Preliminary Libyan Scorecard: Acting Beyond the UN Mandate

6 Sep

            In Western circles of influential opinion, the outcome of the NATO intervention in Libya has already been pronounced ‘a victory’ from several points of view: as a military success that achieved its main goals set at acceptable costs, as a moral success that averted a humanitarian catastrophe, and as political success the creation of an opportunity for freedoom and constitutionalism on behalf of a long oppressed people. This is one of those rare results in an international conflict situation that seems to please both conservatives and liberals. Conservatives because it was a show of force that reaffirmed Western primacy based on military power. Liberals because force was used with UN backing in accordance with international law and in furtherance of human rights and liberal values.


Qaddafi and his loyalists are apparently a spent force, and the future of Libya now becomes a work in progress without any clear understanding of who will call the shots from now on. Will it be the Libyan victors in the war now battling among themselves for the control of the country? Will it be their NATO minders hiding behind the scenes? Will it be the NATO representatives doing the bidding of the oil companies and the various corporate and financial interests that make no secret of seeking a robust profit-making stake in Libya’s future? Or will it be some combination of these influences, more or less harmoniously collaborating? And most relevant of all, will this process be seen as having the claimed liberating impact on the lives and destinies of the Libyan people? It is far too early to pronounce on such momentous issues, although sitting on the sidelines one can only hope and pray for the best for a country substantially destroyed by external forces. Even before the dust of the original conflict settles it is not too soon to raise some skeptical questions about the unconditional enthusiasm in mainstream Western circles for what has been done and what it portends for the future of UN peacekeeping.


            What has transpired since March when the UN Security Council gave its go ahead for the use of force to protect civilians in Libya should never have become an occasion for cheering despite the military and political outcome of the intervention. This unfortunate triumphal spirit was clearly voiced by the normally critically sensitive Roger Cohen. Writing in the New York Times Cohen insists that the Libyan intervention should be viewed as a historically momentous discharge of the global moral responsibility that somehow rests on the shoulders of post-colonial pro-active leaders in the West:  “..the idea that the West must at times be prepared to fight for its values against barbarism is the best hope for a 21sr century less cruel than the 20th .” This rather extraordinary claim cannot be tested by reference to Libya alone, although even narrowly conceived the grounds for such confidence in Western uses of force in the global south seems stunningly ahistorical. But if the net is enlarged, as it must be, to encompass the spectrum of recent interventions under Western auspices that include Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan the self-absorbed gaze of Cohen seems like a dangerously misguided form of advocacy relating to the use of force in international relations. Looking at this broader experience of Western intervention makes one squirm uncomfortably in reaction to the grandiose claim that the willingness of leading Western countries to police the world is humanity’s ‘best hope’ for the future. Cohen is not timid about insisting that the Libya operation up to this point provides a positive model for the future : “The intervention has been done right—with the legality of strong backing, full support of America’s European allies, and quiet arming of the rebels.” A contrast with Iraq is drawn, presumably, in contrast, an intervention ‘done wrong.’


            There is a heavy dose of implicit paternalism, condescension, and passé consciousness, not to mention wishful thinking, present if the West is to be identified as the best hope for the future just because it managed to pull off this Libyan intervention, that is, even assuming that the post-Qaddafi experience in the country is not too disillusioning in this one set of circumstances. What about putting the failed interventions into the balance, and then deciding whether it is helpful or not to encourage the West, which means mainly the United States, to take on this protective role for the rest of the world? I seem to remember not that long ago such self-empowering phrases as ‘white man’s burden’ and ‘civilizing mission’ being used by colonial apologists with a straight face. The West has quite a record of barbarism of its own, both within its geographic confines and in its encounters with others.  It seems arbitrary and contentious to situate barbarism geographically, and it certainly seems strange to think that the long exploited and abused non-West generates a new breed of barbarians at the gates.


            And let us not be to quick to heap praise on this Libyan model? It is certainly premature to conclude that it has been a success before acquiring a better sense of whether the winners can avoid a new cycle of strife and bloodshed, and stick together in a Libya without the benefit of Qaddafi as the common enemy. Or if they do, can they embark upon a development path that benefits the Libyan people and not primarily the oil companies and foreign construction firms. Any credible assessment of the Libyan intervention must at least wait and see if the new leaders are able to avoid the authoritarian temptation to secure their power and privilege within the inflamed political atmosphere of the country. The majority of the Libyan people undoubtedly have strong expectations that their human rights will now be upheld and that an equitable economic order will soon be established that benefits the population as a whole, and not the tiny elite that sits on the top of the national pyramid. These are expectations that have yet to be satisfied anywhere in the region. The challenge is immense, and perhaps is beyond even the imagination and aspirations of the new leaders, posing a challenge that exceeds their capabilities and will.


            Yet such worries are not just about the uncertain future of Libya. Even if, against the odds, Libya turns out to be the success story already proclaimed, there are still many reasons to be concerned about the Libyan intervention serving as a precedent for the future. These concerns relating to international law, to the proper role for the UN, and to the shaping of a just world order have been largely ignored in the public discussion of the Libyan intervention. In effect, once NATO helped the rebels enough to get rid of the Qaddafi regime, it has been treated as irrelevant to complain about aspects of the undertaking and such issues have been completely ignored by the media. In the rest of this blog I will try to explain why the Libyan intervention is far from providing future diplomats with an ideal model. I believe we should learn from the Libyan experience, and reject it as a precedent.


            As the World Court made clear in the Nicaragua decision of 1986, modern international law does not allow states to have recourse to force except when acting in self-defense against a substantial prior armed attack across its borders, and then only until the Security Council acts. The United Nations, normally the Security Council, but residually the General Assembly, has the authority to mandate the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on behalf of peace and security, including on the basis of UN evolving practice, for humanitarian ends under extreme circumstances of the sort that arguably existed in Libya during the latter stages of Qaddafi’s rule. This humanitarian extension of UN authority has been challenged as opening a loophole of indefinite dimensions that can be used to carry out a post-colonial imperialist agenda. Even granting that humanitarian ends should now be understood to have been legally incorporated into prevailing ideas of ‘international peace and security,’ a crucial further question exists as to whether the force used by NATO remained within the confines of what was authorized by the Security Council.


            The Security Council debate on authorization indicated some deep concerns on the part of important members at the time, including China, Russia, Brazil, India, and Germany, that formed the background of SC Resolution 1973, which in March 2011 set forth the guidelines for the intervention.This extensive resolution articulated the mission being authorized as that of protecting threatened Libyan civilians against violent atrocities that were allegedly being massively threatened by the Qaddafi government, with special reference at the time to an alleged imminent massacre of civilians trapped in the then besieged city of Benghazi. The debate emphasized the application of the norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) endorsed by the Security Council a few years ago that sought to allay fears about interventions by the West in the non-West by refraining from relying on the distrusted language of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and substituting a blander way of describing the undertaking as less of a challenge directed at the territorial supremacy of sovereign states and more in the nature of a protective undertaking reflecting human solidarity. The R2P norm relies on a rationale of protecting vulnerable peoples from rulers that violated basic human rights in a severe and systematic fashion.


            But once underway, the NATO operation unilaterally expanded and qualitatively shifted the mission as authorized, and almost immediately acted to help the rebels win the war and to make non-negotiable the dismantling of the Qaddafi regime. NATO made these moves without even attempting to explain that it was somehow still acting primarily to protect Libyan civilians. This was not just another instance of ‘mission creep’ as had occurred previously in UN peacekeeping operations (for instance, the Gulf War of 1991), but rather mission creep on steroids! It would have been possible during the Security Council debate to explain in a forthright manner what obviously must have been the real intentions all along of NATO. It would have been possible and respectful of the integrity of UN discourse to have made the attempt to convince the members of the Security Council that the only way the Libyan people could be protected was to help the rebels win the civil war and to be sure that Qaddafi was taken out of the picture. Presumably such forthrightness was avoided by the pro-interventionist states because it would almost certainly have turned several of the already reluctant abstaining five countries into negative votes, including in all likelihood, those of China and Russia that are permanent members whose votes have a veto effect, which in this case would have prevented the Security Council from reaching a decision. So the pro-interventionists admittedly faced a genuine dilemma: either dissemble as to the ends being pursued and obtain the legitimacy of limited advance authorization from the UN or reveal the real goals of the operation and be blocked by a veto from acting under UN auspices. If so blocked, then the further issue arises as to whether to intervene in the absence of a UN mandate.


A similar dilemma faced the intervening governments prior to the 1999 NATO’s Kosovo War. It was resolved by ignoring the legalities altogether, with NATO acting without any UNSC authorization. It was also a controversial precedent, and some blamed the Kosovo reliance on ‘a coalition of the willing’ or on a military alliance as providing a sufficient authorization, for the later claim of de facto authority to carry out the Iraq invasion without gaining prior UN approval. In both Kosovo and Iraq circumventing the UN’s legally prescribed role of deciding when to authorize non-defensive force on behalf of international peace and security was criticized, but the unlawfulness of the action led to no clear repudiation of either intervention after the fact, and rather highlighted the weakness of the UN. In both cases the UN after the fact acted to ratify the results of uses of force that clearly violated the UN Charter’s unconditional prohibition imposed on all uses of non-defensive force by member states. The rogue recourse to force was especially disturbing in Iraq as the attack legally amounted to a war of aggression, a crime against the peace in the language of the Nuremberg Judgment rendered in 1945 against surviving Nazi leaders after World War II.


            With regard to Libya, the culprits are not just the states that participated in this runaway operation, but the members of the Security Council  that abstained from supporting Resolution 1973 and the Secretary General of the United Nations have a special duty to make sure that the limits of authorization were being respected throughout the undertaking. It would seem to be a matter of constitutional responsibility for all members of the Security Council to ensure respect for the Charter’s core effort to prevent wars and seek peaceful resolution of conflicts. When exceptions are made to this generalized Charter prohibition on the use or threat of force it should always be strictly formulated, and then continuously monitored and interpreted, and if limits are exceeded, then the supervisory authority and responsibility of the Security Council should kick in as a matter of course, and in a spirit of upholding the autonomy and legitimacy of the United Nations. The Secretary General also has secondary responsibility to take appropriate steps to call the attention of the membership to such blatant departures from an authorizing resolution as an essential aspect of his role as custodian of the integrity of UN procedures and as the UN’s de facto ombudsman in relation to ensuring fidelity to the Charter. This allocation of responsibility seems more important when it is realized that the actions of the Security Council are not subject to judicial review. This controversial doctrine of judicial self-restraint within the UN System was ironically decided by the World Court in the 1992 Lockerbie case involving sanctions imposed on Libya in apparent violation of relevant treaty law. The majority of the judges concluded that whatever the Security Council decided needed to be treated as authoritative even if it went against international law, that the Security Council always had the last word in shaping UN policy even when it was acting unwisely or irresponsibly.


            Against this background, the abstaining states were also derelict at the outset by allowing a resolution of the Security Council involving the use of force to go forward considered that it contained such ambiguous and vague language as to raise a red flag as to the scope of the proposed authorization. Although Security Council Resolution 1973 did seem reasonably to anticipate mainly the establishment of a No Fly Zone and ancillary steps to make sure it would be effective, the proposed language of the resolution should have signaled the possibility that action beyond what was being mandated was contemplated by the NATO countries and would likely be undertaken. The notorious phrase ‘all necessary measures’ was present in the resolution, which was justified at the time as providing the enforcers with a desirable margin of flexibility in making sure that the No Fly Zone would render the needed protection to Libyan civilian.  Almost immediately once NATO launched its operations it became obvious that an entirely new and controversial mission was underway than what was acknowledged during the debate that preceded the adoption of 1973. The U.S. Supreme Court has often invalidated Congressional action as ‘void for vagueness,’ and this is something in the UN setting that Security Council members should have been prepared to do on their own in their role as final guardians of constitutional integrity in relation to war making under UN auspices. Given the Charter emphasis on war prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes, it should be standard practice that exceptional mandates to use force would be interpreted strictly to limit the departure from Charter goals and norms, but the UN record even before Libya has been disappointing, with geopolitics giving states a virtually unlimited discretion that international law purports to withhold.


            There is a further related issue internal to best practices within the United Nations itself. The Security Council acts in the area of peace and security on behalf of the entire international community and with representational authority for the whole membership of the Organization. The 177 countries not members of the Security Council should have confidence that this body will respect Charter guidelines and that there will be a close correspondence between what was authorized and what was done especially when force is authorized and sovereign rights are encroached upon. This correspondence was not present in the Libyan intervention, and this abuse of authority seems to have barely noticed in any official way, although acknowledged and even lamented in the corridors and delegates lounge of UN Headquarters in New York City.


This interpretative issue is not just a playground for international law specialists interested in jousting about technical matters of little real world relevance. Here the life and death of the peoples inhabiting the planet are directly at stake, as well as their political independence, the territorial integrity, and economic autonomy of their country. If the governments will not act to uphold agreed and fundamental limits on state violence, especially directed at vulnerable countries and peoples, then as citizens of the world, ‘we the peoples of the United Nations,’ as proclaimed by the Preamble to the Charter need to raise our voices. We have the residual responsibility to act on behalf of international law and morality when the UN falters or when states act beyond the law. Of course, this imperative does not imply a whitewash for tyrannical rule.

24 Responses to “Preliminary Libyan Scorecard: Acting Beyond the UN Mandate”

  1. monalisa September 8, 2011 at 6:26 am #

    Dear Richard,

    Western countries wanted to show the world how clever they are as well as how much military power they have. The emphasis is on the latter one. Also it inhabits – so I think – some provoking element.

    Maybe this seems so important to them as most of Western countries are indebted.
    To show military power to some countries who aren’t indebted or at least not so much is maybe a sign for those countries/country to whom some of the Western countries are so much indebted.

    To me it shows a little bit the repetition of the Cold War era.

    That the UN Security Council gave in – this is very grave.
    But not so astonishing: let us go back to the swine flu and who were the winners: big corporations (neocons), governments were the loosers (and with it the tax payers). At least in Europe.

    The older people in Libya must have been shocked when Western countries started to bomb. For them it must have been somehow a reminder of maybe meanwhile forgotten days when foreigners ordered and ruled Libya and Libyan citizen had to bend down and obey.

    Having read the comments about Roger Cohen’s article in the New York Times I found that the majority disagrees with his point/s.

    How sad these developments


    • Richard Falk September 8, 2011 at 6:50 am #

      Dear Monalisa (what lies behind such a name beyond the smile!): you always seem to have your finger on the pulse of a larger truth than what the media instructs us to believe, and thus you are a natural teacher! Greetings, Richard

  2. Heidi Morrison September 8, 2011 at 5:05 pm #

    your article makes good points about the emptiness of the claim that the intervention was a valid and praiseworthy intervention on behalf of the libyan people by an international community. the claim is empty because the intervention was part of a “civilizing mission” and also because it was deceitful to international law with opaque calls to use “all necessary measure.”

    perhaps another window into the emptiness of the claim that there was a “responsibility to protect” simply lies in the choice to invade libya and not syria or bahrain (even though i would be against that too).

  3. brian September 14, 2011 at 8:46 pm #

    Prof Falk, the socalled No Fly zone was set up to halt alleged air attacks on Libyan people by the Libyan airforce..But These attacks never happened:
    Airstrikes in Libya did not take place” – Russian military
    Indeed the UN must have been aware that they never happened, as no evidence ever appeared they they did.
    NOW NATO IS bombing and strafing civilians, yet theres a push to renew the No fly zone! Which will mean NATO gets to kill more libyan civilian .

    Sinceyou are an international lawyer, just WHY did UN authorise NATO to do peacekeeping work? ESP when NATO has been killing civilians innafghanistan?
    AND how can UN authorise NATO or any one to violate LIBYAN airspace, which is part of Libyan sovereignty? and so inviolate under the UN Charter.

  4. brian September 14, 2011 at 8:58 pm #

    ‘dismantling of the Qaddafi regime’

    there is no such thing as the ‘Qadaffi regime’….there is the Libyan government… ‘Regime’ is a word used to imply illegitimacy and sordidness. Has the US government ever been called the ‘Obama regime’
    the ‘Bush regime’?
    Noone has any right to say who rules Libya but the Libyan people: The UN under Banki Moon( The Moon Regime?) seems to ignore the UN charter and the bit on a nations sovereignty being inviolate: indeed Moon has violated UN protocol to aid regime change in Libya
    Nor has the UN or NATO made any effort to stem the very real violance against the real peaceful protestors in Bahrain. Its all just a fraud, aided and abbete by the ‘international community'(aka western political party ‘regimes’ and arab gulf dictatorships.
    in lieu of anyone else doing it, groups of people are monitoring NATO and insurgency war crimes in Libya using the very same tools used to try to bring an end to the Libya jamahirya.

  5. brian September 15, 2011 at 12:00 am #

    hello prof Falk
    having read your post, i have some issues with it. I posted some earlier comments , but where you say :’What has transpired since March when the UN Security Council gave its go ahead for the use of force to protect civilians in Libya’, my reading finds no such wording. Here is section 4 :
    ‘4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;’

    AS you see it does not allow the use of ‘force’. The word ‘force’ is nowhere used to that effect anywhere in Res1973, unless i misread it. The very idea that ‘force’ can protect civilians.and that NATO will protect civilians is made absurd by their record in the wars on Afghanistan and Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia, NATO workied with known terrorists: the KLA, since charged with organ trafficking by the EU.

    Whats bleaky ironic about secion 4 is that the civilian population of Libya HAS been under attack: by NATO and the insurgents(not ‘rebels’), and that RES 1973 helped bring this about.
    Reading the preamble to RES 1973, shows its a malicious joke: every accusation made against the Libyan Jamahirya: from :the use of mercenaries( the infamous african mercenaries) to the use of aerial attacks on Libyans is a lie, and has long been exposed as such. But how did these lies end up in a document like RES 1973?
    Like this one: ‘Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,’

    heavy civilian casualties? I source my RES 1973 from the Guardian dated march 17…In april, AlanKuperman made a study of figures from HRW on deaths:

    ‘But Human Rights Watch has released data on Misurata, the next-biggest city in Libya and scene of protracted fighting, revealing that Moammar Khadafy is not deliberately massacring civilians but rather narrowly targeting the armed rebels who fight against his government.

    Misurata’s population is roughly 400,000. In nearly two months of war, only 257 people — including combatants — have died there. Of the 949 wounded, only 22 — less than 3 percent — are women. If Khadafy were indiscriminately targeting civilians, women would comprise about half the casualties.

    there were no ‘heavy civilian casualties’..not by april and certainly not by march 17.That this made kits way into RES1973 should have alerted people that the resolution framers(who were they?) were demonising the Libyan government.

    A look at the rest of Resolution 1973 shows the same facile treatment of events in Libya.

  6. brian September 15, 2011 at 1:10 am #

    my 2nd query is this wording: ‘Of course, this imperative does not imply a whitewash for tyrannical rule.’

    if you mean Gadaffi, thats just the going word among UNSC members and media for a strong independent leader who benefits his people and not foreigners…Thanks to Gadafi moist libyans can now read how their leader is attacked and demonised by the descendents of those who ransacked africa for slaves , land and mineal wealth.
    BUT What does ‘Tyrannical’ mean?
    here is Wikis defn wit an interesting side light:

    the side light is this:
    ‘To mock tyranny, Thales wrote that the strangest thing to see is “an aged tyrant” meaning that tyrants do not have the public support to survive for long.

    in fact, anyone whose seen the massive rallies over the last few months knows that after 40 years as leader, Gadfi has massive support!

    However, Wiki and the greeks aside, the current use of the word runs on these lines :
    a sovereign or other ruler who uses power oppressively or unjustly.
    any person in a position of authority who exercises power oppressively or despotically.

    Which for anyone whose done more research than read WAPO of FOX, knows this is NOT gadaffi:

    do tyrants free women from vicious laws?
    do they give the oil wealth of the nation to the peoplpe, or like any real tyrant, keep it for self and cronies?
    ‘On February 16, 2009, Gaddafi took a step further and called on Libyans to back his proposal to dismantle the government and to distribute the oil wealth directly to the 5 million inhabitants of the country.
    However, his plan to deliver oil revenues directly to the Libyan people met opposition by senior officials who could lose their jobs due to a parallel plan by Gaddafi to rid the state of corruption.

    Some officials, including Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi, Ali Al-Mahmoudi and Farhat Omar Bin Guida, of the Central Bank, told Gaddafi that the measure could harm the country’s economy in the long term due to “capital flight.”

    “Do not be afraid to directly redistribute the oil money and create fairer governance structures that respond to people’s interests,” Gaddafi said in a Popular Committee.

  7. brian September 15, 2011 at 1:25 am #

    This never happened under Gadafis enlightened guidance, but it IS happening with the aid of Omama, Sarcozy, Clinton, Cameron, Foggy Rasmussen, Okampo, Banki Moon and a host of lesser evils.

    Tawargha – the final solution
    Posted on September 14, 2011 by HRI Mark
    Mahmoud Jibril
    The final chapter is now being written for Tawargha, as reported by Sam Dagher of the Wall Street Journal
    Mahmoud Jibril, the NTC prime minister, rubber-stamped the wiping of the town off the map at the Misrata town hall:
    “Regarding Tawergha, my own viewpoint is that nobody has the right to interfere in this matter except the people of Misrata.”

    “This matter can’t be tackled through theories and textbook examples of national reconciliation like those in South Africa, Ireland and Eastern Europe,” he added as the crowd cheered with chants of “Allahu Akbar,” or “God is greatest.”

    The WSJ goes on to report:
    Now, rebels have been torching homes in the abandoned city 25 miles to the south. Since Thursday, The Wall Street Journal has witnessed the burning of more than a dozen homes in the city Col. Gadhafi once lavished with money and investment. On the gates of many vandalized homes in the country’s only coastal city dominated by dark-skinned people, light-skinned rebels scrawled the words “slaves” and “negroes.”


  8. brian September 15, 2011 at 1:45 am #

    how much support has gadaffi in Libya?
    well lets look at one of the humungous rallies:

    of course, thanks to Res1973, NATO and the insurgents have masscred up to 50000 of these people (mostly done by NATO bombings). For which the UNSC must be abolished and the makers of the resolution (AND NATO commanders) charged with the supreme war crime. Where are all the lawyers to undertake this task?

  9. brian September 15, 2011 at 5:00 am #

    the reality of Libya under NATO bombardment and the control of the RATS:

    i bet most westerners did not get to see Green Square bombed or strafed by NATO: for them it never happened…But the death toll must have been enormous.That so many clueless westerners have their minds focused on Gadaffi as villain is pathetic. That the AU hasnt sent armies to defend Libya is a bad sign for africa. AU and Venezuela should slap sanctions on US and EU to force them to withdraw their NATO terrorists.

    • Richard Falk September 15, 2011 at 6:42 am #

      Thanks for these comments calling attention to the most disturbing aspects of the NATO impact on the Libyan strife.

  10. brian September 15, 2011 at 5:14 am #

    For their failure to act, or the connaivance at this atrocity, the mainstream media and international legal communtiy should be charge with assessory to war crimes and esp the supreme war crime…tho ironically war was never declared. Its all been R2P in the media.
    Its sickening. The libyans main problem was not to knock the NATO planes and helicopters out of the sky..allowing them to freely roam killng at will has aided and abetted alll this

  11. brian September 15, 2011 at 5:21 pm #

    FYI Prof Falk:

    video samples of atrocities in Libya: beware graphic

    By Susan Lindauer, former CIA Asset covering Libya

  12. brian September 16, 2011 at 4:19 am #

    Thierry Meyssans report on what he witnessed in Tripoli

    as an aside, the media invariably call the insurgents ‘rebels’ or ‘revolutionaries’..yet in in afghanistan, the same mix of locals and foreign jihadis are called ‘insurgents'(insurgents = fighting a legitimate govt): this is to shape public opinion and perception

  13. brian September 16, 2011 at 8:26 pm #

    the NATO bombing of Zliten, which killed 85 people :

    In the preamble to RES197, it talks of heavy civilian casualties…there were not, as Alan Kuperman demonstrated in april.BUT it was with NATOs entry that the heavy civilian casulalties began.. The Zliten massacre (NATO brazenly said it had no evidence of civilians deaths) was a sign of worse to come.

    UNSC RES 1973 has enabled genocide:

    a black Libyan who tweets from Tripoli has just returned to twitter to say his entire fa,mily were killed:
    LibyanLiberal LibyanLiberal
    My father my brothers and my sister are dead , father and brothers where executed sister committed suiside in order not to be raped.
    9 hours ago

    Id charge the UNSC under Banki Moon and the socalled international community with all of these crimes and more, as RES 1973 enabled all this.

  14. brian September 16, 2011 at 8:30 pm #

    one group in the insurgency are human traffickers”:

    evidence is that angry at the lIbyan govts putting an end to the lucrative business, went on to back the insurgency…The australia govt (im from australia) which backs the insurgents, and which is fighting human trafficking in this region, is backing it there!

  15. brian September 16, 2011 at 11:40 pm #

    from the front lines in Libya: NATO war crimes continue to be made.R2P no where in evidence:
    Today BaniWalid was attacked by both NATO planes & apache, and Rebels, and thanks 2 the heavy resistance the #Rats were forced to retreat.
    As for Sirte a third b Rebel brigade sent to take over the airport and like the others they were completely destroyed, as for the other front lines for Sirte the Rebels pulled back a couple of kilometers due to non stop attacks from the people there!
    Updates from BaniWalid: Rebels COMPLETELY pulled back due to non stop grad rockets from l LIBYAS army, about 100 expected killed in the two days!!
    With the pullout of most independent journalists, its locals using twitter who we now rely on for news.


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