Tag Archives: Iran

Civic Responses to Gaza Genocide and Regional Nuclearism

17 Jul

[Prefatory Note: The post below is in two parts, both interviews published in the Italian weekly, Il Manifesto. The first addresses the Gaza dimension of the current Palestinian ordeal now extended to the West Bank and drawing worldwide negative attention by induced mass hunger and water scarcity. These severe civilian hardships resulting from Israeli criminality have given rise to a variety of protest activities, governmental denunciations, yet continue to gain unconditional support by the United States and the UK, while drawing some mild critical drawbacks from formerly supportive  France, Canada, and Germany but without stoppage of trade or flows of vital supplies to Israel. The second part in the form of an early comment on the short Iran War, initiated by Israel, joined by the US to inflict maximum damage on Iran’s nuclear sites, dramatized by the US reliance on ‘blockbuster bombs’ of 30,000 pounds to destroy nuclear facilities built deep underground. Their initial US and Israeli claims of victorious results have been watered down by growing doubts of how much damage was actually done to Iran’s nuclear attacks. A further setback for the attackers is the widespread speculation that Iran might now decide to develop nuclear weapons unless Israel would agree, which seems highly doubtful, to dismantle their nuclear arsenal and agree to a nuclear-free monitored Middle East. These texts are slightly modified for updating and clarity.]

Patricia Lambroso Interview Questions, Richard Falk Responses, Il Manifesto (5/20/25)

1. The Gaza Peoples Tribunal (civil society tribunal) was launched in November of 2024 in London following the failure by ICJ and ICC, the international tribunals in the Hague, political leaders,  governments, protest activism around the world to stop Israel’s crimes against humanity in Gaza. The anti-war movement that arose during the Vietnam War and the worldwide anti-apartheid campaign against the racist South African government were your examples of civic mobilization that exerted pressure on governments to change their unlawful, criminal policies. Is this possible today in the setting of Gaza and with respect to the Palestinian people regarding the fulfillment of their right of self-determination?

Response: It is not entirely fair to conclude that the ICJ and ICC ‘failed’ to stop the genocidal attack on Gaza or the crimes against humanity alleged to have been extensively committed by Israel and endorsed by its political leaders and supported by the liberal democracies of the West. The ICJ accepted jurisdiction to address tje submission by South Africa alleging violations of the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), and issued near unanimous interim rulings in January and May 2024 to the momentous effect that it was ‘plausible’ to regard the Israeli violence in Gaza after October 7 as amounting to genocide. The ICJ then also ordered Israel to cease altogether interfering with the international delivery to Gaza of humanitarian aid taking the forms of food, medical supplies, and fuel. Although Israel took part in the judicial proceedings, it refused to comply with these interim rulings and was supported in this non-compliant behavior by the main complicit governments, particularly the United States that blocked all UN enforcement and ceasefire efforts by exercising its right of veto. It is more accurate  to speak of an ‘enforcement gap’ in this situation that seemed to nullify ICJ action after it was clear that Israel would not act in the spirit of membership in the UN by voluntarily complying with an adverse decision and that the UN was helpless in view of the clash between the judicial outcome and the geopolitical interests of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council each of whom was vested with authority to nullify ICJ rulings. The ICJ should not be blamed, it should instead be vested with enforcement powers to ensure the effectiveness of its pronouncements on matters of international law. Until then the failure of judicial approaches to global security and the protection of human rights should be associated with the design of the UN, and world order generally, controlled and shaped by the winners of World War II in 1945 to preserve their habitual entitlement that gave precedence to strategic interests when challenged by international law.

The ICJ also issued an historically significant Advisory Opinion on July 19, 2024 that also resulted in a near unanimous outcome in responding to a General Assembly Resolution seeking guidance as to objections to Israel’s role as Occupying Power in Gaza that is legally regulated by the 4th Geneva Convention on Belligerent Occupation.[‘Advisory Opinion on Occupied Palestinian Territory Including East Jerusalem, responding to request of General Assembly for guidance as to “Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the OPT”’]  The Advisory Opinion addressed various allegations of Israeli violations in Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem. The ICJ rendered an authoritative judgment, despite the misleading label of ‘Advisory,’ concluding that Israel’s pervasive pattern of unlawfulness in administering the Occupying Territories since the 1967 War justified terminating Israel’s administrative authority and physical presence as soon as practicable, including Gaza, and within no more than a year. Further that the UN and its member governments were put under legal obligations by the ICJ to implement this authoritative assessment, and not to view implementation with the ruling as merely ‘advisory.’ This legal evaluation of the Israeli obligation in the Occupied Palestinian territory did not extend specifically to the period of time elapsing since October 7 as the GA Resolution was adopted prior to the Hamas attack.

Of secondary significance is the issuance by the ICC of ‘arrest warrants’ for the Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, and the former Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, for a variety of alleged crimes of Israel, although not genocide. As neither Israel nor the US are members of the ICC, and the ICC unlike the ICJ is not part of the UN System, the prospects for enforcement are almost nil.

 Attention should also be given to an ‘Accountability Gap’ of impunity that is supplementary to the ‘Enforcement Gap.’ The US Government actually has imposed sanctions on the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC for advocating proceedings allegedly exceeding the lawful authority of the tribunal. It simultaneously imposed sanctions on the four ICC judges that facilitated the arrest of these Israeli leaders in accord with the arrest warrants. Beyond this the US officially threatened future action in the event of any new effort to take action contrary to the political and economic interests of the US, Israel, and other allies.

Also relevant for analyzing the UN disappointing response to Israel’s prolonged genocide is a ‘Complicity Gap’ in the behavior of the ICJ and ICC. These tribunals have thus far refrained from directly examining allegations of aiding and abetting the commission of international crimes by third party actors, especially governments and corporations. It is up to UN members and international law scholars to encourage increased ICJ attentiveness to the Complicity Gap, which as here, is integral to insulating the wrongdoing actors from enforcement. In early July 2025 the UN Special Rapporteur of Occupied Palestine, Francesco Albanese, was also sanctioned for her attribution of legal responsibility to corporations for continuing their profitable relations with Israel in the face of genocide. She accompanied this assessment with a recommendation that the ICC initiate investigations with an eye toward prosecutions. Known as a dedicated and brave human rights defender, the sanctions generated widespread protests, including calls for awarding Albanese the Nobel Peace Prize and demands that the sanctioning Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, resign. This is highly unlikely to happen so long as the US treats its alliance with Israel as superior to its obligations as a law-abiding member of international society.

It might seem that international law is indeed useless in view of these gaps and the inability to protect a people victimized by international criminal conduct and a settler colonial occupation making Palestinians persecuted strangers in their own homeland. As here, even when the formal judicial outcomes are neither complied with nor enforceable, international law is important. It exerts often unacknowledged influences on many governments, the tone and substance of media coverage, and breadth and depth of civil society activism. In some settings these informal implementations of international law achieve some degree of justice even in the context of the prolonged commission of ‘the crime of crimes,’ genocide, as has been the experience of the Palestinian civilian population in Gaza for more 21 months.

Disregarding international law because of these flaws in the global normative order would be a mistake. Even when not enforced, or its findings repudiated, the outcomes of legal controversy can exert a defining influence on public perceptions of legitimacy, that is, in the dynamics  of configuring of the legal and moral high ground in an underlying political conflict. Contrary to the beliefs of ‘political realists’ who control the foreign policy processes of most governments, relative military capabilities are no longer reliable predictors of which side will prevail in an armed political struggle. This should have been the core message derived by the United States from the Vietnam War during which it militarily prevailed on the battlefield and yet went on to lose the war. This pattern was repeated in most colonial wars fought during the latter decades of the 20th century. The agency of military superiority has declined in relation to many 21st century conflict situations, especially in nationalist resistance to foreign intervention, regime change and state rebuilding projects, settler colonial stabilization repressive policies and practices.

 The Gaza Peoples Tribunal was formed in2024 with this background in mind. It was conceived exclusively as an initiative of global civil society with the dual objectives of helping swing the balance in the Legitimacy War between Israel and the Palestine as well as encourage nonviolent solidarity initiative supportive of the Palestinian struggle. Israel’s violent assault on Gaza that started shortly after the attack on Israeli border villages on October 7, resisted in the months that followed repeated calls for an Israeli ceasefire. Israel also rejected the option of complying with international law defying ICJ and ICC rulings. Such postures amid an r extremely one-sided conflict gave rise to an intensifying moral outrage among the peoples of the world, and eventually among more and more governments, especially in the Global South. The GPT is gathering evidence and assessments from an assortment of qualified survivor witnesses, experts, as well as from three chambers each composed of about 10 specialists documenting the relevance of international law and world politics in its several dimensions bearing on the situation in Gaza. The compilation of testimony and documentation will be presented to a Jury of Conscience composed of persons of diverse experience reflecting prominence in law, political science, and cultural expression who are made responsible for the preparation of oral and written short substantive reports. The distinctiveness of the Gaza Peoples Tribunal (as compared to the ICJ and ICC) is premised on the primacy of justice rather than the primacy of law or the primacy of geopolitics. GPT makes no pretense of being a normal court of law bound to give the accused state and non-state actors of opportunities to mount a legal defense of their behavior. In past peoples tribunals when such a defendant actor is invited to present a defense, it has always been rejected, presumably because the overall outcome of the judicial process is predetermined.  

The GPT does not attempt to mimic judicial tribunals that operate technically and over long durations of time. It is openly partisan although objective with respect to evidence, seeking to add leverage to those engaged in the Legitimacy War. GPT prides itself on being responsive to the urgency of the Gaza humanitarian emergency, and seeks above all to stimulate solidarity on the level of action. The GPT relies on a variety of civil society initiatives to exert pressures on governments to close the enforcement, accountability, and complicity gaps. It also supports a range of nonviolent solidarity initiatives by civil society, including boycotts of sporting and cultural events that have Israeli participants; arms, trade, and investment embargoes; protest activity of all varieties, including act of civil disobedience expressive of the conscience of engaged citizens.     

2. The silence and complicity of Europe on this massacre for extinction of Gaza population today and beside hypocritical condemnation and people demonstrations in Italy and France Why? How the Holocaust  is weaponized  by some like Germany to be accused of antisemitism, but France and Italy have a different history (Vichy and Mussolini and Nazi fascism)?

Response: As your question suggests, history helps us understand and explain the complicity of democratic governments in Europe with Israel’s recourse to genocide and crimes against humanity in Gaza. There are two principal lines of explanation. The first, and most obvious, is embedded sentiments of guilt about the long tradition of European antisemitism, culminating in the Holocaust. Especially, Germany, and to a lesser extent Italy, are acutely sensitive to this allegation. The governments and citizenry of such countries have unfortunately adopted the view that to overcome the disgraces of their past it is better to stand with Israel than to side with the Palestinians who like the Jews of the Hitler period are enduring a horrific genocide. In other words, the ‘never again’ renunciation of genocide pertains exclusively to the past victimized people, the Jews, rather than to a repudiated pattern of behavior, genocide, regardless of the identity of the victim.

The second strand of explanation, implicit on the right end of the political spectrum in Europe, insists that the Nazi genocide was also a matter of racial purification and religion, not just Jewish identity. In this sense, the Jews in relation to the Islamic world of the Middle East are bearing the torch of white supremacy and Western civilizational superiority, a reenactment of the Crusades under different flags in the context of modernity. In this post-Cold War period Israel is situated on the Islamic containment fault line of ‘a clash of civilizations,’ in effect enacting ‘a second coming of Samuel Huntington.’ In this sense, the real ‘enemy’ of these European countries is Iran, a non-Arab country that manifests hostility to the regional encroachment of the white and secular West. For opposite reasons to the Western alliance with Israel, Iran regards Israel as its principal adversary.

 3. Trump touring the Gulf States could have political consequences for Gaza?

Response: There is no doubt that Trump’s May visit to the Gulf States has had adverse consequences for Gaza, but their exact nature remains obscure beyond giving Israel further time to impose its will on the helpless Palestinian civilian population. On one side, it could have been the first stage of a more transactional US relationship with Israel than the kind of unconditional support given during the Biden presidency.

In this sense an altered posture toward regional war prevention might have resulted in a greater willingness to forego the dangerous attack on Iran, and a greater readiness to seek a negotiated solution to Western objections to their nuclear program. Such a course of action would been a challenge to Netanyahu’s Israel. It might even have shaken Israel confidence in receiving unlimited support for their preferred endgame scenarios in Gaza. It might also encourage Netanyahu to lend support, which he has recently done, to Trump’s patently surreal candidacy for a Nobel Peace Prize, supposedly among his narcissistic phantasies, and concretely allow Israel to get on with the genocidal assault on Gaza, and bury once and for all the zombie two-state endgame that while delusional, subverts Israel’s manifest ambition to terminate the Zionist Project triumphalist solution with a single Israeli one-state incorporating the whole of mandate Palestine.

In retrospect, judging by what has happened since, the trip to the Middle East seems to have convinced Trump that he could combine positive relations with the Gulf monarchies and yet give Netanyahu all the support that he wants in Gaza. There is reason to believe that the main Arab leaders share Israel’s goal of destroying Hamas for the sake of their repressive stability.  Many of these Arab regimes might in the future be persuaded to join hands with the US, and even Israel, by adopting a common counter-terrorism orientation. This posture might prove compatible with Israel’s coerced displacement of Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank, persons to be ideally to be dumped in a remote African country where the hope is that in time they will give up their dreams of liberating Palestine.

Israel has in recent months increasingly lost legitimacy by carrying their attack on the civilian population of Gaza to cruel extremes of starvation and by making aid distribution sites into death traps. Israel’s pariah identity will be hard to overcome with the peoples of the world, including an increasing proportion of citizenries of the once liberal democracies in the Europe and North America. Trump’s trip momentarily sidelining Israel diplomatically, and Netanyahu’s arrogant launch of Gideon’s Chariot, the name given Israel’s latest military operation in Gaza has not led to a more problematic phase in Israel/US relations. It is uncertain at this time whether maintaining harmony with Israel, despite the continuing genocide, strengthens or weakens the Trump agenda of the next few years. Given the singling out of Palestinian Support on American campuses as a target for the ultra-right agenda of Project 2025 I would still expect that these demeaning ties with Israel, including complicity with Israel’s resolve to control ‘the day after negotiations’ will continue come what may in Gaza, a sad commentary on the suppression of liberal values whenever upholding the rule of law and minimal morality stand in the way of ideological and strategic goals, including civilizational unity. With the political advent of MAGA Trumpism liberal pretensions within the US have been buried as deep underground as Iran’s nuclear sites and seemingly as indestructible.    

R. Falk Comment for Il Manifesto on US Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities 6/22/25, in response to request by Patricia Lombroso

Once again, the world is moving once again closer to the brink of major war in the Middle East, with Israel doing most of the dirty work relative to Western post-colonial imperialism under the joint Israel/US auspices. The US actively joined Israel’s unprovoked aggression to the extent that Israel needed its help to complete a military operation against Iran’s nuclear sites. The US and Europe keep continuing to evade scrutinizing the ongoing genocide in Gaza and give Israel a totally free hand of impunity to embark upon either the mass forced departure of Palestinian from the Occupied Palestinian Territories of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.  even from pre-1967 Israel itself, or a plan B of constructing death camps in the devastated city of Rafah to confine Palestinian survivors in Gaza. The immoral audacity of Israel is exhibited by naming such morbid arrangements as constituting ‘a humanitarian city.’

To complete the mission of destroying or significantly delaying the completion of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities, Israel needed more than US complicity as it lacked blockbuster bombs and B-2  bombers (alone capable of delivering such massive bombs) to destroy or heavily damage Iranian deep underground facilities at  Fordow and Natanz, and its surface nuclear site at Isfahan. It remains undetermined whether Israel used the pretext of a nuclear threat posed by Iran as a justification for its post-October 7 policy of mounting devastating military attacks throughout the region to destroy hostile movements and weaken potential adversary states such as Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. In the Iran unprovoked attacks, part of the incentive for striking in June 2025 was undoubtedly to divert attention from the growing international opposition from its continuing genocidal policies in Gaza, most recently including luring starving Palestinians to supposed humanitarian food distribution sites, which acted as horrifying death traps.

An irony is that these June 21 US attacks on three main nuclear facilities gave Iran an airtight international law argument for the validation of claims to retaliate by relying upon its right of self-defense against the prior Israel and United States acts of aggression that violated Iran’s territorial sovereignty. The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, vowed to retaliate and did so to a limited extent that penetrated Israel’s layered defenses sufficiently to discredit its claims of invulnerability to air and missile attack. It remains uncertain whether Khamenei’s warning will be fully carried out at some future time in the event that the present ceasefire arrangement lapses, Israel again provokes, and combat resumes.

As a result, the threat of war between Iran and Israel as supported strongly by the US and rather weakly by the European Union casts a dark shadow of potential war throughout the region at this time.  The outbreak of war probably depends on whether Iran is perceived to possess deterrent capabilities taking the form of launching a sufficiently effective attack on US strategic assets, especially against its minimally defended numerous military bases spread around the region. Prior to the ceasefire the Iranian response was measured and cautious, designed to demonstrate that it possessed the military capabilities to inflict heave damage on any adversary in the future. Iran’s show of force was undertaken despite a near certain expectation of an even a more devastating US attack. Such a response would likely be accompanied by a direct and explicit promotion  of regime change in Tehran promoted by mobilizing internal opposition forces, encouraged by pledges of substantial external material encouragement, and even carrying out an assassination of Iran’s Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Khamenei. It is quite possible that Israel will keep pushing tactics designed to promote Iranian regime change although on an ambiguous basis of deniability and covert support for the internal Iranian opposition.

A political complexity facing Iran from a legal perspective arises from the reality that US strategic targets in the region are concentrated in Arab countries currently at peace with Iran. The governments of such states would have a self-defense claim against Iran for forcibly violating their territorial sovereignty. It could also lead to questions in the US about the costs of maintaining its Middle Eastern force structure. It also could lead Arab government to question whether their security and stability is being reliably upheld by the acceptance of visible American military assets on their sovereign territory. Such questioning would almost certainly accompany a Second Arab Spring in the region should it take place.

Whether the world would continue to stand aside while the US and Israel, in apocalyptic interaction with Iran, plunge the world into a new world war is uncertain. This uncertainty exists despite the likely results of threats and even uses weapons of mass destruction. With Trump and Netanyahu calling the shots, there is the prospect of a dramatic further expansion of the combat zone, with few policy guard rails to discourage nuclear threats and their implementation. There is much public pressure in the US to wage wars of choice in a politically acceptable manner that avoids ‘boots on the ground’ so as to minimize American casualties, thereby weakening citizen opposition to wars disconnected with direct threats to national sovereignty. This option of relying on missiles, bombers, drones has made it tempting for the US/Israel leadership to gamble on mounting a credible threat to secure its desired outcome in Iran even, if necessary, by demonstrating the willingness to use nuclear weapons if needed to achieve its strategic objectives. Stumbling into an unwanted nuclear Armageddon may not be expected by war hawks, and certainly not wished for, but the stage is being set for such a catastrophic future. As scholarship has shown, the world was extremely lucky to escape nuclear war back in 1961 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It might not be as lucky this time when much less prudent leaders than Kennedy and Khruschev are in control of warmaking by the antagonistic governments of current geopolitical actors (US, China, Russia).

We should not forget that while this Iranian drama plays out, Israel is freed from media and governmental scrutiny as its war machine speeds up the Zionist master plan of completing the work of Palestinian erasure, Israeli leaders have been increasingly emboldened to proclaim their preferred solution to the conflict by way of a one supremist Jewish state that has now become a de facto political reality. It remains somewhat obscured by the remarkable continuing Palestinian resilience and resistance. Israel has made no secret of its priority as a sequel to genocide, which is the forced disposition of Palestinians living under occupation as a repetition of earlier instances of ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Nakba, 1948; Naksa, 1967) or its grisly alternative of confining Palestinians to a so-called ‘humanitarian city’ currently under construction. The Trump presidency has given many blessings to this Israeli vision of victory over the struggle of Palestinians to sustain their struggle no matter the extremity of the human suffering.

Whether Israel has been decisively weakened by the steady erosion of its legitimacy through its defiance of the most basic norms of international law, by repeated condemnations in sharply worded UN General Assembly resolutions reflecting the views of a majority of the world’s people and governments, and by a hostile turn of world public opinion remains to be seen. It will also be reflected on how civil society in the West responds, facing at present repression at home and impunity-free defiance by Israel.

A decisive question for those seeking a denuclearized Middle East is when will the awkward issue of dismantling Israel’s long hidden nuclear weapons arsenal is at last put on the diplomatic agenda for all to see. It has been one of the geopolitical triumphs of the US and Europe to keep Israel’s opposition to a nuclear-free Middle East from affecting the approach to regional stability and world peace. The major Arab countries and Iran have long favored regional denuclearization, but such a goal has been effectively thwarted by Israel and its closest allies.

A Remembrance of Jimmy Carter

3 Jan

[Prefatory Note: A recollection of my only meeting with the former president at the Carter Center, a minor event, although in the context of repeated mistakes by the ‘political realists’ who continue to shape American foreign policy, perhaps of some interest. The pessimistic note is that the economic hardships imposed on the Iranian people since the fall of the Shah may have been inevitable so long as imperial geopolitics and predatory capitalism dominate the Washington mindscape, and currently to threaten dangerous regional warfare in the Middle East.]

In 1981 or 1982 I was invited to a small human rights meeting at the Carter Centerin Atlanta. It was in the aftermath of the Iran hostage crisis that is blamed for Carter’s loss, Reagan’s win in 1980. The Carters somehow knew that I had previously supported their daughter, Amy, who was an activist against the Vietnam War. It is solong ago I cannot remember the exact context, whether it was a matter of political support or somehow connected with a legal proceeding associated with civil disobedience. Whatever the past, Rosalynn Carter apparently to show their appreciation seated me next to President Carter at a formal conference dinner despite their being more distinguished guests present.

I sheepishly did what I was told and took the opportunity to talk with the ex-president about the situation in Iran. I had been in Iran accompanying Ramsey Clark, the former American Attorney General who had become a leading progressive voice after leaving government and someone sympathetic with the Iran movement against the Shah. While in Iran in early 1979 in a period dramatized by the Shah’s departure from the country, we were frequently asked about Carter’s New Year’s toast to the Shah in 1977: “An island of stability” surrounded by “the admiration and love which your people give to you.” Ensuing events proved how wrong were these sentiments, but that is a longer different story of mass disenchantment that has been frequently told.

During our visit to Iran, we had met with numerous prominent Iranian officials, Islamic leaders, and ordinary citizens. We also met with the American ambassador in Tehran, William Sullivan, who was a hawkish diplomat during the Vietnam Era. Reacting to the anti-Shah movement, Sullivan was clear about the fact that the Shah’s 1979 abdication a few days before our meeting with Sullivan who felt that the Shah’s departure was  an inevitable development given the play of forces in Iran by that time, including the army’s abandonment of the Shah’s government by then. Sullivan hoped that the US Government would accept the outcome, and normalize relations with the new leadership, but reported being blocked by hardline National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was following the pro-Shah diehard diplomacy rather than accommodating approach recommended by the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, a conservative realist, a somewhat aristocratic acquaintance of mine, yet seemingly free from the compulsions of the geopolitically oriented deep state that guided US foreign policy from its undercover sites during the Cold War, and beyond. We should be aware that the Shah was perceived as a major strategic asset in the Middle East, what Henry Kissinger described “as the rarest of things, and unconditional ally.’

During the hostage crisis that started on November 4, 1979 I had been asked to accompany Andrew Young to negotiate the release of the hostages after Ayatollah Khomeini had let it be known that he would welcome an Afro-American negotiator to arrange a diplomatic solutions. The trip was vetoed by Brzezinski. I recall the somewhat bitter, but likely discerning, comment by the head of the State Department’s Iran Desk at the time: “Brzezinski would rather see all the hostage dead than have Andrew Young get credit for their release.” This senior civil servant favored the Young mission, and Young was willing to go, but only if he received a green light from the White House, which never came, we never went, and the rest is history still in the making.

After some pleasantries at the dinner about the Carter Center and the conference, I gathered my courage and asked Carter why he followed Brzezinski policy advice rather than Vance’s counsel, and he gave a short, yet talked further but it was evident that Carter had no deeper reasons to cling to a lost cause, unsatisfactory answer: “Because he was loyal to me.” Nothing more, nothing less. I reflected at the time that Carter would probably have been hosting a state dinner at the White House and being hailed as a peace minded statesman rather than having this tense chat about the low point of his presidency with a brash stranger at his Center.  

The Road Not Taken

We do not know what would have ensued in Iran or the Middle East had the Vance view prevailed, and the US fully respected the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Iranian people. The political sequel to the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy was not clearly prescribed in advance. It might have led to a more democratic version of the Islamic Republic had it not been immediately threatened by internal enemies linked to foreign states in the region. With bad memories of the 1953 anti-Mossadegh coup, facilitated by the CIA, it is hardly surprising that Iran theocratic hard liners took command of the government, especially given the internal and regional challenges mounted against Iranian developments of 1978-79.’ What might have been’ could serve, even belatedly, as a signpost to ‘what should have been’ and more hopefully,  ‘to what will be in the future.’ More soberly, imperial geopolitics and neoliberal capitalism have displayed a willingness to potentially radical enactments of the right of self-determination, and as Kurt Vonnugut vainly tried to teach us, “and so it goes.”    

What Can Iran & Palestine Expect from the US Presidential Elections?

23 Oct

[Prefatory Note: The following interview is in responses to questions addressed.to me by Kayhan New Agency in Iran. It is focused on an interpretation of how the forthcoming American elections are likely to affect Iran, and the policies toward the current  combat zone involving Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. X/0]

Kayhan Interview.   10/9/24

1-What impact does the U.S. election have on the Middle East (Israel-Palestine-Iran)?

Unless Trump is elected, which seems now shamelessly plausible, I see no prospect of change. If Trump is elected, he is more likely to encourage Israel to escalate tensions with Iran by way of an all-out military attack on Gaza and Iran, encouraging the use of a 30k blockbuster bomb and even a missile with a nuclear warhead directed at Iran’s nuclear facilities.

There are also dangers of such a scenario unfolding if Harris are elected, but somewhat less so. It could be brought about by the Netanyahu government exerting provocative pressures by way of alleged intelligence reports that Iran poses an existential threat to Israeli security and currently possesses nuclear weapons or is close to crossing that red line.

It may be that Iran’s conduct in the aftermath of the elections held on 5 November will have some effect in either calming or. agitating bellicose impulses. If the new President of Iran makes a determined diplomatic effort in the region, possibly centered on cultivating positive relations with Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, it could alter Israel’s calculations, but nothing is certain and nothing should be taken for granted or assumed. 

2-The effects of current events in the Middle East on the American elections?

Recent developments in the Middle East, especially the Gaza genocide and the expansion of the Gaza combat zone to the West Bank in Israel and to neighboring countries including Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are having very little impact on the American election, except for the Muslim-American minority and a small group of progressive individuals, including especially younger Jews. However, this numerically small

number compared to the size of the national voting public it could have an impact greater than one would expect because of its influence in battleground states. This reflects the concentration of Muslim-Americans is parts of the country where the electoral competition is very close, and the failure of these normally pro-Democratic voters to support Harris are strengthening Republican prospects, and hence heightening prospects for a Trump victory. The American electoral system is such that the winner is not chosen by the candidate with the most votes, but by a complex weighted system that gives each state, based on population a certain number of votes, which are so allocated as to give advantages to rural and small states where Trump is most popular.

3-Why student protests have been silenced in America and we dont see any protests in universities?

These protests have not yet been completely ‘silenced’ but certainly have been the targets of pressure from administrators of higher education and the Zionist, pro-Israeli, networks of influence.

Major donors to universities throughout the country with strong Israeli sympathies and ties have exerted their influence, usually hidden from public view. Israeli influence with American political elites is strong within the government and strong private sector lobbies (including military industries, energy). Students and faculty are intimidated, with pro-Palestinian activism leading to negative impacts on their career prospects. At the same time these protest sentiments remain strong among the more educated youth of America, although apparently dormant in the immediate period ahead. It would not be a surprise if a progressive movement outside the two-party system emerges in the near future, and becomes a real force in American political life.

4-Western countries state that the attack by Hamas on October 7 was a violation of human rights laws; Do you think the behavior of the Palestinians was a violation of the law?

Even after a year it remains difficult to have an accurate description of the events on October 7. There needs to be a trustworthy international investigation and report, although this will be opposed by Israel, and without such clarification it will be difficult to make a reliable assessment.

On the basis of what we know or are tole, it is the judgment of the most objective international law experts that Hamas had a right of resistance against an abusive and unlawful occupation of Gaza that had persisted since it was occupied in course of the 1967 War, but that atrocities committed during the attack should be considered legally prohibited, and the perpetrators held accountable. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court recommended to a Sub-Chamber of the ICC that ‘arrest warrants’ be issued for three Hamas leaders on the basis of this legal reasoning, and also for Israeli leaders on a similar basis in the course of their retaliatory onslaught.

My own view accepts the obligation of claimants of a right of resistance, regardless of how strong their entitlement to resist, to comply with the laws of war and international human rights law with respect to the deliberate killing of women and children. Hamas culpability this regard is minor if compared to the magnitude and severity of Israel’s genocidal response, but still criminal.

The division in the world between Palestinian and Israeli supportive governments and political movements exhibits the civilizational dimension of Middle East conflict zone that follows a conflict pattern of the West against Islamic societies. This recalls Samuel Huntington’s 1993 prediction that after the Cold War that there would not be peace, but ‘a clash of civilizations’ situated along the fault lines separating the West from various geographies of the Islamic non-West.  

5-What is your opinion about Iran’s attack on Israel and was it Iran’s right to attack Israel?

I am not familiar with the scale, targeting, damage, and details, but Israel had repeatedly provocatively attacked Iran previously without being itself attacked first, recently most strikingly by its assassination of the Hamas leader, Issmail Haniyeh, while he was visiting Iran to attend the inauguration of Massoud Pezeshkian as the new president. Iran certainly had a reprisal right, although the law of the Charter creates some ambiguity limiting international uses of forces to situation of self-defense against a prior armed attack (see UN Charter, Article 2(4), 51). Yet since many countries have claimed such a retaliatory right of reprisal it seems persuasive to argue that the Charter has been superseded by international practice, and the applicable tests of legality are related to such customary norms as proportionality, discrimination (as to targeting), and humanity (as to civilian innocence).

6-Why, despite the widespread protests in the United States? However, the United States still provides massive financial and military aid to Israel?

On the Middle East agenda, the US government is not being responsive to the people. The latter favor by a sizable majority a permanent ceasefire and a more balanced overall US approach to Israel and Palestine. Yet, the special interests associated with military sales and the policy goals of pro-Israeli lobbying organizations, especially AIPAC, are being accommodated by political elites in the US, and in most European countries.

The US situation is one where the pro-Israeli influence on politics is not balanced by pro-Palestinian influence in the venues of governmental authority (Congress, Presidency), which means that politicians have nothing to gain, and much to lose, if they are sympathetic to Palestinian grievances. Israel has effectively manipulated Diaspora Jews to make strong unconditional commitments to Israel financially and politically. Finally, the Holocaust and antisemitism continue to be deployed to punish those who go out of line by supporting Palestine or Iran.

7-What do you think about Iran’s behavior in supporting Palestine and Lebanon?

If you have any comments or suggestions. opinion, please write to us

I think such support as Iran has given, which is not known with any precision, is far less than what Israel and its Arab friends have received, and is thus legitimate as a reasonable

balancing involvement. Beyond this, by supporting Lebanon and the Palestinian struggle Iran is on the right side of history and of morality, while the US and the former coloniall powers of Europe are supporting the prime instance of 21st Century ‘settler colonialism’ and it genocidal disposition of the majority native population.

Palestine, Iran, and Populist Resistance: The Limits of Law, Morality, and the UN

3 May

[Prefatory Note: An interview with the Qods News Agency (Qodsna), the first specialized news agency in Iran, focusing on issues related to the Palestinian cause. The interview was published a week ago in Iran, and is reprinted in modified form that seeks to take account of the Palestinian struggle as connected with wider regional and global conflict patterns, and is giving rise to worldwidestudent protests against genocide and complicity with genocide, as well as a tidal wave of global consciousness sweeping away the cobwebs of political and moral complacency.]

  1. Given the fact that Israel has killed over 34,000 Palestinians in Gaza, mostly women and children, and prevented the entry of international humanitarian aid into the besieged strip, what is your opinion on nearly 200 days of onslaught in Gaza and its aftermath on Palestinians’ lives? How do you describe the genocidal onslaught and war crimes in Gaza?

What has taken place over the last 200 days in Gaza is the most transparent genocide in all of human history. It is the first time that the daily atrocities were broadcast and seen by the peoples of the world in real time. Past genocides have been known almost totally in retrospect through official reports, films and memoirs, which reconstruct horrifying events but after a passage of time. Those Palestinians who managed to survive physically such sustained violence of this extreme character are reported to be suffering from mental disabilities that could persist for their entire life. It is a tragic, dehumanizing ordeal, above all for children. It is further shocking that Israel should remain insulated from denunciation and accountability despite its continuing practice of such extreme criminality.

Genocide should be understood to exist from three quite distinct moral, political, and legal perspectives. The moral perspective is made clear in Gaza by the declared intentions, policies, and practices of Israel’s highest leaders, and carried out in a totally disproportionate, indiscriminate, and lawless manner, and aggravated by consistently sadistic and demeaning treatment of Palestinian civilians who fall under the control of the Israeli armed forces. The political perspective is established in Gaza by numerous trustworthy witnesses and victims, as well as by vivid visual evidence of genocide in line of justifications adopted by Israel and its supporters. Yet the political assurances about the commission of genocide is vulnerable, as here, to the be overridden by geopolitical considerations and strategic calculations. The legal perspective relies on the presentation of evidence and interpretations of international law, above all by the delineation of genocide in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). Provisional conclusions as to international law can be derived from the opinions of legal experts holding important professional positions. For instance, the current UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur for Occupied Palestine, Francesca Albanese issued an excellent report in March 25, 2024 entitled ‘Anatomy of a Genocide’ [A/HRC/55/73]that carefully analyzed the elements of the crime and concluded that the facts and law supported the allegation of genocide. And yet until a qualified national or international tribunal with jurisdictional authority to assess the charge of genocide examines the evidence and hears the arguments of the defendant government or political actor it is impossible to say with technical propriety that the behavior in question is genocide from a legal perspective.

2-How can the world public put pressure on governments to force Israel to stop atrocities in Gaza?

It has proven difficult to challenge Israel effectively at the UN and elsewhere. Powerful countries in the Global West are complicit in supporting Israel’s policies and practices, including Israel’s misleading claim that it possesses an unlimited right to defend itself in response to the Hamas attack of October 7. The liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America are prominent among governments lending varieties of support to Israel that extends to endorsing Israel’s gross distortions of facts and law, which has had a detrimental effect on the authority of international law and the UN. The US above all has been guilty of double standards, using international law as a policy instrument to attack its adversaries such as Russia and China and disregarding its relevance with respect to the behavior of allies and friends such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and India.

It is important to also understand the more passive complicity of Israel’s main Sunni Arab neighbors that fear challenges from Hamas-type Islamic movements more than intrusions on their autocratic stability associated with the establishment of Israel or post-colonial intrusions by Western powers. It was a surprise to many in the West that the governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia cooperated in defending Israel on April 13 against the Iranian retaliation for Israel’s April 1st attack on its Syrian consular facility, killing two of its top military advisors. This pattern of regime politics in the Arab world does not reflect the outlook of the population in these countries, which shares a strong affinity with the Palestinian struggle and is often oriented with Islamic leadership of populist, protest Arab politics as was evident during and after the Arab Spring.

South Africa has been applauded widely for taking the initiative to bring allegations of genocide to the International Court of Justice under Article XI of the Genocide Convention that legally empowers any party to the treaty to bring a dispute with another party before the ICJ. Although the ICJ rose above politics by rendering an historically important, near unanimous interim decision granting several of South Africa’s requests for Provisional Measures on January 26, 2024. Unfortunately, this preliminary ICJ order had little behavioral effect as Israel defied the interim obligatory adjustments in Gaza pending a subsequent decision on whether the allegation of genocide has been legally established after fully weighing pro and con arguments.

Israeli defiance and US dismissive attitude toward the authority of the ICJ given its view of Israeli violence in Gaza fully exposed ‘a UN crisis of implementation’ of great significance. Given Israel’s refusal to comply meant that any effort to enforce the ICJ Interim Orders would depend on action by the Security Council, which would almost certainly be vetoed by the United States. Additionally, an ICJ decision on the merits with respect to genocide must await comprehensive oral arguments and written pleadings, as well as the time needed by the judges to do their own inquiries, a legal process that would not be completed for several years, which would likely be after present emergency conditions in Gaza had been resolved for better or worse.

Nevertheless, the ICJ Interim Order was an impressive vindication of international law and a legitimating demonstration of the legal professionalism and political independence of the Court. It has also had an authenticating impact on the governments of the Global South and even more worldwide in relation to civil society, including even in the United States and other complicit countries where the surge of student pro-Palestinian protest activism cannot be wholly disconnected from the authoritative findings of the ICJ disregard in policy by Washington almost as much as by Tel Aviv. Whether this pressure will remain robust enough to result in coercive actions by way of boycotts and sanctions, and pariah status, remains to be seen, but at minimum it suggests that even in this unfavorable political setting international law and populist activism offer some hope that genocide can be stopped and its perpetrators held accountable, if not formally, then by the action of peoples around the world.   

3-What do you think about Palestinian resistance fighters’ right to initiate the October 7 operation against Israel?

The right of resistance on the part of a people long occupied and abused is well established. Prior to October 7, Israel’s commission of the crime of apartheid in its manner of governing the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian minority in Israel had been documented in detailed reports by several of the most respected human rights NGOs including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well as by the Israeli NGO, B’tselem, and by UN’s ESCWA.

While the right to resist is certainly justified by the conditions imposed over the long period of occupation, which featured Israeli failure to uphold its duty as Occupying Power to protect Palestinian civilians under its control, it does not confer unlimited rights of resistance. Tactics of resistance, as for other armed groups including those operating under the authority of a sovereign state, are obliged to comply with international criminal law, and not abuse or target civilians, impose collective punishment, and commit atrocities. Yet unlike the apartheid and genocide allegations against Israel, there is as yet no authoritative account of what happened on October 7. There were, at first, luridly exaggerated claims of barbarous behavior reported to the world by Israel, but later modified by retractions and much skepticism about Israel’s depiction of events on that day. Until an international factfinding commission is established and given full cooperation there will be doubt about the extent to which the criminality of the Hamas attack tainted its resistance claims, and the degree to which Israel itself was negligent about heeding warnings and otherwise responsible for the lapse of border security.

4-How can the Palestinian people achieve their rights and overcome the ongoing occupation?

The Palestinian people are winning the struggle for public support in civil society and among many governments in the Global South. The rise of popular support for Palestinian rights even in complicit governments may erode somewhat their willingness to continue normal relations with Israel. Whether this political post-Gaza reappraisal is enough at this stage to make a difference with regard to ending Israeli occupation is not clear at present. Prior anti-settler colonial struggles have been eventually won by a colonized people if they manage to survive the almost inevitable genocidal assault by settlers to their existence. The breakaway British colonies in North America, Australia, and New Zealand managed through genocidal tactics to marginalize or eliminate the resistance of native and indigenous peoples and complete their settler colonial projects; South Africa failed, and the project collapsed. Israel is in that space where it will either join the settler colonial ‘success’ stories or it will succumb to national resistance, with Jews either giving up the Jewish supremacy claims of Zionism or finding a means to coexist with Palestinians on the basis of true equality and mutual respect, presupposing a honest accounting of the past as with some sort of truth and reconciliation process that has smoothed a transition from repressiveness to constitutionalism. The best example of managing such a transition was South Africa, benefitting from the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, yet also experiencing bumps in the road along the way. Its pro-Palestinian ICJ initiative was a symbolically important way of honoring the enduring legacy of Mandela’s anti-apartheid struggle.

5-As you know, Israel attacked Iran’s consulate, killing its military advisors in Syria which is considered contrary to international conventions, which prompted a military response by the country. What is your take on Iran’s punitive response to Israel, especially in terms of international laws?

The Iranian retaliatory strike against Israel caused neither deaths nor damage, although had its array of missiles and large number of drones not been destroyed, it might have had a war-generating disproportionate effect. The interpretation of Iran’s retaliation remains ambiguous. Did it intend to display its military capabilities to attack Israel directly without inflicting major damage or was it an operational failure in the sense that the intention was to be as destructive as possible. Without clarity on this question, it is impossible to make an intelligent assessment of the relevance of international law to the events of April 13th.

The legal status of retaliatory violence is a gray area of conflicting opinions among law experts, often colored by political identities and jurisprudential orientations. On the one side are legalists who suggest that all retaliations violate the UN Charter and international law by validating uses of international force only in situations of a sustained armed attack across an international border. By this reading even a modest retaliation against the Damascus attack was not lawful.

As with other issues, this strict reading of international law is not descriptive of international practice with respect to acts of retaliation, which in practice over the years validate ‘reasonable’ retaliations so long as proportionate in relation to the provocation. Israel’s second attack on Iran, however, would seem to be unlawful as it ignored the reality that it initiating the cycle of violence on April 1st by its lethal attack on Iran’s consular facility in Damascus, and to regard it as entitled by any standard of law or reasonableness would tend to continue the cycle of interactive violence indefinitely.

Netanyahu Failed in Gaza, Tries to Widen War

20 Apr

I

[Prefatory Note: Interview by Mohammad Ali Haqshenas, initially published on April 20, 2024, by International Quran News Agency. In light of the relative mildness of the Israeli response, I would revise somewhat my responses below. It now seems either that the US reaction to the Damascus attack or the concerns of the Netanyahu war cabinet rejected, at least for now, the temptations of a wider war. Iran as well seemed to accept an outcome of its retaliation directed at Israel, resulting in neither death nor damage was nevertheless sufficient for its purposes. The overall situation remains unstable, and hence uncertain, but Netanyahu’s escaping accountability for failures in Gaza seems for the present to rule out the option of a wider war against Iran, with US active involvement.]

QNA – Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has failed to achieve goals in the “inhumane” war on Gaza and seeks to widen the conflict, a former UN special rapporteur says.

Netanyahu Failed in Gaza, Tries to Widen War: Ex-UN Rapporteur

“Netanyahu has failed to achieve the goals of Israel’s massively destructive and inhumane response to October 7, leaving his last best option, the widening of the war in ways that make Iran the main antagonist of Western interests,” Richard Anderson Falk, a professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University, told IQNA.

The comments come amid boiling tensions in the region after the Israeli regime targeted the consular section of the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria, on April 1.

The attack claimed lives of high-profile Iranian military personnel that were in Damascus on advisory mission.

Faced with the international organizations’ inaction, Tehran decided to respond to the attack. Iranian armed forces launched Operation True Promise with dozens of drones and missiles against military targets in Israeli-occupied territories on April 14.

What follows is the full text of the interview with Professor Falk about the issue: 

IQNA: What do international laws and conventions say when it comes to targeting a country’s diplomatic mission?

Falk: The immunity of consular facilities from international attack is one of the most widely respected and uncontroversial commitments of international law as formalized by the Vienna Convention on Consular Immunity. Even without this Convention Israel would be bound by a similar body of constraints that are considered part of “customary international law” or enjoying the status of “jus cogens” norms, binding on all sovereign states whether or not a treaty exists, and in the event that a treaty exists, being a non-party does not relieve a government of a sovereign state to comply with the legal framework.

In this instance such arguments are unnecessary as both Israel and Iran are parties to the Vienna Convention as are another 191 states. 

IQNA: Following the Israeli strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Tehran urged the United NationsSecurity Council to condemn the strike but the Council failed to do that due to the US support for Israel. What does this inaction mean when we take into account the responsibilities of the UN to maintain international peace?

Falk: Such action in the UNSC by the USA to insulate Israel from its obligation to comply with international law with regard to consular and embassy immunity is a reminder that when it comes to enforcing international law, the UN was designed to be weak, giving a right of veto to the five countries victorious in World War II, which arguably is the UN’s greatest deficiency when it comes to achieving the paramount war prevention goals of the UN.

In effect, the 1945 architects of the UN subordinated upholding international law to according primacy to these five geopolitical actors in relation to enforcement or even interpretation of relevant legal obligations. Although only five countries are accorded a right of veto in the UN Charter, it has been used, especially by the US to thwart the will of the majority of states and of members of the UN by being extended to shield “friends” and allies from accountability.

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Some years ago the Turkish leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, complained about this situation by the pithy phrase “the world is greater than five.” The world may be greater, but the UN is not. There are many situations of this kind concerned with securing compliance with international law by UN members who cannot veto a proposed UN decision but enjoy a sufficient special relationship with one of the five that suffices to block any UN enforcement initiative taken against it.

IQNA: What are the long-term implications for international law if such attacks go unchecked?

Falk: The implications for international law are what they have always been in modern times. When the obligations of law clash with the strategic interests of powerful states, geopolitical policies prevail, and the core obligation of the rule of law (treating equals, equally) is ignored. This generalization applies to the pre-UN history of international relations.

A good example is the war crimes trials conducted at Nuremberg and Tokyo in 1945 where the crimes of the victors were exempted from legal scrutiny while the crimes of the losers were the subject of indictment, prosecution, and punishment. More concretely, the atomic bombings of Japanese cities and the strategic bombing of German cities were accorded impunity. A double standard highlighted by being described as “victors’ justice.”

It is a mistake to conclude that international law is useless because of this subordination to geopolitics. For one thing, an effective international legal order is essential to sustain the stability of relations in most areas of interaction among sovereign states. Trade, investment, finance, communications, travel and tourism, diplomacy are among the areas of international life that depend on mutuality of interests and the practice of equality when it comes to enforcement and implementation.

Many would insist that the US has weakened the UN by its “irresponsible statecraft.”

Beyond this, “responsible statecraft” by dominant states (‘dominance’ does not refer to the same political actors that possess veto rights at the UN) can unilaterally exercise restraint in the use of the veto or in pursuing conflictual behavior. Many would insist that the US has weakened the UN by its “irresponsible statecraft.” The extent to which the US has managed relations between the UN and Israel in an excessive manner is illustrative.  It is as much a reflection of domestic political considerations as it is of the international conflictual context.

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Even when international law is flagrantly violated as it was in the Damascus attack, and Israel is protected against a punitive response at the UN, the impact on world opinion, global solidarity initiatives, and the clarification of legitimacy ensure that international law plays a role in the behavior of states. Populist action often influences the actions of leading geopolitical actors.

In the post-1945 anti-colonial wars the weaker side militarily generally prevailed politically, in part because international law and the flow of history was on their side. Transnational activism in the form of boycotts and sanctions often is vindicated by assessments that the targeted country is violating international law in serious ways.

International law, even if not implemented by the inter-governmental order of states or by the UN, is helpful in mobilizing civil society to take a variety of nonviolent coercive actions.

In short, international law, even if not implemented by the inter-governmental order of states or by the UN, is helpful in mobilizing civil society to take a variety of nonviolent coercive actions. This dynamic contributed to the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa 30 years ago and it is mounting ever stronger pressure on Israel in light of its Gaza genocide, further justified by its defiance of international law.   

IQNA: Iran said it used its legitimate right to self-defense by launching strikes against Israel. What do international laws say about this?

Falk: There are several issues present. Does a single attack of this nature, however unlawful, engage the right of self-defense as specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. This Charter definition is linked to “a prior armed attack” as distinct from an act of aggression, but given the paralysis in the UN, it might be deemed reasonable in view of the frequency of past lethal violations of Iran’s sovereign rights and the failure to take any punitive action against Israel’s defiant attitude in shaping national policy in the security domain.

A further international law issue concerns matters of proportionality and discrimination. Estimates vary as to the scale of the Iranian attack involving 170 or more drones, 120 ballistic missiles, and 30 cruise missiles, and yet little damage resulted, and no one killed. As Iran gave some notice of its planned retaliation to the US and other governments, it may have intended, as some commentators have suggested, that its retaliation for Israel’s responsibility in relation to the Damascus attack, its retaliation to be symbolic and performative, rather than a full-scale attack as suggested by the array of drones and missiles.

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To some extent, because of enforceability issues, what a state does in retaliation for such one-off violation of its sovereignty is assessed and judged in relation to precedents reflecting past practice. If deemed to be consistent with such practice it is legitimized and widely viewed as reasonable, whereas if not, it is regarded as unacceptably provocative. Israel has reacted to the Iranian attack of April 14 as an unacceptable provocation, despite its own prior attack causing high-profile Iranian deaths and the paucity of damage inflicted by Iran’s retaliation. Israel is proposing a retaliation to Iran’s retaliation. If Israel carries out its threat in a way that causes death and destruction in Iran it is almost certain to escalate the conflict in dangerous ways. When acting in these grey sectors of law, such as the law governing international retaliation, the criterion of reasonableness offers some guidance to both actor and responder. Of course, perceptions of reasonableness may vary greatly.

IQNA: Some analysts believe that the Israeli regime targeted the consulate to escalate tensions with Iran and use this as a cover to continue its massacre of Palestinians in Gaza. What is your take on this and how can Tel Aviv be held accountable for its crimes in Gaza?

Falk: As suggested above, Netanyahu has failed to achieve the goals of Israel’s massively destructive and inhumane response to October 7, leaving his last best option, the widening of the war in ways that make Iran the main antagonist of Western interests. The backgrounding of the Ukraine War in light of the events in Gaza lend plausibility to this kind of ‘politics of deflection.’ Israel is a master of shifting public attention from its crimes to its critics or to lesser objects of concern.

Achieving accountability in a legal sense is almost impossible so long as the Global West, especially the US, supports Israel. Any sort of attempt at imposing accountability through the UN can be blocked by casting a veto in the Security Council, which the US has not been reluctant to do. Accountability in its political sense could be achieved if Israel is treated by many governments in the Global South as a “pariah state” as was the experience of apartheid South Africa; also important are solidarity initiatives rooted in civil society activism. Accountability in a moral sense is exhibited by public expressions of outrage on the part of peoples the world over as well as by the frustrations caused by unenforceability of ICJ decisions.   

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IQNA: What do you think about the efforts of the ICJ to hold Israel accountable for its genocide in Gaza, especially given that the regime is planning an attack on Rafah where more than 1.5 million displaced have taken refuge?

Falk: This question raises complicated issues. The initiative in the ICJ has been greatly important for passing judgment on Israel’s moral and political wrongdoing with respect to the Gaza genocide yet limited in effectiveness. The ICJ has been unable to implement the persuasive legal pronouncements of its Interim Orders of January and March instructing Israel to take actions to mitigate further suffering of the Palestinian people. Israel has refused compliance, backed by the US, and seems poised to go ahead with its threatened attack on grossly overcrowded Rafah, with expectations of shockingly high casualties.

The ICJ and the UN generally are neutralized by “a crisis of implementation.” In the face of stubborn geopolitical resistance, it lacks the mandate, will, and capabilities to enforce international law, let alone promote global justice. If the UN became more robustly endowed, an obvious undertaking would be to form an International Protection Force that would give meaning to the Responsibility to Protect norm. As things are, such a justifiable response to genocide is unthinkable, which conveys a lot about why so many people are disappointed by or frustrated with the UN.

Professor Richard Anderson Falk is the author or co-author of 20 books and the editor or co-editor of another 20 volumes. In 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) appointed him to a six-year term as a United Nations Special Rapporteur on “the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967”.

The views and opinions expressed in this interview are solely those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the view of International Quran News Agency.

Innovative Regional Dialogue: Iran, Iraq, and Six Gulf Countries

7 Aug

[Prefatory Note: The post below is a modified text of an August 2, 2023 interview by the Iranian journalist, Javad Heiran-Nia. The text containing my responses was published in the periodical, Tahrir Bazaar [link: < https://www.tahlilbazaar.com/news/235594/Professor-Falk-China-s-influence-in-the-Persian-Gulf-has-worried>] The focus is upon the regional dialogue scheduled for September 2023 between Iran and Iraq and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), formed in 1981. It is a notable recent breakthrough by way of a new series of diplomatic initiatives to replace tensions with stability in the Middle East, and in the process gaining political independence from U.S./Israel hegemony. This development also reflects the increased involvement of China in the region, most strongly evident in promoting normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and by creating the political space to give Saudi Arabia and OPEC the self-confidence needed to set oil production and pricing on the basis of national interests rather than in response to international pressures exerted by oil-importing countries.]    


1. It is planned to hold a meeting this September at the initiative of the Secretary General of the United Nations with the participation of the foreign ministers of eight countries of Iran and Iraq and GCC members. The Secretary General’s initiative for regional dialogue is included in UN Security Council Resolution 598, which led to the end of the Iran-Iraq war. What is your assessment of this meeting?

It is notable that SC Res. 598 adopted in 1987 has not yet been implemented more than 35 years later. In view of the intervening conflicts, especially the Gulf War in 1991 and the US/UK in 2003 attack on Iraq, which was undertaken without UN authorization and in violation of the UN Charter this long delay is hardly surprising. Violations included recourse to international sanctions, non-defensive force, ‘shock and awe’ tactics. regime-changing intervention, prolonged occupation, denial of sovereign rights, failed state-building, it is notable that this old conflict resolution and war prevention resolution is being revived in this new serious, seemingly stability-seeking spirit. At this stage it is difficult to anticipate what will result from the September meeting because of the diverse motivations of the direct participants and attitudes of such leading influential international actors as the U.S. and China have not been disclosed. The willingness of the eight participating states to agree to hold an exploratory regional dialogue that includes Iran and Iraq is itself an encouraging development, suggesting that Israel, as well as the United States’ has less regional leverage in 2023 than previously for several interrelated reasons.

It is worthy of comment that the forthcoming regional dialogue is structured in a way that brings Iran and Iraq into conversation with Gulf countries rather than the entire Arab Middle East or the region as a whole. Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen have been excluded (along with Israel), and presumably were never invited. This diplomatic framework with its ad hoc sponsorship can also be understood as substituting the regional and sub-regional actors for the U.S. and even China as a preferred path to realizing a ‘comprehensive, just, honorable, and durable’ peace specified long ago in this Security Council initiative that was original a response to the long destructive war between Iraq and Iran. What lies behind such an extensive wording of peaceful relations in the contemporary setting has not been publicly disclosed at this point. It will become clearer in the course of the conference in September provided transcripts of the meetings are released or at least. a concluding Declaration is issued, the assembled foreign ministers meet with the media before and after the event, and most significantly agree to meet again or to keep meeting periodically.

The fact that it is a meeting of foreign ministers, and neither lower-level national representatives nor higher-level heads of state, suggests a rather strong commitment to the event by the participating governments. At the same time, there is no expectation that this single dialogue event,  no matter how successful the meeting and upbeat the Declaration, will itself produce immediate or spectacular results. It is best conceived as a promising beginning of a long overdue process of reconciliation and coexistence.

Iran stands to gain most from the event, and an ensuing process, as it is definitely a step toward reintegration into the normal politics and economics of the region and away from continued isolation. Saudi Arabia may also gain increased credibility for its recent efforts to pursue a more independent regional diplomacy, which at times has departed rather pointedly from the policies preferred by the U.S. Or maybe this event is favored because it somewhat balances and offsets Riyadh’s long rumored move toward a normalization of its relations with Israel. At this point, such conjectures should not be taken too seriously. The fact that the conference is taking place at all is a hopeful breakthrough considering the conflictual atmosphere of recent decades in the Middle East, particularly in interactions with Iran. A major unknown involves the extent to which non-participating regional and extra-regional actors will exert obstruct proceedings from behind the scenes.

2. After the improvement of the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia, improvement in the relations between Iran and other Arab countries can be seen. To what extent can creating a mechanism for regional dialogue be successful in such an atmosphere?

This UN sponsored conference seems definitely to parallel recent inter-governmental diplomacy that began normalizing Iran’s relationship with the Arab World after decades of tension and hostile engagement as in the course of the Syrian War that began in 2011. The September conference can also be contextualized in relation to declining U.S. hegemonic ambitions, capabilities, and strategic priorities in the region, and a slowly shifting geographic emphasis on attaining stability. A further consideration is the interplay between Israel’s search for diplomatic normalcy with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, and this Iran/Iraq/Gulf move toward normalization of relations as a foundation for achieving internal cohesion and stability.

Also relevant is the rise of other regional concerns on the part of the U.S. and others, including non-political challenges within the region encouraging replacing conflictual relations with. cooperative ones on a priority basis. Severe stresses are already being experienced throughout the Middle attributable to severe global warming, which has brought record heat impairing health and even threatening future livability within the region. Responsible statecraft of regional actors needs more than ever to focus its problem-solving capabilities on these new threats to wellbeing arising out of rising instabilities between modernizing economies and the natural habitat. In this sense, militarism and warfare become expensive distractions from too longed delayed efforts to achieve national and human security given the greatly altered ecological and political conditions in the contemporary world.

3. Following the reduction of America’s presence in the region, diplomacy in the region regarding important security issues for the countries of the region has increased. Do you evaluate this process as tactical or strategic?

It seems to me that caution is in order about present and near future regional roles of major non-Middle East actors. Not only are political differences being reexamined under present conditions, but also the prospect of achieving peaceful coexistence as between the Gulf monarchies and the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite their continued adherence to antagonistic traditions of Islamic theology and practice. Another uncertainty concerns whether recent American preoccupations elsewhere in the world, especially Ukraine and Taiwan, have given Saudi leaders the confidence needed to keep engaging with Iran and others beyond its borders giving priority to its national interests. Also relevant is whether prolonged suffering from regional hostility and an international sanctions regime has increased Iran’s interest in the potential benefits of dialogue, especially if it is allowed to be a stepping-stone toward reconciliation and relations based on common interests and mutual benefits. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have likely been negatively affected by their antagonistic involvements in the political turmoil in Yemen, which may partly underlie their joint willingness to substitute stability for conflict as the cornerstone of their future national security.

4. China’s participation in the region – although it does not have a wide military and security aspect at the moment – what effect will it have on regional trends?

The increased diplomatic activism of China contrasts with the essentially militarized diplomacy practiced previously by the United States in the region often openly in support of Saudi and Israeli goals, as in Yemen or with respect to the Palestinian struggle for basic rights. I believe China’s surprisingly skillful effort to achieve a dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran has created confusion in Washington. Should the U.S. attempt to reassert its hegemonic ambitions through coercive diplomacy or should it pursue its own version of normalizing and stability-oriented diplomacy in the region? To what extent is China motivated by its concerns relating to energy security and assurances of access to Gulf oil? And to what extent is China sending the U.S. Government a message to the effect if it intrudes on the traditional Indo-Pacific preoccupations of China, then China will reciprocate by intruding in areas where there has been a strong U.S. presence.

As I consider the Ukraine War to be partly about geopolitical alignments after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, much will depend on whether global security maintains its unipolar structure that emerged after the Soviet implosion in 1992 or reverts to some new type of bipolarity (perhaps China/Russia v. NATO/India) or transitions to forms of multipolarity that seek a greater reliance on cooperative global problem-solving for the sake of national, and even more, human security.

5. To what extent can commercial relation and economic interdependency be used for regional dialogues?

I believe that robust commercial relations under most conditions produce positive forms of economic interdependency, which in turn strengthens processes of conflict-resolving dialogue. Such a momentum also builds the political foundations for increases in trade, investment, tourism, cultural exchanges in the common interest, yielding mutual benefits. And yet such economic dimensions cannot be assumed as necessarily having these positive effects. It depends on the perceive balancing of complex interests and often contradictory perceptions, as well as the presence or absence of geopolitical pressures. It is difficult to generalize about such matter, which always depend on contextual factors, which are constantly in flux.

For reasons suggested earlier, regional and global developments currently support stabilizing diplomacy and the expansion of mutually beneficial economic relations among countries that have spent the last half century or more in unproductive, costly, dangerous conflict. The impact of such developments on relations with Israel, especially considering that the current internal ferment in that country remains a great, yet relevant, unknown. If the extremist Netanyahu government manages to hold onto power it may try to distract attention from internal confrontations by restoring national unity by recourse to actions that deliberately increase regional tensions, especially with Iran, backed by inflammatory claims that Israel’s national security is at stake. It is questionable whether this old diversionary game will work under present conditions, but moves in that direction could be dangerous nevertheless. Also, dangerous and posing regional and extra-regional challenges would be the implementation of annexationist and one-state visions on the part of the apartheid, settler colonial, Jewish exclusionary state of Israel.  

Is it Time to Stop Bullying Iran? Washington Should Restore the Nuclear Program Agreement with Iran Now

4 Sep

[Prefatory Note: A somewhat modified text of an article published by COUNTERPUNCH on Sept. 2, 2022. I recommend CP highly for anyone seeking to follow the best quality progressive commentary on global issues; also, follow Transcend Media Service (TMS) for a more global, academic, and cultural orientation heavily influenced by the pioneering work of Johan Galtung in the area of peace studies broadly conceived).

In the post below I call particular attention to the fact that the relevance of Israel’s nuclear weapons unregulated weapons capabilities and regional militarism has been totally overlooked in assessing the negotiations on whether the U.S. should rejoin the JCPOA, which Trump unilaterally withdrew from in 2018, reviving the agreement. Israel’s influence on the nature of the bargain reached for renewal and the side benefits that it will receive as ‘compensation’ for overriding its faux opposition to the agreement as articulated by its leading political figures. It illustrates the distortion of global policy debates whenever the domestic politics of the U.S. are entangled with the way an issue is resolved even sometimes, as here, at the cost of maximizing national interests.]To Renew or Not to Renew the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement, That is the Question

Photograph Source: United States Department of State – Public Domain

The Road Not Taken

After two weeks in Iran during latter part of January 1979, the height of the revolutionary movement against the dynastic, autocratic rule of Mohammed Reza Shah, I had the opportunity for an extended conversation with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in his tent where he received foreign visitors and journalists during his final days in Paris. This was the individual who would serve as uncontested Iranian leader, officially the Supreme Guide of the Islamic Republic of Iran until his death in 1989.

I was accompanied at the meeting by Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Attorney General and major progressive personality at the time in the United States and Don Luce, a prominent and courageous anti-war religiously oriented activist who gained worldwide fame in 1970 by departing from a prescribed tour route to expose a visiting delegation of U.S. Congress members to the notorious ‘tiger cages’ in Con Son Prison in Saigon, a major facility in South Vietnam that had become a repeated focus of severe torture allegations. During our time together in Iran we met many religious leaders and secular supporters of the popular uprising, individuals who would soon be running the government. We witnessed extraordinary displays of mass popular excitement in the country and anxious sighs of disbelief that greeted the news that the Shah had abdicated the Peacock Throne, and as it turned out, leaving Iran never to return.

There are many aspects of this meeting that are worth recalling but one stands out for me as having current relevance more than 43 years later. Immediately after greetings were exchanged, Ayatollah Khomeini carefully posed a question to us that seemed uppermost in his mind, more so than any of the topics covered in the ensuing two hours or so of questions and answers, with the three of us raising most of the questions. But the Ayatollah’s question came first, and it turned out to be the one where our words of response earned the full attention of this religious leader: “Do we think that the U.S. Government will repeat its intervention of 1953 that overthrew a popularly elected government and restored the Shah as Iran’s dynastic leader?” Later Ayatollah Khomeini confided that he had “only entered politics because there was a river of blood between the ruler and the people of Iran.”

We each responded along these lines: “Of course, we could not know for sure how Washington will act, but we believed the U.S. had learned some lessons from the past, including the awkwardness of supporting coups that brought to power repressive leaders while professing to lead ‘the free world’ against Communism and Soviet expansionism. We also stressed the recent failure of intervention in Vietnam and the apparent strength and unity of the movement that overthrew the Shah, as well as our impressions of the Iranian military as beset by divided loyalties, as well as institutionally weakened by the Shah’s own distrust of the leadership of the armed forces.”

We also called to the attention of the Ayatollah, on the basis of our meeting a few days earlier in Tehran with the American Ambassador in Iran, William Sullivan, who told us that he had forwarded repeated similar assessments to the White House, and a supposedly liberal president, Jimmy Carter, that the movement against the Shah’s government enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Iranian people and that even the leadership of the Iranian armed force was resigned to the acceptance of the political outcome. On this basis, Sullivan recommended an immediate and urgent  U.S. Government effort to reassure the leaders of the Iranian revolutionary movement that it sought normal and positive relations with whatever government emerged in Iran during the ensuing weeks.

Ayatollah Khomeini was a formidable presence, pondered our comments, and slowly responded in almost these exact words, “If what you are telling us is accurate, and comes to pass, then we have no objection to the Shah coming to the U.S. or elsewhere for medical treatment, and we can have normal relations with your country.” Of course, this road was not the path taken by either country, which has resulted in enormous adverse consequences for Iran and the Middle East as a whole, with distorting effects that have been playing out over the intervening decades, which are shamelessly generating skepticism and propaganda about the U.S. rejoining the JCPOA, thus setting the stage for another phase of dangerous outcomes whether the Iran Nuclear Agreement is restored or not in 2022.

There were already present some worrisome signs back in 1979 that made such an exploratory attempt to accept this dramatic internal display of the human rights of all peoples to self-determination unlikely to materialize without generating geopolitical friction. The U.S. National Security Advisor at the time, Zbigniew Brzezinski, strongly favored a commitment to once again restore the Shah to his throne, and had a strong influence on President Carter’s thinking, which was given priority over Sullivan’s strong advice based on his direct knowledge of the realities in Iran.

Meanwhile, in Iran there were some strong words being uttered by militants about the revolutionary intentions of Iran extending to the whole of the Islamic world, and especially the Gulf monarchies, which sent strategic chills down the backs of Western foreign policy elites extremely sensitive in those days to any further strategic threats to Gulf oil reserves. In the background was Israel aware of the pro-Palestinian, anti-Zionist leadership emerging in Tehran, which set off loud alarms in reaction to some anti-Zionist rhetoric of the more militant leaders in the early period of the Islamic Republic. In any event, normalization between the two countries was not to be, however much sense it made with respect to peace, security, and self-determination back then and now.

Lines from a much quoted poem by Robert Frost are worth reflecting upon given this exchange of views more than 43 years ago.

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.

Recontextualizing Nonproliferation for Some, Nuclearism for Others

Restoring JCPOA through Negotiations.

It needs to be emphasized that Trump unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 JCPOA and reimposed punitive sanctions (‘maximum pressure’) on Iran that inflicted many hardships on the civilian population despite the fact that Iran had been in full compliance with the terms of the agreement up through 2018 as confirmed by IAEA periodic inspections. It appears that Trump was induced by his ardent Zionist son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and leaders in Israel, especially the Prime Minister at the time, Bibi Netanyahu. Trump seemed thus persuaded to denounce the agreement as a terrible deal from a security perspective, providing a justification for U.S. withdrawal, but seemed no more than a pragmatic rationalization to cover a calculated political move. Not irrelevant, although further in the background is the powerful Iranian expatriate presence in the United States that has not given up on restoring secular rule in Iran, and views any kind of normalizing of relations with Iran to be ‘appeasement.’ Consider the recent shrill declaration to this effect by the eldest son of the autocratic Shah:

  • “This shift to appeasement was never going to solve any of the world’s issues with the Islamic Republic. The regime’s problem with the West is the West’s very existence, which obstructs its path to a global caliphate.” Reza Pahlavi, eldest son of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2022.

In the drawn-out Vienna negotiations on restoring the agreement the U.S. has been under constant public pressure from Israel and the Gulf monarchies to extract concessions from Iran bearing on matters outside the scope of the nuclear agreement. It would seem more plausible for the U.S. Government to have been confronted by demands from Iran for reparations for the harm it experienced by restoring, and intensifying, the sanctions since 2018. This bad faith behavior of the U.S. sets a dreadful precedent for the reliability of non-treaty international commitments. The fact that Iran has been prepared to go along with such a one-sided negotiating format undoubtedly reflects their motivation to gain relief from sanctions, and may also reinforce the sincerity of Iran’s continuing declared intention never to acquire nuclear weapons. Building trust in international relations presupposes mutual good faith adherence to carefully negotiated arrangements. At the very least, Biden should have humbly apologized to Iran for the disruptive 2018 withdrawal, and despite his legal inability to bind future presidents, he might have regained some higher ground by pledging to respect the agreements for as long as he remains president, and more rapidly moved to end sanctions once the agreement was restored.

It is worth comparing the extravagant language of the August 14th Biden-Lapid Joint Jerusalem Declaration of Strategic Partnership in which Biden not only affirmed a long-term U.S. commitment, audaciously proclaiming it as ‘bipartisan’ even ‘sacrosanct.’ The following language deserves scrutiny in light of the Vienna impasse::

“Consistent with the longstanding security relationship between the United States and Israel and the unshakable U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, and especially to the maintenance of its qualitative military edge, the United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to preserve and strengthen Israel’s capability to deter its enemies and to defend itself   by itself against any threat or combination of threats. The United States  further reiterates that these commitments are bipartisan and sacrosanct, and that they are not only moral commitments, but also strategic  commitments that are vitally important to the national security of the United States itself.’

Confirming Israel’s Nuclear Hegemony in the Middle East.

It has been completely ignored by the Western media that Iran has made a huge concession when it entered the Obama promoted Nuclear Agreement in 2015 (JCPOA) without an insistence that Israel simultaneously commit to destroying  its arsenal of nuclear weapons. As the agreement was negotiated, at least in public, there were no assurances required of Israel, not even something as intangible as requiring Israel to issue a No First Use Declaration. It was to be expected that Israel and the United States would remain silent about solidifying Western control of the region, and especially the signature feature of the ‘strategic partnership,’ the. crux of which is retaining sole possession of the ultimate weapon of destructive violence. Yet Israel, in particular, seems empowered enough to insist on receiving firm assurances that the U.S. would prevent Iran from ever acquiring nuclear weapons by all means necessary (again without drawing into question Israel’s retention of such weapons without any disclosure of its intentions with respect to threat or use). The language of commitment in the Jerusalem Declaration puts the U.S. in the position of committing itself to a use of force without any hint of or apparent need for a further legal authorization. Again the language of the Jerusalem Declaration is important:

“The United States stresses that integral to this pledge is the commitment never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that it is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”

Even this was apparently not enough for Israeli security hawks who wanted the pledge to pertain to any perceived steps toward acquisition.

Such an explicit bilateral strategic commitment as contained in the Jerusalem Declaration seems to overlook Iran’s completely valid legal and political option, if it wishes to rely upon it, to withdraw from the NPT, which it is entitled to do under Article X(1) of the treaty:

‘1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall    include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”

Given Israel’s threats, its nuclear capabilities, its strategic partnership with the U.S., withdrawal would seem an entirely reasonable course of action for Iran to take. If deterrence can serve as a security justification under the NPT, it would seem few states in the world could make as strong a case as Iran.

Taking Nonproliferation Seriously. 

There is a further consideration. If the United States were taking the ethos of nonproliferation seriously it would be concentrating on denuclearizing the Middle East as a region rather than acting to preserve Israel nuclear hegemony. The obvious way to achieve such a result would be to support the negotiation of a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone together with a non-aggression security framework. All states except for Israel have supported such an initiative, including Iran and Saudi Arabia. It would be a breakthrough for peace and security, besides freeing billions for more constructive uses.

The NPT regime is not the best path to non-use of the weaponry in a state-centric world. The NPT, however, it may be best path if the true geopolitical objective is to retain oligopolistic control over nuclear weapons. Phased disarmament within a treaty framework is the only promising path if the overriding objective is to achieve a world free from this infernal weaponry.

A start in this benevolent direction has been made in the Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) negotiated under UN auspices and coming into force in 2021. But to gain political traction sufficient to provide a post-nuclear security framework it require to receive the support of the current nine nuclear weapons states. None have so far become Parties to TPNW, and the three NATO nuclear weapons states, the U.S., France, and the UK, along with Russia have issued statements expressing their principled opposition and unconditional rejection of a disarmament approach, despite its promise of total nonproliferation.

A Concluding Remark

If we are destined to live with nuclear weapons, we may have to endure the nuclear hegemony of the P-5, but to use the NPT ethos to justify discriminatory treatment of a non-nuclear state such as Iran seem to be an extremely regressive geopolitical undertaking. For this reason alone, people of good will should hope for the unconditional renewal of the JCPOA. It is time for the morally attuned public to awake to the reality that a nuclear Israel has neither a security justification nor political grounds for its posture of continuing bullying of Iran. To complain about Iran’s political solidarity with some movements in the region as Israel does is gross hypocrisy. It pales in its gravity compared if fairly to the U.S. and Israel’s discretionary bombing, political assassinations, interventions, and violations of the basic sovereign rights of countries in the Middle East..

Remembering Ramsey Clark

12 Apr

Remembering Ramsey Clark

Ramsey Clark was a great man, and it was my privilege to work with him closely on several occasions. His death is a time to mourn, but it is also a time to remember who he was and why his life mattered in profound ways to so many people. 

I first met Ramsey under somewhat unusual circumstances. It was not long after the ending of the infamous Chicago 8 trial of 1969 that prompted Ramsey’s withdrawal from government, and it was just prior to the Harrisburg Kissinger Kidnapping Trial of Philip Berrigan, Elizabeth McAlister, Eqbal Ahmed, and several other for a fanciful alleged plot to kidnap Henry Kissinger while he was Secretary of State, at attractive phantasy but never planned beyond the musings of anti-war imaginaries. There were concerns about the future wellbeing of these idealistic defendants. because Harrisburg was deemed a conservative site for such a trial and that attempted kidnapping might produce lengthy prison sentences. With these considerations in mind, these defendants believed that it would be inflammatory to have the defense team led by a theatrical celebrity lawyer like William Kunstler who was seen as likely taunting and probably antagonizing judge, jury, and community. It was feared by friends of the defendants that such tensions could lead to a harsher sentence, however outlandish the charges.

The three best known defendants were my close friends, and I was asked to go meet Ramsey in Washington and see if he might be willing to represent the Berrigan/McAlister defense, which was delicate, as Bill Kunstler was their longtime devoted lawyer, friend, and devoted comrade. Ramsey was still in his Washington office shortly after leaving the government as its Attorney General, accompanied by gossip that LBJ hoped that Ramsey would become the next Texan to become a U.S. President. I was somewhat nervous about such a mission and intimidated by the prospect of meeting on my own about an ultra-sensitive issue with this high profile former government official who had this recent change of heart with respect to the Vietnam War. 

My anxieties were misplaced. I arrived on time, and was immediately ushered into Ramsey’s office, directed to a comfortable seat while he finished a phone call. As soon as I sat down, Ramsey tossed me a box of triscuits that had been on his desk, and fortunately I caught it or else legal history might have turned out differently. But what was disclosed by this trope was Ramsey’s unpretentious, casual, folksy, humble, and unassuming manner, which was a bit disconcerting as it was combined with a laser sharp mind and a character that could stand his ground as firmly as the most prized Texas Longhorn steer. When Ramsey’s phone call ended we talked without formality, as if friendly cousins who had much in common and had not seen each other recently. Our conversation ended with Ramsey agreeing to visit Philip Berrigan in a Danbury, Connecticut jail where he was serving time for prior acts of civil disobedience. Ramsey went on to represent and befriend the famed Berrigan brothers, at first only Philip at Harrisburg, bonded with them and the others on the legal team, and staked his claim, never to be relinquished, as America’s once mainstream nationally prominent civil servant, who became in the years after his heralded departure from government a renegade to those who identified with the establishment and a legendary hero to those of us who thirsted for progressive change.

For me Ramsey was a great man because of two extraordinary qualities:

–he never allowed his formidable ambition and public reputation stand in the way of principled action,resigning with cause from the highest echelons of government, burning his bridges of return by identifying openly with the radical wing of the anti-Vietnam War Movement. It has long surprised me how rare such displays of conscience are in American public lifeI could think of only Daniel Ellsberg who came close, who although acting from a lower level of prominence, made his notorious break with the government by way of high drama featuring the release of a large dossier of classified official documents relating to Vietnam policy, known to us as the Pentagon Papers that he expected to land him in prison for a lengthy sentence. Ramsey never wavered, and as far as I can tell, never regretted this momentous change from looking down from the pinnacles of public authority to looking up from the trenches of struggle on behalf of thoae marginalized and vulnerable at home and abroad. Ramsey, in common again with Dan, never lost his faith that the American way, politically and constitutionally, was the best path for governance, but if and only if it lived up to the Jeffersonian vision of political democracy so early encapsulated in the Declaration of Independence, which critics insist was already relegated to museum viewings by the more property-minded conservative U.S. Constitution.  

–Ramsey second quality that so impressed me was his fearlessness in the face of danger. We went together with Philip Luce to Iran at the climax of the revolution in early 1979, and had some harrowing experiences that shook my composure while leaving him unphased. I recall with especial vividness, as if yesterday, being together for lunch in the Iranian religious city of Qom after having just had an intellectually stimulating meeting with a leading Islamic figure, Ayatollah Shariat Maderi, who we were told was the best theological mind in Iran. After enjoying a simple Persian lunch on the central square, we ventured outside for a walk, soon to be confronted by young Iranians of high school age who identified us as Americans. They shouted in English chilling slogans: “Death to the Shah, Death to Americans.” Before we realized what was happening, hundreds more were attracted by the spectacle, some carrying posters with the picture of Ayatollah Khomeini. Two youthful ardent mullahs took over the spontaneous gathering, leading the chanting that raised the mob temperature to a fever pitch, which I interpreted as the prelude to a lynching. Ramsey standing tall amid the bloodthirsty crowd was as calm as if cutting a birthday cake. 

As might be obvious as I survived to recall the incident, our guides from Tehran finally managed to convince the mullahs that we were not CIA operatives or off-duty American soldiers, but had come to Iran at this time at the personal invitation of Mehdi Bazargan so as to understand that a popular revolution was underway, which was  revolutionary determined to transform the country but hoped it could avoid a feared U.S. intervention of the kind that had displaced the democratically elected Mohamed Mossadeq in 1953. With the switch in crowd mood from hostile to hospitable, Ramsey was fully at ease, while it took me time to quell my anxieties of a few minutes earlier when I was sure that I was on the verge of experiencing a bloody ending of my life. As it happened, we had meetings back in Tehran, declining offers of dinner by our former tormentors, and left in peace with the blessings of those whose chants had called for our death a short while ago.

–Ramsey had a third quality, which for most of us would have been sufficient to make most of us feel fulfilled in life, but for him merely added luster to those virtuous qualities that I believe he would have most wanted to be remembered for—principle above all else and fearlessness. As I was earning bread and board as a salaried intellectual, Ramsey’s third special quality aalone aroused my envy, knowing that the first two were beyond my reach. Ramsey possessed a prodigious storehouse of quotations from Rousseau, Jefferson, Locke, Oliver Wendell Holmes, FDR, JFK, Churchill, Martin Luther King, Jr., and many others that he inserted effortlessly into his many extemporaneous talks during our times together, conveying the impression that he had internalized the wisdom of the ages. In addition, he was able to recall and distinguish what we were told by the numerous political and religious figures whom we had met day after day, reciting sentences verbatim, without ever taking a single note. I felt my mental inferiority, struggling to take down as much as I could from this fascinating array of individuals who met with us during those ten historic days in Iran during which the Shah left his throne forever, allowing the revolutionary movement to celebrate its extraordinary victory. All the while our modest mission dealt with a daunting schedule from dawn until the moon was high in the sky, and Ramsey gladly missed sleep rather than cancel even one of our scheduled meetings.

During this exhausting trip, climaxing with a long meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris, just prior to his return to Iran after 17 years spent in exile, we all learned a great deal, grateful for this exposure to the live tissue of revolution. I am tempted to set down as part of this concluding conversation with this future leader of Iran in the form of recalling this mysterious personage who was to dominate the political stage in his country for the rest of his life, but I will refrain. I did try to recall and appraise in my political memoir, Public Intellectual: The Life of a Citizen Pilgrim that published weeks ago, which devotes a long chapter to this Iranian visit, with Ramsey figuring larger than life in many of its aspects.

Having praised Ramsey, I want to acknowledge some minor reservations that caused some friction during this Iran experience, and an earlier one in the less fraught, yet still tense, circumstances of the Tunisian struggle for democracy in the face of dictatorial rule. We had been invited to the country to speak at a human rights conference in the capital city of Tunis, convened by the leading opposition figures. The public event was cancelled by government edict, and we tried our best to perform in private venues according to the wishes of our brave, unintimidated hosts. Ramsey was as in Iran a tower of strength, an eloquent voice for freedom, democracy, decency who avowed his solidarity with those in opposition who, unlike the revolutionaries in Iran, resembled American liberals, invoking John F. Kennedy as their model of governance.

My reservations may be linked in various ways to Ramsey’s virtues. I was at times embarrassed by his ‘lectures’ to eminent Iranian religious and political leaders in which he basically urged them to follow the path of American constitutionalism. Although he was all for their revolutionary struggle, he felt its outcome could be best realized by following the American lead. Our hosts were invariably polite, partly sensing the importance of winning the valuable support of such a high profile visitor who opposed in Iran what Washington was hoping for, but I also noticed that they were bored and despite their best efforts, inattentive, staring out the window, playing with a pen or pencil but refraining from taking notes. I believed then and still do, that these Iranians didn’t appreciate being instructed even by Ramsey about what was best for the future of their country, a place with a long history and deep distinctive cultural characteristics. In my view, even Ramsey didn’t understand that we lacked credibility to Instruct Iranians about how to construct their post-Shah future.

I was also bothered by Ramsey’s tendency to dominate these meetings, and our contacts with the media. I felt that I had some things worth saying as did our third companion, Phil Luce, a notable anti-war activist with a religious vocation, combining social shyness with political brashness. We both felt somewhat frustrated by this unintentional marginalization. I overcame my own deference to Ramsey to raise our concern somewhat timidly. He responded that he understood, but claimed that he was helpless, that the persons we encountered and the media were primarily interested in him because of his background. This was a large part of the story, but not the whole of it. Ramsey could have made space for us, but the more I observed him, the more I realized that he flourished in the limelight, and sought it. Putting all this in perspective, on reflection it is more impressive that someone so ambitious in a context that was within his comfort zone, could toss ambition aside when it encroached upon his principles of justice and truth. I learned so much more from Ramsey about being-in-the-world that perhaps I should have suppressed these petty reservations. These criticisms are do not dilute my admiration for the man and his life, although maybe these qualities might have limited the depth of our friendship to some degree.

One final thought. When I first knew Ramsey he was a different person in the presence of Georgia, his life partner, who brought him joy and loving companionship, as well as lightened his manner. Without Georgia, Ramsey was a different person, austere and totally serious even when off camera. I never had the feeling that Ramsey on his own was capable of self-indulgence—reading trashy novels or watching entertaining movies, following sports, playing games, and being silly. Maybe he exposed his less puritanical sides to others who were more intimate. The bottom line is that Ramsey Clark, in my book, was an American hero who coveted virtue more than power or profits, and more than most lived his truths to the fullest. 

State Terrorism: Remembering General Soleimani

8 Jan

[Prefatory Note: 2020 hardly began when the news reported the shocking MQ9 Reaper Drone assassination of General Qassim Soleimani on Januarary 3rd shortly after he landed at the Baghdad Airport to begin a discreet diplomatic mission to reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. At the time, I felt this was provocative and self-defeating, as well as unlawful and criminal, as to deed and precedent. After a year those initial reactions seem even more appropriate than they did at the time. If the United States is setting the operative rules of world politics it is doing itself no positive service by such behavior, and with drones proliferating at a rapid rate, encouraging forces of disorder, whether governments or political movements. Published below are two efforts of mine to comprehend the many facets of this most unfortunate and humanly tragic incident, which was reinforced by the apparent Mossad murder by remotely controlled explosives of the senior Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on November 27th while driving in a suburb of Tehran. The first selection is a short essay entitled ‘Remembering General Soleimani,’ and the second is an interview titled Responses Questions of Tasnim News Agency on the 1st anniversary of General Qassim Soleimani’s Assassination by U.S. drone on 3 Jan 2020.]

Remembering General Qassim Soleimani

This first anniversary of the assassination of General Qassim Soleimani, provides an occasion to remember not only the man but the nature of the act, the precedent set, and degree to which Iran and the region have become the main hunting ground of post-colonial Western imperialism. It is also relevant to take note of Mossad’s apparent responsibility for the   targeted killing of Iran’s leading nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, ten months later. Although for the world 2020 will be primarily remembered for the COVID-19 pandemic, but for Iranians, although themselves hard hit by the virus further aggravated by U.S. sanctions maintained despite many international humanitarian pleas, the year will be long primarily associated with these acts of state terror.

Without shame or even the typical ruse of ‘deniability,’ Donald Trump made no secret of his role in ordering, and even claiming credit for the killing of General Soleimani, while this stateman/military commander was arriving in Baghdad at the invitation of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Adil Abdul Mehdi, apparently to engage in discussions with Iraqi and Saudi Arabian officials with the purpose of deescalating regional tensions. Trump claimed without the slightest proof that killing Soleimani staved off an imminent attack on American diplomatic facilities. As the UN Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial and Arbitrary Executions, Agnés Callimard, made clear in an official Human Rights Council report concentrating on this event that the use drone weaponry to assassinate a top leader of a foreign country, without presenting a shred of evidence for the purported U.S. justification that there existed a threat of an attack on American diplomatic facilities, is more serious than a violation of international human rights law. According to her report the assassination amounts to ‘an act of war’ that violated the core norm of the UN Charter, which in Article 2(4) prohibits recourse to aggressive forms of international force. The world is fortunate that Iran did not exercise its defensive rights beyond a gesture of retaliation that caused no fatalities. The fact that the assassination occurred in Iraq, a third country, without the consent of the government was a further aggravating factor. It continues to produce calls for the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from the country, and has bolstered those Iraqi forces demanding an end to the U.S. occupation that began more than 17 years ago.

There are additional lessons to be learned in thinking about the life and death of General Soleimani. An important lesson for Americans is to appreciate the degree to which tying their role in the Middle East to Israeli priorities brings negative consequences for the wider national interests in the region. The most important achievement of General Soleimani was to be the most effective anti-ISIS leader in the struggle against extremist barbarism in the region, which built upon his earlier efforts to weaken the Taliban in Afghanistan. In effect, the only real threat to legitimate American security interests came from ISIS, and earlier Al Qaeda. Seen in this light, to regard Iran as Enemy #1 was to misinterpret U.S. interests, and to perpetuate earlier mistakes in grand strategy, above all the 2003 attack and subsequent occupation of Iraq, in ways that were extremely costly in lives, expenses, and reputation, while producing a political outcome that realized none of the goals of this military (mis)adventure. If U.S interests in the Middle East were appraised free from distortions attributable to the Israeli lobby and the pro-Israeli bureaucracy in Washington, Netanyahu’s leverage in Washington would not exist, and long ago the U.S. Government would have taken the sensible step of normalizing relations with Iran, which would have diminished chaos and tensions thoughout the entire MENA region.

I believe that Obama arrived at the White House with the intention to achieve this reset of U.S./Iran relation. Obama tried skillfully to move out of a policy orbit shaped in Tel Aviv and Riyadh, angering the Israeli leadership to such an extent that the Trump presidency, despite its overall irresponsibility, was enthusiastically embraced by an Israel extremely displeased with the Obama effort despite its limited results. What Obama tried to do was to remove anxieties about Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the removal of sanctions, formalized in the Joint Comprehensive Program of Comprehensive Action (JCPOA) agreement unanimously supported by the P-5 membership of the Security Council plus Germany in 2015. I was surprised at the time that Iran was willing to accept a diplomatic outcome that curtailed its nuclear program without raising objections to Israel’s arsenal of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, for Israel and Saudi Arabia JCPOA was treated as a betrayal, and Trump re-bonded with these two states by repudiating and then withdrawing from this breakthrough agreement in 2018. Without question Trump seemed motivated to undo this major diplomatic achievement by his predecessor as president to dramatize his anachronistic commitment to an ‘America First’ foreign policy that rejected internationalism in all its forms. Trump also withdrew from the Paris Climate Change Agreement for similar anti-Obama, ultra-nationalist reasons.

We are led to wonder, with the advent of the Biden presidency, whether the Obama approach will be restored with respect to Iran, and if so, in what manner and with what effort to balance such an accommodating diplomacy with Iran while trying not to upset Israeli support groups too much, having witnessed at close range Israel’s dirty pushback tactics. The litmus test of Baden’s diplomacy will be revealed by whether Washington insists on more stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities, and even more so, if it links its renewed participation in the JCPOA with a demand that Iran disavow its regional diplomacy in such countries as Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. Such one-sided enlargements of the scope of what is agreed beyond its nuclear program is highly unlikely to be acceptable in Iran, and for good reasons, given the interventions of Saudi Arabia and Israel in these conflicts. This anticipated reluctance would also antagonize hardline opinions in Iran, and likely partly express a lingering resentment about the targeted killing of General Soleimani, an individual who was not only beloved and revered by the Iranian people but was considered an extremely promising future president for the country, someone regarded by close Iranian observers as second in importance only to the Supreme Guide, who was beloved by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  

Q1: As you know, the US assassinated Lieutenant General Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), along with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy head of Iraq’s Hashd al-Sha’abi, and their companions by targeting their vehicles outside Baghdad International Airport on January 3. The act of terror was carried out under the direction of Trump, with the Pentagon taking responsibility for the strike. How do you see the role of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and certain Arab states in the region in killing?

R1: I have no inside information on the undisclosed connections between the states mentioned in the question and the assassination of Lieut. General Soleimani, but offer some generalizations based on the public reactions of these governments to the event and their general approach to the confrontation with Iran. Two things are clear. First, Israel and Saudi Arabia officially and explicitly welcomed the killing of Gen. Soleimani for reasons different than those put forward by the United States, while disavowing any connection with the event; secondly, the Arab governments, and even some Israeli strategists, acknowledged being wary of the possible consequences associated with feared Iranian retaliations and a regional escalation of tensions. It seemed that the most respected analysts of Israeli security interests were urging their government to do its utmost to deescalate the confrontational approach that had been previously advocated. Such moderating moves seemed to reflect an awareness of the vulnerabilities of Israel and the Gulf countries to Iranian missile attacks and overall worries about regime security. With these considerations in mind, it makes sense that these governments insisted that the U.S. acted on its own, without prior consultation or encouragement. Some reports in the Arab media alleged that Qatar should be viewed as complicit because the drone that responsible for this act of state terror was apparently launched from the U.S. Udeid air base in their country, but there was no indication of any advanced knowledge, much less participation, by Qatar before the attack was launched. The apparent reconciliation between Qatar and the Saudi-led Gulf coalition at the start of 2021 may also be interpreted as part of this moderating trend, perhaps also a cautionary reaction to the defeat of Trump’s bid for reelection and uncertainties associated with how Biden will approach the region.

Of great concern is the failure of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, to condemn the event. The UN Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, Agnés Callamard, did issue a report on July 6, 2020 that concluded that the targeted killing of such a prominent military leader as General Soleimani was not only a violation of international human rights law, but ‘an act of war’ that violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This important report does highlight the use of drones as creating a class of weaponry that erodes the distinction between war and peace, and creates a threat to all countries and their population. The international tolerance of such state behavior is totally unacceptable, aggravated in this instance by being openly authorized by the head of state of a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. The rapid proliferation of attack drones also adds a destabilizing dimension that makes the Soleimani killing a particularly dangerous precedent.

In short, for Israel the elimination of Iran’s most effective military commander was viewed as reducing the security threat posed by Iran’s regional influence in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, supposedly surrounding Israel with unpredictable political forces. Eliminating the architect of Iran’s regional influence was viewed as a positive  development from the perspective of Israeli security that deems itself as virtually ‘at war’ with Iran. Yet even some Israeli strategic commentary at the time of the assassination tended to worry about such a high-profile assassination being treated as an ‘act of war’ by Iran intensifying risks of an unwanted all out conflict urging, contrary to Trump and Netanyahu, offsetting concessions to Iran. Some Israeli security experts urged the unconditional revival of the JCPOA deal relating to Iran’s nuclear program and even the elimination of sanctions.

For Saudi Arabia, in particular, although insisting that it had no role in the assassination viewed it partly through the perspective of finally overcoming Trump’s refusal to respond to the psychologically and material damaging September 2019 drone attack on the state-owned Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq and Ehurais located in eastern Saudi Arabia. These attacks although emanating from Yemen were attributed to Iran, at least indirectly. In this regard, the assassination was interpreted as responsive to the Saudi (and Israeli) criticisms of the Obama presidency’s moves toward normalization with Iran, as well as of Trump’s allegedly timid responses to prior provocations and some concern that withdrawals of American forces from Iraq, which was viewed with alarm as the beginning of U.S. strategic disengagement from the region.

 Q2: General Soleimani is viewed by the world’s freedom-seeking people as the key figure in defeating Daesh/ISIS, the world’s most notorious terrorist group, in the Middle East battles. What are your thoughts on Gen. Soleimani’s character and his role in fighting terrorism?

R2: I am aware of the revered status of Gen. Soleimani for his various roles in defense of the Iranian Revolution and in opposition to the spread of U.S. and Israeli influence in the region. He had that rare quality of being a military commander whose intelligence and political leadership were widely appreciated at all levels of Iranian society, from the Supreme Guide to the Iranian citizenry. Over the course of the last ten years there have been many reports that he was being urged to become a presidential candidate in Iran. It is significant in my view that Gen. Soleimani was killed while on a diplomatic mission mediated by Iraq to reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. There is no reason to believe that the assassination was timed to disrupt such a move, but its occurrence surely had the effect of intensifying regional tensions in a highly provocative, lawless manner that generated widespread calls in Iran and Iraq for revenge and retaliation. Iran has formally issued a warrant for the arrest of Trump on charges of premeditated murder, which according to the Iranian penal code imposes a death sentence. Iran has asked Intepol for assistance in inducing police forces around the world to implement the arrest warrant.

By and large, commentators on the assassination in the West, including critics of Trump’s presidency, viewed the event from a narrow American perspective. This meant highlighting Gen. Soleimani’s role both in Iraqi violent resistance to the American occupation and in giving overall help to the general opposition throughout the region to Washington’s strategic priorities, including Hezbollah and Hamas, the Damascus government, and the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. What was not stressed, and rarely acknowledged, was Gen. Soleimani extremely effective role not only in defeating Daesh (or ISIS) in the Syria and Iraq, but also in temporarily neutralizing the Taliban in Afghanistan. As the Mossad official, Yossi Alpher, correctly noted of the fallen military leader: “He was a highly intelligent strategic thinker who understood how to wage asymmetric warfare.” Contrast this assessment with the words of Thomas Friedman, the liberal icon of American journalism, writing in an opinion piece published in the immediate aftermath of the event. Friedman praised Trump for ordering the assassination of “possibly the dumbest man in Iran and the most overrated strategist in the Middle East.” [“Trump Kills Iran’s Most Overrated Warrior,” Jan. 3, 2020.] Why dumb? Because Gen. Soleimani role in expanding Iran’s regional resistance to U.S. regional interventions prompted Washington to take major countermeasures that had an overall disastrous impact on Iran. In effect, the United States’ imperial role was legitimate, and to challenge it, was not only illegitimate but self-defeating as the killing of their leading military commander demonstrates. 

Viewing Gen. Soleimani’s role more objectively, a larger geopolitical distortion is revealed. The United States real security concerns over the course of the past twenty years were associated with eliminating threats of transnational extremist violence that culminated in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. It is only through an acceptance of Israel’s and the Gulf monarchies’ regional priorities that made rational either the attack on Iraq in 2003 or the repeated efforts to destabilize Iran. To some extent Obama did somewhat recognize that reaching an accommodation with Iran and continuing to support the national security of Israel were not necessarily contradictory. In contrast, Trump, whether wittingly or not, subordinates U.S. national interests to the Israeli/Gulf sectarian view of Middle East politics. At this point, with the imminent prospect of Biden’s presidency there is reason to be cautiously hopeful about the formulation of a policy for the Middle East that is more coherent, less Israeli driven, less guided by impulse, and more oriented toward achieving stability rather than seeking ‘solutions’ based on coercive diplomacy.

Q3: How do you see the future of the region after the assassination of Gen. Soleimani? Do you think that foreign troops including the US forces will be forced out of the region and Iraq at people’s will?

R3: The turmoil throughout the region, along with interventions by geopolitical actors, makes predictions hazardous. There are some encouraging indications that Biden seeks to revive JCPOA as soon as possible and seeks order and moderation throughout the Middle East. Such post-Trump modifications will not be undertaken without taking Israel’s views into account, but to what extent is at present unknown. Israel will certainly try its best to condition the renewal of American participation in JCPOA on imposing new, more stringently restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program. Israel is also likely to insist that the U.S. receive assurances from Iran that it will no longer extend material support Islamic political tendencies in the region as exemplified by Hezbollah and Hamas. Upholding such assurances would be correlated with reducing sanctions. It seems unlikely that Iran would be willing to end its support for self-determination and human rights in Israel/Palestine, Yemen, and Lebanon, and more controversially, governmental legitimacy and counterinsurgency in Syria. And if such a political surrender were to be accepted by Iran’s current elected leadership, it would be effectively challenged from within the country.

The Arab acceptance of normalization agreements with Israel are not likely to be challenged by the Biden presidency, although brought about by American inducements, including advanced weaponry and a greater commitment of the U.S. to extend its security protection beyond Israel. In this regard, should a second Arab Spring occur in Gulf countries or Egypt, it is likely that Washington will more overtly side with the established order, no matter how repressive.

Of relevance as well is whether China and Russia will play more active diplomatic roles in the region, either seeking alignment or as offering an alternative to the American imperial presence. Such speculation depends in part on whether the U.S. adopts confrontational approaches to Russia in relation to Ukraine and Crimea and to China with respect to international trade relations and tensions in the South China Seas. Unless the U.S. disengages from its reliance on global militarism as the basis of its foreign policy, which seems highly unlikely, there are almost certain to be troubled waters in many parts of the world, including the Middle East. More than Trump, the Biden presidency is likely to adopt a foreign policy of the sort that resurrects the ‘bipartisan consensus’ that was borne shortly after the World War II, and persisted throughout the long Cold War. The essence of this consensus is the exaggeration of security threats so as to justify political support for high peacetime military budgets.

It is finally possible that energy geopolitics will also exert an influence over how relations with Iran evolve. It seems to serve OPEC’s interest to restrict Iran’s energy export markets, but if European or Asian demands rise, the reintegration of Iran in the world economy is like to receive strong backing that could change the balance in the Middle East, especially if confrontation with China dominates U.S. foreign policy in the years ahead. 

From Counterterrorism to Geopolitics: Reviving the U.S. Deep State

25 Dec

[Prefatory Note: The challenge of transnational non-state violence, what the media dutifully criminalizes as ‘terrorism’ while whitewashing the abuses of state and state-sponsored violence as ‘counterterrorism’ or exercises of every state to act in self-defense. Language matters as those who wanted to sugarcoat ‘torture’ by such phrases as ‘enhanced interrogation.’ The pendulum of U.S. foreign policy is swinging back in the direction of geopolitical confrontation, given the prospects of the Biden presidency. Although it is the highest political priority to be done with Trump and Trumpism, the renewal of ‘bipartisan foreign policy’ under the guidance of the American version of the deep state is not good news. It could mean a new cold war tilted toward China, but with different alignments, possibly including Russia, filled with risk and justification for continuing overinvestment in a militarized approach to national security causing a continuing underinvestment in human security, exposing the root cause of American imperial decline. The post below addresses some of these issues, and was published in the Tehran Times (17 Dec 2020).]

From Counterterrorism to Geopolitics: Reviving the U.S. Deep State

  1. In 1972, a specialized Committee on Terrorism was set up at the United Nations, and member states made great efforts to provide appropriate definitions of international terrorism, but due to intense political differences, the actual definition of international terrorism and comprehensive conventions in practice was impossible. Security Council Resolution 1373 was the most serious attempt to define terrorism after 9/11, which evolved into UN Security Council Resolution 1535. Despite providing a definition of terrorism, countries approach it differently. What is the reason?

There exists a basic split between those political actors that seek to define ‘terrorism’ as anti-state violence by non-state actors and those actors that seek to define terrorism as violence directed at innocent civilians, regardless of the identity of the perpetrator. The latter approach to the definition reaches targeted or indiscriminate violence directed at civilians even if the state is the perpetrator. States that act beyond their borders to fulfill counterrevolutionary goals seek to stigmatize their adversaries as terrorists while exempting themselves from moral and legal accountability.

There exists a second basic split due to state practice following political rather than legal criteria when identifying terrorist actors. When the Taliban and Al Qaeda were opposing Soviet intervention in Afghanistan they were identified as Mujahideen, but when seen as turning against the West, they were put on the top of the terrorist list. Osama Bin Laden, once hailed as a Western ally deserving lavish CIA support became the most wanted terrorist after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Such subjectivity and fluidity makes it virtually impossible to develop a coherent and legal approach to ‘terrorist’ activity.

In essence, geopolitical actors have always sought to have international law regard the use of force by states acting on their own as falling outside the framework of terrorism while regarding transnational political violence by adversary or enemy non-state actors as terrorism even if the targeted person or organization is a government official or member of the armed forces, or if the non-state actor is resisting occupation by foreign armed forces. Before the 9/11 attacks Israel adopted influentially adopted this approach in its effort to portray Palestinian resistance as a criminal enterprise. After 9/11 the United States added its political weight to this statist approach to the conception of terrorism, which meant in effect that any adversary target that could be characterized as associated with a non-state actor that resorted to armed struggle was criminalized to the extent of being treated as unprotected by international humanitarian law. In practice, this subjectivity was vividly displayed in recent years by support given to anti-Castro Cuban exiles that engaged in political violence against the legitimate Cuban government, and yet were given aid, support, and encouragement while based in the United States.

The UN was mobilized after the 9/11 attacks by the United State to support this statist/geopolitical approach to political violence, which possessed these elements, and given formal expression in a series of Security Council Resolutions, including 1373, 1535: 

     –terrorists are individuals who engage in political violence on behalf of non-state actors;

               –states, their officials and citizens may be guilty of supporting such activities through money, weapons and safe haven, and therefore indictable under national law as aiding and abetting terrorism;

              –political violence by states, no matter what its character, is to be treated by reference to international law, including international humanitarian law, and not viewed as terrorism;

              –even if the non-state actor is exercising its right of resistance under international law against colonialism or apartheid, its political violence will be treated as ‘terrorism’ if such a designation furthers geopolitical ambitions.  

The alternative view of terrorism that I endorse emphasizes the nature of the political violence, rather than the identity of the perpetrator. As such, political violence can be identified as ‘state terrorism,’ which amounts to uses of force that are outside the framework of war and peace, and violate the sovereign rights of a foreign country or fundamental rights of citizens within the territory of the state. Such acts of terrorism may be clandestine or overt, and may be attributed to state actors when counterrevolutionary groups are authorized, funded, and encouraged directly or indirectly by the state. Non-state actors can also be guilty of terrorism if their tactics and practices deliberately target civilians or recklessly disregard risks of death or harm to civilians. 

  • How do you assess the role and position of Iran in the fight against terrorism in the region?

As far as I know, Iran has opposed non-state political violence of groups such as ISIS or Taliban that engage in terrorist activity by committing atrocities against civilians that amount to Crimes Against Humanity. Iran has also consistently condemned state terrorism of the sort practiced by Israel and the United States, and possibly other governments, within the region. In this regard, Iran has been active both in the struggle against non-state and state terrorism.

Iran has been accused of lending funding and material support to non-state actors that many governments in the West officially classify as ‘terrorist’ organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Part of the justification for U.S. sanctions arises from this allegation that Iran supports terrorism in the Middle East. These allegations are highly ‘political’ in character as both Hezbollah and Hamas engaged in violent resistance directed at unlawful occupation policies that denied basic national rights to the Lebanese and Palestinian people, including the fundamental right of self-determination, although some of their tactics and acts may have crossed the line of legality.

There are also contentions that Iran’s support for the Syrian government in dealing with its domestic adversaries involves complicity in behavior that violates the laws of war and international humanitarian law. This contention is a matter of regional geopolitics. As far as international law is concerned, the Assad government in Damascus is the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and is treated as such at the UN. Iran is legally entitled to provide assistance to such a government faced with insurgent challengess from within its boundaries. If the allegations are true that Syria has bombed hospitals and other civilian sites, then the Syrian government could be charged with state terrorism. 

3- How do you assess the role and position of General Ghasem Soleimani in the fight against terrorism and ISIS in the region? 

Although a military officer, General Soleiman, was not in any combat role when assassinated, and was engaged in peacemaking diplomacy on a mission to Iraq. His assassination was a flagrant instance of state terrorism. With considerable irony, the truth is that General Soleiman had been playing a leading counterterrorist role throughout the region. He is thought to have been primarily responsible for the ending, or at least greatly weakening, the threat posed by ISIS to the security of many countries in the Middle East.

  • Given the conflict of interests of different countries, can we see the same action by countries against terrorism? What mechanism can equalize the performance of countries against the terrorism?

As suggested at the outset, without an agreed widely adopted and generally agreed upon definition of terrorism it is almost impossible to create effective international mechanisms to contain terrorism. As matters now stand, the identification of ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorism’ is predominantly a matter of geopolitical alignment rather than the implementation of prohibitions directed at unacceptable forms of political violence within boundaries and across borders.

To imagine the emergence of effective international, or regional, mechanisms to combat terrorism at least four developments would have to occur:

             –the reliance on legal criteria to categorize political violence as terrorism;

            –the inclusion of ‘state terrorism’ in the official definition of terrorism;

            –the inclusion of political violence within sovereign territory as well as across boundaries;

            –an internationally or regionally agreed definition incorporating these three elements and formally accepted by all major sovereign states and by the United Nation. 

In the present international atmosphere, such an international consensus is impossible to achieve. The United States and Israel, and a series of other important states would never agree. There are two sets of obstacles: some states would not give up their discretion to attack civilian targets outside their borders and would not accept accountability procedure that impose limits on their discretion over the means used to deal with domestic transnational non-state adversaries.

Under these conditions of geopolitical subjectivity such that from some perspectives non-state actors are ‘freedom-fighters’ and from others they are ‘terrorists,’ no common grounds for  meaningful and trustworthy intergovernmental arrangements exists.

It remains important for individuals and legal experts to advocate a cooperative approach to the prevention and punishment of terrorists and terrorism by reference to an inclusive definition of terrorism that considers political violence by states and by governments within their national territory as covered. 

It is also in some sense to include non-state actors as stakeholders in any lawmaking process that has any prospect of achieving both widespread acceptance as a framework or implementation at behavioral levels. It would seem, in this regard, important to prohibit torture of terrorist suspects or denial of prisoner of war rights. One-sided legal regimes tend to be rationalizations for unlawful conduct, and thus operate as political instruments of conflict rather than legal means of regulation.

Unless surprises occur, almost a probability, the Biden foreign policy will likely follow the George H.W. Approach approach more than the Obama approach, which continued to unfold as part of the aftermath to the 9/11 attacks. This means becoming again captive to the deep state’s approach to world order: global militarism, Euro-centric points of reference, predatory capitalism, and quasi-confrontational toward China, Russia.