Tag Archives: US Complicity

Reflections on October 7

6 Oct

[Prefatory Note: A commentary on October 7 stimulated by an interview with an independent Turkish journalist, Naman Bakac,]

Q: how do you briefly evaluate the last year regarding the October 7th operation in terms of HAMAS, Palestine and Israel?

Response: For the several months after October 7, Israel’s mastery of public discourse promoted an understanding that allowed Israel to carry out the early phases of its genocidal assault on Gaza with relatively little diplomatic friction in the West but growing discontent among progressive sectors of civil society. Throughout this early period the mainstream media relied on an Israeli optic to promote a one-dimensional misleading appreciation of October 7 as an unprovoked terrorist attack by Hamas terrorists on innocent Israeli civilians accompanied by barbaric atrocities. The atrocity dimension of the Hamas attack was gradually scaled back but without eroding governmental support for Israel in the West led by the US, but with the backing of UK, France, Germany, and most other Western states.

What was missing in this phase of basically unquestioning support for Israel was critical media treatment that did more than blandly report Israel’s version of the facts through endless TV time given over to Israeli government spokespersons, retired military and intelligence officials commenting on the progress of Israel’s supposed retaliatory campaign, and pro-Zionist opinion columnists writing for such established media platforms as the New York Times, Washington Post, The Economist. Except for rather obscure online platforms there was no space given to critics who pointed to the pre-October 7 extremism of the Netanyahu government focused on making the West Bank unlivable by unleashing settler violence and setting its sights expansively on a one-state Greater Israel solution.

The demonization of Hamas went completely unchallenged although it has been persuaded by the US Government to compete in the 2006 Gaza legislative elections in Gaza as a path if taken by Hamas would lead to political normalization, understood to include removal from the terrorist list. Yet neither Washington nor Tel Aviv expected Hamas to prevail in these internationally monitored elections, and when they did, and Hamas later displaced the corrupt Fatah presence in Gaza, Israel went to work reversing the reassurances given to Hamas prior to the elections, refusing to honor the results, imposing a comprehensive blockade on Gaza in 2007, which continues in effect and amounted to a cruel extended  form of collective punishment of the entire Palestinian population of the Gaza strip, 75% of whom were refugees from the 1948 War denied their right of return under international law. Only very recently has there been some attempt to present Hamas in a balanced manner, most notably in a book co-edited by Helena Cobban, Rami Khouri, and David Wildman, entitled Understanding Hamas and Why That Matters (OR Books, 2024).

My own views on Hamas were influenced by meetings ten years ago with Hamas leaders in Doha, Cairo, and Gaza City while I was acting as the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  I was impressed by the intelligence and moderation of these Hamas officials that I remain convinced that they were not putting on ‘a show’ to mislead a minor UN official. In these discussions two elements were stressed—first, the need for a political alternative to the resumption of armed struggle for the sake of both Palestine and Israel, and secondly, a long-term ceasefire coupled with an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Palestinian Territories of Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem as a formula for long-term stability. Turkey more than other countries at the time sought covertly to mediate between Hamas and Israel under the leadership of its star diplomat, Ahmet Davutoglu (later Turkey’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister), with hopes that some accommodation could be agreed upon, bringing stability and hope to the region and a recovery of some limited sense of normalcy to the long oppressed Palestinian people, now to the people of Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and most of all, Iran. Yet, as events since 2006 have darkly demonstrated, this was not to be. Quite the contrary!

Undoubtedly, the worst distortion in these first months after October 7 was the insistence in the Western liberal democracies that the use of the word ‘genocide’ in connection with Israel’s military operation was defamatory, an instance of ‘hate speech’ that warranted punitive responses such as formal retractions, student dismissals, faculty suspensions, and forced administrative resignations. ‘Playing it safe’ in many corporate and governmental settings meant keeping silent about Israeli atrocities except in private conversations among trusted friends. Western governments accentuated this anti-democratic turn by exerting pressures on educational administrators and government employees.

Not mentioning genocide was to ignore the proverbial elephant in the room. Numerous statements by top Israeli political officials and military commanders made no secret of their genocidal intent. On October 9, Israel’s Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, announced ‘a total siege’ of Gaza applicable to food, fuel, and electricity. He explained that when ‘fighting human animals’ it is necessary to treat the adversary accordingly. Prime Minister Netanyahu invoked the bloodiest chapter in the Bible justifying revenge against the Amalekites: “Do not spare them, put to death men and women, children and infants, cattle and sheep, camels and donkeys.” Modern Torah teaching generally interprets this troublesome passage metaphorically or as a message intended to address the evil within Jews, but for the far right, including cabinet members of the Netanyahu coalition, the Amalek passage is taken literally and has long served as justification for killing all and any Palestinians.

When reinforced by tactics exhibiting disregard for Palestinian vulnerabilities, the inference of genocide was unmistakable, so much so that even the juridically cautious ICJ gave a preliminary nod in the direction of acknowledging genocide in their rulings of January 26 in response to the South African initiative seeking resolution of its contention that Israel was violating the Genocide Convention of 1951. Of course, Israel rejected these genocidal allegations by its usual tactic of castigating the motives of critics, insisting as always, that it was confronting worldwide antisemitism as well as Hamas terrorism, which it characterized as ‘genocide’ in a willful effort to reverse perceptions.

After this early period of mind control and public confusion, Israel gradually lost control of the discourse except in the Western elite circles where opinion bent somewhat, but in a manner coupled with irresponsible continuation of support. Israel shifted the focus to the plight of the hostages seized on October 7, and admittedly subjected to a harrowing experience of captivity and Israeli bombardments often ending in their death. Such a humanitarian concern about the fate of the hostage is fully justified although typically diluted by Western silence about the unspeakably abusive detention of

several thousand Palestinians on scant or no charges.

Even the European members of NATO were induced by popular protests in their own countries increasingly to abstain rather than openly side with Israel in UN ceasefire votes, leaving only the US and Israel firmly opposing any pronounced criticisms of Israel even if after the near unanimous Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on July 19 condemned Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories as unlawful for multiple reasons. This ICJ pronouncement was given a strong measure of approval in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on September 17 by a vote of 124-14, with 43 abstentions. To be expected, the US and Israel were among the 14, while the European countries abstained.

Such a new objectivity was also evident in the gradual rise of civil society opposition to what Israel is doing in Gaza and throughout its region. It is not yet robust enough to penetrate the bipartisan support given to Israel by the US, although the media is slightly more willing to expose the daily cruelty of Israel’s tactics, but still habitually cushioned by Israel’s official accounts that whitewash Israel’s controversial tactics by raising their often unsupported claims of Hamas responsibility by way of their siting of tunnels and human shields. The media rarely invites spokespersons for the Palestinian side or strong civil society critics of Israel to its most prestigious platforms.

Perhaps, the most vivid demonstration of this Phase 2 of the Israeli genocide was the widespread protests on college campuses around the world, having the indirect effect of exposing the widening gap between what the governments of the West support and what a growing proportion of their citizenry believe and favor. Israel’s loss of control over the public discourse is unprecedented and coupled with the increasing weight of authoritative interpretations of international law within the UN framework that underscores both Israel’s unlawful behavior of the past year and its underlying unlawful occupation policies, and lingering presence since 1967, as the Occupying Power of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. The US has during the year over and over again given its endorsement to Israel’s strategic moves and occupation policies at the cost of disregarding international law. When coupled with its indignant insistence on international law compliance by Russia in the Ukraine context, the US made clear that it will not hesitate to use international law to attack adversaries while dismissing it when an international ally’s behavior is unlawful. This is clearly a glaring instance of double standards and moral hypocrisy, reducing international to a policy instrument rather than a regulative norm.

In conclusion, the more we learn about October 7, the more suspect becomes the official rationale for Israel’s ferocious response.  An independent international investigation is long overdue. How can the  ‘security lapse’ that let the attack happen acknowledged recently by Israel be reconciled with the warnings Israeli leaders received from Egypt and the US, undoubtedly confirmed by Israel’s surveillance and intelligence capabilities in Gaza. The inevitable skeptical views directed at the Israeli retaliation was given immediate credibility by the scale and intensity of the Israeli response that seemed to offer a pre-planned pretext to escalate pre-October 7 plans to establish Greater Israel from the river to the sea facilitated by the forced expulsion of as many Palestinians as possible.

At present, it seems almost foolish to anticipate that October 7, 2025 will be a time to look back on the despair of 2024 as a grotesque anomaly in human experience, but it is not foolish to pray that it might be so.

Can Yemen Be Saved?

23 Dec

Can Yemen Be Saved?

 

[Prefatory Note: The people of Yemen has been experiencing devastating civil strife for several years. This ordeal was greatly intensive by a massive and sustained Saudi-led air attacks and other belligerent tactics that have targeted civilians, even hospitals. Several recent events hint at the possibility of restoring peace to the country, thereby averting the worst effects of a threatened mass famine, risks starvation for more than 75% of Yemen’s population of over 22 million. These developments pushing toward some kind of political compromise in Yemen include the dark cloud over Riyadh since the Khashoggi murder, the heightened concern of the UN and world public opinion, and the spillover from possible US disengagement in view of the sudden withdrawal of troops from Syria. We should be fully aware that Washington has been complicit and supportive of this criminally unlawful Saudi war policy, including its flagrant crimes against humanity, throughout the conflict, the struggle for control of Yemen being defined in sectarian and anti-Iranian terms. The shift in domestic mood was recently disclosed when the US Senate has expressed opposition to any continued funding for the Yemen War. Whether this followed up in 2019 by a strong effort to achieve US disengagement from the conflict remains to be seen.

This post consists of modified responses to an interview by Javad Heirania published on December 18, 2018 in the Tehran Times.]

 

 

 

 

Q 1: Stockholm talks in Sweden led to a cease-fire agreement in Al Hudaydah and other agreements. What do you think about these agreements?

The atmosphere relating to Yemen is not conducive to sustaining agreements if past experience is taken into account. There are apparently various rogue militia factions supporting the government side that might be motivated to disrupt the agreement, and there already have been some worrisome incidents along these lines.

At the same time, from a humanitarian perspective, it is crucial to uphold even this partial mitigation of the suffering of the Yemenpeople. The opening of the port cities of Al Hudaydah and Sanaa, both covered by the Stockholm Agreement, handle up to 80% of humanitarian imports of food and medicine. At this point, according to the most reliable international sources, 17.8 million Yemenis out of a population of 22.2 million are on the brink of starvation. The UN has fortunately supported a peacekeeping mission to maintain compliance with the Stockholm Agreement.

 

Q2: Will this agreement lead to an agreement on the Sana’a airport and brings an end to this horrible war?

It is difficult to predict with any confidence any development with respect to Yemen, but if the Stockholm Agreement holds up, then there is an expectation that the same humanitarian arguments and needed minimal cooperative outlook would lead to the reopening of the Sana Airport in the very near future.

 

Q3: What made the countries involved in the Yemen war come to the negotiating table?

Again, it is difficult to offer any confident interpretation. We all know that governments in situations of this kind do not reveal in public disclosure the real basis of their behavior. It is likely that on the Saudi side, especially in the aftermath of the Khashoggi murder there appeared to be a serious Saudi concern relating to being blamed for another major humanitarian catastrophe if the Yemeni ports remained closed. For similar reasons, Washington may have exerted pressure to negotiate at this point with the central aim of reducing regional tensions. Such speculation gains credibility when account is taken of the recent U.S. Senate anti-Trump move to oppose further funding and involvement in the Yemen War, which while not binding without endorsement by the House of Representatives, which is unlikely until the Democrats take control in 2019.

Q4: Regarding repeated war crimes of the Saudi coalition in Yemen, will the United Nations and the International Criminal Court review this matter?

The answer here depends on the political context, and whether the war can be brought to a rapid end by diplomacy. If this is done there may be considerable pressure on the various interested parties to refrain from any initiative that would raise tensions, induce mutual recriminations, and worst of all, could lead to a resumption of hostilities. The answer to your question may also be linked indirectly to whether war crimes allegations are brought before the UN and ICC with respect to the Syrian War, especially in relation to the serious criminal policies and practices attributed to the Assad regime over the entire combat period stretching back to 2011.