Archive | October, 2024

WHAT DRIVES ISRAEL—10/29/24

29 Oct

Prefatory Note This post is a much modified, updated version of my responses to questions posed Murat Sofuoglu, a Turkish journalist associated with TRT World. The dehistoricizing and decontextualization of the Hamas attack of October 7 was spread around the world by the most influential global media platforms and political leaders of the liberal democracies, and led to widespread sympathy for Israel and some months of tolerance of their response despite its legally and ethically unacceptable character. As such the Israeli response was initially sanitized by regarding  Palestinian grievances in Gaza as irrelevent, and also by uncritically accepting Israeli  hasbara that its response to the Hamas attack was solely motivated by security and counter-terrorist considerations, and thus disconnected from the Greater Israel priority and preoccupations of the Netanyahu coalition that came to power at the start of 2023 or more than nine months before the attack.]  


1. Has the Israeli model to secure Jews a homeland in Palestine failed?

I think it is misleading to refer to the Zionist Project in the singular and by reference to ‘a homeland’ as originally pledged in the Balfour Declaration issued in 1917. The minimum pre-1948 goal of world Zionism was to create a Jewish supremist state in Israel with an unlimited right of returns for Jews from anywhere in the world, and the denial of such an equivalent right to the Palestinians who were the native majority population. The Nakba that accompanied the 1948 War involved the forced expulsion from Palestine and permanent refugee/exile status for of at least 700,000 non-Jewish residents of the portion of Palestine set aside for Israel by the partition resolution of 29 November 1947 UN GA Res. 181. Israeli expulsion politics exhibited the Zionist intention in the fog of war was to ensure a long-term Jewish majority settler population that would enable Israel to claim credibly in its early years to be both Jewish and democratic, the latter proving to become

overwhelmed by the apartheid regime that was convincingly delimited as such over the course of the last decade. The occupation was fully documented as a type of apartheid violating the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. This assessment was validated by comprehensive reports, filled with data, prepared by ESCWA, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Israeli NGO, B’Tselem.

Prefiguring the response of the governments of most liberal democracies was the failure to express any adverse reactions to Israeli apartheid despite their earlier support for the global anti-apartheid movement that exerted so much pressure on the South African government that it pleasantly surprised the world by releasing Nelson Mandela from prison and proceeding rapidly to become a constitutional democracy incorporating legal commitments to racial equality. Why was there no negative international response to Israeli apartheid?  At the very least the apartheid assessments should have led to a demand that Israel withdraw from Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem.

Even earlier, the most that the US Government could manage to say about the relentless expansion of unlawful settlements that ‘it was unhelpful.’  At first, Western governments were reluctant to be even mildly critical of Israel because of their own failure to do more by way of opposition to the Holocaust, inducing a debilitating sense of guilt made more potent by Israel’s domination of the public discourse subtly facilitated by a racist dehumaniization of the Palestinian other as an Orientalized inferior people when compared to the rapid modernizing prevailing temperament in the new Jewish state.

The UN contributed to the Palestinian tragedy by initially proposing partition of a previously colonized national entity without bothering to consult the Arab majority population residing in Palestine that would have certainly been opposed to lending legitimacy to such a fracturing of their homeland. But the Palestinians were never given a chance to vote in a referendum on partition, which itself was an ahistorical imposition of UK colonial interest and methods of control by a logic of ‘divide and rule.’

This post-1945 tragedy was compounded and prefigured the future ordeals of the Palestinian people by the failure to at least secure the promised Palestinian state of equal status to Israel before legitimating Israel’s claims to statehood by diplomatic recognition and admission to the UN as a member sovereign state. The 1967 War aggravated Palestinian grievances by. establishing Israeli de facto control by way of conquest over the Palestinian territories of East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza, again given unregulated de facto control by way of the doctrine of Belligerent Occupation, supposedly within a temporary and regulative international law framework set forth in the 4th Geneva Convention and the First Additional Protocol. Israel massively violated its terms of occupation in numerous fundamental ways from Day One. Perhaps, the most flagrant early expression of Israeli territorial unilateralism was its incorporation of East Jerusalem into sovereign Israel as ‘its eternal capital.’ This symbolic and substantive land-grabbing that included Islamic sacred sites has never to this day been accepted by the majority of states, and the Israeli move to establish Jerusalem as the Israeli capital was declared ‘null and void’ in an 2017 Emergency Session General Assembly Resolution (ES-1019) supported by a super-majority of Member states but opposed and then ignored by the US and the main states of NATO [the vote was 129-9-35 (abstentions).

The developments between 1967 and 2024 consolidated Israeli territorial ambitions in occupied Palestine by way of the extensive unlawful settlement movement, a coercive apartheid occupation regime that subjugated Palestinians living under prolonged occupation that culminated in the genocidal and ecocidal assault on Gaza that killed many in real time and totally devastated Gaza as a livable habitat. The settler colonial assessment of Israel disposing the majority native population resembled the pattern of the breakaway British colonials (US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) each of which, although New Zealand less so, implemented their colonial encroachments by genocidal tactics in response to resistance, and succeeded in establishing their flourishing and enduring state.

In retrospect, it seems obvious that Zionism, and since 1948, Israel itself pursued a two-track strategy: first, a public hasbara discourse that claimed moderation and pretended to seek a democratic polity and engage in a search for a political compromise on land rights, democracy, and human rights with the native population; secondly, a political strategy that opportunistically advanced by stages to realize the hard core Zionist Project of restoring Jewish exclusive control over the Biblically ‘promised land’ of Jewish tradition at a given time for what it could get by way of an expansionist vision with respect to Israel itself, neighboring countries, and regional geopolitics. Not only did the shadows cast by the Nazi Holocaust in the early years of Israel’s existence inhibit criticism of the settler colonial aspects of Israel’s approach to the indigenous non-Jewish residents of Palestine but Israel’s first political leader, David Ben Gurion a committed secularist, cynically declared ‘Let the Bible be our weapon,’ and in the process claimed a religious entitlement to all of historic Palestine as ‘the promised land’ of Jewish tradition, which has prevailed over the prime norm of colonial decline, that of the right of sef-determination.

After the 1967 War Israel became itself a partner in ‘colonialism after colonialism’ in the Middle East. There emerged a strategic relationship with the United States and Europe that embraced regional security, safeguarding oil and gas reserves for the West, and cooperating with respect to the containment of political Islam, especially after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). This US led geopolitical limitations imposed on regional autonomy were highlighted by the unprecedented US political commitment to ensure that Israel possessed a military capability to defeat any combination of regional adversaries. Such a willingness to indulge ‘Israeli exceptionalism’ with respect to regional security was  dramatized by looking away while Israel covertly, with European active complicity not only became the sole nuclear weapons state in the Middle East but assumed the role of guardian of non-proliferation when it came to Iran.  As Israel gained in strength and regional acceptance via the Abraham Accords reached in 2020 during the last months of the Trump presidency it seemed on a path that would end with a one-state solution under its sole and uncontested dominion.

As Israel gained in political acceptance and self-confidence it became less shy about revealing its nationalist agenda. The 2018 Basic Law, with a quasi-constitutional status, was forthright in claiming Israel as a Jewish State, with the Jewish people exclusively entitled to exercise the right of self-determination (ignoring the rights and relevance of the 20% of its population that was non-Jewish, and Hebrew was confirmed as the only official language. Even extreme Israeli apologists seemed reluctant to any longer claim, what was never true, that “Israel was the only democracy in the Middle East.” The net result as of late 2024 is that it is the Palestinians who have become unwelcome strangers in their own historic homeland. Israeli democracy, such as it has become, was clearly in practice and law ‘for Jews only.’ And again the Western patrons of Israel watched from the sidelines as Israel kept enlarging and disclosing its zero-sum vision of conflict resolution, and disregard of the US role as intermediary in the search for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.  

2. What is Israel trying to achieve with its ongoing war campaign across the Middle East?

Again, we are challenged to deal with Israel’s mainly undisclosed intentions and what is disclosed is not trustworthy or a small part of the Israeli policy agenda motivating the enlargement of the combat zone. For greater insight we are forced to rely on conjecture to produce some kind of illuminating, yet plausible, interpretation. As with Gaza, Israel claims a right of self-defense. It seeks extra weight by insisting that its enemies are all sponsors or guilty of ‘terrorist’ violence’ and proxy engagements determined to undermine Israeli security, Even if we accept this line of argument Israel’s use of force in Lebanon is disproportional and indiscriminate, self-acknowledged and operationalized as an inflammatory application of the Dahiya Doctrine originally set forth in the Lebanon War of 1982. The Dahiya Doctrine was enunciated by a leading Israeli general, expressing the intention to retaliate disproportionately against security provocations threatening Israeli interests. The Gaza genocide can be viewed as a grotesque and maximal example of Dahiya thinking and practice, although specifically motivated by Israeli extraterritorial security priorities, ethnic cleansing, economic ambitions, regional paranoia, as well as its invariable dismissal of the genuine grievances and armed resistance of adversaries as invariably of a terrorist character.

In certain ethical respects the Dahiya Doctrine is an Israeli adaptation of the logic of deterrence that guided security policy of both US and USSR during Cold War. Its most salient feature was known as Mutual Assured Destruction  (or to critics as MAD). Israel’s adaptation consisted of substituting the threat of genocide for that of nuclear retaliation. The core idea of deterrence is a credibly threatened unacceptably disproportionate response to any fundamental threat to strategic interests or to homeland security of the nuclear antagonists and their close allies.

There is no mutuality in Israel’s approach to deterrence, which is a generalized warning to its regional adversaries of dire results if they dare to attack or provoke Israel. Any regional state purporting to balance Israel hegemonic nuclear capabilities is projected as such a threat, which presupposes a geopolitical right to maintain Israel’s regional nuclear supremacy.

3. Do you think with the current campaign, the Netanyahu government aims to resolve once and for all the Jewish question, fixing Israel’s place in the Middle East? 

It seems as though Israel has been expanding its combat objectives initially justified as retaliation against Hamas for the October 7 attack by adopting a proclaimed goal of exterminating Hamas. While pursuing this goal Israel engaged in such excessive and indiscriminate violence that its behavior was widely perceived as a transparent instance of genocide committed in real time and including a growing and increasingly activist minority in the civil societies of the Western countries, including many Jews, whose governments most ardently support Israel. Israel has suffered a near total loss of legitimacy as a normal state and is increasingly viewed as a pariah or rogue state to an extent exceeding the condemnation of even overtly racist and oppressive South Africa. This ended when the Pretoria government surprised the world by abandoning apartheid in the mid-1990s, apparently for pragmatic reasons associated with debilitating sanctions that limited South Africa’s participation in world society, including cultural and sporting boycotts that curtailed the freedoms of the ruling white minority.

Israel has handled this international hostility differently and more defiantly than South Africa, partly because it has had the benefit of strong geopolitical support from the governments of the Global West, especially the all-important US. Israel’s security is a matter of strategic importance to the West as a beachhead in the Middle East for the related purposes of ensuring access to oil and gas reserves of the region and containing the spread of political Islam. Thus, the increase of Israel’s war objectives to include Hezbollah, the Houthis, and of course Iran has also become a battleground in the Clash of Civilizations within the region and is a potent source of instability parallel to the incipient Second Cold War with China and Russia. Whether Israel, with Washington’s backing and probable participation will provoke war with Iran is one of the great uncertainties of this historical moment. Part of this uncertainty involves assessing the relevance of Netanyahu’s personal survival agenda and whether the Religious Right in the governing coalition will push these wider objectives to the point of regional war with dangerous geopolitical risks. An ethical imperative is also continues to be present– not to shift attention away from the ongoing acute human catastrophe entrapping the civilian population of Gaza in deliberately induced death threatening traumas of mass hunger and widespread disease.

What Israel does and refrains from doing in the next few weeks will have a major impact on the prospects for a peaceful future responsive to growing ecological challenges. This in turn may reflect the outcome of the US presidential elections, and how the new leadership handles this dangerous, fragile global situation that combines a prolonged humanitarian catastrophe, ethical and legal gross abuses of civilian innocence, and hazardous neglect of heightened risks of geopolitical encounters and ecological collapses.

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What Can Iran & Palestine Expect from the US Presidential Elections?

23 Oct

[Prefatory Note: The following interview is in responses to questions addressed.to me by Kayhan New Agency in Iran. It is focused on an interpretation of how the forthcoming American elections are likely to affect Iran, and the policies toward the current  combat zone involving Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. X/0]

Kayhan Interview.   10/9/24

1-What impact does the U.S. election have on the Middle East (Israel-Palestine-Iran)?

Unless Trump is elected, which seems now shamelessly plausible, I see no prospect of change. If Trump is elected, he is more likely to encourage Israel to escalate tensions with Iran by way of an all-out military attack on Gaza and Iran, encouraging the use of a 30k blockbuster bomb and even a missile with a nuclear warhead directed at Iran’s nuclear facilities.

There are also dangers of such a scenario unfolding if Harris are elected, but somewhat less so. It could be brought about by the Netanyahu government exerting provocative pressures by way of alleged intelligence reports that Iran poses an existential threat to Israeli security and currently possesses nuclear weapons or is close to crossing that red line.

It may be that Iran’s conduct in the aftermath of the elections held on 5 November will have some effect in either calming or. agitating bellicose impulses. If the new President of Iran makes a determined diplomatic effort in the region, possibly centered on cultivating positive relations with Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, it could alter Israel’s calculations, but nothing is certain and nothing should be taken for granted or assumed. 

2-The effects of current events in the Middle East on the American elections?

Recent developments in the Middle East, especially the Gaza genocide and the expansion of the Gaza combat zone to the West Bank in Israel and to neighboring countries including Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are having very little impact on the American election, except for the Muslim-American minority and a small group of progressive individuals, including especially younger Jews. However, this numerically small

number compared to the size of the national voting public it could have an impact greater than one would expect because of its influence in battleground states. This reflects the concentration of Muslim-Americans is parts of the country where the electoral competition is very close, and the failure of these normally pro-Democratic voters to support Harris are strengthening Republican prospects, and hence heightening prospects for a Trump victory. The American electoral system is such that the winner is not chosen by the candidate with the most votes, but by a complex weighted system that gives each state, based on population a certain number of votes, which are so allocated as to give advantages to rural and small states where Trump is most popular.

3-Why student protests have been silenced in America and we dont see any protests in universities?

These protests have not yet been completely ‘silenced’ but certainly have been the targets of pressure from administrators of higher education and the Zionist, pro-Israeli, networks of influence.

Major donors to universities throughout the country with strong Israeli sympathies and ties have exerted their influence, usually hidden from public view. Israeli influence with American political elites is strong within the government and strong private sector lobbies (including military industries, energy). Students and faculty are intimidated, with pro-Palestinian activism leading to negative impacts on their career prospects. At the same time these protest sentiments remain strong among the more educated youth of America, although apparently dormant in the immediate period ahead. It would not be a surprise if a progressive movement outside the two-party system emerges in the near future, and becomes a real force in American political life.

4-Western countries state that the attack by Hamas on October 7 was a violation of human rights laws; Do you think the behavior of the Palestinians was a violation of the law?

Even after a year it remains difficult to have an accurate description of the events on October 7. There needs to be a trustworthy international investigation and report, although this will be opposed by Israel, and without such clarification it will be difficult to make a reliable assessment.

On the basis of what we know or are tole, it is the judgment of the most objective international law experts that Hamas had a right of resistance against an abusive and unlawful occupation of Gaza that had persisted since it was occupied in course of the 1967 War, but that atrocities committed during the attack should be considered legally prohibited, and the perpetrators held accountable. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court recommended to a Sub-Chamber of the ICC that ‘arrest warrants’ be issued for three Hamas leaders on the basis of this legal reasoning, and also for Israeli leaders on a similar basis in the course of their retaliatory onslaught.

My own view accepts the obligation of claimants of a right of resistance, regardless of how strong their entitlement to resist, to comply with the laws of war and international human rights law with respect to the deliberate killing of women and children. Hamas culpability this regard is minor if compared to the magnitude and severity of Israel’s genocidal response, but still criminal.

The division in the world between Palestinian and Israeli supportive governments and political movements exhibits the civilizational dimension of Middle East conflict zone that follows a conflict pattern of the West against Islamic societies. This recalls Samuel Huntington’s 1993 prediction that after the Cold War that there would not be peace, but ‘a clash of civilizations’ situated along the fault lines separating the West from various geographies of the Islamic non-West.  

5-What is your opinion about Iran’s attack on Israel and was it Iran’s right to attack Israel?

I am not familiar with the scale, targeting, damage, and details, but Israel had repeatedly provocatively attacked Iran previously without being itself attacked first, recently most strikingly by its assassination of the Hamas leader, Issmail Haniyeh, while he was visiting Iran to attend the inauguration of Massoud Pezeshkian as the new president. Iran certainly had a reprisal right, although the law of the Charter creates some ambiguity limiting international uses of forces to situation of self-defense against a prior armed attack (see UN Charter, Article 2(4), 51). Yet since many countries have claimed such a retaliatory right of reprisal it seems persuasive to argue that the Charter has been superseded by international practice, and the applicable tests of legality are related to such customary norms as proportionality, discrimination (as to targeting), and humanity (as to civilian innocence).

6-Why, despite the widespread protests in the United States? However, the United States still provides massive financial and military aid to Israel?

On the Middle East agenda, the US government is not being responsive to the people. The latter favor by a sizable majority a permanent ceasefire and a more balanced overall US approach to Israel and Palestine. Yet, the special interests associated with military sales and the policy goals of pro-Israeli lobbying organizations, especially AIPAC, are being accommodated by political elites in the US, and in most European countries.

The US situation is one where the pro-Israeli influence on politics is not balanced by pro-Palestinian influence in the venues of governmental authority (Congress, Presidency), which means that politicians have nothing to gain, and much to lose, if they are sympathetic to Palestinian grievances. Israel has effectively manipulated Diaspora Jews to make strong unconditional commitments to Israel financially and politically. Finally, the Holocaust and antisemitism continue to be deployed to punish those who go out of line by supporting Palestine or Iran.

7-What do you think about Iran’s behavior in supporting Palestine and Lebanon?

If you have any comments or suggestions. opinion, please write to us

I think such support as Iran has given, which is not known with any precision, is far less than what Israel and its Arab friends have received, and is thus legitimate as a reasonable

balancing involvement. Beyond this, by supporting Lebanon and the Palestinian struggle Iran is on the right side of history and of morality, while the US and the former coloniall powers of Europe are supporting the prime instance of 21st Century ‘settler colonialism’ and it genocidal disposition of the majority native population.

Empowering the UN, Disempowering Militarist Geopolitics

22 Oct

[Prefatory Note: I post a review of the recently published Liberating the United Nations: Realism with Hope appearing in Foreign Affairs, the most influential journal for mainstream foreign policy analysia. The book was written by Hans von Sponeck, former Assistant Secretary General of the UN, and myself, and published by Stanford University Press a few weeks ago. The title given to this generally positive review essay of our book is deeply misleading. It not a matter of ‘saving the UN’ but of empowering the UN to fulfill its originall missions of war prevention and global security, and overcoming those aspects of its identity that gave instututional hegemony to the winners of World War II; thus we would entitle a review ‘Can Humanity be Saved Through the UN’?]

]


Can the United Nations Be Saved? | Foreign Affairs

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November/December 2024cover

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Review Essay

Can the United Nations Be Saved?

The Case for Getting Back to Basics

By Thant Myint-U

November/December 2024Published on Sign in and save to read laterPrint this articleSend by emailShare on TwitterShare on FacebookShare on LinkedInGet a linkPage urlRequest Reprint Permissions

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The quest to fix the United Nations is almost as old as the organization itself. Eighty years ago, Allied leaders imagined a postwar order in which the great powers would together safeguard a permanent peace. The Security Council, dominated by its five veto-wielding members—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China—reflected the world as it was. Other, less hierarchical parts of the new UN system were meant to foster international cooperation across a host of issues: the global economy, public health, agriculture, education. The seeds of a future planetary government were evident from the start.

The UN was initially conceived as a military alliance, but that objective became impossible with the onset of the Cold War. Many observers predicted an early death for the UN. But the organization survived and was soon reenergized, fashioning aims that its founders never imagined, such as peacekeeping. Its secretary-general became a figure on the global stage as the world’s preeminent diplomat, jetting off to war zones to negotiate cease-fires. Specialized agencies under the UN, such as its Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and a raft of new technical assistance programs spread their wings. For some officials, scholars, and activists both within and outside the UN, a hopeful vision of global government persisted.

The American legal scholar Richard Falk and the former German diplomat Hans von Sponeck are clearly in the camp of those who would like to see a far stronger UN. In Liberating the United Nations, they make the case for an organization that can deal effectively with the slew of challenges facing the world today, from climate change to nuclear proliferation. They see no alternative. At the same time, they bemoan the UN’s current dysfunctional state and its increasing marginalization from the major issues of the day. The global body, they say, “is more needed than ever before and yet less relevant as a political actor than at any time since its establishment in 1945.”

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The authors provide a detailed overview of the UN’s complex structures and multifaceted undertakings and make a spirited attempt to convince readers that a renewed investment in the organization is the best possible path to a better future. They offer a worthy vision of an ideal global body, imagining, for example, a reformed Security Council linked with civil society organizations from around the world. Their prescriptions, however, do not fully account for challenges to the UN’s legitimacy and standing. Given today’s realities, those who believe in the enduring importance of the UN should not seek to make the institution all things to all people but should instead adopt a laser-like focus on strengthening the organization’s most fundamental function: preventing war.

THE GOOD OLD DAYS

In Falk and von Sponeck’s telling, the UN has demonstrated considerable innovation, even during the Cold War, despite the constraints of that era’s superpower rivalry. This was especially true under Dag Hammarskjold, who served as secretary-general from 1953 until his death, in 1961, and pioneered new forms of preventive diplomacy. The speedy deployment of blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers during the Suez crisis in 1956 was a prime example of this early creativity.

By the 1990s, with the Cold War over and Moscow’s veto no longer a hindrance to American primacy, the UN expanded its peacekeeping operations, which proved successful in places as far from the seats of power as El Salvador and East Timor. The organization also became an intellectual leader—it crafted, for example, the notion of human development as a counterbalance to the simple metric of per capita GDP.

For Falk and von Sponeck, this was also a period of lost opportunity, as the United States focused its energies on consolidating a new international regime favorable to global capitalism rather than on building the foundation of a UN-centered world government. A series of peacekeeping failures, from Bosnia to Rwanda, colored the lead-up to the turn of the century, by which time the world’s post–Cold War enthusiasm for the UN had largely dissipated. The American invasion of Iraq without UN authorization marked a new low point for the organization, demonstrating its impotence in the wake of great-power aggression. Today, Falk and von Sponeck say, in the face of a “dysfunctional ultra-nationalist backlash,” the organization is hobbled even more and has little political support for much-needed amendments to the UN Charter, such as reforming the composition of the Security Council.

The quest to fix the United Nations is almost as old as the organization itself.

There are problems with the book’s history. For example, the authors mistakenly describe the crisis in the Republic of the Congo, which drew in the UN in 1960, as being caused principally by “tribal conflicts and ethnic regionalism,” when it was very much about attempts by white supremacists to maintain their dominance over Congo—in particular, its vast mineral riches—after the country won independence from Belgium. The authors are also mistaken in suggesting that Hammarskjold supported what they oddly describe as Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba’s “radical economic nationalism.” The two men were famously at odds, and at least a few of Hammarskjold’s aides, if not the secretary-general himself, were complicit in Lumumba’s overthrow in 1960.

Far more important, however, is what’s missing from the authors’ account. For nearly all the peoples of Africa and Asia, the history of the twentieth century was first and foremost a history of empire and their long fights for freedom. Over the late 1950s and early 1960s, representatives from newly independent nations—the “Afro-Asians,” as they called themselves—transformed the UN, bringing it to the height of its ambition and vigor. The UN was the mechanism through which they asserted their hard-won independence and shaped and protected their sovereignty. For them, Congo was a test of whether white supremacy would be a mainstay of the postcolonial world.

Falk and von Sponeck correctly mention the critical role played by the UN from its very beginning in the struggle against racism globally and against the apartheid regime in South Africa in particular. But they are incorrect in suggesting that non-Western governments were more interested in the development of a fairer world economy than in the prevention of war. For the Afro-Asians, peace, development, and the realization of human rights were interdependent parts of a bigger project of equality after empire.

The Afro-Asians embraced the UN. In 1961, they were instrumental in the appointment of one of their own to secretary-general: the Burmese diplomat U Thant (my grandfather). In 1962, Thant, working closely with other Afro-Asian leaders, played a pivotal role (which is lost in most narratives) in the de-escalation of the Cuban missile crisis. His mediation efforts between U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and the Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro marked the apex of the organization’s work in war prevention. While the Security Council was often deadlocked, the secretary-general and his team of mediators were more active than ever across a variety of conflicts, from Cyprus and India to Pakistan and Vietnam. The UN’s record of peacemaking endeavors, which were intimately linked to the ascendancy of what was then called the “Third World” majority, is absent from the book.

REFORM AND REALITY

Liberating the United Nations includes a deep dive into the authors’ own experiences in the organization. Falk, for many decades a professor of international law at Princeton University, was in the early 2010s the UN’s special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967. Von Sponeck, a career international public servant, was the UN’s humanitarian coordinator in Iraq in the late 1990s; he resigned in protest over the harm that sanctions did to Iraqi civilians. Both demonstrate the many ways in which their efforts were thwarted by geopolitics—that is, the interests of the United States and other powerful governments. Behind their accounts is the central tension in the book: on the one hand, the authors’ desire to see the UN become a kind of global government and, on the other, the political currents frustrating this aim.

Falk and von Sponeck are “puzzled” by the inability of the UN to “gain the political traction needed” to make itself the effective tool for peace that they believe it can be. They contend that over the decades, despite herculean obstacles, the UN has proved itself an “indispensable feature of a sustainable and positive world order.” With more funding, “as well as greater forbearance by geopolitical actors and more appreciation by member governments, civil societies, and the media,” the world body could again scale new heights.

The obstacle, as they see it, is an “outmoded form of ‘political realism’” that “will require an ideological struggle” to overcome. Governments are trapped in their own geopolitical calculations and do not appreciate that the only answer to today’s global challenges is a reformed UN at the heart of vigorous global cooperation. For this to happen, they call for a “progressive transnational movement of peoples,” one “strong enough to exert a benevolent influence on governmental and international institutional practices.” Only with this kind of groundswell will the UN be able to address “such basic structural problems as predatory capitalism, global militarism, and ecological unsustainability.”

The authors are certainly right that the UN has not only survived but succeeded in a number of sectors and settings. It has produced a body of international law unprecedented in history. Its humanitarian agencies would be difficult to replace. In the event of another pandemic, only the World Health Organization, for all its flaws, could coordinate a truly global response.

With more funding, the UN could again scale new heights.

Falk and von Sponeck place front and center the need to update the composition of a Security Council that is still locked in a World War II–era constellation. There are few, if any, good arguments for denying countries such as India a position at least on par with that of the United Kingdom or for denying non-Western states greater representation more generally. In recent decades, the story of the Security Council has been of a body dominated by five rich countries deliberating conflicts in low-income countries. The unrepresentative composition of the five permanent members leads to a host of inequities, such as the biased appointments of senior officials, that run through the UN system. It is easy to see why enthusiasm for the UN in much of the world has steadily declined.

But any effort to fix the UN today will run against immense political headwinds. It’s nearly impossible to imagine a package of changes to the Security Council’s membership that could win support among its current permanent members. It’s also unclear that any change to the composition of the Security Council, however salutary to the UN’s legitimacy, would improve the organization’s effectiveness. The only result may be new kinds of deadlock (albeit with perhaps more interesting debates).

There’s also a more basic challenge: the plethora of alternative avenues for governments to pursue their interests, including bilateral agreements; regional organizations, such as NATO; and forums, such as the G-20. The UN’s headquarters, in New York, was once the only place in the world where representatives of many countries could meet. There were few other summits. Over the late 1950s and early 1960s, the annual General Assembly meetings stood at the very center of global politics, with everyone from Kennedyto Khrushchev to anticolonial revolutionaries, among them Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, all playing their larger-than-life roles in a dramatic theater that gripped the planet.

Falk and von Sponeck conclude that U.S. unilateralism is what has been constraining the UN, with Washington unwilling to invest in the organization’s renewal. But surely, it is not only the United States that seeks to act outside the UN. For smaller states, the UN may be the one arena where they have an equal seat at the table. But for others, such as the rising middle powers of the world, there’s an ever-increasing menu of options.

MISSION: POSSIBLE

There’s a deeper challenge still: the nature of the UN itself. Over the decades, the UN has developed its own culture, language, and ways of working—invaluable products of the only attempt ever to build an institution that involves all humanity. But it has long been addicted to process over outcome. The organization’s built-in need to reflect everyone’s views, in every paragraph of every text—in a staff circular as in a General Assembly resolution—too often strips away meaning and value from even its best-intentioned efforts.

The manner in which the UN manages its people is another vexing issue. The organization includes legions of public servants, including aid workers and peacekeepers, who are dedicated to its lofty principles and perform heroically, often under the most trying circumstances. But few of them have benefited from good management. The most capable are rarely recognized for their skill and sacrifice. Governments, especially the great powers, insist on their own (often unqualified) nominees for the top jobs, creating a perversion at the heart of the system that undermines morale, as well as efficiency. An effective UN needs at its core a highly motivated civil service staffed by the most qualified women and men from around the world. It’s an area of reform that receives almost no attention.

The default scenario is one in which an unreformed or slightly reformed UN continues evolving a smorgasbord of functions—protecting refugees, facilitating climate change negotiations, providing development assistance—doing well in some areas and less so in others. Its conferences, even if they do not necessarily solve global problems, keep alive dialogue on global issues, at times providing a platform for an array of international civil society organizations. The trouble with this status quo scenario is that by spreading itself thin, the organization is distracting itself from its main purpose of preventing war.

For the foreseeable future, the Security Council, the main body responsible for international peace and security, will likely remain unable to address the primary threats of the day, among them the Russian invasion of Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East, and disputes over Taiwan and territories in the South China Sea. Superpower tensions within the Security Council are nothing new—but they need not stand in the way of preventive diplomacy and mediation. Hammarskjold and Thant’s most important peacemaking achievements took place during the Cold War, in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the late 1980s, the quiet mediation of Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar made possible several peace agreements that set the stage for the end of the Cold War itself.

By spreading itself thin, the UN is distracting itself from its main purpose of preventing war.

In the absence of a dynamic, reformed Security Council, the key to future UN success is the secretary-general’s role as the world’s preeminent diplomat. Peace is the primary business of the UN. There are many conflicts that may well be resolved without any UN role. But the past 80 years demonstrate that the secretary-general, an impartial mediator representing a universal body, is at times indispensable. One who is sidelined on the issues of war and peace will have far less influence with which to lead on global challenges such as climate change and development.

The public expects the UN to head efforts to end war. Today, terrible new wars are destroying the lives of millions and raising the threat of nuclear confrontation. It’s a very different time than the 1990s, when all the great powers were content to dispatch peacekeeping operations to end internal conflicts. The world has returned to a period of warfare between states, exactly what the UN was set up to prevent.

Because there is little oxygen for reforming the UN, whatever oxygen exists needs to be deployed efficiently to restore and broaden the secretary-general’s peacemaking role, which can address not only internal conflicts but interstate wars, as well. This will require building a team of experienced in-house mediators who have an intimate knowledge of what the organization can and cannot do. In the past, the UN achieved considerable success through the leadership of officials such as the Nobel laureate Ralph Bunche, who served both Hammarskjold and Thant and was instrumental in dozens of peace efforts around the world.

In this dangerous and uncertain moment, the secretary-general of the United Nations can explore and create opportunities for conflict resolution. Only the UN has the authority and credibility to play this role. And over the coming years, it may make all the difference between global war and peace.

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What is Israel Doing in Lebanon? War with Iran? Expansionism? Deterrence by State Terror? Netanyahu’s CV

16 Oct

[Prefatory Note: This post is based on my responses to questions put by a Brazilian journalist working for CORREIO BRAZILIENSE, Rodrigo Craveiro, on October 16, 2024. The focus is on the regional spillover of violence as linked the Gaza Genocide, which itself is still ongoing after more than a year, arousing concerns from internationally reliable sources of starvation and disease prompting adverse reaction from Israel’s supporters. Major states in Europe are threatening Israel with an arms embargo if does not accept a ceasefire, while the US warms Israel that it will cease supplying Israel with weapons if does not facilitate an increase in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Gaza within the next 30 days.]

1– Today US warned Israel to take urgent steps to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza within the next 30 days or face losing access to US weapons funding. How do you see that?

From the perspectives of international law, human rights, and the UN such a US move comes far too late, yet from a political perspective of ending the violence in Gaza and the expansion of the combat zone beyond Gaza a cutoff of US weapons support would be a small step in the welcome direction of peacemaking.

It is worrisome that the Gaza warning is framed in terms of the humanitarian catastrophe that continues to befall the Palestinian civilian population in Gaza without mention of a ceasefire or the spillover Israeli violence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

And why a 30 day grace period, and not immediately in view of emergency realities in Gaza that threaten increasing famine and disease, concerns that have received confirmation in recent days from reliable and respected international expert sources.

From experience over the past year, it is too early to tell even whether the US warning to Israel will be implemented. The US Government has warned Israel in the past, most recently in relation to avoid attacking Rafah with its large number of sheltering Palestinians. Israel ignored the warning and nothing was done by Washington to withdraw US support.

Finally, improving the humanitarian situation is vague, and can be satisfied by vague and often unverified and contested self-serving assessments as with disruptions during an agreed pause in the violence to allow delivery of polio vaccines to Palestinians in Gaza.

2– Netanyahu said today Israel owes its existence to victory in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and not to the approval of its creation by the UN. What do you think about it?

Israel has always been guided by a realist belief that national security is a reflection of military hard power rather than be earning a law-abiding reputation. In that sense, Netanyahu is merely declaring what has been obvious at every stage of Israel’s existence and even during the pre-state period of the Zionist Movement.  Only a fool in 2024 would deny that Israel puts its trust in weaponry rather than in legality or morality. By setting military approaches to security against legitimation by the UN as a distinct choice, Netanyahu and leaders before him, have consistently avoided a stance in which Israel’s leaders would contend that both their battlefield success and the UN acceptance as a legitimate state were instrumental is establishing Israel as a state back in 1948, a date long prior to finding an appropriate solution for Palestinian grievances and just aspirations, a great, rarely acknowledged UN failing.

In the recent year or so, Netanyahu along with other Israeli leaders and Western supporting governments have joined in defaming the UN as biased against Israel, even institutionally antisemitic. This is manifested in many ways, but none resented by Israel more than the alleged holding of Israel to standards higher than applicable in the treatment of all other UN members.

Critics of Israel’s approach to security and conflict resolution approach believe the opposite is true, that even at the UN Israel has been able to hide its crimes and expansionism behind thick clouds of obfuscation and geopolitical protection. Palestinians  have a far stronger case against the UN due to its imposition back in 1947 of a partition of their country to achieve a two-state outcome without ever consulting the wishes of the resident majority Arab population, and then failing to secure Palestinian rights in the land allocated for their state, the extent of which was further diminished by Israeli military expansion. The UN has let the Palestinian people suffer despite their acceptance of responsibility as the successor to the British Mandate.  

3– Hezbollah threatened today to  carry out attacks in “all” Israel. Why do you think Israel is facing difficulties to defeat Hezbollah?

It is difficult to speculate on the motivations of Hezbollah, and hence their evident determination to withstand the Gaza-like onslaught that Israel threatened and is now enacting. It may be partly tied to the Israeli assassination of their longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah, or to a sense of a sacred struggle in the spirit of jihad or to a collective Islamic response to Israel’s recourse to genocide. The support for Israel among the liberal democracies of the Global West is a somewhat analogous collective civilizational stance, although not portrayed as such, especially in the US. On neither side of this most destructive and dangerous encounter since the Cold War can behavior be explained by reference to traditional national interests alone.

Ever since the anti-colonial struggles for self-determination and against Western encroachment have been won by the militarily far weaker side, the realist equation of military superiority leading to political victory has lost its analytic power and explanatory force of how history evolves and  is made. In light of this development, it should be no surprise that Israel has not managed to defeat Hezbollah as yet despite mounting a series of punishing assaults on its Lebanon base area. As the Gaza post-October 7 experience illustrates, the only way to overcome the commitment of a victimized people struggling for a liberating freedom is by engaging in genocidal operations comparable to how the various Western settler colonialist projects dealt with the resistance of native peoples.

Militarism and Genocide in Gaza: The Bloody Signature of Western Decline

9 Oct

[Prefatory Note: The text of an interview with an independent Turkish journalist, Naman Bakac, published in Turkey on Sept. 26, 2024. Somewhat modified for this online publication.]

1.Almost all fundamental rights and principles are clearly being violated in the Palestinian territories: from the right of Palestinians living in occupied lands to self-determination, to the right of representation, which leads to the murder, imprisonment, and exile of their freely elected representatives; from the right to shelter as tents are deliberately bombed, to the right to food as Palestinians are deliberately left to starve; from sexual abuse of prisoners to torture, and from there to the right to housing as homes are demolished. However, international law and the community have been unable to prevent these violations to date. What legal texts are missing to stop these systematic violations? Which institutions are absent? If legal texts, legal institutions, and decision-making mechanisms cannot resolve this, what other tools and methods should be activated to prevent these systematic violations of rights?

Response: The Palestinian ordeal is not a consequence of the shortage or inadequacy of legal norms or mechanisms for their enforcement. The primarily obstacle to imposing adverse consequences in reaction to gross and transparent Israeli criminality is one of political will, especially on the part of dominant states in the Global West and to a lesser extent on the part of leading Arab neighbors, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Egypt.

It is only countries from the Global South that have been willing to have recourse to the existing international judicial procedures, the ICJ and ICC. The ICJ, the judicial organ of the UN, has a strong reputation for political independence and persuasive interpretation of international law, and its pronouncements are influential, even if they are procedurally cumbersome, often take years from start to finish., lack enforcement capabilities or mandates, and have a mixed record of compliane.

The ICC is a more recent institution, and nor part of the UN System. It does fill a serious gap in the legal coverage accorded to accountability for individuals accussed of committing serious international crimes. The ICC is further weakened by the failure of several leading states to become parrties to the Rome Statute, which is the legal framework governing ICC activities. The ICC also has never achieved legitimacy in the Global South because of its early image of being mainly preoccupied with crimes of leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, which was responsible for its West-centrric reputation. The ICC has seemed reluctant to hold accountable individuals associated with powerful states in the Global West, which include countries in Westernn Europe, North America, and currently Israel. By recommending the issuance of arrrest warrants to three top Israeli leaders (somewhat offset in political messaging by simultaneously making a reccomendation of arrrest warrants for the three top Hamas leaders, the ICC prosecutor made a gesture to challenge geopolitical impunity. So far the ICC sub-chamber that has the sole responsibility to issue arrest warrants has not yet acted. It has give to suspicion that the ICC is stalling in its treatment of these controversial recommenndations, due to reliable reports of pressure by Israel and allies to delay its decision, or better, reject the prosecutor’s recommendation on a variety of contrived grounds centering of the dual grounds of Israel not being a member of the ICC and it would be wrong to appear to criminalize a reasonable Israeli claim of self-defence.

The secondary obstacle is the degree to which World Order continues to be based on a hybrid arrangement of hybrid and contradictory relations of law to power: the majority of states are subject to international law in the area of peace and security, while a few, including the UN P5 (and their strategic friends) occupy a position that allows such governments to privilege strategic interests if these clash with legal obligations in UN settings. This hierrarchy is indirectly acknowledged by the veto power allowing the most dangerous states in 1945 to paralyze UN responses to their criminality and even to that of their friends and allies.

The Western support for Israeli genocide is itself criminal, as complicity is criminalized in the Genocide Convvention, but it is virtually exempt from critical scrutiny at the UN or elsewhere. A domestic court in the US has had been the cite of a judicial action to stop the Gaza Genocide brought by a çivil society organization, Center for Constitutional Rights, relying on a Universal Jurisdiction rationale. It has been so far been blocked in this legal pursuit by a dubious internal doctrine that views US foreign policy initiatives as not subject to adjudication due to a so-called Political Questions doctrine. This doctrine rests on an anachronistic view of the Separation of Powers that views Foreign Policy as belonging exclusively in the Executive Branch of Government, and therefore is not subject to judicial scrutiny. This overlooks the growth of international legal authority as a constraint on national behavior even if conducted as foreign policy.

2.Despite the world witnessing, in an unprecedented way, one of the most brutal massacres in history, with live footage, after Gaza can we still talk about international humanitarian law, international human rights, or the Pax Americana order established after World War II? Doesn’t the “Rule of Law in the Global Village,” the title of one of your books, come to an end after Gaza? Or should the path of reform regarding the United Nations, international law, and world order, as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been advocating for years, be built?

Response: Although the first-order implementation of international humanitarian law, human rights law, annd Pax Americana failed at the governmental and international institutional level, their existence was important in awakening çivil society to the gross injustices and crimes that have been inflicted on the Palestinian people. Changes in the public discourse are important, as well, branding Israel, Israeli leaders, and complicit governments as perpetrators of genocide in a particularly overt and sadistic manner. By such reasoning Israel should be sanctioned for violating the Genocide Convention, its leaders be criminally proscecuted, and complcit governmentss be at least censured. This should make Israel and its supporters leading candidates for çivil society pressure to impose boycotts, to express moral and legal outrage, and to suspend Israel from participation within the framework of legitimate sovereign states until a dynamic of peace and reconciliation takes the place of war and genocide. Israel is guilty of unspeakable crimes and a defiance of respect for the norms of civilized behavior. Such an assessment is not meant to excuse Hamas, and its allies, for its alleged atrocities, although provoked and of a dramatically smaller impact than Israel’s post October 9th behavior.

Civil society is a court of last resort that becomes relevant, as here, when the established processes of law are unavailable, or worse, defied. In this regard, the established of the Gaza Tribunal Project to express opposition to what Israel and the West have done since October 7 and to give voice to the disappointment of citizens of conscience around the world that the normative structure of world order, including the UN, could not protect the vulnerable, essentially innocent and much abused Palestinian civilian population and respond to Palestinian grievances with respect to basic rights.

3.You have written more than 10 books on world order, global order, and international law. You also served for many years as the North America Director of the “World Order Models Project.” In nearly 100 years since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as you put it, “the genocide is a continuation of the Apartheid in Palestine.” What kinds of gaps has the Palestinian genocide exposed in the world order paradigm? What truth has it revealed about the foundation upon which the world order is built? After Gaza, what kind of world order and international legal order do you foresee to prevent humanity from experiencing genocides like Srebrenica, Rwanda, and Gaza again? What is your belief and hope in this regard?

Response: If world order persists in its present form it seems almost inevitable that gruesome repetitions of genocide and other severe atrocities in the future. To transform the structures of authority now entrusted with the management of global security ensures a continuation of behavioral patterns that produce genocide, apartheid, aggression, and are responsible for many economic and ecological crimes will require an unprecedented movement from below by peoples organized through çivil society activism, insisting on a framework of law that has the capacity and will to enforce compliance on the strong as well as the weak. Such a development, admittedly utopian, alone could do away with geopolitics whose defining characteristic is a manageriall approach to global security that treats law and morality as irrelevant when in conflict with strategic interests of the Great Powers, and is by practice as well as theory iss dedicated to geopolitical rivalry that reduces law and morality to the level of propaganda and a policy instrument in the foreign policy toolbox useful to denounce the behavior of adversaries yet irrelevant as a constraint..

As for alll those books. I have been around a rather long time. The world changes and so do I. It is a matter of listening to others and being attenntive to what is happening. In this period of global interactive intensity it is especially important to learn from those who speak from other cultural spaces. Listening does not means abdicating judgment, but it does require making the effort to respond knowledgeably, which does a constant effort to detect and purge the subtle biases of your educational, discursive, and personal background. This is most difficult for we Americans who are trapped between their ‘exceptionalism’ and a dysfunctional militaritst sense of history. We are now living at a time of radical new technological and ecological challlenges that are being addressed, if at all, without taking accoount of long-term thinking, risks, harns, and solutions. We have entered an historical period of unprecedented species hazard, and most national elites are continuing blandly as if ‘business as usual’ was their job description. In some cases, even worse is to acknowledge in rhetoric the dangers that are intensifying, and then acting as if these fundamental challenges do not necessitate profound changes in how we think, feel, and act both individually and collectively.

As for alll those books. I have been around a rather long time. The world changes and so do I. It is a matter of listening to others, especially those who speak from other cultural spaces, and making the effort to respond, which requires learning to address the subtle biases of your own  educational and personal background. I have found this to be most difficult for Americans who are trapped between their claims of ‘exceptionalism’ and a dysfunctional militaritst sense of history. We are now living at a time of radical new technological and ecological challlenges that are being addressed, if at all, without taking accoount of long-term thinking and solutions. This is a time of unprecedented species hazard.    

4.As you know, Palestinian territories before 1967 were occupied by Israel. Regarding the occupied territories, the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, Turkey, the United Nations, and some Islamic countries are advocating for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders and for a two-state solution. Does this mean that the lands that Israel seized before 1967 through terror, violence, and Nakba are being accepted? Doesn’t this imply that the forced displacement of Palestinians before 1967, and the massacres and raids carried out by Jewish militias in Palestinian villages, are either ignored or legitimized? How do you assess the period from 1917 to 1967 in terms of international legal principles, the global legal order, and the founding mission of the United Nations? Moreover, since Israel does not accept the two-state solution, how is it that international law, institutions, and countries continue to accept it?

Response: I share your overall assessment of an exceedingly llimited willingness to redress the historic wrongs initially inflicted on the Palestinian people by way of a pre-Holocaust colonialist move on the part of the UK, known to the world as the Balfour Declarration, which was the source of the two original wrongs embedded in the Zionist Project, culminating in the Holocaust and its aftermath: first, an Orientalist disregard of non-Western societal wellbeing. It took the form of solving the problems in Europe caused by antisemitism and Jewish presence by encroaching on the sovereign rights of a non-consenting Muslim majority resident population in Palestine. And secondly, a Zionist resolve based on a politically self-serving biblical interpretation that created a Jewish entitlement to make Palestinians persecuted and unwanted strangers in their existential homeland. By such a logic the surviving native peoples in almost every part of the world dispossessed of their land and sovereignty rights would have an unassailable right to their indigenous pre-modern forms of sovereignty.

Given this background, the UN played its own part in furthering the Western-centric solution in the years after World War II, by way of proposing ‘partition’ of Palestine in a period dominated by the sense of guilt of the liberal democracies and effective propaganda by the Zionnist Movemennt  as well as superior military training, weaponry, and tactics in the 1948 War. For the post-1945 period, Israel emerged as as an expansionist nuclear-armed ‘settler colonial state’ that existentially rejected the co-existence, partition, compromise solutions as put forth in a biased framework controlled by the US, a most partisan intermediary. Israel for public relations reasons pretended to go along with this global consensus while acting to undermine it by its settlements, coercion, land-grabbing, and oppressive apartheid regime of control after 1967. During this process liberal Zionism, the UN, Western countries withheld criticism of Israel’s transparently defiant behavior, and continued their stubborn ineffectual adherence to the mantle of internationalism by way of the two-state mantra dismissing Palestinian resistance and even gestures of accommodation as forms of ‘terrrorism’ to be rejected in practice, colliding with the hidden Zionist vision of later became known as ‘Greater Israel.’ In the interim Israel became useful to the West. It lent muscle and diplomacy to the Euro-American regional priorities of retaining access to Gulf energy reserves at acceptable prices and resisting the spread of Islamically oriented nationalism.

The Gaza Genocide was the latest chapter in the struggle revealing political alignments in unexpected ways: the unity of the Western liberal democracies in their complicit response to such criminality; the passive response of Israel’s most prominent Arab neighbors, prompted by fear of Israel, hostility to Iran, and the links between governing elites and non-Middle East geopolitical actors, mainly the US. Given the size and extremism of the Israeli settler movement, especially in the West Bank, it seems politically naive and irrelevant to advocate a two-state solution even if it requires a Palestinian willlingnesss to swallow pre-1967 territorial and resource injustices and land-grabbing. Overall, the story of the West in the Middle East is a shameful chapter in the long narrative of Western encroachment on the most basic rights of non-Western peoples.   

5.While reading your book on “Humane Global Governance,” which is still in the idea phase and gives you hope, I couldn’t quite distinguish whether humanity or religion is the central focus of globalization. Despite your claim that globalization and secularism are in crisis, do you believe that religion should be utilized or that a humane globalization should be grounded in religion? Since your book also includes the chapter “Why and to What Extent Religion?” let us ask: Why is religion a dynamic factor in your model?

This question poses one aspect of why prescriptive writing about the geopolitical management of global security and relations among dominant states is so contingent on historical circumstances that evolve over time. In certain times and situations religion seems to have emancipatory potential and in others its theocratic governance and exclusionary policies seems dystopian. The same extremes can be observed in the role of secularity as national and global phenomena, which has given rise to visions of peace and justice but by way of geopolitical ambition and technological innovation has caused widespread conquest, exploitation and corruption in what was widely considered a post-colonial world following a wave of successful anti-colonial struggles. I have written of ‘colonialism after colonialism’ as best capturing the excesses of Western militarism and capitalism in this period between the end of the Cold War and the Gaza Genocide. It raises a new haunting question ‘What comes next for specific nations and for humanity as ideal and reality?’

6.In your book “Globalization and Religion,” you briefly address a very intriguing question as a chapter title. I would like to ask you to elaborate on it. The question in the book, if I may quote directly, is: “Does the Western secular state have a future?” If so, why? If not, why not?

Response: This kind of fundamental question requires a book if I were to attempt a comprehensive assessment. A brief response refers to the anti-democratic and regressive trends toward autocratic governance at home and anti-internationalism in foreign policy. Whereas ecological threats and technological developmentss are posing increasing threats of catastrophic futures, political agendas of leading governmennts are preoccupied with the short-term satisfactions and frustrations of the citizenry in the face of growing inequality and of governing elites in terms of geopoliticall rivalry and a stagnancy or worse for Western middle class life styles and expectations. It amounts to shifting ecological and technological problem-solving to future generations that will only survive if new political agendas are enacted under the influence of strengthened structures of global governance that are neither secular nor theocratic, but normative in a radical values-driven format of global-democacy-to-come. Such a benevolent future would depend on governmental elites renouncing narrow militarized forms of security.    

October 7: A Grim Anniversary

6 Oct

[Prefatory Note: Anadolu Agency RAF text on Oct 7; further reflections] 

October 7: A Grim Anniversary

Israel has long been renowned for its ability to shape public discourse

pertaining to its behavior toward the Palestinians, particularly in the West.

Its greatest triumph is undoubtedly the manner with which it managed the

media treatment of its response to October 7 in North America and Europe. Israel’s response was depicted as purely a matter of defensive security against Palestinian terrorists who staged an unprovoked and barbaric surprise attack by Hamas. This public distortion of the event gave the Western governments the political space needed to justify their closed eyes military, diplomatic, and intelligence support of Israel while genocide daily unfolded in Gaza.

This political manipulation of this incident in the long struggle between Israel and Palestine has several different dimensions. Above all, it absolutizes October 7 to create the false impression that peace and quiet prevailed in Gaza until ruptured by this vicious Hamas attack on Israeli villages and civilians gathered for a dance festival. The actual context from a Palestinian point of view couldn’t have been more different, and more objective.

The entire population of Gaza was living under a repressive occupation since the 1967 War as abetted by a punitive blockade imposed in 2007 that caused a steady and deliberate deterioration in the quality of Gaza civilian life that was already one of hardship, danger, and abuse. It is also worth remembering that Hamas was cajoled by Washington to give up armed struggle and pursue its goals by political means to avoid the stigma of its terrorist listing. In this spirit Hamas took part in the Gaza elections of 2006, which it was expected to lose. When it surprised Israel and the US by its success in these internationally monitored elections the result was not welcomed in Tel Aviv, which used its influence in Washington, to keep Hamas in a terrorist box, and the rest is history culminating in the genocidal assault of the past year.

But the history might have been different. Hamas for its part after its electoral success, reinforced by ousting Fatah from its leadership role in Gaza, resorted to diplomacy, seeking a political compromise with Israel reinforced by a long-term ceasefire of up to 50 years, which Israel refused to consider, much less take seriously. This gave Hamas little choice but to surrender its political rights, above all the right to self-determination, or resume its earlier posture of resistance by the means at its disposal.  

Further, from the first day that the extremist Netanyahu far right coalition took over the governance of Israel at the start of 2023 it proclaimed a ‘new Middle East’ which in a map exhibited by Netanyahu just weeks before October 7 erased Palestine. Even then, its main tactic in Gaza was the 2018 nonviolent ‘right of return’ movement, which Israel met at its borders with lethal violence again narrowing Hamas’ choices to surrender or armed struggle. This was a poignant moment when we take account of the fact that 75% of Gaza’s 2.3 milllion inhabitants were refugees or their descendants of the 1948 Nakba.

This course of development is consistent with the Western management of the October 7 event.  First, the early Israeli news releases that greatly exaggerated the atrocities attributed to Hamas were dutifully spread around the world by political leaders and echoed by a compliant media. But more than this, the complete absence of self-scrutiny involving the obvious lapse of Israeli border security helped shift exclusive responsibility to the attackers. This pattern gave rise to suspicions because of widespread reports of reliable warnings given personally to Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders in the days and months before October 7. In light of this it seems highly improbable that the impending Hamas attack was unknown to Israeli intelligence, likely supplemented by surveillance capabilities that could not have missed the training and rehearsals that almost openly preceded the attack.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that in the background of October 7 was the flagrant official greenlighting of settler violence that became part of the West Bank foreground after the attack. In the last days of August Israel unleashed a devastating Gaza-style military campaign so far focused on the West Bank cities of Jenin and Tulkarm.

When October 7 is contextualized, Israeli motivations for a genocidal response become

more plausible. The Hamas attack provided Israel with a pretext for genocide, and increasingly supported an interpretation of this severe violence as ethnic cleansing that should be understood as a prelude to land-grabbing, which helps us understand that the West Bank was always part of the theater of Israel’s military operation. In this sense, interpreters should take a hard look at October 9 (the day that Israel’s response began) if they want to grasp the significance of October 7. Currently, this exposure of ethnic cleansing realities is obscured by an obsessive Western media focus on the tragic fate of Israeli hostages while the larger scenario of Netanyahu extremism evolves beneath the radar.

All along Israel could not have addressed the Hamas challenge as one of pure terrorism without unwavering US and European support, no matter what the human costs and the reputational damage to Western global leadership. To the extent countered, it has been from Islamic sources, centering on Iran but including Hezbollah and the Houthis as active allies of Hamas. October 7 so perceived activated the larger conflict between the West and political Islam, with the Palestinian squeezed between, and for the last year victimized by the worst genocide since the Holocaust.

Among the many unfortunate consequences of the past year has been to weaken gravely the war and genocide prevention reputations of the UN. By ignoring the near unanimous rulings of the juridically respected International Court of Justice, the West showed its contempt for the authority of international law if it clashed with strategic interests. The contrast between insisting on the sanctity of international law in the Ukraine context and its complicity in the Gaza genocide exhibited both double standards and moral hypocrisy. A positive development, including in the Western countries supporting Israel, has been the civil society pro-Palestinian activism that is challenging the disregard of international law and human decency by the Western governments.

Let us hope that the year ahead brings peace and justice to the Palestinian people, the entire region, and the other 50 armed combat realties around the world. 

Reflections on October 7

6 Oct

[Prefatory Note: A commentary on October 7 stimulated by an interview with an independent Turkish journalist, Naman Bakac,]

Q: how do you briefly evaluate the last year regarding the October 7th operation in terms of HAMAS, Palestine and Israel?

Response: For the several months after October 7, Israel’s mastery of public discourse promoted an understanding that allowed Israel to carry out the early phases of its genocidal assault on Gaza with relatively little diplomatic friction in the West but growing discontent among progressive sectors of civil society. Throughout this early period the mainstream media relied on an Israeli optic to promote a one-dimensional misleading appreciation of October 7 as an unprovoked terrorist attack by Hamas terrorists on innocent Israeli civilians accompanied by barbaric atrocities. The atrocity dimension of the Hamas attack was gradually scaled back but without eroding governmental support for Israel in the West led by the US, but with the backing of UK, France, Germany, and most other Western states.

What was missing in this phase of basically unquestioning support for Israel was critical media treatment that did more than blandly report Israel’s version of the facts through endless TV time given over to Israeli government spokespersons, retired military and intelligence officials commenting on the progress of Israel’s supposed retaliatory campaign, and pro-Zionist opinion columnists writing for such established media platforms as the New York Times, Washington Post, The Economist. Except for rather obscure online platforms there was no space given to critics who pointed to the pre-October 7 extremism of the Netanyahu government focused on making the West Bank unlivable by unleashing settler violence and setting its sights expansively on a one-state Greater Israel solution.

The demonization of Hamas went completely unchallenged although it has been persuaded by the US Government to compete in the 2006 Gaza legislative elections in Gaza as a path if taken by Hamas would lead to political normalization, understood to include removal from the terrorist list. Yet neither Washington nor Tel Aviv expected Hamas to prevail in these internationally monitored elections, and when they did, and Hamas later displaced the corrupt Fatah presence in Gaza, Israel went to work reversing the reassurances given to Hamas prior to the elections, refusing to honor the results, imposing a comprehensive blockade on Gaza in 2007, which continues in effect and amounted to a cruel extended  form of collective punishment of the entire Palestinian population of the Gaza strip, 75% of whom were refugees from the 1948 War denied their right of return under international law. Only very recently has there been some attempt to present Hamas in a balanced manner, most notably in a book co-edited by Helena Cobban, Rami Khouri, and David Wildman, entitled Understanding Hamas and Why That Matters (OR Books, 2024).

My own views on Hamas were influenced by meetings ten years ago with Hamas leaders in Doha, Cairo, and Gaza City while I was acting as the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  I was impressed by the intelligence and moderation of these Hamas officials that I remain convinced that they were not putting on ‘a show’ to mislead a minor UN official. In these discussions two elements were stressed—first, the need for a political alternative to the resumption of armed struggle for the sake of both Palestine and Israel, and secondly, a long-term ceasefire coupled with an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Palestinian Territories of Gaza, West Bank, and East Jerusalem as a formula for long-term stability. Turkey more than other countries at the time sought covertly to mediate between Hamas and Israel under the leadership of its star diplomat, Ahmet Davutoglu (later Turkey’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister), with hopes that some accommodation could be agreed upon, bringing stability and hope to the region and a recovery of some limited sense of normalcy to the long oppressed Palestinian people, now to the people of Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and most of all, Iran. Yet, as events since 2006 have darkly demonstrated, this was not to be. Quite the contrary!

Undoubtedly, the worst distortion in these first months after October 7 was the insistence in the Western liberal democracies that the use of the word ‘genocide’ in connection with Israel’s military operation was defamatory, an instance of ‘hate speech’ that warranted punitive responses such as formal retractions, student dismissals, faculty suspensions, and forced administrative resignations. ‘Playing it safe’ in many corporate and governmental settings meant keeping silent about Israeli atrocities except in private conversations among trusted friends. Western governments accentuated this anti-democratic turn by exerting pressures on educational administrators and government employees.

Not mentioning genocide was to ignore the proverbial elephant in the room. Numerous statements by top Israeli political officials and military commanders made no secret of their genocidal intent. On October 9, Israel’s Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, announced ‘a total siege’ of Gaza applicable to food, fuel, and electricity. He explained that when ‘fighting human animals’ it is necessary to treat the adversary accordingly. Prime Minister Netanyahu invoked the bloodiest chapter in the Bible justifying revenge against the Amalekites: “Do not spare them, put to death men and women, children and infants, cattle and sheep, camels and donkeys.” Modern Torah teaching generally interprets this troublesome passage metaphorically or as a message intended to address the evil within Jews, but for the far right, including cabinet members of the Netanyahu coalition, the Amalek passage is taken literally and has long served as justification for killing all and any Palestinians.

When reinforced by tactics exhibiting disregard for Palestinian vulnerabilities, the inference of genocide was unmistakable, so much so that even the juridically cautious ICJ gave a preliminary nod in the direction of acknowledging genocide in their rulings of January 26 in response to the South African initiative seeking resolution of its contention that Israel was violating the Genocide Convention of 1951. Of course, Israel rejected these genocidal allegations by its usual tactic of castigating the motives of critics, insisting as always, that it was confronting worldwide antisemitism as well as Hamas terrorism, which it characterized as ‘genocide’ in a willful effort to reverse perceptions.

After this early period of mind control and public confusion, Israel gradually lost control of the discourse except in the Western elite circles where opinion bent somewhat, but in a manner coupled with irresponsible continuation of support. Israel shifted the focus to the plight of the hostages seized on October 7, and admittedly subjected to a harrowing experience of captivity and Israeli bombardments often ending in their death. Such a humanitarian concern about the fate of the hostage is fully justified although typically diluted by Western silence about the unspeakably abusive detention of

several thousand Palestinians on scant or no charges.

Even the European members of NATO were induced by popular protests in their own countries increasingly to abstain rather than openly side with Israel in UN ceasefire votes, leaving only the US and Israel firmly opposing any pronounced criticisms of Israel even if after the near unanimous Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on July 19 condemned Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories as unlawful for multiple reasons. This ICJ pronouncement was given a strong measure of approval in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly on September 17 by a vote of 124-14, with 43 abstentions. To be expected, the US and Israel were among the 14, while the European countries abstained.

Such a new objectivity was also evident in the gradual rise of civil society opposition to what Israel is doing in Gaza and throughout its region. It is not yet robust enough to penetrate the bipartisan support given to Israel by the US, although the media is slightly more willing to expose the daily cruelty of Israel’s tactics, but still habitually cushioned by Israel’s official accounts that whitewash Israel’s controversial tactics by raising their often unsupported claims of Hamas responsibility by way of their siting of tunnels and human shields. The media rarely invites spokespersons for the Palestinian side or strong civil society critics of Israel to its most prestigious platforms.

Perhaps, the most vivid demonstration of this Phase 2 of the Israeli genocide was the widespread protests on college campuses around the world, having the indirect effect of exposing the widening gap between what the governments of the West support and what a growing proportion of their citizenry believe and favor. Israel’s loss of control over the public discourse is unprecedented and coupled with the increasing weight of authoritative interpretations of international law within the UN framework that underscores both Israel’s unlawful behavior of the past year and its underlying unlawful occupation policies, and lingering presence since 1967, as the Occupying Power of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. The US has during the year over and over again given its endorsement to Israel’s strategic moves and occupation policies at the cost of disregarding international law. When coupled with its indignant insistence on international law compliance by Russia in the Ukraine context, the US made clear that it will not hesitate to use international law to attack adversaries while dismissing it when an international ally’s behavior is unlawful. This is clearly a glaring instance of double standards and moral hypocrisy, reducing international to a policy instrument rather than a regulative norm.

In conclusion, the more we learn about October 7, the more suspect becomes the official rationale for Israel’s ferocious response.  An independent international investigation is long overdue. How can the  ‘security lapse’ that let the attack happen acknowledged recently by Israel be reconciled with the warnings Israeli leaders received from Egypt and the US, undoubtedly confirmed by Israel’s surveillance and intelligence capabilities in Gaza. The inevitable skeptical views directed at the Israeli retaliation was given immediate credibility by the scale and intensity of the Israeli response that seemed to offer a pre-planned pretext to escalate pre-October 7 plans to establish Greater Israel from the river to the sea facilitated by the forced expulsion of as many Palestinians as possible.

At present, it seems almost foolish to anticipate that October 7, 2025 will be a time to look back on the despair of 2024 as a grotesque anomaly in human experience, but it is not foolish to pray that it might be so.

Global Governance and Global Security in the 21st Century:  A Philosophical Inquiry

4 Oct

Richard Falk

            [50th Anniversary of Philosophical Society of Turkey, Ankara, Oct. 4, 2024]

A Preliminary Reflection on Orientation

It is an honor for me, not even a philosopher, to be a panelist on this program honoring Professor Kucuredi for her inspirational role in the development of the Turkish Society of Philosophy over its life of 50 years.

Listening to the presentations and the introduction of speakers have made me aware that this Society, unlike so much of contemporary philosophy whether of the language or postmodern variety, is devoted to understanding the global crises of our time and how they might be best resolved for the benefit of all humanity.

If ever during the history of the human species did we need the benefits of ‘deep thinking,’ which is the enduringly profound contribution of philosophy, is now so many of the world’s leaders and influencers are behaving mindlessly or malevolently, raising risks of provoking quasi-species or even extinction events. Never has the need for philosophical deep thinking been greater with attention to the time dimensions of urgency as well as with the space dimensions of complex and intensive interdependence. Of course, this is not to denigrate longer term thinking relating to peacemaking and peacebuilding as a contribution to transformative patters of behavior in political, economic, and cultural domains of human expression and ecological awareness, but it is alerting deep thinker to the emergency conditions that bind together the destinies of all peoples sharing life on planet earth.

I have chosen to focus my remarks on the theme of ‘global governance’ that has been at the core of my scholarly work ever since I was a bewildered graduate student, then fearful of a major war fought with nuclear weapons. My overriding concern is with the management of global security in the sense of war, genocide, and atrocity prevention, which explains their linkage here. I was less concerned with the management of routine interactions across and within national borders that brings order, stability, and benefits in many diverse areas of life, including health, travel, diplomacy, sports, culture, and countless others. It ranks high among the achievements of modernity, but it is not enough given the rate and nature of technological innovation.

I explored from the standpoints of international law, international relations, and cultural values two central issues: 1) a critique of global governance as a structure of international life; 2) were there viable alternative modes of global governance that were less war-prone, more justice-oriented, and less a product Western hegemonic ambitions and civilizational provincialism. In carrying forward this line of thought I often turned to Western philosophy for insight and wisdom and to Eastern philosophy for empathy, different groundings in social/political realities, and ethical values reflecting different civilizational traditions.

Sketching the Philosophical Roots of Global Governance      

Existing structure and procedures of global governance have their normative and political deep roots in the framework set forth in the Peace of Westphalia back in 1648, but continuously evolved to adapt to changing conditions.

The essential feature of this Westphalian framework was the formal or juridical autonomy of territorial states sovereign within recognized international borders, a systemic condition of philosophical anarchy most influentially theorized by Thomas Hobbes in The Leviathan published in 1651. This vision was accepting of the abiding reality of war, which in Hobbes’ words pitted ‘all against all.’

Hedley Bull modernized Hobbes in his important book, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order initially published in 1977. The originality of Bull’s adherence to state-centrism was his idea that anarchy could be combined within the overarching non-governmental normative reality of ‘society,’ which was the narrative he believed best described world history, and could not be changed for the better.  Revealingly, the main societal premise of Bull’s worldview was the political, moral, and legal obligation of sovereign governments to show respect for the norm of non-intervention by refraining from forcible intervention in the internal affairs of foreign countries.

The realist element in Bull’s approach was expressed by his rejection of the pretensions of international law as ‘a higher law’ than national legal authority when it came to maintaining global security, establishing and upholding political order, and imposing criminal accountability on individuals. Bull illustrated his bold reluctance to submit power to law within international settings by his rejection of the Nuremberg precedent by which German political and military officials were held internationally accountable after World War II for their alleged criminality.

Bull believed, and experience has largely vindicated his skepticism, that such punitive treatment as imposed on the losers in World War II made a mockery of law by overriding the sovereignty of only the losers. This unwillingness of the victorious countries to submit their own behavior to any legal assessment meant that what was being called ‘law’ at Nuremberg is more properly regarded as a naked expression of power.  At the same time Bull valued law for its functional roles in serving the mutual or reciprocal interests of states in political order internationally, but he believed it had no constructive role in relation to war/peace contexts other than shared humanitarian concerns such as the humane treatment of prisoners-of-war by adversaries.

In effect, the Nuremberg Judgment was more an exercise of state propaganda by the winners in World War II than their claim of an advance in criminal jurisprudence of international accountability. In effect, war was accepted as embedded in the anarchic structures and it was leading many liberal idealists to regard international life as governed by law rather than power. Such thinking was an anathema to a confirmed realist such as Bull who felt there no alternative to leaving global governance and global security to what the most influential international relations

agreed upon despite policy divergencies (Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Kennan).

Bull’s deconstruction of Nuremberg accountability claims have been reinforced by invoking criminal law to punish Saddam Hussein after the Iraq War of 2003 while foregoing any legal scrutiny of serious war crimes allegations directed at George W. Bush or Tony Blair. The furious refusal by the US to have any member of its armed forces investigated or arrested for international crimes by the International Criminal Court is a further indication that Bull’s skepticism continues to be validated by experience.

Also significant is the reality that these projections of global governance that originated in the West and served Western interests in overriding the sovereignty of non-Western national societies by disguising power grabs as criminal justice. At its peak this Western hegemony both had recourse to law to rationalize colonialism, sugarcoat in the process genocidal policies directed toward native populations, especially in the British breakaway colonies in North America, Australia, and New Zealand.

As world history unfolded the US Government insisted upon and achieved total impunity even in relation to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that were viewed as unlawful in more objective legal and cultural venues ever since such weaponry of mass destruction came into existence. We can only regret that these grants of impunity for the atomic attacks cleared the path to the Nuclear Age that might not have come to pass if Germany or Japan had resorted to such weaponry and yet went on to lose the war. Controversial combat tactics by the losers in war rarely become acceptable practices in future wars, but if by winners it becomes more tenuous to deny the validity of their future use.

Kant’s disruptive challenge to Hobbes and contemporary realists

An earlier partial philosophical break came to the fore in the aftermath of the French Revolution articulated in perhaps the most conceptually sophisticated manner by Immanuel Kant in his publication 230 years ago of a long essay given the title Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. The basic Kantian insight was that the global spread of democratic republicanism, and accompanying human rights, could come to allow separate states to co-exist in a condition of harmony with respect to their national security, thereby indirectly achieving global security.

Kant sought to counter the structure of political realism that envisioned no alternative go ‘perpetual war’ with the revolutionary idea that war was not rooted in the human condition or even in the fragmented character of international society, but is an outgrowth of ideological tension, predatory economic impulses. Kant explored the possibility that the newly comforting belief that democracies would not wage war against each other. There were other related features in this Kantian hopeful view of international relations including a self-interested dynamic of state in mutual demilitarization.

It is arguable that this Kantian radical vision has never been tested historically because of the failure of democracy to spread to many important countries outside of the West, and with anti-democratic national governance remaining commonplace even in the West. The source of both world wars of the prior century were often accurately described as pitting the liberal democracies against first fascism and then totalitarian socialism, which can be conceived as a meeting place between Kant’s bonding expectations of democracies and their antagonism to anti-democratic forms, a kind of second-order fulfillment of Kant’s views on the relevance of internal state/society relations.

With the rise of civilizational consciousness conflict configurations are often portrayed by reference to diverse religious or ethnic  identities, and their conflictual perspectives. Biden is the latest of Western leaders who sought to rally democracies against autocracies, as if he were a Kantian, although his designation of democracy was so broadened as to be normatively meaningless, malevolent, and mendacious by including Israel, Modi’s India, Saudi Arabia, and others. Such ideological opportunism undermines second-order Kantianism.

There remains a slender basis for the Kantian belief that ‘genuine’ democracies do not fight one another, and that if global political landscape came one day to consist only of genuine democracies, there would be, or at least might be, a prolonged period of world peace.

 The Fleeting Promise of Governmental Solutions 

From pre-Westphalian times contrary expectations envisioned an enhanced role for international law, entertaining political and ethical notions of overcoming Hobbesian anarchy by various ideas of institutional centralization expressive of various ideas of spontaneous or coerced unity of humanity, generating even governmental proposals for world government or geopolitical ambition to establish a global state. In other words, the pathway to a peaceful world led not through an anarchic structure but depends on overcoming political fragmentation by way of a deliberative process that credibly gives rise to a more centralized system of governance.

What now exists, epitomized by the design of the UN as an institutional (non-governmental) system in which all sovereign states are treated as equal in a formal diplomatic sense yet the five main prevailing states in World War II enjoy a right of veto in the Security Council, the only UN political organ with the authority to reach binding decisions. In effect, this has meant that global security is managed outside the UN by these powerful political actors who are granted the legal authority to evade the UN Charter while pursuing either peacekeeping or strategic interests.

In fact, this P5 managerial role produced during the 40 years of Cold War led to a precarious balance between the Soviet Union and the three NATO members of the SC led by the US with respect to major war. Since the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War this geopolitical P2 became behaviorally the P1, at least until Russia mounted a geopolitical challenge as an accompaniment to the Ukraine War and the Global South showed signs of promoting their own version of global governance with encouragement by China. The Ukraine War also highlighted the moral hypocrisy of the West by its denunciation of Russia while actively supporting Israel in openly carrying out genocide in Gaza. This posture also exhibited a betrayal of liberal values associated with respect for international law and human rights in this clash with strategic interests and cultural affinities.

After each of the world wars, idealists on the sidelines of world politics put forward views that advocated world government in the form of the enactment of a federalist constitutional framework providing global governance and the institutional management of global security.

These views never gained political traction against either the realist consensus that dominated foreign policy elites in the powerful countries of the world or by public advocacy on the part of engaged national citizenries. These ideas of centralized global governance continued to languish despite the advent of nuclear weapons, the climate crisis, and the wastefulness and menace of militarized global security in the nuclear age. The UN was framed to create a system of institutional centralization for functional activities while being forced to adapt to the geopolitical management of war prevention and global security. It should therefore come as no surprise that the UN has been minimally involved in the ongoing war in Ukraine and the genocidal assault in Gaza

The 2024 UN Summit of the Future with its call for virtuous behavior protective of long-term human wellbeing and ecological stability by UN members and along with the championing of inspiring policies directed at mitigating human suffering seems likely to experience the disappointing destiny of the UN Preamble to the Charter with its confident call to end the scourge of war and serve as a beacon of hope for a peaceful future. Satisfying words with a pacifying impact without obligatory matching deeds is similar to being presented a beautiful wine bottle that is empty of the coveted liquid within.

A Concluding Lament

We live in disillusioning times, where the appeals of 21st century pragmatic thinkers and critics, alive to real world challenges, are still dismissed as visionary, and are neither heard nor heeded in the corridors of power. These venues of power and wealth still remain mainly the preserve of ambitious men who continue to be bewitched by the benefits of short-term performances, while the profound challenges that haunt a human future facing increasingly urgent imperative consisting of long-term vision, commitment, empathy, ecological resilience, and spiritual wisdom. May it be so! And may philosophers add their variants of deep thinking in the process.     

Israel’s Bloody EndgameS

4 Oct

[Prefatory Note: This post was initially published on the TRT World website on September 30th, having been edited by Shabrina Khatri. It has

been modified to take account of subsequent developments in the region including the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut and a widening onslaught against Hezbollah, while tensions mount with Iran. These developments have also affected the US relation to the conflict.]

Netanyahu’s bloody endgame seeks a future Israel with a Minimum   Palestinian Presence

In the face of mounting global criticism, Israel is stepping up its military offensive in Lebanon, continuing its genocidal violence against the Palestinians and even intensifying its attacks on the Houthis in Yemen.

AFP

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holds maps as he speaks during the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly at the United Nations headquarters in New York City on September 27, 2024. that erase all traces of a Palestinian claim to statehood and the exercise of their right of self-determination.

Israel in the year since the Hamas-led attacks on October 7 has insisted that it is motivated only by anti-terrorist goals in its original pledge to exterminate Hamas, and more recently expanded by the commitment to destroy Hezbollah as a credible adversary, and in the process weaken its most feared adversary, Iran. Its evident incidental purpose has been to cast Hamas, Hezbollah, and Yemen’s Houthis as proxies for arch-enemy Iran, which stands accused of being the main enabler of “anti-Israeli terrorism” in the Middle East, a coalition of militias and political groups in the Middle East, most on Western lists of terrorist organization, and alleged linked to Iran, and less so Syria, as a so-called ‘axis of resistance.’

Casting new dark clouds over the observance of the grim anniversary of October 7, is the Gaza-like onslaught carried out by Israel in recent months against alleged Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon, and extending to the Hezbollah controlled neighborhoods of south Beirut.

This latest phase of Israeli hyper-violence culminated in the deadly pager/radio attacks followed days later by the assassination of Hezbollah’s longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah on September 27. And this was one year after the United Nations Secretary General spoke of the world “as becoming unhinged as geopolitical tensions rise.”

Amid this preoccupation with daily reports of atrocities and severe, massive civilian suffering, a question is recently being posed in reaction to the prolonged excessiveness of Israeli violence coupled with its stubborn refusal to accept the near universal call at the UN and elsewhere for a Gaza ceasefire tied to a hostage/prisoner swap deal: What is Israel’s strategic objective that is worth this much sacrifice in its global reputation as a dynamic and legitimate, if controversial, state?

And lurking behind this unnerving question is a related anxious query: does Israel have an endgame that might vindicate, at least in its eyes, this self-sacrifice along with its sullen acceptance of the criminal stigma of credible allegations of apartheid and genocide, as well as the laundry list of crimes against humanity and its crude defamation of the United Nations?

Netanyahu’s endgame

Last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared in New York to delivered an angry, arrogant speech before a UN General Assembly. Netanyahu managed to blend bitterness toward Israel’s UN critics with an Israeli vision of peace that seemed better treated as a delusional Israel victory speech.

In a diversionary attack, Netanyahu began his remarks by referring to the UN as “a swamp of anti-Semitic bile,” a racist filter through which any allegation against Israel, however perverse, could gain “an automatic majority” against what he pointed out was the world’s only Jewish-majority state “in this flat-earth society” that is the UN. An allegation that seemed to imply that Israel could do no wrong internationally, and if any serious charges were mounted against Israel, no matter how well evidenced, they would be dismissed as nothing more than another instance of antisemitic racist barbs.

AFP

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly at the United Nations headquarters in New York City on September 27, 2024.

It was in this strained atmosphere that Netanyahu chose to announce his grandiose vision of an Israeli endgame that he claimed would alone bring peace and prosperity to the region. What Netanyahu presented to the almost empty UN chamber (because many delegates left in protest of his speech) was a geopolitical package tied together with the verbiage of “the blessings of peace.”

It was essentially a manifesto in which stage one involved the destruction of Israel’s active adversaries, the proxies of Iran. It was to be followed by a stage two “historic peace agreement with Saudi Arabia” presented as a dramatic sequel to the Abraham Accords reached in the last period of Donald Trump’s presidency four years ago.

These words celebrating the emergence of “a new Middle East” were hyped by Netanyahu, who said, “what blessings such a peace with Saudi Arabia would bring.” Other than those who wanted to be fooled by such an envisioned endgame, informed persons realized it was little other than a crude example of state propaganda with little chance of happening and almost no prospect of delivering a bright, peaceful, prosperous future to the peoples of the region.

Netanyahu displayed a map of his new Middle East that assigned no presence to Palestinian statehood, even though Saudi Arabia has recently indicated that it would not establish peace with Israel until a Palestinian state existed.

Such an omission was not an oversight. The Netanyahu coalition with the far-right religious parties led by such extremists as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich would collapse the instant any genuine commitment to Palestinian statehood was officially endorsed. It is impossible to believe that Netanyahu was unaware of this constraint, and so it seems unlikely, to put it mildly, that he expected any enthusiasm even in Washington for his vision of a peace-building endgame. The US had long hidden its Israeli partisanship behind the two-state mantra that was also a UN consensus that substituted piety for realism.

Probing Israel’s real endgame

Underneath the public relations idea of Israel’s endgame lies a worrisome reality. Even before the Netanyahu government took over at the beginning of 2023, it was evident that Israel’s political agenda was in hot pursuit of a publically undisclosed endgame that would complete the Zionist Project after a century of settler colonial striving.

This first became clear as a publicly endorsed goal when Israel’s government introduced a quasi-constitutional Basic Law in 2018. With it, Jewish supremacist rights were written into Israeli law as conferring the right of self-determination exclusively on the Jewish people, establishing Hebrew as Israel’s sole official language, and extending Israeli protective sovereignty to the occupied West Bank settlements that had been declared ‘unlawful.’

It was this legislative action by the Knesset that confirmed an Israeli endgame of a one-state solution widely known as “Greater Israel,” a formula for extending Israel’s sovereignty over the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem in violation of international law and the UN consensus, including that of most Western countries.

Such a Basic Law cannot be changed in Israel, which lacks a written constitution, by normal legislative action, but only by a later overriding Basic Law.

When the Netanyahu coalition took over in January 2023 there were provocative signs that this 2018 Basic Law would be coercively expedited as Israel’s number-one priority. It was initially signaled by the informal, yet unmistakable, greenlighting of settler violence in the occupied West Bank with the pointed frequently articulated message to Palestinian residents: “leave or we will kill you.” This violence was tolerated by the IDF, which on some occasions joined in, without even producing a fake censure from Tel Aviv.

In September 2023, Netanyahu’s UN speech featuring a map of the region with no Palestine was reinforced by feverish diplomatic efforts to secure an Abrahamic normalization with some Arab states, further indications to establish so-called “Greater Israel”. These acts along with provocations at the Al Aqsa Mosque compound helped set the stage for the Hamas-led attack on October 7, an event itself now veiled in ambiguity that can only be removed by an international investigation.

Miscalculations on both sides

The world at first largely accepted, or at least tolerated, Israel’s version of October 7, including its retaliatory rationale given an international law cover as an exercise of the “right of self-defense”.

As further information became available, the original Israeli rationalization for its response to October 7 became problematic. It was established that the Netanyahu leadership had received several reliable warnings of an imminent Hamas attack.

After months of training including rehearsals of the Hamas attacks, it strains credulity to accept the official version that Israel’s world-class surveillance capabilities did not detect the impending attack. Further, the immediate magnitude and severity of the Israeli response raised suspicions that Israel was seeking a pretext to induce the forced evacuation of Palestinians from Gaza to be followed by their forced exit from the occupied West Bank.

These developments established a credible prelude to the formal establishment of “Greater Israel”, and the attainment of Israel’s real endgame.

In retrospect, both Hamas and Israel seem to have seriously miscalculated. Israel seems to have counted on genocidal violence producing either political surrender or cross-border evacuation, and a new wave of Palestinian refugees.

,,

Having endured so much, it is hard to envision any kind of acquiescence by the Palestinians, however decimated by the Israeli onslaught, of an endgame that doesn’t include the establishment of a viable Palestine political future.

Israel underestimated Palestinian attachment to the land and to the indignity of being made unwanted strangers in their own homeland, even in the face of total devastation. Israelis undoubtedly anticipate the growth of hostile public opinion around the world after an initial grace period after October 7 of indulging Israeli violence, given the widely endorsed accounts of atrocities inflicted and hostages seized in the Hamas-led attack.

On its side, Hamas underestimated the ferocity of the Israeli response apparently because it conceived of its attack in normal battlefield action and reaction patterns, and not linked to a grandiose Israeli endgame scenario.

Israel’s hollow claims of victory suggest that the Netanyahu coalition is as committed as earlier to the “Greater Israel” endgame, with the enlargement of the combat zone to include Lebanon, and maybe even Syria and Iran, as parts of the Israeli endgame quietly enlarged to include what is being called ‘restored deterrence.’

Having endured so much, it is hard to envision any kind of acquiescence by the Palestinians, however decimated by the Israeli onslaught, of an endgame that doesn’t include the establishment of a viable Palestine political future. This could be either a co-existing Palestinian state with full sovereign rights or a new safeguarded one-state confederation based on absolute equality between these two peoples with respect to the totality of human rights.

In conclusion, the political conditions do not currently begin to exist for an endgame that would satisfy the minimum expectations of both peoples.

Israel’s Bloody Endgame

4 Oct

[Prefatory Note: This post was initially published on the TRT World website on September 30th, having been edited by Shabrina Khatri. It hasbeen modified to take account of subsequent developments in the region including the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut and a widening onslaught against Hezbollah, while tensions mount with Iran. These developments have also affected the US relation to the conflict.]

Netanyahu’s bloody endgame seeks a future Israel with a Minimum   Palestinian Presence

In the face of mounting global criticism, Israel is stepping up its military offensive in Lebanon, continuing its genocidal violence against the Palestinians and even intensifying its attacks on the Houthis in Yemen.

AFP

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holds maps as he speaks during the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly at the United Nations headquarters in New York City on September 27, 2024. that erase all traces of a Palestinian claim to statehood and the exercise of their right of self-determination.

Israel in the year since the Hamas-led attacks on October 7 has insisted that it is motivated only by anti-terrorist goals in its original pledge to exterminate Hamas, and more recently expanded by the commitment to destroy Hezbollah as a credible adversary, and in the process weaken its most feared adversary, Iran. Its evident incidental purpose has been to cast Hamas, Hezbollah, and Yemen’s Houthis as proxies for arch-enemy Iran, which stands accused of being the main enabler of “anti-Israeli terrorism” in the Middle East, a coalition of militias and political groups in the Middle East, most on Western lists of terrorist organization, and alleged linked to Iran, and less so Syria, as a so-called ‘axis of resistance.’

Casting new dark clouds over the observance of the grim anniversary of October 7, is the Gaza-like onslaught carried out by Israel in recent months against alleged Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon, and extending to the Hezbollah controlled neighborhoods of south Beirut.

This latest phase of Israeli hyper-violence culminated in the deadly pager/radio attacks followed days later by the assassination of Hezbollah’s longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah on September 27. And this was one year after the United Nations Secretary General spoke of the world “as becoming unhinged as geopolitical tensions rise.”

Amid this preoccupation with daily reports of atrocities and severe, massive civilian suffering, a question is recently being posed in reaction to the prolonged excessiveness of Israeli violence coupled with its stubborn refusal to accept the near universal call at the UN and elsewhere for a Gaza ceasefire tied to a hostage/prisoner swap deal: What is Israel’s strategic objective that is worth this much sacrifice in its global reputation as a dynamic and legitimate, if controversial, state?

And lurking behind this unnerving question is a related anxious query: does Israel have an endgame that might vindicate, at least in its eyes, this self-sacrifice along with its sullen acceptance of the criminal stigma of credible allegations of apartheid and genocide, as well as the laundry list of crimes against humanity and its crude defamation of the United Nations?

Netanyahu’s endgame

Last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared in New York to delivered an angry, arrogant speech before a UN General Assembly. Netanyahu managed to blend bitterness toward Israel’s UN critics with an Israeli vision of peace that seemed better treated as a delusional Israel victory speech.

In a diversionary attack, Netanyahu began his remarks by referring to the UN as “a swamp of anti-Semitic bile,” a racist filter through which any allegation against Israel, however perverse, could gain “an automatic majority” against what he pointed out was the world’s only Jewish-majority state “in this flat-earth society” that is the UN. An allegation that seemed to imply that Israel could do no wrong internationally, and if any serious charges were mounted against Israel, no matter how well evidenced, they would be dismissed as nothing more than another instance of antisemitic racist barbs.

AFP

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly at the United Nations headquarters in New York City on September 27, 2024.

It was in this strained atmosphere that Netanyahu chose to announce his grandiose vision of an Israeli endgame that he claimed would alone bring peace and prosperity to the region. What Netanyahu presented to the almost empty UN chamber (because many delegates left in protest of his speech) was a geopolitical package tied together with the verbiage of “the blessings of peace.”

It was essentially a manifesto in which stage one involved the destruction of Israel’s active adversaries, the proxies of Iran. It was to be followed by a stage two “historic peace agreement with Saudi Arabia” presented as a dramatic sequel to the Abraham Accords reached in the last period of Donald Trump’s presidency four years ago.

These words celebrating the emergence of “a new Middle East” were hyped by Netanyahu, who said, “what blessings such a peace with Saudi Arabia would bring.” Other than those who wanted to be fooled by such an envisioned endgame, informed persons realized it was little other than a crude example of state propaganda with little chance of happening and almost no prospect of delivering a bright, peaceful, prosperous future to the peoples of the region.

Netanyahu displayed a map of his new Middle East that assigned no presence to Palestinian statehood, even though Saudi Arabia has recently indicated that it would not establish peace with Israel until a Palestinian state existed.

Such an omission was not an oversight. The Netanyahu coalition with the far-right religious parties led by such extremists as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich would collapse the instant any genuine commitment to Palestinian statehood was officially endorsed. It is impossible to believe that Netanyahu was unaware of this constraint, and so it seems unlikely, to put it mildly, that he expected any enthusiasm even in Washington for his vision of a peace-building endgame. The US had long hidden its Israeli partisanship behind the two-state mantra that was also a UN consensus that substituted piety for realism.

Probing Israel’s real endgame

Underneath the public relations idea of Israel’s endgame lies a worrisome reality. Even before the Netanyahu government took over at the beginning of 2023, it was evident that Israel’s political agenda was in hot pursuit of a publically undisclosed endgame that would complete the Zionist Project after a century of settler colonial striving.

This first became clear as a publicly endorsed goal when Israel’s government introduced a quasi-constitutional Basic Law in 2018. With it, Jewish supremacist rights were written into Israeli law as conferring the right of self-determination exclusively on the Jewish people, establishing Hebrew as Israel’s sole official language, and extending Israeli protective sovereignty to the occupied West Bank settlements that had been declared ‘unlawful.’

It was this legislative action by the Knesset that confirmed an Israeli endgame of a one-state solution widely known as “Greater Israel,” a formula for extending Israel’s sovereignty over the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem in violation of international law and the UN consensus, including that of most Western countries.

Such a Basic Law cannot be changed in Israel, which lacks a written constitution, by normal legislative action, but only by a later overriding Basic Law.

When the Netanyahu coalition took over in January 2023 there were provocative signs that this 2018 Basic Law would be coercively expedited as Israel’s number-one priority. It was initially signaled by the informal, yet unmistakable, greenlighting of settler violence in the occupied West Bank with the pointed frequently articulated message to Palestinian residents: “leave or we will kill you.” This violence was tolerated by the IDF, which on some occasions joined in, without even producing a fake censure from Tel Aviv.

In September 2023, Netanyahu’s UN speech featuring a map of the region with no Palestine was reinforced by feverish diplomatic efforts to secure an Abrahamic normalization with some Arab states, further indications to establish so-called “Greater Israel”. These acts along with provocations at the Al Aqsa Mosque compound helped set the stage for the Hamas-led attack on October 7, an event itself now veiled in ambiguity that can only be removed by an international investigation.

Miscalculations on both sides

The world at first largely accepted, or at least tolerated, Israel’s version of October 7, including its retaliatory rationale given an international law cover as an exercise of the “right of self-defense”.

As further information became available, the original Israeli rationalization for its response to October 7 became problematic. It was established that the Netanyahu leadership had received several reliable warnings of an imminent Hamas attack.

After months of training including rehearsals of the Hamas attacks, it strains credulity to accept the official version that Israel’s world-class surveillance capabilities did not detect the impending attack. Further, the immediate magnitude and severity of the Israeli response raised suspicions that Israel was seeking a pretext to induce the forced evacuation of Palestinians from Gaza to be followed by their forced exit from the occupied West Bank.

These developments established a credible prelude to the formal establishment of “Greater Israel”, and the attainment of Israel’s real endgame.

In retrospect, both Hamas and Israel seem to have seriously miscalculated. Israel seems to have counted on genocidal violence producing either political surrender or cross-border evacuation, and a new wave of Palestinian refugees.

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Having endured so much, it is hard to envision any kind of acquiescence by the Palestinians, however decimated by the Israeli onslaught, of an endgame that doesn’t include the establishment of a viable Palestine political future.

Israel underestimated Palestinian attachment to the land and to the indignity of being made unwanted strangers in their own homeland, even in the face of total devastation. Israelis undoubtedly anticipate the growth of hostile public opinion around the world after an initial grace period after October 7 of indulging Israeli violence, given the widely endorsed accounts of atrocities inflicted and hostages seized in the Hamas-led attack.

On its side, Hamas underestimated the ferocity of the Israeli response apparently because it conceived of its attack in normal battlefield action and reaction patterns, and not linked to a grandiose Israeli endgame scenario.

Israel’s hollow claims of victory suggest that the Netanyahu coalition is as committed as earlier to the “Greater Israel” endgame, with the enlargement of the combat zone to include Lebanon, and maybe even Syria and Iran, as parts of the Israeli endgame quietly enlarged to include what is being called ‘restored deterrence.’

Having endured so much, it is hard to envision any kind of acquiescence by the Palestinians, however decimated by the Israeli onslaught, of an endgame that doesn’t include the establishment of a viable Palestine political future. This could be either a co-existing Palestinian state with full sovereign rights or a new safeguarded one-state confederation based on absolute equality between these two peoples with respect to the totality of human rights.

In conclusion, the political conditions do not currently begin to exist for an endgame that would satisfy the minimum expectations of both peoples.