Tag Archives: Palestine

Changing the Names of the West Bank: Foretaste of a Severe further Crime Against the Palestinian People

20 Feb

[Prefatory Note:  The post below has to do with the decision by the legislative bodies in Israel and the US to hereafter refer internationally to  the West Bank by their biblical names, Judea and Samaria. An article by Kazim Aizaz Alam appears in TRT World on February 14 that quotes my responses to an interview he conducted with me on February 12. https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-us-israel-want-to-rename-occupied-west-bank-as-judea-and-samaria-18264875

I publish here a somewhat extended version of my response to the two questions put to me. The issue of language, as it with authoritative declarations of applicable law make nothing happen by themselves, but they have potentially great values in the symbolic domains where politics occurs.]

1. Isreal claims that the occupied West Bank — which they’re officially renaming as Judea and Samaria — is an integral part of Israel? Some Israelis cite Biblical references to say that Judea and Samaria form an “inseparable part of the historic homeland of the Jewish people”. What does history say? Do the Palestinians have a counter-argument?

The Biblical references, Judea and Samaria, has long been used in Hebrew discourse about the future of the West Bank, especially internally by Israeli leaders, but was not previously used internationally in deference to the broad consensus among state and at the UN on treating the areas of Palestine West of the Jordan River by English language names in the period of the British Mandate. Reference to the biblical names within

Israel conveyed to Israeli public that the governing leadership had not given up its resolve to incorporate the West Bank within the boundaries of its territorial sovereignty whenever political conditions were favorable to such an enlargement of Israel. although the claim, regardless its status in Jewish religious tradition had no modern legal or moral standing.

By using this kind of messaging adherents of Zionist Project had long been signaling to their adherents a rejection of the establishment of meaningful Palestinian statehood even if they appeared to go along for public relations reasons with the two-state approach. It was always was assumed in international circles that a Palestinian state would have its core reality by way of sovereign rights in the West Bank, as supplemented by a national capital in East Jerusalem and recovery of Gaza linked by corridor to the West Bank. This was the dominant contours of the idea underneath the almost universally promoted ‘two-state solution,’ and earlier provided the basis for the UN partition resolution of 1947 [GA 181, Nov 29, 1947] that was rejected by Palestinians at the time as a division of mandate Palestine decreed by the UN without any legitimating referendum determining the preferences of the residents of Palestine or through the participation on the part of authentic representatives of the Palestinian people in shaping the UN plan. Hence, from Palestinian and Arab perspectives this imposition of partition was regarded as an unacceptable denial of the inalienable Palestinian right of self-determination and by the Zionist Movement as a major victory on the road to Palestinian state, second in importance only to the Balfour Declaration pledging British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, an instance of colonial unilateralism.

The Palestinian argument rests on the legal and moral relation of the two peoples as regulated by international humanitarian law and the 4th Geneva Convention governing situations of belligerent occupation that commenced in the aftermath of the 1967 War. The UN has been ineffectual when it comes to addressing the repeated flagrant violations by Israel, which consistently evaded and defied it legal responsibilities as Occupier. This refusal to adhere to its obligation under international law was exhibited in various ways, above all by the establishment and expansion of Jewish settlements, the annexation of the whole of the formerly divided city of Jerusalem, and a reliance on multiple forms of collective punishment. These were the most prominent Israeli and consistent violations, aside from its failure to uphold its primary legal duties specified in the Geneva Convention to respect and leave unaltered the Occupied territory and unconditionally safeguard its inhabitants. Israel never fulfilled the initial widespread expectations on all sides that its occupation of the West Bank in 1967 would be temporary and short-lived. This was the authoritative expectation underpinning the widely heralded unanimous Security Council Resolution 242 adopted unanimously on Nov. 22, 1967. This UN resolution ambitiously and optimistically delimited the conditions for a durable peace: Israeli withdrawal of security forces; peace within secure and recognized boundaries; freedom of navigation; just resolution of ‘refugee problem,’ and security measures including within de facto demilitarized zones.. None of these conditions came to pass because the Israeli state managers of the Zionist Project were determined at some future opportune time to achieve sovereign control of the West Bank, and signaled this intention when comparative weak and insecure only in Hebrew to avoid an international pushback.  The names of the West Bank embodied in Jewish traditions involving a return to the so-called ‘promised land’ were ways of keeping faith with dominant strains of Zionist ideology. 



2/ What should the Palestinians, and the supporters of their cause in the rest of the world, do to stop the renaming effort?

The Israel overtness in renaming the West Bank as Judea and Samaria indicated an Israeli intention to make these territorial claims overt and to impart active coercive policies to satisfying its remaining territorial and sovereign claims to the West Bank. Such a move in defiance of the UN framework governing Occupation, which was as noted to be accompanied by an expectation of IDF withdrawal, dismantling of the settlements, protection of Palestinian rights.

Governments and media should refuse to follow this Israeli lead as was unfortunately done by the US Government. It is important in contrast to follow the lead of ICJ in its Advisory Opinion of July 19, 2024 in ordering an end to Israel’s prolonged belligerent occupation, not only by an Israel withdrawal of its forces, but also by repudiating any Israeli territorial sovereignty that occurred during its punitive and abusive occupation that has already lasted almost 58 years. Such perceptions of unlawful Israeli administration of the West Bank underlay the ICJ near unanimous and historically important Advisory Opinion that authoritatively set forth Israel’s violation of international norms of belligerent occupation, and placed Israel under a duty to bring to an immediate end its Occupation regime, putting the UN and member governments under a legal obligation to assure that this would happen.

By this internationalization of the Zionist renaming of the West Bank in accordance with its goals, but in opposition to the international consensus is indicative of the confrontation that seems to be the shared intention of Netanyahu and Trump, but if coercively implemented in a substantive manner will further inflame the dire situation facing the Palestinian people who have been subjected to a genocidal ordeal of the past 16 months, and left the Gaza Strip devastated and its people bare survivors of one of the great humanitarian and ecological disasters of modern times. .

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“Naming Genocide” conference of Palestine Return Centre in London on February 22, 2025

8 Feb

[Prefatory Note: An important conference of Feb 22, 2095 under the auspices of Palestine Centre of Return, in London. Free registration below. Program copied below.]

https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/naming-genocide-the-global-responsibility-for-gaza-tickets-1203126948089 PRC Conference

Conference Schedule

Saturday, 22 February 2025

9:30 – 10:00 Arrival And Registration

10:00 – 10:30 Opening and Introduction by PRC Director

Conference Begins

Panel 1

Genocide and International Law:

Obligations and Accountability

Chair: Haydee Dijkstal – Barrister, international criminal law and international human rights law

10:30 – 10:50 Prof. Richard Falk Emeritus of international law at

Princeton University, and Euro-

Mediterranean Human Rights

Monitor’s Chairman of the Board of

Trustees.

10:50 – 11:10 Dr. Nimer Sultany Reader in Public Law

SOAS University of London

11:10 – 11:30 Att. Lara Elborno Palestinian-American international

lawyer

11:30 – 11:50 Prof. Neve Gordon Prof. of International Law, Queen

Mary University of London

11:50 – 12:10 Q&A

Version: 5-2-2025Lunch Break

12:10 – 13:10 Lunch at Main Dining Room

Conference Resumes

Panel 2

Voices from Gaza: Lived Realities and Resilience

Chair: Professor Penny Green – Australian criminologist, Professor of Law and Globalisation

Timing Speaker About the Speaker

13:15 – 13:35 Dr.Ahmed Mokhallalati Plastic, Hand & Reconstructive

Surgeon

13:35 – 13:55 Dr. Mads Gilbert Award-winning Norwegian medical

doctor and author

13:55 – 14:00 Mr. Wael Al-Dahdouh Palestinian journalist and Bureau

Chief of Al Jazeera in Gaza

(Recorded)

14:00 – 14:20 Mr. Ahmed Al Naouq UK based Gaza Journalist, Founder of

We are not Numbers

14:20 – 14:40 Prof. Wesam Amer Visiting Professor, Sociology

Department, University of Cambridge

14:40-15:00 Q&A

Coffee Break

15:00- 15:20 Coffee BreakConference Resumes

Panel 3

International Solidarity: Turning Advocacy into Action

Chair: Dr. Mandy Turner – Senior researcher with Security in Context

Timing Speaker About the Speaker

15:20 – 15:40 Dr. Nadia Naser- Najjab Senior lecturer in Palestine Studies

Co-director of European Center for

Palestine Studies (ECPS),

University of Exeter

15:40 – 16:00 Ms. Grazia Careccia Deputy Regional Director for the

Middle East and North Africa and

head of the Israel-Palestine team

at Amnesty International

16:00 – 16:20 Att. Mira Naseer Legal Officer at the International

Centre of Justice for Palestinians

16:20- 16:40 Ms. Nuvpreet Kalra Digital Content Producer, Code

Pink

16:40- 17:00 Q&A

17:00 – 17:15 Closing notes

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The Death of Francis Boyle: A Great Progressive International Law Scholar and Practitioner

6 Feb

[Prefatory Note: The following post represents my reflections on the outstanding progressive international law expert of our time, and takes notes of both pardonable faults and eternal gratitude for a courageous life well spent.

Francis Boyle: In Memoriam; RIP

It is with sadness that I take note of the sudden unexpected death of one of the few consistently progressive international Law scholars in the academic ranks of the US on January 30, 2025 at the age of 74. Boyle was active until he was pronounced dead due to undisclosed causes.

Despite being born in Chicago Boyle maintained his primary national identity was Irish. Francis was fond of asserting that he was ‘born Irish,’ and not as a white North American. Throughout his productive life Francis associated himself with many neglected struggles for justice, with especial attention given to opposing the Israel’s treatment of the Palestinian people, which he termed genocidal as early as 2009. He acted as a legal advisor to the Palestinian Authority and to the Palestinian negotiating team. He also acted as counsel representing several tribal communities seeking to redeem their legal rights as indigenous peoples and several other causes involving vulnerable or abused communities.  

Among those deserving praise for their courage in speaking truth to power, no

one among international law experts since the end of World War II, so exemplified this crucial virtue of engaged and progressive citizenship than Francis Boyle. He spoke bluntly, and often insultingly, about those who invoked international law to rationalize the foreign policy of the US Government.  His published writing was informed by a deep knowledge of his varied subjects, always expressing himself lucidly and uncompromisingly, most energetically when condemning US and Israeli lawlessness. His views were set forth in a self-confident style and his interpretations of law invariably placed him on what progressive persons agree is the right side of history. In keeping with this posture of radical dissent, Boyle’s heroes were unsurprisingly academicians and public figures who shared his outlook and public engagement, most notably Noam Chomsky and Ramsey Clark, and the less well known, the respected Harvard Law professor, Clyde Ferguson. Francis had an elite education, that included earning a magna cum laude degree from Harvar Law School. Nevertheless, Francis never attained the front ranks of those recognized as public intellectuals as were Edward Said, Howard Zinn, Daniel Ellsberg, and Susan Sontag.

As is often the case with radical dissenters, unless first tier scholars, they pay a price for their civic integrity and engagement, and there is little doubt in my mind, that Francis was informally blacklisted in many prestigious centrist venues, including the American Society of International Law and the Council of Foreign Relations. He clearly merited election to the Board of Editors of the American Journal of International Law on the basis of his scholarly stature, but it never happened during his 41 years as a faculty member of the College of Law at the University of Illinois. His many books on controversial issues were rarely reviewed in mainstream journals or appeared on the syllabi or recommended reading lists of international law courses. Despite being spurned at home, Francis was well known internationally as a skilled lawyer who would provide his services to causes unpopular or unknown in the West.

Francis managed to do many bold and valuable things in his own way over the years. He believed in using juridical frameworks to expose the wrongdoing of the powerful with an awareness that winning in court made the claim legitimate, but did not assure enforcement, which he correctly understood to be a political rather than a legal project.

Francis supported in courts of law claims of justifiable civil disobedience by young Americans during the Vietnam War, served as a lead prosecutor for a high profile Malaysian civil society tribunal condemning the role of the US in the Iraq War, he advised Palestinian negotiators seeking a just peace with Israel, provided services as a lawyer on behalf of indigenous rights, and represented Bosnia and Herzegovina in the International Court of Justice in their legal action against Serbia, charging genocide.

Yet not all that glitters is gold. Francis was stubborn and dogmatic, unyielding in articulating his controversial views, and had an annoying habit of invariably proclaiming his own importance that diverted attention from the substantive issues to be addressed. I believe Francis brought on some of the unfair blacklisting in academic circles by a kind of obsessive and unabashed narcissism that diverted attention from his great talents as jurist and lawyer with an unwavering commitment domestically and internationally to the rule of law as a source of justice and core element of a genuine democracy, which helps his affinities with the powerless and vulnerable.

In the end, we should celebrate the achievements and ethical heroism of Francis Boyle, and forgive those all-too-human shortcomings when it comes to matters of humility.  Too few of us who profess progressive have the courage of our convictions that put our ideas and beliefs in the public square. Maybe we should express gratitude to the Irish genes, which seems to have guided Francis Boyle to be the foremost progressive international law specialist of our time. Unfortunately, he has left us when we need his thought and action as never before in the history of this republic that had at least revered the Constitution even as it broke its own laws and supposed value from the moment is broke from the British Empire but not from imperialism, and even slavery for Africans and genocidal policies toward native Americans. We who benefited from Francis’s presence bemoan his absence.  

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The Fragile Ceasefire: Gaza Tribunal More Relevant

30 Jan

[Prefatory Note: The post below was published in Middle East Eye on 29 January 2025,

representing my latest attempt to express support for the Gaza Tribunal Project seeking

civil society enforcement of international law given the neutering of the global normative order.]

Amid fragile ceasefire, the Gaza tribunal on genocide will bring us closer to justice

Richard Falk

In 1 November 2024, a coalition of concerned individuals and organisations launched the Gaza Tribunal (GT) in London in response to the international community’s failure to halt the genocide in Gaza.

After more than a year of carnage, its convenors launched this civil society initiative with an urgent mission: to stop the killing in Gaza and establish a permanent, reliable ceasefire – something the United Nations and other parties involved failed to do.

The guiding aspiration of the tribunal was to represent the peoples of the world in their endeavour to overcome this horrifying spectacle of daily atrocities in Gaza and resist the temptation to accept our collective helplessness in the face of such totalising devastation.

It also seeks to hold Israel – along with complicit governments, international institutions and corporations – accountable for their roles in the violence.

In line with this mission, the GT has worked to ensure political independence from governments and active politicians, refusing to accept governmental or compromised funding.Top of Form

Bottom of Form

With the three-phase ceasefire agreement now being implemented, the tribunal remains more critical and relevant than ever.

Complementary role

From the start, a key question facing the tribunal was what particular role it would play, given that both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) were already investigating criminal charges against Israel.

How could a civil society tribunal add anything to the work of this respected judicial process, an organ of the UN enjoying a preeminent status when called upon to resolve legal disputes among governments?

The tribunal is not seeking to compete with the ICJ but rather to play a complementary role that appreciates the ICJ’s contributions while offering its own distinctive impact

What could be our added value? Who the hell did we think we were?

In response to the perception of irrelevance, the tribunal views its function as distinct from these international bodies.

Through its operations, the tribunal will reach conclusions about the central issue of genocide and related criminality much faster than the ICJ, which is expected to take several years to issue a final judgment.

A key justification for this type of tribunal is its freedom from legalistic rules that limit the scope of inquiry, allowing it to address underlying questions of justice directly.

Additionally, the GT will produce accessible and readable texts that are informed by international law but not burdened by its technicalities, making them far more

accessible to the public through media outlets and political gatherings.

In sum, the tribunal is not seeking to compete with the ICJ but rather to play a complementary role that appreciates the ICJ’s contributions while offering its own distinctive impact that addresses some of the limitations of a strictly legal approach, however authoritative.

Continued relevance

An additional concern, along similar lines, arises from the ceasefire process, which, if upheld, will be seen as the end of the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza by many but as the beginning of a fragile and ambiguous future by the convenors of the tribunal.

The issues of continued relevance in light of the ceasefire are different and can be summarised as follows: issues of accountability, complicity and the fulfilment of the basic rights of the Palestinian people are outside the scope of the ceasefire.

The ceasefire itself is fragile, and the right wing of the Israeli cabinet appears confident that the genocidal war will resume after the return of the first batch of hostages, with no concern for the further promised release of Palestinian prisoners.

As with the Oslo diplomacy of the 1990s, Israel often upholds the first phase of promising peacemaking that serves its interests – only to then scuttle the remainder, which would require agreeing to some form of co-existence.

There are already signs of Israeli non-compliance, highlighted by the lethal shooting of Palestinians in Rafah and deadly raids in Jenin and Nablus in the occupied West Bank.

Additionally, US President Donald Trump and his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, have both floated proposals of ethnic cleansing, suggesting that the return of hostages could be coupled with the transfer of a portion of the surviving Palestinian population in Gaza to neighbouring countries and other Muslim states, including Indonesia.

Like previous civil society tribunals that have addressed violent conflict, civic efforts to establish such a tribunal are undertaken only when formal structures of authority in international relations fail to stop the violence and related criminal actions.

Civil society approach

Perhaps the most important – yet least understood – aspect of the Gaza Tribunal initiative is its deliberate political nature in both the proceedings and the goals being pursued.

This civil society-driven approach to its judicial framework differs significantly from the analogous frameworks found in intergovernmental or national courts.

The tribunal begins with the premise that the policies, practices and politicians of the accused state are guilty of severe wrongdoing – ethically, legally and, in a profound sense, spiritually.

Unlike government-established courts, this tribunal does not extend due process or presumptions of innocence to governments or individuals accused of criminal actions.

This contrasts with conventional court proceedings, which are generally considered unfair or invalid unless defendants are provided a sincere and adequate opportunity to defend their actions.

In this sense, the Gaza Tribunal’s approach differs markedly from the Nuremberg trials, where due process rights were granted to surviving Nazi political figures and military commanders after World War Two.

While these trials sought to deliver justice, they were criticised as “victors’ justice”, as the crimes of the victors were neither investigated nor prosecuted.

The GT operates from a presupposition of guilt, grounded in available evidence and perceptions.

It is motivated by two main objectives: to document criminal wrongdoing as authoritatively as possible and, perhaps more importantly, to mobilise individuals and groups worldwide. This mobilisation draws on moral and cultural authority figures – such as the UN secretary-general, the pope, and Nobel Peace Prize laureates – as well as faith-based groups, labour unions and human rights organisations.

‘People power’

The tribunal can be seen as a form of ethical or advocacy jurisprudence, a kind of lawmaking not typically taught in even the most prestigious law schools in the world’s most democratic societies.

Despite this, it remains an indispensable tool for resisting unchecked evil, of which genocide is widely regarded as the “crime of crimes”.

Unlike the ICJ or the ICC, the Gaza Tribunal encourages enforcement through civic activism in various forms without relying on governments to provide enforcement capabilities, which has yet to happen.

To clarify, the primary goal of the tribunal is action, not judgment, and this holds true even after a ceasefire.

Its focus is on “people power”, not institutional authority.

Its success will be measured by its societal impact, particularly in terms of the intensity and quality of solidarity movements around the world, akin to the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign in relation to the Palestinian struggle.

Similar non-violent solidarity movements played a key role in dismantling apartheid in South Africa, helping transform it from a regime of racial governance to a constitutional democracy with equal rights for all citizens.

A generation earlier, the anti-Vietnam War movement also demonstrated the power of a mobilised global citizenry – especially in the US and France – to end the interventionist policies of the most powerful nation in the world.

This effort gave rise to the first civil society tribunal, sponsored by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation in the UK, led by the great philosopher Bertrand Russell, with participation from leading intellectuals of the time, such as Jean-Paul Sartre.

‘Legitimacy war’

Public opinion today is largely shaped by the modern state, which exerts indirect influence over corporatised mainstream media.

In turn, powerful special interests and their well-funded think tanks ensure that governmental institutions remain aligned with their agendas.

The tribunal can be seen as one symbolic battleground in the legitimacy war that has been ongoing for more than a century between Israel and Palestine

This dynamic has perpetuated the misleading belief that military power remains the decisive factor in global conflicts post-World War Two.

However, historical records contradict this belief: every significant conflict since World War Two, including anti-colonial wars, has been won by the weaker side militarily.

Israel appears to be an exception to this trend, but its wars should be understood as part of an ongoing and unresolved struggle over sovereignty and control of historic Palestine.

The outcome in Palestine is still undecided, and despite the horrific violence in Gaza, Israel is losing the all-important “legitimacy war” – a symbolic battle for control over law, morality and public opinion.

Except in rare cases – such as Western Sahara, Kashmir and Tibet – the winner of a legitimate war ultimately controls the political outcome.

However, even the winning side may suffer significant losses over the prolonged struggles required to achieve that victory.

The Gaza Tribunal can be seen as one such symbolic battleground in the legitimacy war that has been ongoing for more than a century between Israel and Palestine.

Measure of success

If it succeeds, the tribunal will account for both the success or failure of the ceasefire while also creating a comprehensive archive documenting Israel’s criminality.

Moreover, it will foster worldwide solidarity, encouraging global militancy for justice.

The tribunal also contributes to the legitimisation of an alternative paradigm of international law, one that derives its authority from people and their sense of justice rather than relying solely on governments and their institutions.

The Gaza ordeal should awaken the conscience of people worldwide, making them more receptive to civil society initiatives like the tribunal.

By doing so, it acknowledges the complementary role of civil society in educating and mobilising citizens to embrace the view that the future of international law and justice often depends on their direct engagement in current political struggles.

In this way, this populist backstop of morally and legally driven activism has the potential to help humanity meet mounting global challenges effectively and fairly.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

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New Realities of Israel/Palestine in the Trump Era: Settler Colonial Destinies in the 21st Century

25 Jan


[Prefatory Note: This post modifies and updates an interview with Mohammad Ali Haqshenas, a journalist with the International Quran News Agency, published under its auspices on January 22, 2025. It is affected by the assumption of the US presidency by Donald Trump and the early days of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement negotiated during the Biden presidency more than seven months earlier.]  

1. How do you assess Donald Trump’s public and behind-the-scenes efforts as the U.S. President-elect to advance the ceasefire agreement and prisoner exchange?

For Trump a major incentive of achieving the ceasefire and prisoner exchange was to show America that he gets things done as contrasted with Biden who let this same ceasefire agreement sit on the shelf for more than six months.

The ceasefire is publicized as a demonstration of Trump’s and US leverage with respect to Israel when it actively seeks results rather than merely wants to make a rhetorical impression, but there is more to this ceasefire that is immediately apparent. In addition to a promise to Netanyahu of unconditional support, Trump may well have given confidential assurances of backing Israel’s high priority strategic ambitions. Number one would be to give cover if Israel chooses to annex all or most of the West Bank. Almost as important would be Trump’s promise that it would do his best to persuade the government of Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. This would represent a continuation of the arrangements brokered by the US to induce the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morrocco at the end of first presidential term in 2020 to reach normalization agreements with Israel.

It is also significant that numerous Washington officials in the Trump entourage have unconditionally promised to support Israel if the ceasefire arrangements collapse regardless of which side is at fault. There is not even a pretension of being objective in the sense of seeking to discern where the evidence of responsibility points.

Netanyahu is rumored to have given his hardline cabinet members, Ben Gvir and Smotrich, assurances that the military campaign will resume at the end of the six-week first phase. These assurances were probably necessary to avoid the collapse of Israel’s

shaky governing coalition.

2. How do you view the relationship between Trump and Netanyahu, as well as U.S. political considerations, in light of this ceasefire?

I think the relationship of these two autocratic leaders is based on their shared transactional style, ideological agreement, and shared strategic interests. Both leaders are defenders of the West against the rest, being especially hostile to Islamic forces in the Islamic world. The Palestinian struggle is on one level the core expression of this geopolitical rivalry, with all the complicit supporters of Israel coming from the white dominant countries, that is, the European colonial powers and the breakaway British colonies in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. On the Palestinian side, except for Iran, which is indirectly supportive of the Palestinian struggle, the political actors siding with the Palestinians are Islamic non-governmental movements and militias in the Middle East, most militantly the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, both materially and diplomatically aided by Iran. Islamic governments in the Arab world have condemned Israel for committing genocide but have refrained from acting materially or even diplomatically in ways that might exert pressure on Israel. The alignments in this ‘clash of civilizations’ correspond closely to the political vision of Trump and Netanyahu, and recall the prophetic pronouncements of Samuel Huntington shortly after the end of the Cold War.    


3. Previous ceasefire agreements between Israel and Hamas were violated due to clashes between the two sides and ultimately failed. Do you think this agreement signifies a permanent end to the war or merely a temporary halt in conflicts?

I believe that Israel will not end the conflict until it satisfies at least one of its two strategic goals, both of which are outside of Gaza—the primary goal of Israel is the annexation of the West Bank coupled with a declaration of Israel’s victory over the Palestinians, signified by the formal establishment of Greater Israel as an exclusivist Jewish state from ‘the river to the sea.’ The secondary goal is to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia as a political foundation for the formation of an aggressive coalition that adopts policies to achieve regime change in Iran. Israel seems prepared to risk a major war in the course of doing so, while Saudi Arabia appears more cautious. The Trump presidency is clearly disposed to join Israel if it makes such an effort, indirectly if possible, directly if necessary. General Keith Kellogg, appointed by Trump as his Special Envoy to Ukraine in keeping with such conjectures is publicly advocating the revival of a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran as a priority of American foreign policy under Trump.

I think the Hamas side will do its best to uphold commitments to release hostages and abide by the ceasefire while Israel will pragmatically weigh its interests as the process goes forward, but seems far more likely to break the ceasefire agreement after the first 42 days, perhaps as Netanyahu’s way of keeping his coalition from collapsing, or even before as several violent incidents provoked by Israeli military forces have already occurred.  Nothing short of a total Hamas political surrender including the willingness to give up whatever weapons the resistance movement possesses might induce Israel to give temporily up its unmet goals of annexation and Saudi normalization by way of a peace treaty. Even if the ceasefire is more or less maintained in its first phase, Israel seems unlikely to remain within the ceasefire framework once the six weeks of phase one is completed, which means that the latter two latter phases of ending the campaign and IDF withdrawal phases of the ceasefire will never happen. In this event, it is all but certain that Israel would then resume the full fury of its genocidal campaign, provoking Hamas to react. Israel would then use its influence with mainstream media and support in Washington to shift blame to Hamas to avoid any responsibility for the breakdown in the courts of public opinion while resuming its genocidal campaign in Gaza that never was truly abandoned despite the claims made on behalf of the ceasefire diplomacy..

4. The Israeli finance minister, referring to his discussions with Netanyahu, stated that Israel has not yet achieved its objectives in the war. Can it be argued that this agreement will undermine Israel’s security?

I believe the Israeli response was never primarily about security. It was main about land and demography, more specifically about gaining sovereignty over the West Bank, and giving the settler militants a green light to make life unlivable for the Palestinians so that they would die or leave. This anticipated and indulged settler rampage has gathered momentum with its undisguised agenda of dispossessing and killing enough Palestinians so as to restore a Jewish majority population. By such means, settler violence serves an undisguised prelude to the incorporation of the West Bank into Israel, likely with Trump’s endorsement.

Prior to October 7, Palestinians and Israelis were almost evenly split in the overall population of 14 or 15 million inhabiting Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza. The higher Palestinian birthrate means that it is only a matter time until a majority of Palestinians are living under Israeli apartheid control and long dubious claims made by Israel to being a democracy would become delusional.

In the background pf my response is the growing evidence that Israel allowed the October 7 attack to happen because it wanted to initiate massive violence against the Palestinians with the justification of acting in a retaliatory mode that would excuse the death and  expulsion of large number of Palestinians, a lethal process more or less repeating the expulsions of an estimated 750.000 Palestinians in 1948, what is known to Palestinians as the nakba or catastrophe.

The Israel government received several extremely reliable warnings preceding the October 7 attack, including from US intelligence sources. In addition, Israel possessed advanced surveillance capabilities throughout Gaza to monitor Hamas resistance moves. These technical capabilities were reportedly reinforced by informers making the supposed ‘surprise’ nature of the attack hardly possible to believe. Under such circumstances it is inconceivable that Israel, at the very least, should have prepared to defend its borders and nearby Israeli communities. This is not to say that Israel was necessarily privy to the details or scope of the attack and might have been genuinely surprised by its sophistication and severity. This might explain the widespread support in Israel and indulgence throughout the world for an excessive military retaliation that lasted for several months. During this period protests were small and were hardly noticed despite the genocidal features of the Israeli attack. As the violence and denial of the necessities for Palestinian subsistence went on month after month civil society opposition grew more intense and widespread, an impression furthered by agitated by repeated Israeli lethal interferences with humanitarian aid deliveries and accompanying aid workers, including even the targeting of ambulances, rescue vehicles, and the supplies sent for the relief of desperately hungry, sick, and injured Palestinians. 

5. The release of prisoners is a critical step in the course of the war. Israel has incurred significant costs by agreeing to release Hamas members and individuals convicted of violent actions, which has sparked disputes within the Israeli cabinet. In your view, what challenges will this stage of the ceasefire face?

I think the main humiliation for Israel was not the release of so many Palestinian prisoners, but the need to negotiate as equals with Hamas to recover 33 hostages in a military campaign justified from the beginning as dedicated to the destruction and elimination of Hamas as a political actor and the reconfiguring of governance in Gaza.

Anyone following these events would also have hardly known from the one-sided media coverage that Palestinian prisoners were being released as the near exclusive media focus, especially that of the leading platforms in the West, was on the plight of the ‘hostages,’ while ignoring the far worse plight of the civilian population of Gaza or the many Palestinian women and children subjected to far worse treatment while under confinement. The release of more than 90 Palestinians prisoners on the first days of the ceasefire, many of whom had endured extremely abusive treatment and were innocent of any involvement in the October 7 attack was deemed hardly newsworthy. By the end of the six-week Phase One of the Ceasefire Arrangement nearly 2,000 Palestinians are scheduled for release. True, it is a direct violation of the law of war to hold innocent civilians or even captured enemy soldiers as hostage, but considering the disparity of weaponry and given the long history of Israel’s violence against civilians in Gaza, it becomes understandable why the Hamas resistance would seek at least the so-called

‘bargaining chip’ of hostages.

This underlying disparity in the relation between the hostage release and prisoner release reinforced the long-nurtured Israeli discourse that Israel values the life and freedom of its citizens so much than does Hamas that it is willing to make to agree to an unequal exchange with its enemy. Such state propaganda is consistent with the reverse disparity in media treatment, showing a human interest in each Israeli hostage released while viewing the Palestinian prisoner releases as a purely impersonal matter of statistics, a portrayal movingly contradicted by the crowds in the West Bank celebrating the prisoner releases, heeding their words of anguish about their detention experience (often held for long periods without charges) and their joyous embrace of ‘freedom.’

Those of us with experience of the two political cultures are struck by the closeness of Palestinian families and the absence of any sacrificial ethos comparable to Israel’s Hannibal Directive that instructs IDF soldiers to kill Israelis at risk of being captured rather than allowing them to become prisoners who will be traded for a disproportionate number of Israels. Living under conditions of an apartheid occupation or oppression allows Palestinians few satisfactions in pattens of existence most of us would regard as a life of misery other than personal intimacy of family and friendship.


6. How do you evaluate the future of Palestine, particularly the Gaza region? Some observers believe that Gaza’s current generation of children, who have lost their homes and families in this war, might take action against Israel in the future. What is your analysis?

Given the present correlation of forces, including the Trump assumption of the US presidency, I see little hope for a just resolution of Palestinian grievances soon. A further period of struggle, including a continuing process of Israeli delegitimation is underway. Israeli as a result of the Gaza genocide has been rebranded as a pariah state whose lawlessness has undermined it sovereign rights, and even drawn into question its entitlement to remain a member of the UN that its leaders regularly defame as ‘a cesspool of antisemitism.’ Israel also faces increased pressures from the impact of a rising tide of global solidarity initiatives generated by civil society activism, and taking the form of boycotts, divestment, sanctions, taxpayer revolt, and reinforce by reductions of trade with and investment in Israel. Such developments are bound to have economic and psycho-political impacts over time on the quality of life in Israel. Few doubt that such a campaign caused apartheid South African elites to experience the anguish of being excluded from international sporting events or of by having lucrative invitations refused by performing international musicians.

If the dynamics of delegitimation lead a significant number of Israelis to leave the country, choose to live elsewhere it would be a signal of the imminent collapse of Zionism as the state ideology of Israel, if not of Israel itself. Suddenly, the phantasies of veteran residents of Palestinian refugee camps are becoming real political possibilities. In other words, the Palestinians are winning the nonviolent Legitimacy War as measured by the Palestinian capture and global control of the high moral and legal ground of the conflict, and by the vitality of its national resistance under the most extreme pressures exerted by Israeli recourse to apartheid and now genocide. The dynamics of delegitimation may take decades of further suffering for Palestinians to feel vindication by the success of their prolonged resistance, above all by its translation into a political outcome that finally realizes Palestinian self-determination in a form that the Palestinians favor, and not by an arrangement pre-packaged and imposed by the UN or outside forces.

If this path to the realization of basic rights is effectively blocked by Israel’s apartheid tactics of domination, even should the genocidal jagged edges no longer are present, it will undoubtedly stimulate armed Palestinian resistance especially from survivors of the Gaza genocide who lost parents and children, and in some cases, whole families, or are living as amputees or with maimed bodies. It is impossible to imagine the depths of grief, which over time will give way to a sense of rage and resentment that will seek political expression in the form of violent anti-Israel acts and movements, as well as fuel global surges of genuine antisemitism, the opposite of the weaponized variants used so opportunistically to shield Isreal from criticism, censure, and sanctions.


7. From the international law perspective, what can be done to stop the Israeli occupation, which is basically the source of years-long conflicts in Palestine?

As should have become clear after decades of Israeli efforts to convert Palestinians into persecuted strangers in their own homeland, there is no path to a secure Israeli future even if the oppressor maintains its harsh apartheid regime. If that does not achieve political surrender or at least sullen acquiescence, then as a final effort to deal with resistance, then the settler elites are quite likely to engage in a last-ditch recourse to genocide. Israel is following the same path that the colonial West chose when compelled to deal with native peoples in the countries settled, who were dehumanized, slaughtered, and permanently marginalized. These pre-modern aggressions were most often rationalized by international law that until the last century generally legitimated colonial conquest and claims of sovereignty. In contrast, international law has since 1945 formally declared apartheid and genocide as high international crimes, but such a reclassification has proved inadequate in the face of Israeli defiance reinforced by the geopolitical complicity of the West, especially as led by the US.

The test of Palestinian resistance may emerge shortly and can be reduced to whether the remarkable steadfastness (samud) of the Palestinian people can withstand a final Israeli effort to transfer, eliminate, or kill the resident Arab population. There are already indications that the Trump leadership favors bizarre ethnic cleansing operations such as that mentioned by Trump’s newly appointed Middle East Envoy, Steve Witkoff. He recently proposed transferring a portion of the surviving population of Gaza to Indonesia.  Even if such a bizarre proposal is discounted as mere rhetoric it exhibited an intention to aid, abet, and facilitate Israel’s version of ‘a final solution’ that left the Jewish state in unobstructed control of historic Palestine. If we assume the Israeli willingness to implement such a plan and Indonesia agreeing in exchange for being lavishly subsidized, the very idea of such a proposal contradicts the proclaimed ethos of the 21st century. Channeling Trump, Witkoff is talking as if the world of states was a chess board on which the US could shift the pieces at will, an assert of hegemonic prerogatives.

  

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‘From Ground Zero: Stories from Gaza’: An Appreciation of the Palestinian People

22 Jan

[Prefatory Note: Reflections on the experience of seeing an unusual film in conception, initially published on January 20, 2025 in CounterPunch, and movingly transparent as a cinema experience.]

This extraordinary film, on the 2024 Oscar shortlist for documentaries, consists of 22 episodes stitched together by the noted Palestinian film director, Rashid Masharawi, but without any apparent effort to curate a narrative experience of the Gaza ordeal now in its 15th month. The power of the film taken as a whole derives from the cumulative impact of the utterly helpless and vulnerable Gaza civilian population seeking to survive despite overwhelming challenges to safety and pervasive loss of loved ones, home, neighborhood, schools, and sacred/historical sites in the overcrowded tiny Gaza Strip [25 miles long, 3.7-7.5 miles wide, population estimate of 2.3 million]. The various episodes both express the distinctiveness of Palestinian lived culture, its rich historical heritage, and the universality of a devastating saga of prolonged victimization.

I read through a series of admiring reviews that stressed these features of Palestinian resilience and creativity in the face of this cruel, undeserved collective fate. None of the episodes delves into the history of Palestinian suffering brought on by the Zionist Project for over a century. Nor is there any explicit linkage of the Gaza ordeal to the pathological geopolitics of the US-led supposed bastions of liberal democracy with its constitutional façade of fidelity to the rule of law and the international protection of human rights. From a cinematic perspective this purifies the message of bravery in the face of suffering, the existential variations of such an experience that has the potential to inspire remarkable acts of memorialization and transcendent behavior, as by making artworks from shards of glass or chunks of rubble.

These silences inevitably raise such questions as ‘Was this foreclosure of response a pragmatic adjustment to market realities, well-grounded fears of ideological suppression if the film had dared to examine even glancingly the underlying political impetus, the genocide of the perpetrators, the context of the October 7 attack, and the systemic disregard of law and morality by leading political actors? As it is, the film is being shown widely in American theaters, received accolades from reviewers, and much deserved attention from film festivals, even honored by nominations for coveted cinema awards. It seems fair to conjecture that this desirable outcome would not have happened had the Palestinians expressed anger directed at the sources of their misery. What we may never know was whether this set of foreclosure were set forth and monitored by the curator to make the film suitable for Western audiences in North America and Europe or whether this represented his aesthetic judgment to keep a steady universalizing focus on a dire humanitarian tragedy, somewhat mitigated by the courage and inner spirit of its victims. In sum, to consider effects of genocide rather than crime and its perpetrators.

At least in my review of mainstream film critics there was no commentary on this question of boundaries, whether consciously or not imposed on these 22 Gaza filmmakers. I left the theater struck by the failure of any of the characters to mention the words ‘genocide,’ ‘Israel,’ ‘Zionism,’ ‘United States,’ ‘United Nations,’ ‘international law,’ and ‘International Court of Justice.’ It should be mentioned that there was also no mention of ‘Hamas,’ ‘terrorism,’ and ‘hostages.’  This raises the question as to whether the absence of such references represented an effort by to adopt a posture of apolitical neutrality either for aesthetic or pragmatic reasons. We may never know, and would the motives of the curator be important beyond its human interest relevance? At the same time, I find it unacceptable to hide the evil of genocide behind a ‘two sides’ political smokescreen that equates the crimes of the oppressor with the criminal excesses of resistance on the part of the oppressed. The film completely avoids even a hint of some kind of implied parity of responsibility for the suffering inflicted on the people of Gaza.

From Ground Zero also steers clear of evoking our pity in frontal ways by showing hospital scenes of amputation or severe injury, which of course abound in Gaza alongside the daily death toll. From my own previous visits to Gaza where I was exposed to such visible torments, I know the power exerted by direct contact with such victims. I shall never forget the imprint left after many years of seeing a distraught father carrying his bleeding and badly wounded young son in his arms while shouting angrily in Arabic. I didn’t understand the words, but the sentiments he was expressing were transparent, and needed no translation. This conscious or unconscious decision to exclude such material from the film may have lessened its immediate impact, but it deepened the longer term understanding of the underlying humanitarian ordeal being endured by the Palestinian people.

The closest the film comes to making political allusions is put in the mouth of an engaging puppet who voices a damning indictment in one of the latter episodes, “everything is gone and the world just watches.’  There are also brief isolated references to the Nakba and the coerced expulsions from their homeland that at least 700,000 Palestinians experienced in 1948, and have ever since lived as refugees being unlawfully denied by Israel any right to return. These references express the deep roots of Palestinian suffering, but without pointing an accusing finger, and will likely be noticed at all except by those non-Palestinian viewers that have followed Palestinian misery through the decades. While for Palestinians those allusions to the past likely serve as grim reminders of familiar realities.

On balance I applaud the rendering of the Palestinian experience in this authenticating and original manner. It is itself a triumph of the Palestinian imagination over the daily torments that have become a reality of their lives 24/7.

It is not only the unbearable losses of family and home, but the menacing nightly sound of nearby explosions and the constant noise of drones overhead. The episodes are uniform in exposing the total vulnerability of the Palestinians and the disregard of the limits set by international law and morality made far worse by deliberately imposing a desperate struggle for subsistence arising from the obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid causing death and disease throughout the wretched tent cities in which Gazans have been forced to live since the destruction of their homes. The daily life of searching for food and drinkable water are only available, if at all, at sub-

subsistence levels.

Of course, I hope that From Ground Zero receives an Oscar at the Academy Awards night coming soon.

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Why a civil society tribunal on Gaza Genocide is necessary.

15 Dec


[Prefatory Note: The questions and responses were made a month ago and now presented in a modified form. The original intention was to cooperate with Aida Naouel Kara Mohammed of The Interviews Office of Aljazeera.net based in Doha Qatar that was gathering  information for a report about the newly formed Gaza Tribunal.]

1-How and when the idea of making “Gaza Tribunal” came?

The idea of a peoples or civil society tribunal on the persisting genocidal assault on the entrapped and blockaded Palestinian civilian population has long been conceived of as a valuable initiative. Yet a specific proposal with adequate funding only came to our attention

when my wife, Hilal Elver, and I were approached in Turkey during May of 2024 by a group of concerned Turkish citizens associated with the Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum inviting  and encouraging us to embark on such a project and asked me to serve as president, and Hilal to act as chief coordinator. We carefully deliberated upon whether we should accept such a proposal given the time-consuming complexities of organizing and carrying out such a project, and considering the political complexities of dealing with an undertaking of this magnitude.

During negotiations we insisted upon a strict pledge of political independence from interference by sponsors and funders, and above all, and by the Turkish Government. As well as independence from all governments. We also made clear that we would only proceed if assured about the exclusion of active politicians or diplomats. Such assurances were given in a persuasive form, and in August 2024, as the genocide intensified and the UN and US seemed in the first case unable and in the second case unwilling to even establish a ceasefire, we accepted this invitation and have been planning the organization, structure, and activities ever since. A successful launch meeting of the Gaza Tribunal Project was held in London on October 31-November 1st with many prominent scholars and activists taking part, including giving great attention to the work of Palestinian civil society grassroots organizations working under harsh conditions prevailing throughout Occupied Palestine.

2-Many nongovernmental organizations participate in this initiative, how do they coordinate and cooperate with each or other?

As a civil society initiative oriented toward lending support to the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and other basic rights, we have sought participation from a wide range of Palestinian NGOs, and have been encouraged by their strongly positive response as evidenced by their participation. We have established a Palestinian Civil Society Working Group as well as Global Civil Society Advisory Council to ensure that there are clear channels for participation and influence. To date there has been excellent cooperation among participating Palestinian organizations and in relation to the global CSOs, and of course we hope this will continue and be reflected in the final

judgment of the Gaza Tribunal. The identity of the Gaza Tribunal is global in its orientation, aiming to mobilize support throughout the world for global solidarity initiatives.

3-What are some of the prominent active organizations?

To varying degrees representatives of many organizations are active and or influential in the work of the GT, including notable Palestinian civil society actors: Al Haq, Palestinian Center of Human Rights,  Addameer, and Al Mezan Center of Human Rights. We have a special working group in the project composed of representatives of Palestinian grassroots and solidarity organizations. We on the Steering Committee of the GTP will turn to them for guidance throughout the entire GT process. We also are responsive to the valuable contributions of such global civic society organizations Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Doctors Without Borders, and other civil society organizations and activists wherever situated, including in Israel. We also intend to involve journalists, observers, and experts with a clear knowledge and experience of the violence that has been directed both toward the people of Gaza, but also toward international health and humanitarian aid workers, and indeed any individual of conscience, including poets, novelists, and artists.

4-What are the main goals that the Gaza Tribunal aspires to achieve?

I think a consensus exists among the conveners and sponsors of the Gaza Tribunal Project that we hope to organize the tribunal in such a manner

that its final judgment gives primary emphasis to the particulars of the crime of genocide as perpetrated in Gaza by Israel delimited by international law and the Genocide Convention. It also seeks to complement the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by acting more quickly and by producing texts that are technically competent yet readable by any concerned person without the obstructions of the sort of obscure legalism and boundaries that tend to be characteristic of ICJ judgments. The GT will operate without the guard rails of normal national and international courts, especially those affecting jurisdiction to decide, the scope of criminality that is to be pronounced upon, and especially the professional discipline of giving equal opportunity to complainants and defendants. A peoples tribunal is activated only by a sense of widespread injustice that is not being adequately addressed by the intergovernmental structures of world and their institutional policy tools for implementation (as center in the UN System).

Additional to the text itself and wider than any proceeding before the tribunal is the overall goal of producing an accurate and comprehensive record of what has transpired in Gaza (and spillover combat regionally) since the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, which itself should be contextualized in terms of prior Israeli provocations over the decades, intensified from the time the Netanyahu took control of Israeli governance at the start of 2023. It is a documentation of the criminal course of action free from jurisdictional restrictions on scope of inquire and from legalistic proceedings that impose boundaries on what kind of evidence and arguments are acceptable.

A further objective is to create a civil society template for a critical understanding and treatment of international law, including the world order significance of the GT experience for the development of an alternative pedagogical paradigm for the teaching and apprehension of international law that seeks to be critical of standard approaches and more dedicated to forging linkages between law and justice. As matters currently stand, the ICJ despite ‘justice’ being in its name veers sharply toward a strictly legalistic and positivist framing of issues it is called upon to resolve. Of course, in extreme circumstance such as Gaza legalistic and populist approaches to international law tend to converge, and the professionalism of the judges at the ICJ gives legitimacy and legal prestige to their rulings even if, as here, the obligatory features of their rulings are neither respected, nor observed, by Israel.

A further goal is to explain and justify a ‘judicial’ proceeding that does not accord due process to the defendant or adversary. Such partisan jurisprudence fills the gap created by the shortcomings of intergovernmental judicial processes even if operating free from geopolitical interference.  Again, if competently and objectively done, this mode of populist adjudication deserves respect, and implementation by private sector solidarity initiatives. For instance, BDS or cultural, sporting, and academic steps responsive to calls for populist modes of ‘enforcement.’ The effective of implementation depends on the degree to which a civil society undertaking has a mobilizing effect on people. The struggle against South African apartheid contains many reasons to believe that global expressions of solidarity strengthens the will and prospects on a national struggle for basic rights.

5-Do you think that your efforts will exert a meaningful inflience?

Yes, if the quality of performance at various stages of the GT live up to its diverse aspirations and potential. A civil society tribunal lacks any direct enforcement capabilities, but it can encourage solidarity initiatives that exert pressure. This seems to have been instrumental in the case of the anti-apartheid movement that differed from the Palestinian situation because the UN exerted an important delegitimizing influence, including by way of several Advisory Opinions of the ICJ. Also organized elements in civil society including faith-based groups, labor unions, and university protest movement supportive of divestment and boycott exerted pressure on the apartheid regime. As well, as with Occupied Palestine, an array of anti-racist pro-constitutional human rights actors were active and effective in delegitimizing apartheid South Africa.

One such established effort in the Palestinian struggle along these lines is the BDS Campaign which was initiated in 2005 by a coalition of Palestinian activists and grassroots organization. A strong judgment by GT, if widely distributed will add legitimacy to such civil society initiatives and give rise to other meaningful non-governmental undertaking including cultural and sports boycotts, and cooperative academic projects involving exchange programs and other interactions with Israel’s university.

The success or disappointment of our efforts will of course reflect the contextual situation, especially whether there continues to be widespread concern about the behavior of Israel toward Palestinian basic rights as well as whether Israel will continue under present or similar leadership. It is possible if Israel implements its increasing overt plans to annex the West Bank, Gaza in whole or in part, and deny any prospect of agreeing to the emergence of a Palestinian state of equivalent sovereignty, the impact of our GT Tribunal could be considerable even if indirect.

Also quite possible is a Zionist led pushback against the GT probably under its familiar tactic of weaponizing antisemitism. There exists a substantial prospect that a Trump presidency will encourage the demonization of the GT and those closely associated. So far, such dark prospects have not discouraged participation in its activities by those whose contributions we have solicited, which include persons prominent in the civic life of their respective country. The US as a geopolitical leader and the principal supporter of Israel despite the transparency in real time of the genocide is an important battleground in the Legitimacy War being waged effectively on behalf of the Palestinian struggle but at great costs if measured in terms of human suffering and traumatized alienation endured by the entire civilian population of Gaza. A recent report on the condition of the mental health of children in Gaza reached the conclusions that 96% of children believe that they will soon die, 49% have lost the will to live, and 100% of surviving children will need psychological help to restore their mental health. [Study and Report of Gaza Community Centre for Crisis Management, supported by the UK-based War-Child Alliance.]

6-Some believe that people have lost hope in such initiatives, what do you respond to them?

Such initiatives have always had to swim against the currents of geopolitical hard power and the mainstream media’s establishment alignments that were dismissive or hostile to such populist challenges. Such statist attitudes were present from the inception of civil society tribunals as a policy instrument of persons opposed to the behavior of states and their institutions. The serious development of this populist approach to law goes back to the formation  of the Russell Tribunal in the mid-1960s addressing the alleged crimes associated with the conduct of the Vietnam War. This first instance of a people’s tribunal did not have a discernable effect on the US conduct of the war, although it energized to some extent anti-war activism in the US and Europe, and pioneered a model of legitimacy challenges that has been emulated in numerous subsequent instances, including tribunal initiatives concerned with nuclear weapons, interventions in the Global South, gender equality, environmental protection, and corporate wrongdoing. In this sense, this civil society format has emerged as a pedagogical model of soft power resistance with variable educational, media, and activist impacts depending on the issue, overall political context, and the skills of the organizers in disseminating the outcome of their tribunal. 

The Palestinian struggle and Israel’s genocide is in many ways a special case, which makes its likely effects either less than hoped for or greater. For one thing Israel learned from apartheid South Africa to use major resources to shape effectively the public discourse relevant to its behavior, including resorting to ‘a politics of distraction’ to divert attention from substantive allegations and criticism by mounting defamatory attacks on the messenger to divert attention from the message.  In this respect Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders have consistently dismissed UN authority, including of the ICJ, with contrary-to-fact defamatory attacks irresponsibly charging UN antisemitism.

Further, the historical background- of Jewish victimization climaxing with the Holocaust continues to inhibit criticism or identification with the Palestinian struggle particularly in Germany but also in the Western democracies, especially the US, that emerged from World War II with a guilty conscience because these governments did so little to oppose Nazi antisemitism culminating in the Holocaust before and during the Second World War. This liberal guilt led to an Orientalist sequel in the postwar context in which Europe’s long history of extreme persecution of Jews were addressed at the expense of people resident in a Global South nation, making Palestinian Arabs themselves persecuted strangers in their own homeland. This is the deep roots of a process that culminated in genocide when Palestinian resistance persisted despite Israeli apartheid policies and practices. Such a pattern of recourse to genocide is embedded in the experience of settler colonialism that long preceded Israeli genocide. While eliminating or marginalizing the resistance of native peoples, settlers from Europe coupled their state-building operations with genocidal tactics in the breakaway British colonies of North America, Australia, and New Zealand in systematic processes. I have labeled this dynamic as ‘genocide before genocide,’ that is before the word ‘genocide’ was invented by Rafael Lemkin and widely adopted throughout the world in the post-Holocaust, written into international law in a widely ratified treaty, International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1948).

Finally, we who are devoting time and mainstream reputations to the GT acknowledge the uncertainty as to its usefulness. In part, we make this major commitment in response to Michelle Obama’s pre-election imperative then directed at Democrats in the US 2024 pre-electoral setting: ‘Do Something!’ Also, even if a direct impact on Israel’s behavior fails, we are confident that there will be secondary impacts of a high-quality tribunal in relation to future legal education, especially in the Global South. The compilation of a historical record and archive is itself a contribution to a people-oriented approach to the study and application of international law in global security contexts.

I suspect that most of those ‘who lost hope’ never had much hope or belief in ‘such initiative.’

7- Why was the Gaza Tribunal Project launched it in London exactl

The principal reason for locating the November 1 launch in London was to signal and underscore our intention to be global rather than to appear Turkish or even Palestinian. The diverse background of the London participant in this initial meeting of the GT Advisory Council gave full expression to this issue of global identity. London was also logistically convenient. We plan future meetings in other national settings.

8- It’s known at the international level that such initiatives are symbolic, will be there any legal obligations to punish the perpetrators?

Whenever the obligations of international law clash with strong strategic interests of geopolitical actors, especially in relation to war/peace and global security issues, the impacts of even formal governmental or international institutions has been principally symbolic. Israel defies international law and the UN and there is no political will to counteract or even censure such behavior. At most, a non-judgmental call for a ceasefire and a concern about the humanitarian catastrophe being inflicted on the previously entrapped and abused civilian population of Gaza for over 14 months.

And yet, Israel is sufficiently sensitive to the impact of adverse judgments by the ICJ, International Criminal Court (ICC), and the General Assembly as to use all its influence to blunt the effects, including hyperbolic defamation as instanced by characterizing the UN as ‘a vile cesspool of antisemitism’ and trying to use backroom influence to cancel or otherwise nullify the ICC issuance of arrest warrants for Israeli leaders as recommended by the Chief Prosecutor, Karim Khan.  As the Israel historian Tom Segev writes, “Not every criticism against Israel is antisemitic…The moment you say it is antisemitic hate … you take away all legitimacy from the criticism and try to crush the debate.” This is exactly descriptive of the Netanyahu tactics at the UN repeatedly referring to this organization of the world peoples and their governments as an ‘Anti-Israel Flat Earth Society’ and calling the UN ‘a swamp of antisemitic bile.’ Indeed, the UN deserves criticism as weak and incapable of upholding its own Charter and exhibiting no capacity or will to challenge ‘the primacy of geopolitics.’ At least, the president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has mounted muted criticism of the UN with his catchy slogan ‘the world is greater than five.’

In this sort of context of geopolitically supported lawlessness, the main path leading todd effectiveness for law is symbolic, but the symbolic effects of legitimate political actors, whether inter-governmental or not, are real as evidenced by targeted states doing everything in their power to prevent and discredit them. I have long believed that symbolic arenas of lawmaking should not be trivialized or derided as I argue most emphatically with respect to the existence and activities of the GT. It is always worth remember that the anti-colonial wars since 1945 have all been won by nationalist forces on the symbolic battlefields of legitimacy. In other words, victors in Legitimacy Wars have controlled political outcome in war while competing with militarily superior colonial armies. This is a prime lesson of history, which ‘political realists’ that dominate foreign policy circles and arms merchants wanted banned throughout the lifetime education of their citizenries.

If nothing else, the Gaza Tribunal Project can offer an alternative, TWAIL, or sub-altern pedagogical model of how the interplay of law, morality, and war should be configured and interpreted at this time of planetary danger.

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The ICC Issues Arrest Warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant: Winning the Legitimacy War

24 Nov

Richard Falk

The ICC delayed the formal issuance of ‘arrest warrants’ for top Israeli

political leaders directing the genocidal assault on Gaza for six months although

it responded affirmatively to a comparable request involving Putin’s alleged criminality in

Ukraine in less than a month after the Russian attack.

Double standards to be sure, yet ICC action is a welcome alternative to either denying the Chief Prosecutor’s recommendation of May 20 or delaying indefinitely to its decision on whether the arrest warrants should be issued. The ruling of ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 1 to issue arrest warrants for the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, in view of the overwhelming evidence of their responsibility for severe international crimes comes as big news. It is a mighty symbolic blow against geopolitical impunity and in favor of accountability.

If this ICC action is assessed by its ability to sway Israel’s short-term behavior in directions more in accord with international law, as well as to the majority views prevalent in the UN, the Global South, and world public opinion this ICC decision the cynical dismissal of Sub-Changer as ‘an empty gesture.’  Some argue that the tangible impact of arrest warrants, if any, will be to alter Netanyahu’s and Gallant’s future travel plans slightly. The decision obliges the 124 member states of the ICC to carry out arrests of these individuals should they be so bold as to venture onto their territory. Non-parties, including the US, Russia, China, Israel and others are not subject to this enforcement obligation. We should remember that Palestine is a party to the ICC treaty and thus if either Netanyahu or Gallant were to set foot in the Occupied Palestinian Territories of Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem the governmental authority in Ramallah would be legally obliged to make arrests. Yet it would test the bravery of the Palestinian Authority far beyond its past behavior if it dared arrest an Israeli leader, however clear the obligation and no matter how strong the evidence against him. This assessment of tangible effect misses the point of why this is an historically significant development both for the Palestinian struggle and the credibility of the ICC.

Before putting forth an argument as to why this ICC move is a historic step, it seems responsible to acknowledge several important limitations:

                  –First and foremost, although the Prosecutor’s recommendation to the Sub-Chamber of the ICC was made in May (or eight months after Oct. 8th), it did not include even a mention of ‘genocide’ among the crimes attributed to these two leaders, which is of course the core criminality of the Israeli onslaught, as well as expressive of their role in the enactment of this ultimate international crime;

                  –Another notable limitation is the long ICC delay between recommending the arrest warrants and Sub-Chamber ruling. This was substantively inexcusable in view of the dire emergency conditions of devastation, famine, and suffering existing in Gaza during this interval, and aggravated by Israel’s obstruction of humanitarian assistance provided by UNRWA and other international aid and humanitarian organization to the Gazan civilian population in desperate need of food, fuel, electricity, potable water, medical supplies, and health workers.

                  –Also, the ICC decision remains subject to jurisdictional challenge once the arrest order has been finalized. The Nov 20 acceptance of jurisdiction is in a formal sense provisional as Israel’s objection to ICC jurisdictional authority was made prematurely, but can be made without prejudice despite its denial in the future now that the ICC has acted.

                  –Even in the highly unlikely event that arrests will be made, it is improbable that detention could be implemented, given the US Congressional legislation authorizing the use of force to liberate detainees from ICC captivity if US nationals or the accused as here are nationals of allies. There have been already intimations that some members of the US Senate and House will seek sanctions against the persons of the Chief Prosecutor, Karim Kahn, and the members of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber. Such initiatives if actualized will further weaken the US reputation as supporter of the Rule of Law in international affairs.

Despite these formidable limitations, this invocation of the procedural authority of the ICC is itself a grim reminder to the world that accountability for international crimes should pertain to all governments and that the evidence against these two Israeli leaders has been assessed by objective and professionally qualified experts under the auspices of an international institution that is empowered by a widely ratified treaty to make a determination on the legal appropriateness of making such a controversial decision.

The ICC like the ICJ has no independent enforcement capability other than compliance by member states, but because the ICC is not part of the UN it at least are rendered, unlike the ICJ without being subject for enforcement to a right of veto that has paralyzed the UN Security Council throughout this period of Gaza violence. This does not mean that implementation will follow or that prosecution will go forward much less that future findings of guilt will be respected, in the event that they occur, as the older more venerable ICJ has found out to its dismay since its establishment in 1945. But both the ICC and ICJ in their judicial proceeding are formally free from ‘the primacy of geopolitics’ that so often overrides the relevance of international law or the UN Charter in other non-judicial venues.

An outcome of the sort that the ICC reached regarding the arrest warrants is a direct and authoritative application of international law, and in that sense produces no counter-arguments but it is subject to crude denunciations. Netanyahu calls the ICC ruling ‘absurd’ and a manifestation of antisemitism, while the American lame duck president, Joe Biden, has called the issuance of these arrest warrants as ‘outrageous’ but never tells the world why. This kind of verbal Israeli lashing of the ICC has in the past been directed at the UN itself in response to criticism of its policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

The lasting and redeeming significance of the issuance of the arrest warrants is to help Palestine win the ‘legitimacy war’ being waged to control the high ground of law, morality, and public discourse. Political realists that continue to dominate foreign policy elites in important states dismiss international law and normative considerations in global security and geopolitically inflamed settings as a misleading distraction to interactions that are best guided, and in any event will be determined by the interplay of military force.

Such thinking overlooks the reverse experience of all anti-colonial wars in the prior century that were won by the weaker side militarily. The US should have learned this lesson in the Vietnam War in which it dominated air, sea, and land battlefields and yet lost the war. The weaker side militarily prevailed, that is, it prevailed in the legitimacy war, which more often than not has controlled the political outcomes since 1945 in internal conflicts waged around issues of national and ideological identity of sovereign states.  These outcomes reflect the decline in the historical agency of militarism even in the face of many seemingly breakthrough technological innovations in warfare on the part of aggressor states.

For this reason, yet mainly without this line of analysis, more and more close observers have come to the surprising conclusion that Israel has already lost the war, and in the process endangered its future security and prosperity, and possibly even its existence. In the end Palestinian resistance may achieve victory despite paying an unspeakable price exacted by such a horrifying genocidal assault. If this outcome comes to pass, one of the international factors that will be given attention is this ICC Sub-Chamber unanimous decision to issue arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant. In this defining sense the frustrations with implementation of these arrest warrants are not the end of the story, but

are part of a larger historically unfolding narrative of ‘hope against hope.’ ##

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WHAT DRIVES ISRAEL—10/29/24

29 Oct

Prefatory Note This post is a much modified, updated version of my responses to questions posed Murat Sofuoglu, a Turkish journalist associated with TRT World. The dehistoricizing and decontextualization of the Hamas attack of October 7 was spread around the world by the most influential global media platforms and political leaders of the liberal democracies, and led to widespread sympathy for Israel and some months of tolerance of their response despite its legally and ethically unacceptable character. As such the Israeli response was initially sanitized by regarding  Palestinian grievances in Gaza as irrelevent, and also by uncritically accepting Israeli  hasbara that its response to the Hamas attack was solely motivated by security and counter-terrorist considerations, and thus disconnected from the Greater Israel priority and preoccupations of the Netanyahu coalition that came to power at the start of 2023 or more than nine months before the attack.]  


1. Has the Israeli model to secure Jews a homeland in Palestine failed?

I think it is misleading to refer to the Zionist Project in the singular and by reference to ‘a homeland’ as originally pledged in the Balfour Declaration issued in 1917. The minimum pre-1948 goal of world Zionism was to create a Jewish supremist state in Israel with an unlimited right of returns for Jews from anywhere in the world, and the denial of such an equivalent right to the Palestinians who were the native majority population. The Nakba that accompanied the 1948 War involved the forced expulsion from Palestine and permanent refugee/exile status for of at least 700,000 non-Jewish residents of the portion of Palestine set aside for Israel by the partition resolution of 29 November 1947 UN GA Res. 181. Israeli expulsion politics exhibited the Zionist intention in the fog of war was to ensure a long-term Jewish majority settler population that would enable Israel to claim credibly in its early years to be both Jewish and democratic, the latter proving to become

overwhelmed by the apartheid regime that was convincingly delimited as such over the course of the last decade. The occupation was fully documented as a type of apartheid violating the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. This assessment was validated by comprehensive reports, filled with data, prepared by ESCWA, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Israeli NGO, B’Tselem.

Prefiguring the response of the governments of most liberal democracies was the failure to express any adverse reactions to Israeli apartheid despite their earlier support for the global anti-apartheid movement that exerted so much pressure on the South African government that it pleasantly surprised the world by releasing Nelson Mandela from prison and proceeding rapidly to become a constitutional democracy incorporating legal commitments to racial equality. Why was there no negative international response to Israeli apartheid?  At the very least the apartheid assessments should have led to a demand that Israel withdraw from Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem.

Even earlier, the most that the US Government could manage to say about the relentless expansion of unlawful settlements that ‘it was unhelpful.’  At first, Western governments were reluctant to be even mildly critical of Israel because of their own failure to do more by way of opposition to the Holocaust, inducing a debilitating sense of guilt made more potent by Israel’s domination of the public discourse subtly facilitated by a racist dehumaniization of the Palestinian other as an Orientalized inferior people when compared to the rapid modernizing prevailing temperament in the new Jewish state.

The UN contributed to the Palestinian tragedy by initially proposing partition of a previously colonized national entity without bothering to consult the Arab majority population residing in Palestine that would have certainly been opposed to lending legitimacy to such a fracturing of their homeland. But the Palestinians were never given a chance to vote in a referendum on partition, which itself was an ahistorical imposition of UK colonial interest and methods of control by a logic of ‘divide and rule.’

This post-1945 tragedy was compounded and prefigured the future ordeals of the Palestinian people by the failure to at least secure the promised Palestinian state of equal status to Israel before legitimating Israel’s claims to statehood by diplomatic recognition and admission to the UN as a member sovereign state. The 1967 War aggravated Palestinian grievances by. establishing Israeli de facto control by way of conquest over the Palestinian territories of East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza, again given unregulated de facto control by way of the doctrine of Belligerent Occupation, supposedly within a temporary and regulative international law framework set forth in the 4th Geneva Convention and the First Additional Protocol. Israel massively violated its terms of occupation in numerous fundamental ways from Day One. Perhaps, the most flagrant early expression of Israeli territorial unilateralism was its incorporation of East Jerusalem into sovereign Israel as ‘its eternal capital.’ This symbolic and substantive land-grabbing that included Islamic sacred sites has never to this day been accepted by the majority of states, and the Israeli move to establish Jerusalem as the Israeli capital was declared ‘null and void’ in an 2017 Emergency Session General Assembly Resolution (ES-1019) supported by a super-majority of Member states but opposed and then ignored by the US and the main states of NATO [the vote was 129-9-35 (abstentions).

The developments between 1967 and 2024 consolidated Israeli territorial ambitions in occupied Palestine by way of the extensive unlawful settlement movement, a coercive apartheid occupation regime that subjugated Palestinians living under prolonged occupation that culminated in the genocidal and ecocidal assault on Gaza that killed many in real time and totally devastated Gaza as a livable habitat. The settler colonial assessment of Israel disposing the majority native population resembled the pattern of the breakaway British colonials (US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) each of which, although New Zealand less so, implemented their colonial encroachments by genocidal tactics in response to resistance, and succeeded in establishing their flourishing and enduring state.

In retrospect, it seems obvious that Zionism, and since 1948, Israel itself pursued a two-track strategy: first, a public hasbara discourse that claimed moderation and pretended to seek a democratic polity and engage in a search for a political compromise on land rights, democracy, and human rights with the native population; secondly, a political strategy that opportunistically advanced by stages to realize the hard core Zionist Project of restoring Jewish exclusive control over the Biblically ‘promised land’ of Jewish tradition at a given time for what it could get by way of an expansionist vision with respect to Israel itself, neighboring countries, and regional geopolitics. Not only did the shadows cast by the Nazi Holocaust in the early years of Israel’s existence inhibit criticism of the settler colonial aspects of Israel’s approach to the indigenous non-Jewish residents of Palestine but Israel’s first political leader, David Ben Gurion a committed secularist, cynically declared ‘Let the Bible be our weapon,’ and in the process claimed a religious entitlement to all of historic Palestine as ‘the promised land’ of Jewish tradition, which has prevailed over the prime norm of colonial decline, that of the right of sef-determination.

After the 1967 War Israel became itself a partner in ‘colonialism after colonialism’ in the Middle East. There emerged a strategic relationship with the United States and Europe that embraced regional security, safeguarding oil and gas reserves for the West, and cooperating with respect to the containment of political Islam, especially after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). This US led geopolitical limitations imposed on regional autonomy were highlighted by the unprecedented US political commitment to ensure that Israel possessed a military capability to defeat any combination of regional adversaries. Such a willingness to indulge ‘Israeli exceptionalism’ with respect to regional security was  dramatized by looking away while Israel covertly, with European active complicity not only became the sole nuclear weapons state in the Middle East but assumed the role of guardian of non-proliferation when it came to Iran.  As Israel gained in strength and regional acceptance via the Abraham Accords reached in 2020 during the last months of the Trump presidency it seemed on a path that would end with a one-state solution under its sole and uncontested dominion.

As Israel gained in political acceptance and self-confidence it became less shy about revealing its nationalist agenda. The 2018 Basic Law, with a quasi-constitutional status, was forthright in claiming Israel as a Jewish State, with the Jewish people exclusively entitled to exercise the right of self-determination (ignoring the rights and relevance of the 20% of its population that was non-Jewish, and Hebrew was confirmed as the only official language. Even extreme Israeli apologists seemed reluctant to any longer claim, what was never true, that “Israel was the only democracy in the Middle East.” The net result as of late 2024 is that it is the Palestinians who have become unwelcome strangers in their own historic homeland. Israeli democracy, such as it has become, was clearly in practice and law ‘for Jews only.’ And again the Western patrons of Israel watched from the sidelines as Israel kept enlarging and disclosing its zero-sum vision of conflict resolution, and disregard of the US role as intermediary in the search for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.  

2. What is Israel trying to achieve with its ongoing war campaign across the Middle East?

Again, we are challenged to deal with Israel’s mainly undisclosed intentions and what is disclosed is not trustworthy or a small part of the Israeli policy agenda motivating the enlargement of the combat zone. For greater insight we are forced to rely on conjecture to produce some kind of illuminating, yet plausible, interpretation. As with Gaza, Israel claims a right of self-defense. It seeks extra weight by insisting that its enemies are all sponsors or guilty of ‘terrorist’ violence’ and proxy engagements determined to undermine Israeli security, Even if we accept this line of argument Israel’s use of force in Lebanon is disproportional and indiscriminate, self-acknowledged and operationalized as an inflammatory application of the Dahiya Doctrine originally set forth in the Lebanon War of 1982. The Dahiya Doctrine was enunciated by a leading Israeli general, expressing the intention to retaliate disproportionately against security provocations threatening Israeli interests. The Gaza genocide can be viewed as a grotesque and maximal example of Dahiya thinking and practice, although specifically motivated by Israeli extraterritorial security priorities, ethnic cleansing, economic ambitions, regional paranoia, as well as its invariable dismissal of the genuine grievances and armed resistance of adversaries as invariably of a terrorist character.

In certain ethical respects the Dahiya Doctrine is an Israeli adaptation of the logic of deterrence that guided security policy of both US and USSR during Cold War. Its most salient feature was known as Mutual Assured Destruction  (or to critics as MAD). Israel’s adaptation consisted of substituting the threat of genocide for that of nuclear retaliation. The core idea of deterrence is a credibly threatened unacceptably disproportionate response to any fundamental threat to strategic interests or to homeland security of the nuclear antagonists and their close allies.

There is no mutuality in Israel’s approach to deterrence, which is a generalized warning to its regional adversaries of dire results if they dare to attack or provoke Israel. Any regional state purporting to balance Israel hegemonic nuclear capabilities is projected as such a threat, which presupposes a geopolitical right to maintain Israel’s regional nuclear supremacy.

3. Do you think with the current campaign, the Netanyahu government aims to resolve once and for all the Jewish question, fixing Israel’s place in the Middle East? 

It seems as though Israel has been expanding its combat objectives initially justified as retaliation against Hamas for the October 7 attack by adopting a proclaimed goal of exterminating Hamas. While pursuing this goal Israel engaged in such excessive and indiscriminate violence that its behavior was widely perceived as a transparent instance of genocide committed in real time and including a growing and increasingly activist minority in the civil societies of the Western countries, including many Jews, whose governments most ardently support Israel. Israel has suffered a near total loss of legitimacy as a normal state and is increasingly viewed as a pariah or rogue state to an extent exceeding the condemnation of even overtly racist and oppressive South Africa. This ended when the Pretoria government surprised the world by abandoning apartheid in the mid-1990s, apparently for pragmatic reasons associated with debilitating sanctions that limited South Africa’s participation in world society, including cultural and sporting boycotts that curtailed the freedoms of the ruling white minority.

Israel has handled this international hostility differently and more defiantly than South Africa, partly because it has had the benefit of strong geopolitical support from the governments of the Global West, especially the all-important US. Israel’s security is a matter of strategic importance to the West as a beachhead in the Middle East for the related purposes of ensuring access to oil and gas reserves of the region and containing the spread of political Islam. Thus, the increase of Israel’s war objectives to include Hezbollah, the Houthis, and of course Iran has also become a battleground in the Clash of Civilizations within the region and is a potent source of instability parallel to the incipient Second Cold War with China and Russia. Whether Israel, with Washington’s backing and probable participation will provoke war with Iran is one of the great uncertainties of this historical moment. Part of this uncertainty involves assessing the relevance of Netanyahu’s personal survival agenda and whether the Religious Right in the governing coalition will push these wider objectives to the point of regional war with dangerous geopolitical risks. An ethical imperative is also continues to be present– not to shift attention away from the ongoing acute human catastrophe entrapping the civilian population of Gaza in deliberately induced death threatening traumas of mass hunger and widespread disease.

What Israel does and refrains from doing in the next few weeks will have a major impact on the prospects for a peaceful future responsive to growing ecological challenges. This in turn may reflect the outcome of the US presidential elections, and how the new leadership handles this dangerous, fragile global situation that combines a prolonged humanitarian catastrophe, ethical and legal gross abuses of civilian innocence, and hazardous neglect of heightened risks of geopolitical encounters and ecological collapses.

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What Can Iran & Palestine Expect from the US Presidential Elections?

23 Oct

[Prefatory Note: The following interview is in responses to questions addressed.to me by Kayhan New Agency in Iran. It is focused on an interpretation of how the forthcoming American elections are likely to affect Iran, and the policies toward the current  combat zone involving Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. X/0]

Kayhan Interview.   10/9/24

1-What impact does the U.S. election have on the Middle East (Israel-Palestine-Iran)?

Unless Trump is elected, which seems now shamelessly plausible, I see no prospect of change. If Trump is elected, he is more likely to encourage Israel to escalate tensions with Iran by way of an all-out military attack on Gaza and Iran, encouraging the use of a 30k blockbuster bomb and even a missile with a nuclear warhead directed at Iran’s nuclear facilities.

There are also dangers of such a scenario unfolding if Harris are elected, but somewhat less so. It could be brought about by the Netanyahu government exerting provocative pressures by way of alleged intelligence reports that Iran poses an existential threat to Israeli security and currently possesses nuclear weapons or is close to crossing that red line.

It may be that Iran’s conduct in the aftermath of the elections held on 5 November will have some effect in either calming or. agitating bellicose impulses. If the new President of Iran makes a determined diplomatic effort in the region, possibly centered on cultivating positive relations with Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, it could alter Israel’s calculations, but nothing is certain and nothing should be taken for granted or assumed. 

2-The effects of current events in the Middle East on the American elections?

Recent developments in the Middle East, especially the Gaza genocide and the expansion of the Gaza combat zone to the West Bank in Israel and to neighboring countries including Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are having very little impact on the American election, except for the Muslim-American minority and a small group of progressive individuals, including especially younger Jews. However, this numerically small

number compared to the size of the national voting public it could have an impact greater than one would expect because of its influence in battleground states. This reflects the concentration of Muslim-Americans is parts of the country where the electoral competition is very close, and the failure of these normally pro-Democratic voters to support Harris are strengthening Republican prospects, and hence heightening prospects for a Trump victory. The American electoral system is such that the winner is not chosen by the candidate with the most votes, but by a complex weighted system that gives each state, based on population a certain number of votes, which are so allocated as to give advantages to rural and small states where Trump is most popular.

3-Why student protests have been silenced in America and we dont see any protests in universities?

These protests have not yet been completely ‘silenced’ but certainly have been the targets of pressure from administrators of higher education and the Zionist, pro-Israeli, networks of influence.

Major donors to universities throughout the country with strong Israeli sympathies and ties have exerted their influence, usually hidden from public view. Israeli influence with American political elites is strong within the government and strong private sector lobbies (including military industries, energy). Students and faculty are intimidated, with pro-Palestinian activism leading to negative impacts on their career prospects. At the same time these protest sentiments remain strong among the more educated youth of America, although apparently dormant in the immediate period ahead. It would not be a surprise if a progressive movement outside the two-party system emerges in the near future, and becomes a real force in American political life.

4-Western countries state that the attack by Hamas on October 7 was a violation of human rights laws; Do you think the behavior of the Palestinians was a violation of the law?

Even after a year it remains difficult to have an accurate description of the events on October 7. There needs to be a trustworthy international investigation and report, although this will be opposed by Israel, and without such clarification it will be difficult to make a reliable assessment.

On the basis of what we know or are tole, it is the judgment of the most objective international law experts that Hamas had a right of resistance against an abusive and unlawful occupation of Gaza that had persisted since it was occupied in course of the 1967 War, but that atrocities committed during the attack should be considered legally prohibited, and the perpetrators held accountable. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court recommended to a Sub-Chamber of the ICC that ‘arrest warrants’ be issued for three Hamas leaders on the basis of this legal reasoning, and also for Israeli leaders on a similar basis in the course of their retaliatory onslaught.

My own view accepts the obligation of claimants of a right of resistance, regardless of how strong their entitlement to resist, to comply with the laws of war and international human rights law with respect to the deliberate killing of women and children. Hamas culpability this regard is minor if compared to the magnitude and severity of Israel’s genocidal response, but still criminal.

The division in the world between Palestinian and Israeli supportive governments and political movements exhibits the civilizational dimension of Middle East conflict zone that follows a conflict pattern of the West against Islamic societies. This recalls Samuel Huntington’s 1993 prediction that after the Cold War that there would not be peace, but ‘a clash of civilizations’ situated along the fault lines separating the West from various geographies of the Islamic non-West.  

5-What is your opinion about Iran’s attack on Israel and was it Iran’s right to attack Israel?

I am not familiar with the scale, targeting, damage, and details, but Israel had repeatedly provocatively attacked Iran previously without being itself attacked first, recently most strikingly by its assassination of the Hamas leader, Issmail Haniyeh, while he was visiting Iran to attend the inauguration of Massoud Pezeshkian as the new president. Iran certainly had a reprisal right, although the law of the Charter creates some ambiguity limiting international uses of forces to situation of self-defense against a prior armed attack (see UN Charter, Article 2(4), 51). Yet since many countries have claimed such a retaliatory right of reprisal it seems persuasive to argue that the Charter has been superseded by international practice, and the applicable tests of legality are related to such customary norms as proportionality, discrimination (as to targeting), and humanity (as to civilian innocence).

6-Why, despite the widespread protests in the United States? However, the United States still provides massive financial and military aid to Israel?

On the Middle East agenda, the US government is not being responsive to the people. The latter favor by a sizable majority a permanent ceasefire and a more balanced overall US approach to Israel and Palestine. Yet, the special interests associated with military sales and the policy goals of pro-Israeli lobbying organizations, especially AIPAC, are being accommodated by political elites in the US, and in most European countries.

The US situation is one where the pro-Israeli influence on politics is not balanced by pro-Palestinian influence in the venues of governmental authority (Congress, Presidency), which means that politicians have nothing to gain, and much to lose, if they are sympathetic to Palestinian grievances. Israel has effectively manipulated Diaspora Jews to make strong unconditional commitments to Israel financially and politically. Finally, the Holocaust and antisemitism continue to be deployed to punish those who go out of line by supporting Palestine or Iran.

7-What do you think about Iran’s behavior in supporting Palestine and Lebanon?

If you have any comments or suggestions. opinion, please write to us

I think such support as Iran has given, which is not known with any precision, is far less than what Israel and its Arab friends have received, and is thus legitimate as a reasonable

balancing involvement. Beyond this, by supporting Lebanon and the Palestinian struggle Iran is on the right side of history and of morality, while the US and the former coloniall powers of Europe are supporting the prime instance of 21st Century ‘settler colonialism’ and it genocidal disposition of the majority native population.

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