee Against Housing Demolition (ICAHD) has circulated a roughly comparable proposal in early November 2023;

–stalemate renewed: a return to the status quo preceding the Hamas attacks, with modifications, but apartheid, border control and blockade roughly as before, resistance continues, global solidarity intensifies in ways that gradually shift the balance of forces in a Palestinian.

None of the Oslo hype clouds the present search for final outcomes of the Palestinian struggle to attain its long denied basic rights as a people and nation. Yet for the foreseeable future the outlook for peace remains dark, including in, maybe especially in Israel.

Concluding Remarks

I would like to believe that Edward would have agreed with most of what I have said, although among his many virtues, was that of intellectual independence, which on occasion could be experienced as a certain cantankerousness. It is entirely possible that after Edward listened to these remarks would approach me after these remarks with a scowl and his half ironic, half serious putdown:  ‘Richard, you can’t be serious.’

Despite my intention to be engaged, my words may still have come across as too academic. Yet I must reaffirm that the events of the last month have resulted in the most tormenting emotions that I have ever experienced in reaction to public events. I confess that to some, my rather academic style may seem designed to hide partisanship. To counter such an impression I will conclude by removing any doubt as to where I stand.

I firmly believe that this is a time for persons of conscience to take action as well as to pierce the propaganda manipulating feelings, perceptions, and allegiances

It is past time to confront the double standards and moral hypocrisy of the Global West’

It is also a time to mourn and grieve the terrible human costs endured by the people of Gaza, but also a time to show solidarity with those seeking peace and justice at great risk

And finally, this is a time to repudiate the horrors of warfare and political violence, the disgrace of genocide, and better arrange our lives and organize our collective endeavors on the power of love, courage, struggle, justice, and hope.

Concluding Remarks

As jurist, citizen, and human rights activist, the issues of aligning law in the books with justice in the life of Palestinians has both tested my commitment to a word order in which law and justice become closely aligned. This cannot happen so long as the UN and the management of power and security is left to the priorities of geopolitical actors, at present the US, China, and Russia, particularly if their relations are strained by the emergent struggles particularly evident in relation to Ukraine and Taiwan. The US seeks to retain the unipoarity—that is, the exclusion of other geopolitical aspirants from the managerial roles of global security—in the face of growing challenges not only from Russia and China, but also from the BRICs and a realigned Global South.

The lives of dissenting public intellectuals whether rooted in the scholarship of the humanities, at which Edward Said excelled, or the academic engagements of a social scientist devoted to the alighment of law and justice, the imperatives of values, thought, and action need to be fused and their impact on governmental and UN actors dramatically increased if world order challenges are to have any chance of being addressed in humane and effective ways. In a constructive sense, all legal analysis rests upon disclosed or suppressed what I have characterized as ‘advocaacy jurisprudence.’ Such an assertion builds on the work of legal realism and critical legal studies, and in keeping with the Lasswell/McDougal explicit endorsement of liberal constitutionalism as the guiding principle of constructing legal outcomes, although slightly disguised by their claim of a scientific social science epistemological foundation for their normative preferences.


* Adapted from Edward W Said Memorial Lecture: The Enduring Legacies of Edward Said

The American University in Cairo, Nov. 4, 2023


[1] My jurisprudential orientation accords with and is influenced by Noura Erakat pathbreaking JUSTICE FOR SOME: LAW AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE (2019)

[2] Others I would mention in the ssame spirit are Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg, Cornel West, David Ray Griffin, and from a distance, Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Bertand Russell, Mohatma Gandhi, and Martin Buber. Within my disciplinary orientation of international law, I found the critical work and normative perspectives of TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Llaw) as a compatible complement to the work of jurists in the Global West working toward a similar realignment of law and justice as are dissenting public intellectuals. In this regard I would mention Asli Bali, Noura Erakat, Darryl Lee, Lisa Hajjar, Victor Kattan, and Penny Green as currently active examples in the US/UK setting.

[3] See the influential writings of Hans Kelsen and the many conscious or unconscious Kelsenites. Also relevant is the writing of Max Weber trying to curtail the influence of religion in policy formation and give way to Enlightenment values privileging science. In some attempts to objectify a preferential set of values the issue of subjectivity is shifted but not eliminated. See Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2003) The most notable undertaking of this sort was attempted by the New Haven School of International Law, as principally propounded by Harold Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal at Yale Law School. See their Jurisprudence for a Free Society (1991)

[4] By ‘first approximation’ I want to again emphasize that legal norms are not self-elucidating. Their ambiguity is

somewhat arbitrarily overcome by leaving the authority to finalize the interpretation of norms to judicial bodies.

The dissatisfaction among liberals about the outlook and judgments of the US Supreme court in recent years reveals tensions in the alignment between law and justice. During the Warren Court it was political conservatives that were distressed by what they regarded as misalignment of law and justice. 

[5] There are enough discrepancies between the initial Israeli account of the Hamas attack and what actually happened on Oct 7 to support the appointment of an international commission should be arranged to produce a trusted objective and comprehensive account of what actually happened on that tragically eventful day.

[6] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1978)

[7] No words in political discourse are more manipulated than are ‘genocide’ and ‘terrorism.’ The former

to criminalize dehumanizing behavior, while the later suspends the laws of war be dehumanizing those

that use political violence as an instrument of armed struggle, with more or less justification.

[8] Although indefinite in its contours, international law authrorizes armed resistance to oppressive rule. See UN General Assembly Res. 2625 (1975).This makes the Hamas attack to be a hybrid event, both containing war crimes and a resistance rationale. This rationale points to the failure to find a peaceful solution after more than 75 years.

[9] See Thomas Suarez, How Terrorism Created Modern Israel (2016)

[10] See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the International Crime of Apartheid, 1973; recently documented by Michael Lynk 2021 report to the HRC in his role as SR, Michael Lynk in Richard Falk, John Dugard, Michael Lynk, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE: WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS (2023), 297-312; also the authoritative reports of the UN’s ESCWA, and NGOs Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and B’Tselem.

[11] This reasoning of mine should be compared to the proposals published on October 22, 2023 in Foreign Affairs by the former PA Prime Minister, Fayyad Salam ideas.

[12] For ellaboration see Richard Falk, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE (2001)

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72: 22-49 (1993)

[14] Ibid, Note 13.

[15] The President of Israel: Isaac Herzog, “This Is Not a Battle Just Between Israel and Hamas,” NY Times, Nov. 3, 2023.

Justifying Genocide, A Shameful Transparent Spectacle

21 Nov

[Prefatory Note: A revised version of responses to questions below posed by Mohaddeseh Pakravan o Mehr News Agency, and published in the Tehran Times on Nov. 18, 2023]

1-How do you assess the international developments taking place around the Gaza war? Can the support of the United States and some European countries to the Israeli regime be justified?

There are two broad responses to this question. The first distinguishes between the Global West, including several EU countries, especially the US that are supportive enablers of Israel and the Global South in which there is present on every continent widespread opposition to the genocidal violence of the Israeli response to the October 7 Hamas attack.

The second line of response is to distinguish between the people in the countries supporting Israel and their governments. Even in the United States and Western Europe, street protests and demonstrations, as confirmed by public opinion polls, suggest that the people are calling for, even demanding, a Gaza ceasefire while governments continues to abstain or even continue to endorse Israel’s military operations despite its daily atrocities, although the support for Israel is expressed in a less unqualified way verbally as the Hamas attacks recedes from consciousness and as Palestinian bodies pile up, especially those of infant children.

The Israeli justification for unleashing this tsunami of violence against an entrapped civilian population was initially expressed in the vengeful language of its leaders in response to the Hamas attack. Such an outrageous embrace of violence failed to produce any dissenting comments from official circles in the Global West. Later Israel and supporters put forward somewhat more standard justifications based on its claimed right to defend itself, which seems to imply that Israel is exercising its international law right of self-defense, but the vague language used may be a deliberate attempt to gain greater latitude than is associated with the scope of self-defense under international law. Israel seems to be issuing itself a license for an unlimited recourse to punitive violence which is not permissible under international law. In any event, Israel’s disproportionate, indiscriminate, and grossly excessive violence that is further aggravated by the targeting of such protected sites as hospitals, mosques and churches, crowded refugee camps, UN buildings, and schools throughout Gaza. Such behavior discredits any Israeli defensive security justifications both legally and morally.

There are additional problems with Israel’s onslaught being carried out against the civilian population of Gaza under the glare of journalistic coverage and TV cameras. Because Israel remains the Occupying Power in Gaza it is subject to the legal framework set forth in the 4th Geneva Convention on Belligerent Occupation, and possesses a primary duty that is spelled out in the provisions of the treaty to protect the wellbeing and rights of the occupied population. It has no right of self-defense as the concept is understood in international law, or set forth in the constraining language of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which presupposes a prior sustained armed attack across an international border by a foreign actor, and not just a single incident of the sort caused by  Hamas, an actor internal to Israel’s de facto domain of sovereign authority, although limited by its duties in relation to the administration of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which has been Israel’s responsibility since the end of the 1967 War.

In 2005 for a variety of reasons associated with a pragmatic approach to national interests, Israel implemented a ‘disengagement’ plan in Gaza, which included withdrawing its troops and security forces from occupied Palestinian territories to Israel proper and dismantling the unlawful settlements that had been established in Gaza between 1967 and 2005. Israel contended that these moves of disengagement ended its responsibilities under international humanitarian law as the Occupying Power. This view was rejected by the UN and the weight of assessment by international jurists because Israel retained effective control over the borders, including the entry and exit of persons and traded goods, as well as exerting its authority to impose continuing control of Gaza’s air space and coastal waters, including a highly restrictive blockade since 2007, confining the identity of Hamas to that of ‘terrorists’ despite its success in internationally monitored election in 2006. Israel made no secret of its policy of keeping the population on what governmental officials called ‘a subsistence diet’ as periodically reinforced by major military incursions luridly described by Tel Aviv as ‘mowing the lawn.’ Such genocidal tropes anticipate the behavior and language relied upon in the ongoing all out attack on Gaza.

From 1967 until the present there have been resistance initiatives undertaken by the Palestinians in Gaza, including the Intifada of 1987, the Great March of Return in 2018, and rocket launches that did minimal damage and always were either in response to Israeli provocations or followed by disproportionate Israel air strikes. Even after its disengagement plan was put in operation the people of Gaza were subjected to a variety of serious forms of collective punishment as prohibited by Ariticle 33 of Geneva IV. The overall conditions of Gaza led prominent international observers to describe  Gaza ‘the world’s largest open air prison,’ a damning indictment of Israel’s dereliction of its duties as Occupying Power.

By way of open diplomacy and by concerted recourse to back channel efforts Hamas from the time of its election victory in 2006 put forward a variety of proposals for an extended ceasefire for as long as 50 years, but Israel showed no interest in exploring such a prospect.

During this period UN Special Rapporteurs chosen by the Human Rights Commission in Geneva reported on Israeli violations of human rights, making various policy recommendations that were never carried out due to geopolitical leverage exerted to insulate Israel from legal accountability.

2-Although the Israeli regime is clearly violating international law, international organizations including the United Nations have failed to take a decisive practical measure against Tel Aviv. Why cannot such organizations take serious measures to stop Israeli crimes?

In the last years i=of World War II the founders designed the UN to be weak regarding the management of power and strategic rivalry, giving a veto power in the Security Council to the winners in the war, presumed then to be the most powerful and dangerous countries in the world. This view seemed to reflect accurately power hierarchies as of 1945. In one respect it was confirm by the fact of the first five nuclear powers were the same five countries given this privileged status in the UN System.

Such an arrangement was also expressed by making the General Assembly’s authority expressly limited to making recommendations and specific fact-finding initiatives despite it being the UN political organ most representative of the peoples of the world. It is made clear in numerous provisions of the Charter that the Organization formally defers to the primacy of geopolitics in a large variety of situations that occur within the UN, including the selection of the Secretary-General, the amendment of the Charter and reform of the UN, the enforcement of International Court of Justice decisions, and the implementation of policy recommendations from the various entities comprising the UN System. This means in practice, the UN can only be effective when P5 reach agreement, and paralyzed when disagreement is fundamental as it is with respect to the present unfolding genocide victimizing the Palestinian civilian population of Gaza, and less directly the whole of the Palestinian presence in both the entire occupied territories and Israel itself.

Even if the Security Council reaches an agreement, the UN does not. possess the capabilities to implement its decisions without the voluntary provision of funds and personnel for peacekeeping and humanitarian undertakings, which presupposes the presence of a supportive political will. The UN can be effective, perhaps too effective, if a Security Council resolution as was the case in 2011, which authorized a limited intervention in Libya. The use of force was implemented by NATO capabilities in a manner that greatly exceeded what the Security Council, producing a regime-changing intervention, angering countries that had abstained and undermining trust among the P5, as well as causing chaos in the country that has lasted up to the present. In the Libyan case the UN allowed itself to be geopolitically manipulated by NATO seeking to legitimize its regime-changing mission that violated Libya’s sovereign rights.

 
3- How successful do you see the Zionist-affiliated world stream media in justifying the Israeli regime’s brutal attacks on civilians in Gaza?

The global media, by and large, did provide credibility for the initial phases of the Israeli response. It became harder to do this as the narrative about the Hamas attack of October 7 receded in time and the Israeli attack took on such visibly vicious characteristics of disproportionate violence and genocide, given an explicit transparency by the statements of numerous Israeli leaders including Netanyahu and the Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant. Gallant issued a notorious decree denying the people of Gaza food, fuel, and electricity and comparing the beleaguered Palestinian civilians to ‘human animals’ who deserved to be treated “accordingly”, a dehumanizing language confirming genocidal intent. Such intent was manifest in the repeated attacks on prohibited targets, producing high casualties including among children, sick and disabled Palestinians, health and aid workers, and those sheltering in UN buildings and hospitals. Israel completely abandoned the canons of responsible statecraft and made no effort to uphold the duties of an Occupying Power. Even before this eruption the UN was seeking guidance from the ICJ and a specially constituted Commission of Inquiry as to whether the UN should formally terminate Israel’s status as Occupying Power and call for Israel’s withdrawal to its former borders from the three Palestinian territories occupied since 1967. It should be remembered that an unanimous Security Council Resolution, 242, anticipating a temporary occupation followed by such a withdrawal. Such thinking was shaped by the view that international law prohibited the acquisition of foreign territory by forcible means. It should also be appreciated that Israel was deemed an apartheid by a wide range of respected civil society human rights civil society non-governmental organizations, which is a serious crime that is continuous as embedded in the structure of Israel’s system of oppressive control of the Palestinian people in their distinct circumstances.

4-What Should Muslim leading countries do to stop Israeli crimes?

This is the most important challenge faced by Muslim majority countries since the end of the Cold War. In essence, the governments of Muslim countries should feel obligated to do more than call for a ceasefire, but they should certainly at least do this, and have yet to do. More is needed by way of punitive and substantive action in the form of boycotts and sanctions, censure for genocide to halt and oppose the Israeli war machine. More is also needed as to the future, ideally accountability for Israel, major reconstruction aid and pressure for a just peace that realizes the Palestinian right of self-determination. This is a. moment of truth for the entire world, and it could become a turning point for a better future for humanity, but only if actions taken are done to oppose Israel’s genocidal campaign in a spirit of urgency, sacrifice, sufficiency, and a re-humanizing solidarity. We cannot let ourselves, wherever located, become resigned to a toxic fate for the Palestinians imposed by Israeli criminality. Better to heed the words and slogans of the enraged masses in the streets of cities throughout the world than resign ourselves to the rhetoric of governmental leaders that condemns but stays on the sidelines. Of course, worse than a failure of commitment to take action in opposition to genocide and Palestinian victimization, is the continuing unwillingness of leading Western countries to show concern for acute and massive patterns of victimization except with respect to the hostages seized by Hamas in the course of their attack that combined armed resistance with terrifying criminal acts of violence inflicted on innocent Jewish civilians as well as on Israeli military forces.

From a Western perspective it may be relevant to reconsider the Huntington contention that after the Cold War the West would face a challenge from the Islamic world, what he labeled ‘a clash of civilizations’ along the faultlines where Muslim majority countries are in direct contact with Western states. It is notable that the Hamas allies in Gaza are all Muslim, and the allies of Israel are European or whit settler colonial countries.

GAZA in real time: Geopolitics versus Genocide

31 Oct

[Prefatory Note: A modified version of this interview conducted by Daniel Falcone, with a long introduction was published online in Truthout on October 29, 2023, The situation in Gaza and its increasingly regional implications grow more humanly distressing and politically menacing with each passing day. Israel has succeeded in influencing the Global West and its corporate main media platforms to accept two interpretations of events following the Oct 7 Hamas attack that are at best highly contentious and controversial and, in my understanding, deeply misleading and distorting: (1) that Hamas is nothing other than a group of terrorists engaged in barbaric crimes, and should be addressed in the same manner as ISIS and Al-Qaeda; (2) that it is legitimate in such a conflict to override normal rules of international law, even to the extent of engaging in genocidal means of ethnic cleansing.

In my view it is truer to the realities of its existence and behavior to regard Hamas as a political actor, freely elected and in charge of administering Gaza since 2007 despite an Israeli blockade and a pattern of punitive harassment.

Israel from the perspective of international law remains the Occupying Power in Gaza and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and as such is bound by the 4th Geneva Convention governing Belligerent Occupation. As a result it has extra legal obligations to protect the Occupied People and although entitled to maintain its security by reasonable means. It has no valid basis for claiming  self-defense as if Hamas was a foreign entity.

Israel’s ‘politics of deflection,’ induce its own and world public opinion to overlook the true motivations and goals of Israel in mounting this genocidal response to the Hamas attack. The attack should be further contextualized by reference to the behavior of the extremist Netanyahu government that took over at the beginning of 2023, making issues other than the vengeful retaliation seem more illuminating: Given Israel tactics as articulated by its leaders, especially Netanyahu and Gallant, the behavior is not primarily about countering the Oct 7 attack. In other words it is less about restoring Israeli security than it is devoted to the ethnic cleansing of Gaza. If security was the core concern in the aftermath of October 7, would not Israel have emphasized its all out effort to correct the gaps revealed by the failure of its surveillance capabilities to warn and its military border strength to protect?

Don’t other find it strange that the most obvious, least disruptive Israeli response would have been to restore its own border security with a sense of urgency, negotiating a prisoner exchange for the hostages, and agreeing to a long-term ceasefire with Hamas, which has been proposing for almost a decade? ]

  1. Can you talk about how misinformation and propaganda serves as an extra arm to overall the Israeli military policy?

Israel has long been a master of what is called in Hebrew hasbara, that is the spinning, manipulating, and distorting of public discourse so that it either justifies what Israel is doing or diverts attention from the message of critics and skeptics to the supposedly questionable credibility of the messenger. ‘The weaponizing of anti-Semitism’ is a cynical example of the deployment of hasbara stratagems designed solely to deflect criticism and shift the conversation to persons falsely accused..   Smearing reputable critics and discrediting objective criticism of Israel by giving voice to irresponsible allegations of hatred of Jews that is known by the Zionist apologists to be untrue is reflective of the hasbara mentality. The hasbara mission is to shield Israel from its critics, regardless of whether the criticisms are accurate or not. The quality of hasbara discourse is not evaluated by their truthfulness, but solely by their effectiveness in changing the subject to an attack mode and inflicting a discrediting, undeserved punishment on their target. Such diversionary maneuvers are undertaken whenever substantive arguments in Israel’s defense are weak or non-existent. 

Asa Winstanley has written a powerful book on years of defamatory attacks on political figures or activist citizens who spoke positively about the Palestinian struggle in the UK and advocated that initiatives be taken to put pressure on Israel in influential opinion-forming venues or by way of activism as in the BDS Campaign. Winstanley compiles evidence showing that these tactics were being strongly and materially encouraged by Israeli officials and even subsidized by government money. The book carefully narrates the well-orchestrated campaign to destroy Jeremy Corbyn as a credible political leader of the Labour Party by widely disseminating knowingly false intimations of antisemitism of his part. [Winstanley, Weaponising Anti-Semitism: How the Israel Lobby Brought Down Jeremy Corbyn, (OR Books, 2023)].

Happening to know Jeremy Corbyn I can testify to his absolute acceptance and affirmation of the Jewish people, and his criticisms of Israel are directed at the objectional nature of their apartheid policies and practices, which have been confirmed in elaborate, documented reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International..

The only reasonable conclusion is that hasbara ethos, fully embraced by Israel’s political leaders and pro-Israel lobbying groups around the world is ‘anti-truth,’ and not just ‘post-truth’ in the pre-modern sense of relying on beliefs more than empirical evidence.

Perhaps, as formidable as are these actual attacks on individuals or institutions are the intimidating secondary impacts on the mainstream media and public atmosphere to the effect that any public manifestations of pro-Palestinian views and acts of solidarity will be stigmatized and harmful to individuals in the workplace or social settings. Many persons are made reluctant to take public stands critical of Israel because fearful of Zionist pushbacks. University administrators, at best a timid lot, withhold funds and even discourage the sponsorship of campus events opposed by unscrupulous pro-Zionist groups and individuals, including apolitical cultural gatherings deemed in some sense to be anti-Israeli or pro-Palestinian. It would seem that the motivations for such mounting such hostile pressures is the belief that cultural expression humanizes ‘the enemy’ and renders less tenable the use of the terrorist label to dismiss Palestinian grievances. Wealthy individuals are aware of this sensitivity, and exert donor influence to achieve desired results with an overtness that erodes freedom of expression and rights of dissent in the midst of an ugly political confrontation, which calls for free discussion and a social atmosphere where dissident views are respected..

I have a young relative living in New York City who tells me that even her silence about current events in Gaza is interpreted by her Jewish friends as a covert criticism of Israel, and a colleague in the West who opposes what Israel is doing but keeps his mouth shut because it will harm his business relationships. As much as we in universities complain, we generally do enjoy the benefits of academic freedom not available in the corporate world, and so we have mostly ourselves to blame for not acting as citizens of conscience who express their beliefs rather than keep our true views closeted. Although in academic settings, the last few weeks have seen university administrators run scared, and impose regulations that prohibit shows of support for Palestinian struggle amid some reports of threats against Jewish students. Given the unscrupulous tactics of hasbara practitioners suspicion about the source of such threats, but given what is happening in Gaza it would be irresponsible o ignore them. After 9/11 an atmosphere of Islamophobia existed in the Global West, but it evoked little concern and what may be more relevant, no donor or community pressures.

The principal point is that the distorting impacts of manipulating the news are not just the spontaneous work of Zionist enthusiasts associated with NGOs and Jewish advocacy and lobbying organizations., They follow a deliberate effort by the most influential Israeli think tanks and the highest levels Israeli officialdom to influence, confuse, and if possible, shape public discourse. When in 2001 the International Criminal Court’s decision authorizing investigations of well-grounded Palestinian complaints about Israeli war crimes post-2014 the technical arguments advanced by lawyers on jurisdiction attracted far less public interest than the outburst by Netanyahu that the ICC decision was a display of ‘pure antisemitism.’ Israeli strategic think tanks have long understood that controlling the main arenas of public discourse are as important as battlefield results and military capabilities, including intelligence. As Israel’s regional security have weakened over the years, hasbara has assumed an ever growing strategic importance in the conduct of Israeli foreign policy, which includes obscuring territorial expansionism and intensification of settler violence in the West Bank. This behavior has become more widely appreciated in the one-sided presentations and reactions to the current orgy of violence in Gaza unleashed by Israel after the Hamas attack, especially the defiant rejection of humanitarian claims by Netanyahu and Yoav

Gallant, Minister of Defense. Both rely on false analogies between ISIS and All Qaeda to underpin their claim that their war is similar to that launched by the US after 9/11 against terrorism and for the sake of security or more absurdly, to the US response against the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. All the while ignoring the elephant in the room, that the Hamas attack only occurred because of a barely believable lapse in Israeli security. It would not require a PhD to grasp the fact that Israeli security and reputation would have been dramatically enhanced by so responding, and in the process do something constructive in the face of Palestinian grievances and frustrations. This, of course, was not to be in part because this incredibly violent response, as barbaric, if not more so, than the events of October 7, serves other purposes, above all

Israeli objectives of seizing land and dispossessing people.

Four elements differentiate Israeli hasbara from standard forms of pro-war state propaganda in periods of intense conflict: (1) unscrupulous tactics to discredit views perceived as hostile consisting of lies, defamation, and subsidized campaigns; (2) greater sophistication, including seeking the deflection of criticism by recourse to false allegations and misleading analogies rather than genuine efforts to defend policies under attack; (3) abundant public and private funding of Zionist anti-truth messaging, lobbying, and lawfare to win support and destroy adversaries; (4) an insistence that it is a justification of the Hamas attack to bring up the context of Palestinian long-term and recently acute victimization, which was the sin of Guterres, met with Israelli calls for his resignation.

Only. during the height of the Cold War were criticisms of the American early role in Vietnam met with discrediting responses that such views were tacit endorsements of Communism and disloyal. By and large, efforts to oppose the latter stages of the Vietnam War or to support BDS as part of an anti-apartheid South Africa campaign were opposed by conservatives as impractical or inconsistent with foreign policy priorities, but not giving rise to punitive witch hunts that have been the experience of critics and activists supporting non-violent pro-Palestinian. initiatives. Nor did the governments of South Vietnam or South Africa get seriously involved in shaping the public dialogue within the United States on nearly the scale or style that Israel and its civil society ardent and well-funded Zionist infrastructure have in the main urban sectors of the Jewish global diaspora.

  • For those who rely on local and national news outlets, and for people who just started watching television coverage in recent weeks, how prevalent do you suspect the “both sides are at fault” account for the casual viewer with this war? And where can non-specialists go to find the context and explanations of the ongoing asymmetries with Gaza and Israel?

This is an important observation and question. In my mind to blame ‘both sides’ in contexts of asymmetrical responsibility such as exists between Jews and Palestinians is to consciously and unconsciously divert attention from the essential hierarchical structure of oppression and subjugation, which is the core reality confronting Palestinians. This is especially true for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation since 1967 or even longer in the  refugee camps of neighboring countries,, and to a somewhat lesser extent characterizing the lives of Palestinians living as Israeli citizens within ‘the green line’ since 1948.

Blaming both sides is also a comfort zone for those who are insufficiently informed or uncomfortable about adopting a controversial position. It makes a pretense of accepting the mainstream media orientation, which purports to be objective, proving it by stressing the diversionary argument that both sides are to blame for the failure of the 1993 Oslo Diplomatic Framework to result in Palestinian statehood, the disappointment with the peace process in general, and even the outbreak of violence. For years Israeli leaders and Zionist militants complained that Israel had ‘no partner’ in the diplomatic search for peace, when it was evident that Israel wanted supremacy and expansion

more than it wanted peace and security, The Abraham Accords gave rise to the delusion that they could have both.

I find it to be an insidious line of argument or reasoning if applied to a grossly asymmetric conflict of the sort that has lasted a hundred years in relation to the contested, evolving future of Palestine as a continuous struggle between the indigenous residents and the colonizing immigrants. It has falsely situated the locus of responsibility for a continuation of the prolonged tragic experience of the dispossessed and subjugated Palestinian people as well as facilitating Israel’s continuous settlement expansion, territorial ambitions, and contribution to the creation of conditions that over time have situated the attainment of Palestinian rights and aspirations well beyond horizons of realistic hope. It has been dramatically illustrated in liberal circles addressing the interaction between the Hamas attack and the Israel provocation and response. By characterizing Hamas as ‘terrorists’ with no credibility as representatives of the victimized Palestinian people, and Israel as the democratic government understandably overreacting in its Gaza attack in the spirit of a traumatized victim ‘both sides’ can be blamed, although in this instance in a manner perversely oblivious to the long Palestinian experience of Israeli state terrorism under the umbrella of its international role as Occupying Power.  

To find accounts sensitive to the asymmetries between Israel and Palestine is not a simple matter. There are several authors who have distinguished over time between the two sides in terms of crucial issues. I would recommend the reports of UN Special Rapporteurs for Occupied Palestine, especially the two more recent ones, Francesca Albanese and her predecessor, Michael Lynk. Their illuminating reports can be found on the website of the UN Human Rights Council covering the last seven years. For more reflective perspectives over a longer time period it might be helpful to consult Richard Falk, John Dugard, and Michael Lynk, Protecting Human Rights in Occupied Palestine: Working Through the United Nations (Clarity, 20223). For a crucial depiction of historical background of the asymmetric and hierarchical relationship between the two peoples, I highly recommend the writings of Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (One World  Oxford, 2008); for a fictional depiction of this relationship see the novels of Susan Abulhawa, especially Mornings In Jenin (Bloomsbury USA, 2010).

  • Could you explain the bombing of the Gazan hospital? Norman Finkelstein has cited the overwhelming evidence that points to the Israeli targeting of ambulances. What is your take on the hospital bombing? 

Given the pattern of Israel’s indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing, as well as the targeting of UN buildings, medical facilities, including ambulances, and schools,  it is only natural to assume that the bomb dropped on al-Ahli Hospital was part of an Israeli attack, a perception reinforced by Israel’s consistent reliance on faked evidence in the past to evade atrocity allegations. My inclination is to hold Israel responsible for such a hospital strike as its forced displacement and lack of respect for civilian innocence has pervaded its behavior since the Hamas attack, and created a situation where such incidents happen by accident or design. The issue of intentionality measures the depravity involved, but it does not by itself resolve issues of legal and moral responsibility for specific acts.

As of now there is no definitive account of the facts surrounding the case of the al-Ahli bombing. There are conflicting views, reflecting broader alignments, as to whether the damage was done by an Israeli bomb or a Hamas/Islamic Jihad rocket mishap. In such circumstances, we my never know for sure what caused the lethal explosion but does it really matter. If trains carrying Jews to Nazi death camps collided and killed many of the passengers would it be fruitful to inquire into whether the accident was part of the Holocaust or something else? 

  • What are your thoughts on proportionality as a guideline in war regarding this conflict? How many human rights violations has Israel incurred just in the last week in terms of the overall big picture? What does global opinion suggest about Israel’s actions in the conflict, all done in the name of self-defense?

This is quite a bundle of international law questions. The overarching claim of self-defense is both of questionable relevance to specific charges of war crimes or broad contentions of collective punishment, unconditionally prohibited by the 4th Geneva Convention Governing Belligerent Occupation. But there is a prior question about the legal applicability of ‘self-defense. From the perspective of the UN and international law Gaza (as well as the West  Bank and East Jerusalem) are Occupied Territories subject to the constraints of international humanitarian law. Israel as the Occupying Power is entitled to take reasonable steps to main its security (that can be considered a practical equivalent to the frequent affirmation of ‘Israel right to defend itself’), but Israel has no legally distinct right of self-defense against an administrative actor and political movement operating totally within territory it occupies by international writ, such as Hamas that is not the government of another sovereign state. Its October 7th attack on Israeli territory certainly qualifies as terrorism by its modes of enactment, although as a political undertaking it possessed a hybrid character, as besides the criminality of its action on the ground it was a long provoked act of resistance to Israeli crimes associated with its failure to comply with the provisions of Geneva IV, including the protection of civilians living under occupations and the various prohibitions safeguarding the land and societal rights of an occupied people.

The legal constraint of proportionality and discriminate targeting are universally considered to be valid rules of international customary law but have functioned even in modern times more as admonitions than strictly implemented legal constraints, giving way in combat zones to self-justifying of contentions of military necessity.

Israel’s persistent bombing of residential areas and civilian targets, given the precision of modern weaponry at its disposal, seems to amount to war crimes, and as applied to the densely populated demography of Gaza deserves to be treated as a species of collective punishment, especially in conjunction with the blockade imposed since 2007. In the current phase of violence in Gaza the bombing is reinforced by the forced evacuation order applicable to half the population and by the siege decree cutting the delivery of food, water, fuel, and electricity to the whole of Gaza, a policy widely viewed as ‘genocide,’ The accompanying language used by Yoav Gallant, Israel’s Minister of Defense, in decreeing the siege that described Palestinians as ‘human animals’ that deserve to be treated accordingly certainly strengthens and grounds the accusations of genocide. Leaving aside Gallant’s slurred regressive reference to animals this is a clear instance of genocidal language by a highly placed Israeli official, made more authoritative as reflective of the views of the Israel’s government because such language has been neither qualified or withdrawn.

The Israeli order of ‘forced displacement’ within 24 hours of 1.1 million Gazans from their place of residence in northern Gaza to the southern part of Gaza is itself a most serious and cruel. example of collective punishment and a distinct wrong, constituting a gross crime against humanity aggravated by being implemented while the siege and blockade persists, and the prospect dims of allowing those displaced to return to their homes after the end of the military operation..

  • How aware is Israel of the varied perceptions of conducting this war and how does that factor into their decision making? 

Israel has long been cynical and opportunistic in its approach to international law as has been the United States. Both countries invoke international law and moral outrage when it helps validate their bellicose allegations or justify their own controversial behavior. Israel defies international law, or treats it as irrelevant, when it goes against its policies and practices, and refuses to act in compliance with international law or show respect for UN authority. This lawlessness has been a prominent feature of its administration of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza since the IDF occupied Palestinian territories in 1967, most routinely through the continuous expansion of unlawful settlements and the imposition of multiple form of collective punishment, culminating in apartheid, and now in Gaza with the siege, forced displacement, and systemic bombing of civilians and their places of shelter.

Until now Israel has managed to get away with such behavior mainly because it enjoys the unwavering political support of the United States, EU, and other countries. Israel’s diplomacy has managed through its military prowess and political skill to neutralize hostile action by most of its Arab neighbors, including many countries in the Global South, and shift their security away from Israel due to the common threats attributed to Iran. This normalizing dynamic, which has proceeded by way of pushing Palestinian grievances further and further into the background, has now been disrupted, perhaps forever. If Israel persists with its current policy in Gaza, demonstrations around the world will be enlarged and radicalized, exerting increased pressure on governments to act responssively, particularly in the Middle East, despite risks of a wider war involving Iran growing by the day, with potentially disastrous consequences.

On October 18th Biden delivered a dangerously arrogant speech that overlooked numerous experiences of American frustration and political defeat since the Vietnam War, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya. The speech reaffirmed the global role of the United States as leader of the ‘democratic’ forces of good in the historic battle against ‘autocratic’ forces of terrorist evil, referencing Hamas and Putin. With no show of humility Biden ended his talk with these history-defying words reaffirming ‘American exceptionalism’ at one of its darkest hours : “In moments like these, we have to remind — we have to remember who we are. We are the United States of America. The United States of America. And there is nothing, nothing beyond our capacity, if we do it together.” Indeed, we do have to remember who we really are and realize that when we act together. we may pose to others, and ourselves, the greatest danger the world has ever faced. The U.S. Senate shockingly voted 97-0 last week as the tragedy for the people of Gaza daily unfolds and the House of Representatives voted one-sidedly promising Israel ‘no strings’. diplomatic backing along with assurances that funds for weaponry will be available as needed..

SHAPE Conversation at a time of Crisis

28 Oct

Invites you to

[Prefatory Note: Several of us (Chandra Muzaffar and Joe Camilleri) responding to the global dangers arising from Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the nuclear dangers exposed, as well as spillover harm to the least developed countries, founded SHAPE (Saving Humaniy and Planet Earth to build a community of persons around the world dedicated to peace, justice, and ecological resilience. In view of Israel’s genocidal onslaught on the people of Gaza we are more convinced that the future of humanity depends as never before on the benevolent agency of the peoples of the world.]

SHAPE (Saving Humanity and Planet Earth) INVITES YOU

Tomorrow Sunday 29 October

Many thanks to all who have registered. If you and friends have not yet registered, you still can, but time is short. Registrations close in just over 24 hours. Attached poster gives all relevant details.

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