Final Text of Joint Declaration on International Law & List of Endorsers
(Prefatory Note: with only a voluntary effort the Joint Declaration on International Law in relation to the Gaza Attacks by Israel has elicited an encouraging response from legal experts from around the world, including some of our most distinguished colleagues. Others without formal legal credentials have also indicated their support, and expressed their desire to endorse the Joint Declaration. The original drafting group agreed that formal endorsers should be limited to those with a law background, although we have recorded all others in a second list that will be made public when an appropriate occasion arises. We thank all of you who have contributed to this initiative by indicating support.
As might be expected the dissemination of this text also generated critical reactions from those who argued that we had understated Israel’s rights under international law and understated Hamas’ violations. There were other more vituperative denunciations of such an initiative and its endorsers that expressed anger and hostility toward anyone who dares criticizes Israel, and even encouraged Israel to persist in its military onslaught in Gaza, and do whatever its leaders think necessary.
With this posting we are formally closing the endorsing process, but we will continue to do our best to insist on the relevance of international law to the behavior of Israel and the other parties in this conflict along the lines of the analysis contained in the Joint Declaration. We discourage pro and con comments at this stage, although welcoming substantive discussion and suggestions for further dissemination)
The International Community Must End Israel’s Collective Punishment of the Civilian Population in the Gaza Strip
As international and criminal law scholars, human rights defenders, legal experts and individuals who firmly believe in the rule of law and in the necessity for its respect in times of peace and more so in times of war, we feel the intellectual and moral duty to denounce the grave violations, mystification and disrespect for the most basic principles of the laws of armed conflict and of the fundamental human rights of the entire Palestinian population committed during the ongoing Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip. We also condemn the launch of rockets from the Gaza Strip, as every indiscriminate attack against civilians, regardless of the identity of the perpetrators, is not only illegal under international law but also morally intolerable. However, as also implicitly noted by the UN Human Rights Council in its Resolution of 23 July 2014, the two parties to the conflict cannot be considered equal, and their actions – once again – appear to be of incomparable magnitude.
Once again it is the unarmed civilian population, the ‘protected persons’ under International humanitarian law (IHL), who is in the eye of the storm. Gaza’s civilian population has been victimized in the name of a falsely construed right to self-defence, in the midst of an escalation of violence provoked in the face of the entire international community. The so-called Operation Protective Edge erupted during an ongoing armed conflict, in the context of a prolonged belligerent occupation that commenced in 1967. In the course of this ongoing conflict thousands of Palestinians have been killed and injured in the Gaza Strip during recurrent and ostensible ‘ceasefire’ periods since 2005, after Israel’s unilateral ‘disengagement’ from the Gaza Strip. The deaths caused by Israel’s provocative actions in the Gaza Strip prior to the latest escalation of hostilities must not be ignored as well.
According to UN sources, over the last three weeks, at least 1,373 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed and 8,265, including 2,502 children and 1,626 women, have been injured. Several independent sources indicate that only 15 per cent of the casualties were combatants. Entire families have been murdered. Hospitals, clinics, as well as a rehabilitation centre for disabled persons have been targeted and severely damaged. During one single day, on Sunday 20th July, more than 100 Palestinian civilians were killed in Shuga’iya, a residential neighbourhood of Gaza City. This was one of the bloodiest and most aggressive operations ever conducted by Israel in the Gaza Strip, a form of urban violence constituting a total disrespect of civilian innocence. Sadly, this was followed only a couple of days later by an equally destructive attack on Khuza’a, East of Khan Younis.
Additionally, the offensive has already caused widespread destruction of buildings and infrastructure: according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, over 3,300 houses have been targeted resulting in their destruction or severe damage.
As denounced by the UN Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on the Gaza conflict in the aftermath of Israel’s ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in 2008-2009: “While the Israeli Government has sought to portray its operations as essentially a response to rocket attacks in the exercise of its right to self defence, the Mission considers the plan to have been directed, at least in part, at a different target: The people of Gaza as a whole” (A/HRC/12/48, par. 1883). The same can be said for the current Israeli offensive.
The civilian population in the Gaza Strip is under direct attack and many are forced to leave their homes. What was already a refugee and humanitarian crisis has worsened with a new wave of mass displacement of civilians: the number of IDPs has reached more than 457,000, many of whom have obtained shelter in overcrowded UNRWA schools, which unfortunately are no safe areas as demonstrated by the repeated attacks on the UNRWA school in Beit Hanoun. Everyone in Gaza is traumatized and living in a state of constant terror. This result is intentional, as Israel is again relying on the ‘Dahiya doctrine’, which deliberately has recourse to disproportionate force to inflict suffering on the civilian population in order to achieve political (to exert pressure on the Hamas Government) rather than military goals.
In so doing, Israel is repeatedly and flagrantly violating the law of armed conflict, which establishes that combatants and military objectives may be targeted, i.e. ‘those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.’ Most of the recent heavy bombings in Gaza lack an acceptable military justification and, instead, appear to be designed to terrorize the civilian population. As the ICRC clarifies, deliberately causing terror is unequivocally illegal under customary international law.
In its Advisory Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, the ICJ stated that the principle of distinction, which requires belligerent States to distinguish between civilians and combatants, is one of the “cardinal principles” of international humanitarian law and one of the “intransgressible principles of international customary law”.
The principle of distinction is codified in Articles 48, 51(2) and 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which no reservations have been made. According to Additional Protocol I, “attacks” refer to “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence” (Article 49). Under both customary international law and treaty law, the prohibition on directing attacks against the civilian population or civilian objects is absolute. There is no discretion available to invoke military necessity as a justification.
Contrary to Israel’s claims, mistakes resulting in civilian casualties cannot be justified: in case of doubt as to the nature of the target, the law clearly establishes that an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes (such as schools, houses, places of worship and medical facilities), is presumed as not being used for military purposes. During these past weeks, UN officials and representatives have repeatedly called on Israel to strictly abide by the principle of precaution in carrying out attacks in the Gaza Strip, where risks are greatly aggravated by the very high population density, and maximum restraint must be exercised to avoid civilian casualties. HRW has noted that these rules exist to minimize mistakes and “when such mistakes are repeated, it raises the concern of whether the rules are being disregarded.”
Moreover, even when targeting clear military objectives, Israel consistently violates the principle of proportionality: this is particularly evident with regard to the hundreds of civilian houses destroyed by the Israeli army during the current military operation in Gaza. With the declared intention to target a single member of Hamas, Israeli forces have bombed and destroyed houses although occupied as residencies by dozens of civilians, including women, children, and entire families.
It is inherently illegal under customary international law to intentionally target civilian objects, and the violation of such a fundamental tenet of law can amount to a war crime. Issuing a ‘warning’ – such as Israel’s so-called roof knocking technique, or sending an SMS five minutes before the attack – does not mitigate this: it remains illegal to wilfully attack a civilian home without a demonstration of military necessity as it amounts to a violation of the principle of proportionality. Moreover, not only are these ‘warnings’ generally ineffective, and can even result in further fatalities, they appear to be a pre-fabricated excuse by Israel to portray people who remain in their homes as ‘human shields’.
The indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, the targeting of objectives providing no effective military advantage, and the intentional targeting of civilians and civilian houses have been persistent features of Israel’s long-standing policy of punishing the entire population of the Gaza Strip, which, for over seven years, has been virtually imprisoned by an Israeli imposed closure. Such a regime amounts to a form of collective punishment, which violates the unconditional prohibition set forth in Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and has been internationally condemned for its illegality. However, far from being effectively opposed by international actors, Israel’s illegal policy of absolute closure imposed on the Gaza Strip has relentlessly continued, under the complicit gaze of the international community of States.
***
As affirmed in 2009 by the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict: “Justice and respect for the rule of law are the indispensable basis for peace. The prolonged situation has created a justice crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory that warrants action” (A/HRC/12/48, para. 1958) Indeed: “long-standing impunity has been a key factor in the perpetuation of violence in the region and in the reoccurrence of violations, as well as in the erosion of confidence among Palestinians and many Israelis concerning prospects for justice and a peaceful solution to the conflict”. (A/HRC/12/48, para. 1964)
Therefore,
- We welcome the Resolution adopted on 23 July 2014 by the UN Human Rights Council, in which an independent, international commission of inquiry was established to investigate all violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
- We call upon the United Nations, the Arab League, the European Union, individual States, in particular the United States of America, and the international community in its entirety and with its collective power to take action in the spirit of the utmost urgency to put an end to the escalation of violence against the civilian population of the Gaza Strip, and to activate procedures to hold accountable all those responsible for violations of international law, including political leaders and military commanders. In particular:
- All regional and international actors should support the immediate conclusion of a durable, comprehensive, and mutually agreed ceasefire agreement, which must secure the rapid facilitation and access of humanitarian aid and the opening of borders to and from Gaza;
- All High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions must be urgently and unconditionally called upon to comply with their fundamental obligations, binding at all times, and to act under common Article 1, to take all measures necessary for the suppression of grave breaches, as clearly imposed by Article 146 and Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; these rules are applicable by all interested parties as well;
- Moreover, we denounce the shameful political pressures exerted by several UN Member States and the UN on President Mahmoud Abbas, to discourage recourse to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and we urge the Governmental leaders of Palestine to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICC, by ratifying the ICC treaty and in the interim by resubmitting the declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, in order to investigate and prosecute the serious international crimes committed on the Palestinian territory by all parties to the conflict; and
- The UN Security Council must finally exercise its responsibilities in relation to peace and justice by referring the situation in Palestine to the Prosecutor of the ICC.
***
Please note that institutional affiliations are for identification purposes only.
- John Dugard, Former UN Special Rapporteur on human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
- Richard Falk, Former UN Special Rapporteur on human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
- Alain Pellet, Professor of Public International Law, University Paris Ouest, former Member of the United Nations International Law Commission, France
- Georges Abi-Saab, Emeritus Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Former Judge on the ICTY
- Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Emeritus Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
- Chantal Meloni, Adjunct Professor of International Criminal Law, University of Milan, Italy (Rapporteur)
- Roy Abbott, Consultant in International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, Australia
- Lama Abu-Odeh, Law Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, USA
- Taris Ahmad, Solicitor at Jones Day, London, UK
- Kasim Akbaş, Professor of Law, Anadolu Üniversitesi, Eskişehir,Turkey
- Susan M. Akram, Clinical Professor and supervising attorney, International Human rights Program, Boston University School of Law, USA
- Maria Anagnostaki, PhD candidate, Law School University of Athens, Greece
- Antony Anghie, Professor of Law, University of Utah, USA
- Javier Ansuátegui-Roig, Director, Human Rights Institute Bartolomé de las Casas, Charles III University of Madrid, Spain
- Ayman Atef, LLM Ain Shams University, Egypt
- Ufuk Aydin, Dean, Professor of Law, Anadolu Üniversitesi, Eskişehir,Turkey
- Nizar Ayoub, Director, Al-Marsad, Arab Human Rights Centre in Golan Heights
- Valentina Azarov, Lecturer in Human Rights and International Law, Al Quds Bard College, Palestine
- Ammar Bajboj, Lecturer in Law, University of Damascus, Syria
- Samia Bano, SOAS School of Law, London, UK
- Asli Ü Bali, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, USA
- Jakub Micha³ Baranowski, Phd Candidate, Universita’ degli Studi Roma Tre, Italy
- Frank Barat, Russell Tribunal on Palestine
- Marzia Barbera, Professor of Law, University of Brescia, Italy
- Emma Bell, Coordinator of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control, Université de Savoie, France
- Barbara Giovanna Bello, Post-doc Fellow, University of Milan, Italy
- Brenna Bhandar, Senior lecturer in Law, SOAS School of Law, London, UK
- George Bisharat, Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of Law, USA
- Marta Bitorsoli, LLM, Irish Centre for Human Rights, Trial Clerk ICTY, The Hague, The Netherlands
- Barbara Blok, LLM Candidate, University of Essex, UK
- John Braithwaite, Professor of Criminology, Australian National University, Australia
- Michelle Burgis-Kasthala, lecturer in international law, University of Edinburgh, UK
- Eddie Bruce-Jones, Lecturer in Law, University of London, Birkbeck College, UK
- Sandy Camlann, LLM Candidate, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, France
- Grazia Careccia, Human Rights Advocate, London, UK
- Baris Cayli, Impact Fellow, University of Stirling, UK
- Antonio Cavaliere, Professor of Criminal Law, University Federico II, Naples, Italy
- Kathleen Cavanaugh, Senior Lecturer, Irish Center for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland
- Elizabeth Chadwick, Reader in International Law, Nottingham, UK
- Donna R. Cline, Attorney at Law, USA
- Karen Corteen, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, University of Chester, UK
- Andrew Dahdal, Lecturer, Faculty of Business and Economics, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
- Teresa Dagenhardt, Reader in Criminology, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland
- Luigi Daniele, PhD candidate in Law, Italy
- Alessandro De Giorgi, Professor of Justice Studies, San Josè State University, USA
- Cristina de la Serna-Sandoval, lawyer and human rights consultant, Spain
- Javier De Lucas, Professor of Law, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Paul de Waart, Professor Emeritus of International Law, VU University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Gabriele della Morte, Senior Lecturer in International Law, University Cattolica, Milan, Italy
- Max du Plessis, Professor of Law, University of Kwazulu-Natal, and Barrister, South Africa and London, UK
- Isabel Düsterhöft, LL.M., Utrecht, M.A. Hamburg, Germany
- Noura Erakat, Georgetown University, USA
- Mohammad Fadel, Associate Professor of Law, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, Canada
- Mireille Fanon-Mendés France, Independent Expert UNO, Frantz Fanon Foundation, France
- Michelle Farrell, lecturer in law, School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool, UK
- Daniel Feierstein, Professor and President International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), Argentina
- Eleonor Fernández Muñoz, Costa Rica
- Tenny Fernando, Attorney at Law, Sri Lanka
- Amelia Festa, LLM Candidate, University of Naples Federico II, Italy
- Katherine Franke, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, USA
- Jacques Gaillot, Bishop in partibus of Partenia
- Katherine Gallagher, Vice President FIDH, senior attorney, Centre for Constitutional Rights (CCR), New York, USA
- Avo Sevag Garabet, LLM, University of Groningen, the Netherlands
- Jose Garcia Anon, Professor of Law, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain
- Cristina Garcia-Pascual, Professor of Law, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Jose Antonio García-Saez, International Law Researcher, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Andrés Gascón-Cuenca, PhD candidate, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Irene Gasparini, PhD candidate, Universitá Cattolica, Milan, Italy
- Stratos Georgoulas, Assistant Professor, University of the Aegean, Greece
- Haluk Gerger, Professor, Turkey
- Hedda Giersten, Professor, Universitet I Oslo, Norway
- Javier Giraldo, Director Banco de Datos CINEP, Colombia
- Carmen G. Gonzales, Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, USA
- Penny Green, Professor of Law and Criminology, Director of the State Crime Initiative, King’s College London, UK
- Katy Hayward, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland
- Andrew Henley, PhD candidate, Keele University, UK
- Christiane Hessel, Paris, France
- Paddy Hillyard, Professor Emeritus, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland
- Ata Hindi, Institute of Law, Birzeit University, Palestine
- Francois Houtart, Professor, National Institute of Higher Studies, Quito, Ecuador
- Deena R. Hurwitz, Professor, General Faculty, Director International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of Virginia School of Law, USA
- Perfecto Andrés Ibánes, Magistrado Tribunal Supremo de Espagna, Spain
- Franco Ippolito, President of the Permanent People’s Tribunal, Italy
- Ruth Jamieson, Honorary Lecturer, School of Law, Queen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland
- Helen Jarvis, former member Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), member of IAGS, Cambodia
- Ioannis Kalpouzos, Lecturer in Law, City Law School, London, UK
- Victor Kattan, post-doctoral fellow, Law Faculty, National University of Singapore
- Michael Kearney, PhD, Lecturer in Law, University of Sussex, UK
- Yousuf Syed Khan, USA
- Tarik Kochi, Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex, UK
- Anna Koppel, MSt Candidate in International Human Rights Law, University of Oxford, UK
- Azra Kuci, legal advisor TRIAL (track impunity always), Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Karim Lahidji, President of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and lawyer
- Giulia Lanza, PhD Candidate, Università degli Studi di Verona, Italy
- Massimo La Torre, Professor of Law, University of Hull (UK), Catanzaro University (Italy)
- Daniel Machover, solicitor, Hickman & Rose, London, UK
- Tayyab Mahmud, Professor of Law, Director of the Centre for Global Justice, Seattle University School of Law, USA
- Maria C. LaHood, Senior Staff Attorney, CCR, New York, USA
- Louise Mallinder, Reader in Human Rights and International Law, University of Ulster, UK
- Triestino Mariniello, Lecturer in International Criminal Law, Edge Hill University, UK
- Mazen Masri, Lecturer in Law, The City Law School, City University, London, UK
- Siobhan McAlister, School of Sociology, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland
- Liam McCann, Principal Lecturer in Criminology, University of Lincoln, UK
- Jude McCulloch, Professor of Criminology, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
- David McQuoid-Mason, Director, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
- Yvonne McDermott Rees, Lecturer in Law, University of Bangor, UK
- Cahal McLaughlin, Professor, School of Creative Arts, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland
- Araks Melkonyan, LLM Candidate, University of Essex, UK
- Antonio Menna, PhD Candidate, Second University of Naples, Caserta, Italy
- Naomi Mezey, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, USA
- Michele Miravalle, PhD candidate, University of Torino, Italy
- Sergio Moccia, Professor of Criminal Law, University Federico II, Naples, Italy
- Kerry Moore, Lecturer, Cardiff University
- Giuseppe Mosconi, Professor of Sociology, University of Padova, Italy
- Usha Natarajan, Assistant Professor, Department of Law & Centre for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo, Egypt
- Miren Odriozola Gurrutxaga, PhD Candidate, University of the Basque Country, Donostia – San Sebastián, Spain
- Georgios Papanicolaou, Reader in Criminology, Teesside University, UK
- Marco Pertile, Senior Lecturer in International Law,
Faculty of Law, University of Trento, Italy - Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Professor of Law and Theory, LLM, The Westminster Law and Theory Centre, UK
- Carli Pierson, Attorney at Law, USA
- Antoni Pigrau Solé, Universitat Rovira i Virgili de Tarragona, Spain
- Joseph Powderly, Assistant Professor of Public International Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands
- Tony Platt, Visiting Professor of Justice Studies, San Jose State University, USA
- Scott Poynting, Professor in Criminology, University of Auckland, New Zeeland
- Chris Powell, Professor of Criminology, University S.Maine, USA
- Bill Quigley, Professor, Loyola University, New Orleans College of Law, USA
- John Quigley, Professor of Law, Ohio State University
- Zouhair Racheha, PhD Candidate, University Jean Moulin Lyon 3, France
- Laura Raymond, International Human Rights Advocacy Program Manager, CCR, New York, USA
- Véronique Rocheleau-Brosseau, LLM candidate, Laval University, Canada
- David Rodríguez Goyes, Lecturer, Antonio Nariño and Santo Tomás Universities, Colombia
- Alessandro Rosanò, PhD Candidate, Università degli Studi di Padova, Italy
- Jamil Salem, Director Institute of Law, Birzeit University, Palestine
- Mahmood Salimi, LLM Candidate, Moofid University, Iran
- Nahed Samour, doctoral fellow, Humboldt University, Faculty of Law, Berlin, Germany
- Iain GM Scobbie, Professor of Public International Law, University of Manchester, UK
- David Scott, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Liverpool John Moores University, UK
- Phil Scraton, Professor of Criminology, Belfast, Ireland
- Rachel Seoighe, PhD Candidate, Legal Consultant, King’s College London, UK
- Tanya Serisier, School of Sociology, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland
- Mohammad Shahabuddin, PdD, Visiting researcher, Graduate School of International Social Sciences, Yokohama National University, Japan
- Angeles Solanes-Corella, Professor of Law, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Dean Spade, Seattle University School of Law, USA
- Per Stadig, lawyer, Sweden
- Chantal Thomas, Professor of Law, Cornell University, USA
- Kendall Thomas, Nash Professor of Law, Columbia University, USA
- Gianni Tognoni, Lelio Basso Foundation, Rome, Italy
- Steve Tombs, Professor of Criminology, The Open University, UK
- Paul Troop, Barrister, Garden Court Chambers, UK
- Valeria Verdolini, Reader in Sociology, University of Milan, Italy
- Francesca Vianello, University of Padova, Italy
- Lydia Vicente-Márquez, Executive Director, Rights International Spain
- Aimilia Voulvouli, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Fatih University, Turkey
- Namita Wahi, Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi, India
- Sharon Weill, PhD, Science Po, Paris/ CERAH, Geneva, Switzerland
- Peter Weiss, Vice President of Centre for Constitutional Rights (CCR), New York, USA
- David Whyte, Reader in Sociology, University of Liverpool, UK
- Jeanne M. Woods, Henry F. Bonura, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola University College of Law, New Orleans, USA
- William Thomas Worster, Lecturer, International Law, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, The Netherlands
- Maung Zarni, Judge, PPT on Sri Lanka and Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science
After July 28th
- Lindsay Adams, Barrister, London, U.K
- Kasim Akbaş, Professor of Law, Anadolu Üniversitesi, Eskişehir,Turkey
- Nidal al-Azza, lecturer in Refugee Law, Al-Quds University, Director of Badil Resource Center for Residency and Refugee Rights, Palestine
- Reem Al-Botmeh, Institute of Law, Birzeit University, Palestine
- Rouba Al-Salem, PhD candidate, faculty of Law, Montreal University, Canada
- Koorosh Ameli, Former Judge, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, Netherlands
- Rinad Abdulla, Lecturer in Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, Birzeit University, Palestin Claims Tribunal
- Mojgan Amrollahi Biuki, Human Rights Lawyer in Tehran, PhD candidate, Freiburg University, Freiburg i.Br., Germany
- Alessandra Annoni, Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Catanzaro, Italy
- Javier Ansuátegui-Roig, Director, Human Rights Institute Bartolomé de las Casas, Charles III University of Madrid, Spain
- Alicia Araujo Mendonca, Lawyer, London, UK
- Maria Aristodemou, School of Law, Birkbeck College, USA
- Huwaida Arraf, Attorney and Human Rights Advocate, New York, USA
- Ayman Atef, LLM Ain Shams University, Egypt
- Ufuk Aydin, Dean, Professor of Law, Anadolu Üniversitesi, Eskişehir,Turkey
- Irene Baghoomians, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, Australia
- Ajamu Baraka, human rights activist and former director of the U.S. Human
- Marzia Barbera, Professor of Law, University of Brescia, Italy, Rights Network (USHRN), USA
- Faisal Bhabha, Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University Toronto, Ontario, Canada
- Onder Bakircioglu, Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland
- Alonso Barros, PhD, Attorney at Law, Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights Advocate, Chile
- Asmaa Bassouri, PhD Candidate, Cadi Ayyad University, Marrakech, Morocco
- Jinan Bastaki, Law PhD candidate, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, UK
- Paolo Bertoli, Professor of International Law, University of Insubria, Como-Varese, Italy
- Marta Bitorsoli, LLM, Irish Centre for Human Rights, Trial Clerk ICTY, The Hague, The Netherlands
- Tessa Boeykens, Legal Researcher in Transitional Justice, Ghent University, Belgium
- Audrey Bomse, Co-Chair, National Lawyers Guild Palestine Subcommittee, USA
- Giorgio Bonamassa, Lawyer, Legal Team Italia, Lawyer
- Marco Borraccetti, senior Lecturer in European Union Law, Alma Mater Studiorum-University of Bologna, Italy
- Fatma Bouraoui, Lawyer, Tunisia
- Bill Bowring, Barrister, Professor, Director of the LLM/MA in Human Rights, School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
- John Burroughs, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York City, USA
- Valentina Cadelo, Researcher, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland
- Andrea Caligiuri, Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Macerata, Italy
- Alejandra Castillo Ara, Lawyer, PhD Candidate, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg i.Br., Germany
- Giovanni Cellamare, Professore of International Law, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bari, Italy
- Emanuele Cimiotta, Assistant Professor of International Law, Law Faculty, University La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
- Maivan Clech Lam, Professor Emerita, City University of New York Graduate Center, USA
- Ziyad Clot, Lawyer, University of Paris II Assas and Sciences Po Paris, France
- Marjorie Cohn, Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law and former president, National Lawyers Guild, USA
- Nicola Colacino, Associate Professor of International Law, University Niccolò Cusano, Rome, Italy
- Judith Cole, Adjunct Professor of International Law, International University in Geneva (IUG), Geneva, Switzerland
- Luigi Condorelli, Professor of International Law, University of Florence, Honorary Professor, University of Geneva, Switzerland/Italy
- Aoife Corcoran, Human Rights Researcher, (UCL Human Rights graduate), London, United Kingdom
- Francesco Costamagna, Assistant Professor of EU Law, University of Turin, Italy
- Jamil Dakwar, International Human Rights Lawyer, New York, USA
- Fredrik Danelius, LLM, former lecturer in international law, Lund University, Sweden, Oslo University, Norway, former editor-in-chief of Nordic Journal of International Law
- Shane Darcy, lecturer, Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway, Northern Ireland
- Nasrin Dashty, Barrister, Associate Special Assistant, ICC, The Hague, The Netherlands
- Birju M. Dattani, Barrister and PhD Student in International Law, SOAS University of London, UK
- Gail Davidson, Director, Lawyers against the War, USA
- Mark de Barros, Lecturer in Law, Université Paris II Panthéon, Assas/Attorney at Law, New York Bar, France/USA
- Emanuele De Franco, Lecturer in Criminal Law, University Federico II, Solicitor, Naples, Italy
- Javier De Lucas, Professor of Law, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Fanny Declercq, LLM, Leiden University, The Hague, The Netherlands
- Géraud de La Pradelle, Emeritus Professor International Law, France
- Adele Del Guercio, Researcher in International Law, University L’Orientale, Naples, Italy
- Cristina de la Serna-Sandoval, lawyer and human rights consultant, Spain
- Francesca De Vittor, Researcher in International Law, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy
- Saverio Di Benedetto, Senior Lecturer of International Law, Università del Salento, Italy
- Mahmoud Dodeen, Lawyer and Professor of Law, Birzeit University, Palestine
- Linn Döring, Lawyer, PhD Candidate, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany
- Pierre-Emmanuel Dupont, Member of the Hague Center for Law and Arbitration, Senior Lecturer at the Free Faculty of Law, Economics and Management, Paris, France
- Isabel Düsterhöft, LL.M., Utrecht, M.A. Hamburg, Germany
- Penelope Ehrhardt, MSt in International Human Rights Law Candidate, University of Oxford, UK
- Lena El-Malak, PhD in Public International Law SOAS, Legal Counsel, UAE
- Ali Ercan, Researcher and Intern at the OIC Mission to the United Nations, New York, USA
- Siavash Eshghi, PhD candidate, SOAS University, London, UK
- Marco Fasciglione, Researcher in International Law, International Institute for Legal Studies, Naples, Italian National Research Council, Italy
- Matteo Fornari, Researcher in International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Milan-Bicocca, Italy
- Francisco Forrest Martin, Former Ariel F. Sallows Professor of Human Rights, University of Saskatchewan, College of Law, Canada
- Fabrizio Forte, PhD Candidate, University Federico II, Solicitor, Naples, Italy
- Micaela Frulli, Associate Professor of International Law, University of Florence, Italy
- Domenico Gallo, Judge, Italian Supreme Court, Rome, Italy
- Cristina Garcia-Pascual, Professor of Law, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Jose Antonio García-Saez, International Law Researcher, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Andrés Gascón-Cuenca, PhD candidate, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain.
- Francesco M. Genovesi, Attorney at Law, Milan, Italy
- Andrea Giardina, Emeritus Professor of International Law, University La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
- Jérémie Gilbert, Reader in Law, University of East London, School of Law and Social Sciences, London, UK
- Andrés Felipe Gómez Ariza, Colombia, Public International Law LLM candidate, University of Leicester, UK
- Henning Grosse Ruse, PhD, Khan, King’s College, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, UK
- Kelly L. Grotke, PhD, Affiliate Research Fellow, Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law, Iceland
- Kumaravadivel Guruparan, Lecturer, Department of Law, University of Jaffna, Sri Lanka
- Mateenah Hunter, LLB (Wits), LLM Public Interest Law and Policy (UCLA), Attorney, South Africa
- Ivan Ingravallo, Associate Professor of International Law, University of Bari, Italy
- Issaaf Ben Khalifa, Lawyer, University of Carthage, Tunisia
- Urfan Khaliq, Professor of International Law, Cardiff University, UK
- Ahmed Amine Khamlichi, Investigator at the CNRS, France
- Adilur Rahman Khan, Senior Advocate at Supreme Court of Bangladesh
- Shoaib M. Khan, Solicitor, Human Rights activist, London, UK
- Daniela Kravetz, International Criminal Justice and Gender Expert, The Hague, The Netherlands
- Azra Kuci, Human Rights Lawyer, LLM Graduate, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Massimo La Torre, Professor of Law, University of Hull (UK), Catanzaro University, Italy
- Roberto Lamacchia, Lawyer, President, Association Democratic Jurists, Turin, Italy
- Michelle Landy, Solicitor, London, UK
- Federico Lenzerini, Assistant Professor of International Law, University of Siena, Italy
- Afsaneh Lotfizadeh, Human Rights Researcher (UCL LLM graduate), London, United Kingdom
- Michael Lynk, Professor, Faculty of Law, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada
- Osama Malik, Advocate, Islamabad High Court Bar Association, Pakistan
- Marina Mancini, Senior Lecturer in International Law, Mediterranean University of Reggio Calabria, Italy
- Ana Manero Salvador, Associate Professor of Public International Law, University Carlos III, Madrid, Spain
- Fabio Marcelli, Research Director, Institute for International Legal Studies of the National Research Council, Rome, Bureau Member of IADL, Italy
- GIlberto Pagani, Avvocato, Legal Team Italia,
- Antonio Martínez Puñal, Professor of Public International Law, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Spain
- Mari Matsuda Professor, William S. Richardson School of Law, USA
- David McQuoid-Mason, Director, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa.
- Maeve McMahon, Associate Professor, Law and Legal Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
- Ladan Mehranvar, PhD candidate in International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada
- Ezio Menzione, Lawyer, Legal Team Italia, Italy
- Ruth Mestre, Professor of Law, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Lies Michielsen, Lawyer Antwerp, Belgium
- Jeanne Mirer, President, International Association of Democratic Lawyers
- Bela Mongia, Human Rights Researcher, (UCL Human Rights student), London, United Kingdom
- Lavinia Monti, PhD candidate in International Law and Human Rights, University La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
- Gloria M. Moran, Professor of Law, Religion and Public Policy, UDC, Spain/USA
- Giuseppe Morgese, Senior Lecturer in European Uninion Law, University of Bari, Italy
- Raffaella Multedo, Lawyer, Legal Team Italia, Italy
- Raymond Murphy, Professor of Law and Human Rights, Irish Centre for Human Rights, Galway, Northern Ireland
- Francesca Mussi, PhD candidate in International Law, University of Milan- Bicocca, Italy
- Egeria Nalin, Senior Lecturer in International Law, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bari Aldo Moro, Italy
- Nina Navid, Human Rights Researcher, (UCL MA Human Rights graduate), London, U.K.
- Mary Nazzal-Batayneh, Barrister, Palestine Legal Aid Fund, Amman, Jordan
- Dorothy-Jean O’Donnell, Lawyer, Hope, British Columbia, Canada
- Maria Irene Papa, Senior Lecturer in International Law, Faculty of Law, University La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
Facoltà di Giurisprudenza - Brad Parker, Attorney, Defence for Children International Palestine, USA
- Gilberto Pagani, Lawyer, Milan, Italy
- Brunilda Pali, Researcher, KU Leuven Institute of Criminology, Leuven, Belgium
- Paolo Picone, Emeritus Professor of International Law, University La Sapienza, Rome, Member of Institut de Droit International, Member of Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Italy
- Enrique Pochat, profesor de Derechos Humanos en la Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina
- Giuseppe Puma – PhD, International Law, University La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
- Antonio Martínez Puñal, Professor of Public International Law, University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain
- Micòl Savia, human rights lawyer, permanent representative of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) at the UN, Italy
- Chiara Ragni, Senior Researcher and Assistant Professor of International Law, University of Milan, Italy
- Michael Ratner, President Emeritus, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, USA
- Edel Reagan, LLM, Irish Center for Human Rights, Galway, Northern Ireland
- Clara Rigoni, PhD Candidate, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany
- Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička, assistent lecturer Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, PhD Candidate Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany
- Yashvir Roopun, Barrister at Law, UK
- Itziar Ruiz-Gimenez Arrieta, Lecturer of International Relations, University Autónoma of Madrid, Spain
- Simeon A. Sahaydachny, LL.M in International Law, New Jersey, USA
- Francesco Saluzzo, PhD candidate in International Law, University of Palermo, Italy
- Laura Salvadego, research Fellow in International Law, University of Ferrara, Italy
- Stephanie Schlickewei, Research Associate in Public International Law, University of Kiel, Germany
- Smita Shah, Barrister, Garden Court Chambers, London, UK
- Rasha Sharkia, Media Advisor, Israel/Palestine,UCL MA Human Rights graduate, London, UK.
- Francesco Sindico, Reader in International Environmental Law, University of Strathclyde Law School, Glasgow, UK
- Francisco Soberon, Director Fundador, Asociacion Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH), Lima, Peru
- Angeles Solanes-Corella, Professor of Law, Human Rights Institute, University of Valencia, Spain
- Mihira Sood, Human Rights Lawyer, Supreme Court of India, India
- Marta Sosa Navarro, Lawyer and International Criminal Law researcher, PhD in International Criminal Law, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain
- Pamela Spees, Senior Staff Attorney, Centre for Constitutional Rights, New York, USA
- Euan Sutherland, CB, Barrister and Parliamentary Draftsman, London, UK
- Patrice Tacita, Lawyer, Member of LKP, Guadeloupe
- Dennis Töllborg, Professor in Legal Science, STIAS Fellow, University of Gothenburg, Sweden
- Seline Trevisanut, Assistant Professor in International Law, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands.
- Maïa Trujillo, Senior Programme Officer for International Law and Human Rights, The Hague, The Netherlands
- Lydia Vicente-Márquez, Executive Director, Rights International Spain
- Luisa Vierucci, Lecturer in International Law, university of Florence, Italy
- Gianluca Vitale, Lawyer, Legal Team Italia, Italy
- Daniela Vitiello, PhD, International Law and EU Law, University La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
- Benjamin Vogel, Senior Researcher, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg i. Br., Germany
- B.J. Walker, Professor, University of Victoria, Canada, and PUC-Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
- Burns H Weston, Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Scholar, UI Center for Human Rights, The University of Iowa, USA
- Laura Westra, PhD, University of Windsor, Canada – International Law
University Bicocca, Milan, Italy - John Whitbeck, Expert on International Law, former legal advisor, Palestinian Negotiation Team
- Richard Wild, Lecturer, School of Law, University of Greenwich, UK
- Pål Wrange, Professor of International Law, Stockholm University, Sweden
- Selma Abdel Qader, LLM, SciencesPo, PSIA, Paris, France
- Jacqueline Alsaid, LLM, freelance writer and Human Rights Activist, UK
- Soumaya Ben Dhaou, PhD, Assistant Professor Nipissing University, ON, Canada
- Francisco Bernete, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain
- Carla Biavati, Members of the IPRI – Institute for Peace Research, Italian branch
- Linda Bimbi, International Section of the Lelio and Lisli Basso Foundation, Rome
- Robert Bourque, Professor of Philosophy and Political Science, College de Thetford and UMCE University, Canada
- Elpidio Capasso, Member of Naples City Council and lawyer, Italy
- Joseph Chiume, Barrister, Malawi
- Elena Coccia, Member of Naples City Council and lawyer, Italy
- Esmeralda Colombo, Legal Practitioner, (LLM, College d’Europe), Milan, Italy
- Antonio Crocetta, Member of Naples City Council and lawyer, Italy
- Maurizio Cucci, Member of the IPRI – Institute for Peace Research, Italian branch
- Simon Dalby, professor, Wilfrid Laurier University, USA
- Luigi De Magistris, Mayor of Naples and former Judge, Italy
- Silvia De Michelis, PhD candidate, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Bradford, UK
- Gennaro Esposito, Member of Naples City Council and lawyer, Italy
- Roja Fazaeli, Lecturer in Islamic Studies, Department of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
- Andrea Florence, Master in International Law (IHEID), Brazil
- Alejandro Forero, Researcher, Observatory on Penal System and Human Rights University of Barcelona, Spain
- César Alejandro González Carrillo, Master in law
Universidad de Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Jalisco, México - Héctor Grad, Associate Professor, Social Anthropology, University Autónoma, Madrid, Spain
- Cristina Greco, PhD in Semiotics, Department of Communication and Social Research, Rome University Sapienza, Italy
- Sondra Hale, Research Professor and Professor Emerita, Anthropology and Gender Studies, UCLA; and Coordinator, California Scholars for Academic Freedom, USA
- Remzi Halil, LLB, UK
- Naomi Head, Lecturer in Politics, University of Glasgow, UK
- Carlo Iannello, Member of Naples City Council and lawyer, Italy
- Mahmood M. Jaludi, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, USA
- Rabania Khan, LLB, UK
- Ronald C. Kramer, Professor of Sociology and Criminology, Western Michigan University, USA
- Charles H. Manekin, Professor of Philosophy, University of Maryland, USA
- Sarah Maranlou, Independent Legal Researcher, UK
- Lloyd K. Marbet, Executive Director, Oregon Conservancy Foundation, USA
- Miriam McColgan, Solicitor (Lawyer), Dublin, Ireland
- Giuseppe Nesi, Dean of the Law School, University of Trento, Italy
- Alba Nogueira López, Associate Professor of Administrative Law, University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain
- Francis Oeser, Poet, London, UK
- Sarah Pallesen, MA Social Anthropology of Development, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, UK
- Daniele Perissi, LL.M Graduate, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Italy
- Raffaele Porta, Professor, Chemical Sciences, University Federico II, Naples Italy
- Nicola Quatrano, Judge, OSSIN – International Observatory on Human Rights, Italy
- Minhaj Quazi, B.Com(Hons) M.Com, LL.B.
- Rezaur Rahman Lenin, Executive Director, Law Life Culture, Bangladesh
- Jale Reshat, Solicitor, UK
- Dario Rossi, Lawyer, Italy
- Marco Russo, Member of Naples City Council and lawyer, Italy
- Ghassan Shahrour, MD
- Lloyd Schneider, Retired Minister, United Church of Christ, Delegate to General Synod 2015, Tuolumne, California, USA
- Gene, Schulman, Former senior editor, Overseas American Academy, Geneva, Switzerland
- Salvatore Talia, graduate in law, Università degli Sudi di Milano, Italy
- Carlo Tagliacozzo, Human Rights Activist, Turin, Italy
- Jeanne Theoharis, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Co-Founder of Educators for Civil Liberties , Brooklyn College of CUNY, New York, USA
- Ismail Waheed, Lecturer, Institute of Islamic Studies, Maldives
- Paul Wapner, Professor, School of International Service, American University, USA
- Saïd Zulficar, Network for Colonial Freedom
Nonviolent Geopolitics: Law, Politics, and 21st Century Security*
4 AprNonviolent Geopolitics: Law, Politics, and 21st Century Security*
In this short essay, my attempt will be to articulate a conception of a world order premised on nonviolent geopolitics, as well as to consider some obstacles to its realization. By focusing on the interplay of “law” and “geopolitics” the intention is to consider the role played both by normative traditions of law and morality and the “geopolitical” orientation that continue to guide dominant political actors on the global stage. Such an approach challenges the major premise of realism that security, leadership, stability, and influence in the 21st century continue to rest primarily on military power, or what is sometimes described as “hard power” capabilities.[1] From such a perspective international law plays a marginal role, useful for challenging the behavior of adversaries, but not to be relied upon in calculating the national interest of one’s own country. As such, the principal contribution of international law, aside from its utility in facilitating cooperation in situations where national interests converge, is to provide rhetoric that rationalizes controversial foreign policy initiatives undertaken by one’s own country and to demonize comparable behavior by an enemy state. This discursive role is not to be minimized, but neither should it be confused with exerting norms of restraint in a consistent and fair manner.
In this chapter my intention is to do three things:
I. The UN Charter and a Legalistic Approach to Nonviolent Geopolitics
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, particularly in light of the horrendous atomic bombings of Japanese cities, even those of realist disposition were deeply worried by what it might portend for the future, and without much reflection agreed to a constitutional framing of world politics that contained most of the elements of nonviolent geopolitics. In one respect, this was a continuation of a trend that started after World War I with the establishment of the League of Nations, reflecting a half-hearted endorsement of the Woodrow Wilson sentiment that such a conflagration amounted to ‘a war to end all wars.’ Yet the European colonial governments humored Wilson, and continued to believe that the war system was viable and integral to maintaining Western hegemony, and the League of Nations proved to be irrelevant in avoiding the onset of World War II. But World War II was different because it offered the political leaders both a grim warning of what a future war among major states would likely entail and it seemed to be entrusting the future to a coalition of victorious powers that had cooperated against the menace posed by Fascism, and in the view of the American leader Franklin Roosevelt, could just as well cooperate to maintain the peace. Beyond this, the memories of the Great Depression and the realization that the punitive peace imposed on Germany in the Versailles Treaty had encouraged the rise of Hitler, gave the global leadership in the world at that time an incentive to facilitate cooperation in trade and investment, and to see the importance of restoring the economies of defeated Germany, Italy, and Japan so as to avoid the recurrence of another cataclysmic depression.
It was in this atmosphere that the UN Charter was agreed upon with its cardinal principles based on the following: (1) the unconditional prohibition of recourse to force in international relations except in self-defense against a prior armed attack, which meant the outlawry of war as an instrument of national policy; (2) the reinforcement of this prohibition with a collective commitment of the UN membership to support any state that was the target of non-defensive force, including acting forcibly under UN auspices to restore the territorial integrity and political independence of such a violated state; under no conditions was it to be legally acceptable for a state to acquire territory by recourse to force; (3) the further reinforcement of this attitude by the precedents set at Nuremberg and Tokyo that held leaders who engage in aggressive warfare criminally responsible on an individual basis, and by ‘the Nuremberg promise’ that made the pledge that in the future all political leaders would be subject to criminal accountability, and not those who lost wars (‘victors’ justice); (4) the commitment to respect the internal sovereignty of all states whether large or small, via the acceptance of an unconditional obligation to refrain from any interference in matters essentially within domestic jurisdiction.
Such a legal framework, if implemented, would have effectively eliminated international warfare and military intervention, preserved the statist structure of world order, and created a robust set of collective security mechanisms to inhibit aggression and defeat and punish any government and its leaders who engaged in aggressive warfare. It is important to realize that this legalistic vision of world order assumed that it was politically possible to establish such a warless world, and that rationality would prevail in the nuclear age to redefine the approach taken to security by ‘realists.’ It is also relevant to observe that the nonviolent geopolitics embedded in the UN Charter never involved an overall embrace of nonviolence as a precondition of political life. It was understood that within states violent insurgent politics and various forms of civil strife would occur, without violating international norms. By the Charter scheme internal wars were beyond the writ of the social contract made by states to renounce recourse to international violence. In this respect even an internal war, unless it spilled over boundaries to become a species of international warfare, was not to be addressed by the UN.
Even within this legalistic conception of nonviolent geopolitics there are significant difficulties. First of all, the conferral of a right of veto on the five permanent members of the Security Council, which meant that no decision adverse to the vital interests of the most dangerous political actors in the world could be reached, and that this de facto exemption from the commitment to nonviolent geopolitics greatly compromised the value of the legal framing, making the optimistic assumption of an enduring alliance for peace absolutely crucial to achieving the security claims being posited by the UN. Secondly, the acceptance of internal sovereignty as legally absolute meant that there would be no legal basis for effectively challenging the recurrence of genocide, or severe crimes against humanity and other catastrophic circumstances confronting a society caught in civil strife of the sort currently afflicting Syria.
Of course, these legal shortcomings seem almost irrelevant in view of the lack of political will to implement the Charter vision of nonviolent geopolitics. In retrospect, it seems clear that before the Charter had even been ratified governing elites in the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their reliance on their military capabilities, political alliances, and deterrent doctrines to ground their security on the logic of countervailing hard power. Also, the anti-fascist alliance so effective in wartime, collapsed quickly in the absence of a common enemy, and the long Cold War ensued, which ensured that the collective security dimensions of the Charter vision would remain a dead letter, although this is not meant to imply that the UN was a failure overall. Actually, its positive contributions were associated with facilitating international cooperation whenever a political consensus was present and working at the normative margins of the prevailing hard power worldview.
These legal gaps could have been overcome if the worldview of the leading political actors truly embraced nonviolent geopolitics as more than a kind of vague aspirational framing of security that must never be allowed to interfere with the realist faith in deterrence and military strength once the initial shock of the dawning of the nuclear age subsided. There was a historical factor that worked against any serious effort to curtail this realist approach to security: the so-called ‘lesson of Munich’ to the effect that German aggression was encouraged by the appeasement policies of the European liberal democracies, which in turn reflected military weakness due to substantial disarmament after World War I. Such a view of the recent past translated into an almost irresistible argument supportive of a militarist approach to world order, which was reinforced by the ideological and geopolitical challenge attributed to the Soviet Union.
What this meant in relation to the position advocated here is that violent or war-prone geopolitics was fully restored, arguably universalized, and restrained only by a quality of enhanced prudence in relation to great power confrontations, as during the various Berlin crises and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Prudence had always been a cardinal political virtue of the classical realist approach, but was not elevated to a central role in balancing the pursuit of vital interests against the risks of catastrophic warfare. (Aron 1966 best articulates this realist approach).
II. The Political/Ethical Argument for Nonviolent Geopolitcs
The contrasting argument presented here is that political outcomes since the end of World War II have been primarily shaped by soft power ingenuity that has rather consistently overcome a condition of military inferiority to achieve its desired political outcomes. The United States completely controlled land, air, and sea throughout the Vietnam war, winning every battle, and yet eventually losing the war, killing as many as 5 million Vietnamese on the road to the failure of its military intervention. Ironically, the US government went on to engage the victorious Vietnam government, and currently enjoys a friendly and productive diplomatic and economic relationship. In this sense, the strategic difference between defeat and victory is almost unnoticeable, making the wartime casualties and devastation even more tragic, as being pointless from every perspective.
Nevertheless, US militarists refused to learn from the outcome, treating the impact of this defeat as a kind of geopolitical disease, the “Vietnam Syndrome,” rather than as a reflection of a historical trend supportive of the legitimate claims of self-determination despite the military vulnerability of such nationalist movements. The mainstream realists drew the wrong lesson, insisting that the outcome was an exception rather than the rule, a case of demoralizing the domestic support for the war, not a matter of losing to a stronger adversar.[2] In effect, overcoming the Vietnam Syndrome meant restoring confidence in hard power geopolitics and thereby neutralizing domestic opposition to war making. This militarist revived control over the shaping of American foreign policy was proclaimed as an achievement of the Gulf War in 1991, which revealingly prompted the American president at the time George H.W. Bush to utter these memorable words in the immediate aftermath of this military victory on desert battlefield of Kuwait: “We finally kicked the Vietnam Syndrome.” Meaning of course that the United States demonstrated it could wage and win wars at acceptable costs, not pausing to notice that such victories were obtained only where the terrain was suited for a purely military encounter or the capability and will of the enemy to resist was minimal or non-existent. It is not that hard power is obsolete, but rather that it is not able to shape the outcomes in the most characteristic conflicts of the period since 1945, namely, the political struggle to expel oppressive forces that represent a foreign imperial power or to resist military intervention. Hard power is still decisive in encounters with hard power, or in situations where the weaker side is defenseless, and the stronger side is prepared to carry its military dominance to genocidal extremes.
It is hardly surprising that the excessive and anachronistic reliance on hard power solutions in situations of conflict has led to a series of failures, both acknowledged (Iraq War) and unacknowledged (Afghanistan War; Libyan War). As long as the United States invests so much more heavily in military capabilities than any other state it is bound to respond to threats or pursue its interests along a hard power path, thereby refusing to reckon with clear historical trends favoring soft power dominance in conflict situations.
Israel also has adopted a similar approach, relying on its military superiority to destroy and kill, but not being able to control the political results of the wars it embarks upon (e.g. Lebanon War of 2006, Gaza Attacks of 2008-09). One other cost of hard power or violent geopolitics is to undermine respect for the rule of law in global politics and for the authority of the United Nations.
A second demonstration of the anachronistic reliance on a violence-based system of security was associated with the response to the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, the dual symbols of the US imperium. A feature of this event was the exposure of the extreme vulnerability of the most militarily dominant state in the whole of human history to attack by a non-state actor without significant weaponry and lacking in major resources. In the aftermath it became clear that the enormous US investment in achieving “full spectrum dominance” had not brought enhanced security, but the most acute sense of insecurity in the history of the country. Once again the wrong lesson was drawn, namely, that the way to restore security was to wage war regardless of the distinctive nature of this new kind of threat, to make mindless use of the military machine abroad and the curtailment of liberties at home despite the absence of a territorial adversary or any plausible means/ends relationship between recourse to war and reduction of the threat.[3] The appropriate lesson, borne out by experience, is that such a security threat can best be addressed by a combination of transnational law enforcement and through addressing the legitimate grievances of the political extremists who launched the attacks. The Spanish response to the Madrid attacks of March 11, 2004 seemed sensitive to these new realities: withdrawal from involvement in the Iraq war while enhancing police efforts to identify and arrest violent extremists, and joining in the dialogic attempts to lessen tension between Islam and the West.[4] In another setting, the former British prime minister, John Major, observed that he only began to make progress in ending the violence in Northern Ireland when he stopped thinking of the IRA as a terrorist organisation and began treating it a political actor with real grievances and its own motivations in reaching accommodation and peace.
The right lesson is to recognise the extremely limited utility of military power in conflict situations within the postcolonial world, grasping the extent to which popular struggle has exerted historical agency during the last 60 years. It has shaped numerous outcomes of conflicts that could not be understood if assessed only through a hard power lens that interprets history as almost always determined by wars being won by the stronger military side that then gets to shape the peace.[5] Every anti-colonial war in the latter half of the 20th century was won by the militarily weaker side, which prevailed in the end despite suffering disproportionate losses along its way to victory. It won because the people were mobilised on behalf of independence against foreign colonial forces, and their resistance included gaining complete control of the high moral ground. It won because of the political truth embodied in the Afghan saying: “You have the watches, we have the time.” Gaining the high moral ground both delegitimised colonial rule and legitimised anti-colonial struggle; in the end even the state-centric and initially empire-friendly UN was induced to endorse anticolonial struggles by reference to the right of self-determination, which was proclaimed to be an inalienable right of all peoples.
This ascendancy of soft power capabilities in political struggles was not always the case. Throughout the colonial era, and until the mid-20th century, hard power was generally effective and efficient, as expressed by the colonial conquests of the Western hemisphere with small numbers of well-armed troops, British control of India with a few thousand soldiers or the success of “gunboat diplomacy” in supporting US economic imperialism in Central America and the Caribbean. What turned the historical tide against militarism was the rise of national and cultural self-consciousness in the countries of the South, most dramatically in India under the inspired leadership of Gandhi, where coercive nonviolent forms of soft power first revealed their potency. More recently, abetted by the communications revolution, resistance to oppressive regimes based on human rights has demonstrated the limits of hard power governance in a globalised world. The anti-apartheid campaign extended the struggle against the racist regime that governed South Africa to a symbolic global battlefield where the weapons were coercive nonviolent reliance on boycotts, divestment, and sanctions. The collapse of apartheid in South Africa was largely achieved by developments outside of the sovereign territory, a pattern that is now being repeated in the Palestinian “legitimacy war” being waged against Israel. The outcome is not assured, and it is possible for the legitimacy war to be won, and yet the oppressive conditions sustained, as seems to be currently the case with respect to Tibet.
Against this background, it is notable, and even bewildering, that geopolitics continues to be driven by a realist consensus that ahistorically believes that history continues to be determined by the grand strategy of hard power dominant state actors.[6] In effect, realists have lost touch with reality. It seems correct to acknowledge that there remains a rational role for hard power, as a defensive hedge against residual statist militarism, but even here the economic and political gains of demilitarisation would seem to far outweigh the benefits of an anachronistic dependence on hard power forms of self-defence, especially those that risk wars fought with weaponry of mass destruction. With respect to non-state political violence, hard power capabilities are of little or no relevance, and security can be best achieved by accommodation, intelligence and transnational law enforcement. The US recourse to war in addressing the Al Qaeda threat, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, has proved to be costly, and misdirected. [7] Just as the US defeat in Vietnam reproduced the French defeats in their colonial wars waged in Indochina and Algeria, the cycle of failure is being renewed in the post-9/11 global setting. Why do such lessons bearing on the changing balance between hard and soft power remain unlearned in the imperial centre of geopolitical manoeuvre?
It is of great importance to pose this question even if no definitive answer can be forthcoming at this time. There are some suggestive leads that relate to both material and ideological explanations. On the materialist side, there are deeply embedded governmental and societal structures whose identity and narrow self-interests are bound up with a maximal reliance upon and projection of hard power. These structures have been identified in various ways in the US setting: “national security state”, “military-industrial complex”, “military Keynesianism”, and “the war system”. It was Dwight Eisenhower who more than 50 years ago warned of the military-industrial complex in his farewell speech, notably making the observation after he no longer was able to exert influence on governmental policy.[8] In 2010 there seems to be a more deeply rooted structure of support for militarism that extends to the mainstream media, conservative think tanks, an army of highly paid lobbyists, and a deeply compromised Congress whose majority of members have substituted money for conscience. This politically entrenched paradigm linking realism and militarism makes it virtually impossible to challenge a military budget even at a time of fiscal deficits that are acknowledged by conservative observers to endanger the viability of the US empire (Ferguson 2010). The scale of the military budget, combined with navies in every ocean, more than 700 foreign military bases, and a huge investment in the militarisation of space exhibit the self-fulfilling inability to acknowledge the dysfunctionality of such a global posture.[9] The US spends almost as much as the entire world put together on its military machine, and more than double what the next 10 leading states spend. And for what benefit to either the national or global interest?
The most that can be expected by way of adjustment of the realist consensus under these conditions is a certain softening of the hard power emphasis. In this respect, one notes that several influential adherents of the realist consensus have recently called attention to the rising importance of non-military elements of power in the rational pursuit of a grand strategy that continues to frame geopolitics by reference to presumed hard power “realities”, but are at the same time critical of arch militarism attributed to neoconservatives (see Nye 1990; Gelb 2009; Walt 2005).[10] This same tone pervades the speech of Barack Obama at the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize ceremony. This realist refusal to comprehend a largely post-militarist global setting is exceedingly dangerous given the continuing hold of realism on the shaping of policy by governmental and market/finance forces.[11] Such an outmoded realism not only engages in imprudent military undertakings; it tends also to overlook a range of deeper issues bearing on security, survival and human wellbeing, including climate change, peak oil, water scarcities, fiscal fragility and market freefall. As such, this kind of policy orientation is incapable of formulating the priorities associated with sustainable and benevolent forms of global governance.
In addition, to the structural rigidity that results from the entrenched militarist paradigm, there arises a systemic learning disability that is incapable of analysing the main causes of past failures. As a practical matter, this leads policy options to be too often shaped by unimaginative thinking trapped within a militarist box. In recent international policy experience, thinking mainly confined to the military box has led the Obama administration to escalate US involvement in an internal struggle for the future of Afghanistan and to leave the so-called military option on the table for dealing with the prospect of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. An attractive alternative policy approach in Afghanistan would be based on the recognition that the Taliban is a movement seeking nationalist objectives amid raging ethnic conflict. As a result it would tend towards a conclusion that the US security interests would benefit from an end of combat operations, followed by the phased withdrawal of NATO forces, a major increase in developmental assistance that avoids channelling funds through a corrupted Kabul government, and a genuine shift in US foreign policy towards respect for the politics of self-determination. Similarly, in relation to Iran, instead of threatening a military strike and advocating punitive measures, a call for regional denuclearisation, which insisted on the inclusion of Israel, would be expressive of both thinking outside the militarist box, and the existence of more hopeful non-military responses to admittedly genuine security concerns.
III. Concluding Observations: Opportunities, Challenges, Tendencies
In conclusion, some form of geopolitics is almost bound to occur, given the gross inequality of states and the weakness of the United Nations as the institutional expression of unified governance for the planet. Especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union the primacy of the United States has resulted inevitably in its geopolitical ascendancy. Unfortunately, this position has been premised upon an unreconstructed confidence in the hard power paradigm, which combines militarism and realism, producing violent geopolitics in relation to critical unresolved conflicts. The experience of the past 60 years shows clearly that this paradigm is untenable from both pragmatic and principled perspectives. It fails to achieve its goals at acceptable costs, if at all. It relies on immoral practices that involve massive killing of innocent persons and colossal waste of resources.
Perhaps the leading test of the thesis of this essay is the ongoing struggle for self-determination of the Palestinian people, whether in the form of a single secular state encompassing the whole of historic Palestine or an independent and viable state of their own existing alongside the Israeli state. As matters now stand, after decades of occupation, the Palestinian struggle is relying mainly on a legitimacy war relying on an array of soft power instruments, including diplomacy and lawfare, a non-violent coercive boycott and divestment campaign, and a variety of civil society initiatives challenging Israeli policies. Uncertainty exists as to the future outcome. The whole soft power orientation has taken a giant leap forward as a result of ‘the Arab spring’ in which unarmed popular movements challenged dictatorial and oppressive regimes with some notable successes, especially Egypt and Tunisia, but elsewhere at least achieving promises of extensive reforms. Increasingly, I think the potentialities of constructing a world order on the basis of soft power principles is gaining support, moving the idea of nonviolent geopolitics from the domain of utopianism to become a genuine political project. Of course, there is resistance, most especially from the hard power holdouts led by the United States and Israel.
Those political forces relying on the alternative of nonviolent practices and principles, in contrast, have shown the capacity to achieve political goals and a willingness to pursue their goals by ethical means, sometimes at great personal risk. The Gandhi movement resulting in Indian independence, the Mandela-led transformation of apartheid South Africa, people power in the Philippines and the soft revolutions of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s are exemplary instances of domestic transformations based on nonviolent struggle that entailed dangers for militants and resulted in some high profile bloody sacrifices. None of these soft power victories has produced entirely just societies or addressed the entire agenda of social and political concerns, often leaving untouched exploitative class relations and bitter societal tensions, but they have managed to overcome immediate situations of oppressive state/society relations without significant reliance on violence.
Turning to the global setting, there exist analogous opportunities for the application of nonviolent geopolitics. There is a widespread recognition that war between large states is not a rational option as it is almost certain to involve huge costs in blood and treasure, and reach mutual destructive results rather as in former times of a clear winner and loser. The opportunities for a nonviolent geopolitics are also grounded in the willingness of government to accept of the increasingly practical self-constraining discipline of international law as reinforced by widely endorsed moral principles embodied in the great religions and world civilizations. A further step in this direction would be a repudiation by the nine nuclear weapons states of weaponry of mass destruction, starting with an announced declaration of no first use of nuclear weaponry, and moving on to an immediate and urgent negotiation of a nuclear disarmament treaty that posits as a non-utopian goal “a world without nuclear weapons” (Krieger 2009). The essential second step is liberating the moral and political imagination from the confines of militarism, and consequent thinking within that dysfunctional box that still remains a staple component of the realist mindset among the leading countries in the West, especially the United States. This psycho-political challenge to move away from reliance on war making capabilities as the cornerstone of security is made more difficult by the bureaucratic and private sector entrenched interests in a militarist framing of security policy.
References
David Ray Griffin and others, American Empire and the Commonwealth of God (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006).
Jorgen Johansen & John Y. Jones, eds,, Experiments with Peace (Cape Town, South Africa: Pambazuka Press, 2010).
Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City, NY: Doublday, 1966).
Johan Galtung, The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1980).
Johan Galtung, “Searching for peace in a world of terrorism and state terrorism,” in Shin Chiba and Thomas J. Schoenbaum, eds., Peace Movements and Pacifism after September 11 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008) 32-48.
Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and power in the coming century (New York: Basic, 2002).
David Cole and Julius Lobel, eds., Less Safe, Less Free: Why America is Losing the War on Terror (New York: New Press, 2007)
Richard Falk, The Great Terror War (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2003).
Jonathan Schell, The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People (New York: Henry Holt, 2003).
Richard J. Barnet, The Roots of War (New York,: Atheneum, 1972)
Leonard C. Lewin (for Special Study Group), Report from Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace (London: Macdonald, 1968).
Niall Ferguson, “The Fragile Empire- Here today, gone tomorrow—could the United States fall fast?” LA Times, Feb. 28, 2010.
Chalmers Johnson. The Sorrows of Empire: militarism, secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan, 2004).
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990
Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004)
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Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The global response to American power (New York: Norton, 2005).
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* Some of the ideas in sections II and III of the article have been earlier developed in “Renouncing Wars of Choice: Toward a Geopolitics of Nonviolence” in Griffin and others, 2006, 69-85 and “Nonviolent Geopolitics,” Johansen & Jones, eds., 2010, 33-40.
[1] A mainstream exception is Rosecrance 2002.
[2] Significantly, every US leader after Nixon did his best to eliminate the Vietnam syndrome, which was perceived by the Pentagon as an unwanted inhibitor of the use of aggressive force in world politics. After the end of the Gulf war in 2001, the first words of President George H. W. Bush were “We have finally kicked the Vietnam syndrome,” meaning, of course, that the United States was again able to fight ‘wars of choice’.
[3] Well depicted in Cole and Lobel 2007; see also my own attempt, Falk 2003.
[4] This comparison is analysed in a similar manner by Galtung 2008.
[5] Significantly documented in Schell 2003.
[6] It is notable that the changes in the global geopolitical landscape associated with the rise of China, India, Brazil and Russia are largely to do with their economic rise, and not at all with their military capabilities, which remain trivial compared to those of the United States.
[7] As interventionary struggles go on year after year with inconclusive results, but mounting costs in lives and resources, the intervening sides contradicts their own war rationale, searching for compromises, and even inviting the participation of the enemy
in the governing process. This has been attempted in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but
only after inflicting huge damage, and enduring major loss of life among their own troops and incurring great expense.
[8] Among the valuable studies are Barnet 1972 and Lewin 1968.
[9] Most convincingly demonstrated in a series of books by Chalmers Johnson. See especially the first of his three books on the theme (2004).
[10] For a progressive critique of American imperial militarism see Kolko 2006.
[11] Several leading scholars have long been sensitive to the disconnect that separates even relatively prudent realists from reality. For a still relevant major work see Galtung 1980. For other recent perceptive studies along these lines see Booth 2007, especially the section on ‘emancipatory realism’, pp. 87-91; Camilleri and Falk 2009; Mittelman 2010.
Tags: American foreign policy, hard power, international law, Nonviolent Geopolitics