[Prefatory Note: The following interview was conducted by Professor Luis Cabrera, a political theorist on the faculty of Griffith University in Brisbane Australia. Cabrera has written notable books on themes of world government and global integration. He is also the co-founder and co-director of the Global Government Research Network. The original posting of the interview can be found at <wgresearch.org/seven-questions-for-richard-falk/?tve=true>
[I would describe myself as a strong skeptic, and place less emphasis on the sympathetic aspects of my views about finding institutional mechanisms protective of global and human interests. I do believe that a stronger and more independent UN is part of the answer as are special governmental and quasi-governmental arrangements to deal with specific subject-matter of global scope. At the same time, advocacy of world government irresponsibly overlooks the danger of sanctioning a move to global tyranny and to a frozen economic order that would almost certainly need to deal with disparities in material circumstances by coercive means. I do recommend checking out the website recently put together by Luis Cabrera and James Thompson, and can be found via Google at ‘World Government Research Network’ where high quality articles and world government related news can be found.]
[The following biosketch preceded the interview: Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University and associated with the program on Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara since 2002. He has been a prominent and prolific voice in scholarship on international law and world order since the late 1950s, and more recently has championed the promotion of ‘humane global governance’ as an alternative to top-down economic globalization. Falk was centrally involved in the World Order Models Project in 1960s-1980s. WOMP was a research-focused outgrowth of the world government movements of the 1940s and 1950s, and its head, Prof. Saul Mendlovitz of Rutgers, was an unabashed advocate of binding world government. Falk was more skeptical, famously arguing that most world government proposals are guilty of ‘premature specificity.’ The World Government Research Network interviewed Prof. Falk on his long career and current views on global integration in August 2015.]
1) You were the North American director for the World Order Models Project (WOMP), which was aimed in part at developing an inclusive international academic dialogue on global integration. What were the major challenges to developing a genuinely global dialogue, and how successful do you think the project was in meeting them?
I think the main participants in WOMP were very disposed to a global dialogue, although sharp differences in outlook were present from its inception. There was an initial split between those of us from the North who focused on war prevention given the anxieties generated by the U.S./Soviet geopolitical rivalry and those in the South who were concerned with development, overcoming European colonial legacies, and steering clear as possible of the Cold War. A secondary split was between Saul Mendlovitz, the overall director and fund raiser who made the project possible, who strongly believed in the near term inevitability and desirability of world government in some form and the rest of us who believed that the preconditions for democratic world government did not exist, were not on the horizon, and in any event were fearful of international integrations of political authority and power beyond the level of regionalism. WOMP was successful so long as it agreed to disagree, which it did during its initial decade or so of existence. There were stimulating meetings in various parts of the world, and a series of interesting books describing our ‘preferred world for the 1990s.’ Mendlovitz edited a volume of essays that gave an overview of the project by giving the authors an opportunity to put forth their distinct visions of a feasible, necessary, and desirable future for world order. Of the principal authors my book A Study of Future Worlds came by far closest to endorsing a global integrationist vision by its stress on the necessity of ‘a central guidance system’ to deal with the problems of the world in the 1970s, but still tried to keep my distance from the Western tradition since the end of World War I of pushing world government schemes.
The second phase of WOMP sought to fashion a consensus view of the future of world order. Its shared framework was based on the acceptance of world order values (peace, human right rights, economic wellbeing & justice, and environmental protection) rather than on trends toward global integration. There was little attention given to the emergence of ‘globalization’ and its economistic orientation via neoliberalism or the optic provided by ‘the Washington consensus.’ This second phase of WOMP coincided with the end of the Cold War. The differences in regional priorities persisted, and the projected ended in a mood of frustration, especially on the part of Mendlovitz who until the very end believed that the secret to a peaceful future was challenging the war system and establishing a robust form of global constitutionalism. The rest of the WOMP participants were either not interested in this form of advocacy or suspected it as a kind of Western geopolitical Trojan Horse that contained a blueprint for global domination that was to be disguised in public discourse as a plan for world government.
2) Overall, what do you see as the most significant contribution of WOMP? What are the lessons that current scholars should take from the WOMP experience, including in such coalitional efforts such as the World Government Research Network?
I think the idea of bringing together prominent scholars in their respective regions who shared normative preferences for a humane world order was an extraordinarily prescient initiative, but it may have been prematurely enacted. I believe there is more awareness in this period of the early 21st century of the need for the collaborative design of alternative futures in an historical context of intensifying global integration and a growing awareness of the fragility of political arrangements in a state-centric structure of world order that can neither protect the global/human interest in relation to climate change and nuclear weaponry nor can provide national or human security for peoples living within the boundaries set by the nation-state.
Online collaboration provides exciting opportunities for collaboration without any dependence on major funding, although it gives up the benefit of face-to-face contact that deepens social networking. The WOMP experience may be helpful in identifying the limits of such collaboration as well as the importance of setting a research agenda that gives space and relevance to a variety of viewpoints. The dialogic experience works best when there is a shared normative ground that is at the same time comfortable with the reality and legitimacy of divergent views, with participants refraining from any compulsion to overcome disagreements and divergent priorities.
3) You have long been associated with world order studies and world federalism, but you have also been consistently skeptical of advocating a binding world government in the relatively near term. What would you say to the many researchers who in recent years have helped revive academic dialogue around world government, in many cases advocating it?
I am not sufficiently familiar with the recent trends in world government advocacy by scholars to have any strong opinion about its usefulness either pedagogically or as the basis for engaged citizenship. I continue to find absent the political preconditions for any kind of constitutional consolidation of authority at the global level as distinct from considerable latent potential for regional and sub-regional integrative developments. I also see some societal benefits accruing from reversing trends toward global integration, and have an interest in what I have enigmatically called ‘anarchism without anarchism’ and might seem to be at odds with my earlier support for global reform to achieve central guidance capabilities.
My scepticism about world government is grounded on three types of objection: first, creating a global polity without a prior global community is almost certainly a formula for either collapse or tyranny; secondly, the unevenness of material circumstances and cultural outlook would make the control of the political center almost certain to depend on iron fist structures of domination and exploitation; thirdly, the almost total absence of political will among either contemporary elites or publics to create a world government, or even to posit world government as a desirable goal; nationalism remains a strong ideological reinforcement for the maintenance of a state-centric world order.
What I do agree about is the vital importance of finding procedures and mechanism that will promote the global and human interest. The UN was conceived to fill this gap, but its statist structures has made it mainly a venue where competing conceptions of national interests seek to find compromises. Such a framework has not been able to address problems of global scope such as nuclear weaponry, climate change, and the regulation of the world economy. Is it possible to imagine the effective promotion of the global/human interest without the existence of world government, whether in federalist or unitary form? I regard this as the primary survival question facing the human species that pertains to the role and nature of global governance. Without a capability to serve the global/human interest, I lack the imagination to grasp how a catastrophic future for generations to come can be avoided.
4) You have championed global civil society, or ‘globalization from below’ as a means of promoting more humane global governance and ultimately preparing the way for shared rule well beyond the state. Are you encouraged by developments in global civil society in the 55-plus years of your academic career, discouraged, or do you see the record as more mixed?
I remain uncertain how to respond. My mood varies with sudden changes in the global atmosphere. I felt encouraged, even excited, by the unfolding of the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement in 2011, but feel more discouraged by the success of subsequent counterrevolutionary forces that have proved so robust in the Middle East and by the inability of the Occupy Movement to sustain its initial impulse to challenge contemporary distortions and injustices attributable to neoliberal capitalist logic and behavior. I continue to believe that hope for the future rests upon challenges from below, a normative insurgency that posits an eco-humanist imaginary with sufficient persuasiveness to mobilize widespread support around the world, including among disaffected segments of economic and political elites that recognize the need for a paradigm shift away from growth-oriented compulsions, as well as a radical turn against the war system as the means to achieve security and stability.
5) You also have championed, with Andrew Strauss, the development of an initially consultative global parliament. Later versions of the argument advocate the signing of a treaty among existing democratic states to get the ball rolling. Does that still appear to you to be a more promising route than, for example, the one advocated by the Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly?
Yes, I still believe that a global parliament that represents people directly is more promising than the creation of a parliamentary assembly that is likely to reproduce most tendencies already present in the UN. I think there is a better chance of a peoples assembly creating a different kind of global agenda with different priorities if it is established as the outcome of a populist movement. To be worthwhile a global parliament must be responsive to global interests and to the grievances of the most marginalized and vulnerable peoples in the world, and should be proposed with these goals uppermost. Of course, as a political institution a global parliament will evolve in ways that reflect changes in the political climate, but it should be insulated to the extent possible against manipulation by money and by national governments, especially by those governments harboring hegemonic ambitions.
6) You are often quoted (from a 1975 piece) as saying that global government proposals and proponents engage in ‘premature specificity.’ How long until the time is right, if ever?
What I meant by the phrase is that without a political climate receptive to global government proposals, the blueprinting of institutions is an exercise of limited value, and tends toward an apolitical approach to global change. The Clark/Sohn plan for limited world government through the radical reform of the UN Charter is a clear illustration of what I have in mind. It lacks any conception of a political scenario that has the slightest chance of moving from the current state of affairs to the ideal future that they set forth as a solution for the world order challenges of the Cold War Era. There is a chicken and egg problem admittedly present: the demonstration of offer practical designs for how a world government would work is intended to overcome criticisms that argue that world government is not capable of preserving societal freedoms and could not restrain the abuse of power by those in control of such strengthened institutions. It has been my experience that those who set forth their plans for world government are usually ultra-rationalists who believe that change follows from having the best ideas, winning after dinner arguments. I disagree with such viewpoints, and regard change as following from the interplay and eruption of social forces. What seems useful at this time is for scholars acting in transnational collaboration to construct a series of political scenarios that envision benevolent forms of global transformation, including tentative ideas about institutional design. I would think this would be an excellent undertaking for the World Government Research Network just launched.
7) You have been actively engaged in social and political affairs for many decades. What advice might you have for upcoming generations of academics, in particular those working in areas of international politics and law, who might also want to engage, and do so effectively?
Political participation is a very personal matter, and depends on how a person views the world, as well as on conceptions of the proper interaction of the life of a professional academic and that of a citizen concerned with public policy. I have taken the view, which is controversial within American universities that engaged citizenship can usefully include advocacy work, which can also make contributions to education in a free society. The first challenge is to develop the skills appropriate for critical and independent thinking. The second challenge is the importance of endowing conscience with sufficient authority as to validate the role of citizen/scholars in talking truth to power and entering the arenas of debate and action to promote preferred policy outcomes.
I felt that forthrightness in the classroom combined with receptivity and openness to opposing viewpoints gave added vitality to the academic experience, and connect the pursuit of knowledge with a commitment to societal reform in positive ways.
It is important to be sensitive to the political atmosphere as it bears on particular issues. In my own experience there is no doubt that I have paid a price for articulating controversial beliefs on current policy issues and implementing such analyses with shows of solidarity with groups and peoples seeking liberation from oppressive circumstances. Challenging the established order is much more likely to produce pushback, even in the form of discriminatory actions and defamatory attacks, on some issues than others. For instance, on questions of world order, although many disagreements exist that reflect divergent worldviews and ethical standpoints, there is rarely the kind of effort to discredit opponents as is encountered when the focus is on contemporary issues of political and social conflict, especially if it touches on matters of military intervention, religious and ethnic identity or counters the work of strongly entrenched domestic lobbies.
Global Justice in the 21st Century 
Toward the Creation of a World Parliament: Strongly Recommended Reading
13 AprToward the Creation of a World Parliament: Strongly Recommended Reading
This is a brief promotional comment to call attention to the publication of a truly outstanding contribution to creative and restorative world order thinking. The book is entitled A World Parliament: Governance and Democracy in the 21stCenturyby Jo Leinen and Andreas Bummel, translated from German by Ray Cunningham, and published in 2018 in Berlin under the imprint of Democracy Without Borders. The book is currently available for purchase from Amazon.
I hope at a later time to do a serious review of this urgent plea for what might be called ‘cosmopolitan rationalism,’ the undergirding of a populist movement dedicated to overcoming the menace of the war system and predatory capitalism, placing a great emphasis on the potential of institutional innovation beyond the level of the state, above all, through the establishment of a world parliament with legislative authority. This would be a revolutionary step in the governance of humanity, and if it happens, is likely to be preceded in the evolutionary agenda of the authors by a global assembly endowed with recommendatory powers but lacking a mandate to make and implement binding decisions, and hence incapable of resolving conflicts or solving challenges of global scope.
The authors are both dedicated advocates of the institutionalization of governmental authority of regional and global scope. Leinen
has been a leading member of the European Parliament since 1999 as well as a German government official. Bummel is an internationally known and respected champion of world federalism incorporating democratic values. He is co-founder and director of the NGO, Democracy Without Borders.
What makes this book a great gift to humanity at a time of global emergency, is what I would call its ‘informed global humanism’ that sheds light on the long and distinguished history of proposals for global parliamentary authority. The institutional focus is greatly expanded and deepened by an erudite consideration of why global problems, as varied as food, water, environment, climate change, and economic justice cannot be solved without the presence and help of a world parliament capable of generating enforceable law. The authors bring to bear an astonishing range of knowledge to support their conclusions, drawing on the accumulated wisdom of philosophers, scientists, social scientists, moral authority figures, and statesmen to illuminate the question of how to meet the formidable challenges of the age. This enlargement of concerns lends weight to their commitment to clear the path of obstacles currently blocking the formation of a world parliament.
Indeed, while building their central case for a world parliament, Leinen and Bummel, have authored a book that tells you all you need to know to understand with some depth what is wrong with the world as it now functions, how it can best be fixed, and by whom. Their central political faith is rooted in an espousal of democratic values that they project as a positive global trend. Only here do I have some reservations, reflecting my reactions to the militarization of democracy in the United States and to the strong trends favoring autocracy in most leading countries. I do share with the authors a skepticism about the capacity of existing elites to promote the necessary reforms, as well as their sense that the time of a transnational revolution of the industrial proletariat has passed, with hopes now resting in the eruption of a transnational democratic and cosmopolitan democratic movement promoting progressive and humane forms of global governance.
I strongly recommend this book as a source of wisdom, thought, and the fashioning of a positive vision of the human future. Pasted below is the table of contents of A World Parliament to give a more concrete picture of the scope and grandeur of this extraordinary scholarly contribution with manifold activist implications for those of us who consider themselves citizen pilgrims.
Detailed Contents of A WORLD PARLIAMENT
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 1
PART I
The idea of a world parliament: its history and pioneers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
of a contract ………………………………………………………………… 8
Cosmopolitanism in ancient Greece 8—Cosmopolitan roots in India and China 9—
Vitoria’s ‘republic of the whole world’ 10—Conceptions of peace under ‘the sovereign
power of the state’ 12—The idea of the social contract in Hobbes and Locke 13—The
social contract and Wolff’s ‘V.lkerstaat’ 16—Kant’s cosmopolitan project 17
The American federal state and representative democracy 20—The historical roots of
parliamentarism 22—Cosmopolitanism in the French Revolution 24—Cloots’ ‘republic
of humanity’ 25—The end of cosmopolitanism 26
inter-parliamentary movement ………………………………………….. 27
Sartorius’ ‘peoples’ republic’ 27—Pecqueur’s concept of worldwide integration 28—
Pecqueur’s world federation and world parliament 29—Tennyson’s ‘Parliament of
Man’ 31—The long struggle to extend the right to vote 32—The birth of the inter-parliamentary
movement 33—The establishment of the IPU 34—The Hague Peace Conferences
as a catalyst 35—Internationalism in the USA 36—An initiative at the IPU 37—
Arguments emerging out of the German peace movement 39
The programme of the ‘Round Table’ group 42—The theory of sociocultural evolution
and a world federation 43—A world parliament on the Versailles agenda 44—The ‘German
Plan’ for the constitution of the League 46—Disappointment over the League of
Nations 46
the early days of the UN ………………………………………………….. 50
Federalism under pressure from fascism 50—The growth of world federalism 51—
Planning the post-war order 53—Fundamental criticism of the UN, and the shock of
Detailed Contents ix
the atom bomb 54—Prominent support for a federal world order 55—Reves’ critique
of democracy, the nation state and sovereignty 56—Albert Einstein and Albert Camus
as advocates 57—The position of the Catholic Church 58—The British initiative of Nov.
1945 59—The issue of a Charter review conference 60—The foundation of the Council
of Europe 62—Sohn’s proposal for a parliamentary assembly at the UN 62—Models for
a world constitution 63—The Clark and Sohn model 64—Parliamentary cooperation
for a world federation 65
World federalism caught between the fronts in the Cold War 68—The federalist movement
and the founding of NATO 68—The declining popularity of world federalism
and a world parliament 69—The World Order Models Project 71—The growing importance
of NGOs 71—The idea of a ‘second chamber’ 73—The issue of weighted voting
in the UN General Assembly 74—Bertrand’s report 75— Perestroika and Gorbachev’s
initiative 76
revitalization of the debate ……………………………………………….. 79
The democratization wave 79—The revitalization of the debate 80—A UN parliamentary
assembly as a strategic concept 81—Support for a world parliament and a UNPA 82—
The report by the Commission on Global Governance 85—The report by the World
Commission on Culture and Development 87
Globalization and the nation state 88—The theory of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ 90—
The Falk and Strauss essays 93—A community of the democracies? 94— H.ffe’s federal
world republic 95—The call for a WTO parliament and the role of the IPU 97—Other
initiatives towards a world parliament and a UNPA 98
UN Parliamentary Assembly ……………………………………………. 102
The ban on landmines, the International Criminal Court and the World Social
Forum 102—New contributions on the idea of a global parliament 103—The Lucknow
conferences 104—9/11 and global democracy 105—The report by the German Bundestag‘
s Enquete Commission 106—The report by the World Commission on the Social
Dimension of Globalization 107—The Ubuntu Forum campaign 108—The Cardoso
panel report 108—Growing support for a UNPA 111—The international campaign
for a UNPA 114—Calls for a UNPA since 2007 117—The third World Conference of
Speakers of Parliament 120—The European Parliament Resolution of 2011 121—The
de Zayas recommendations 123—Later developments 124—The report by the
Albright-Gambari Commission 126—The election of Trump and ongoing efforts 127
PART II
Governance and democracy in the 21st century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
commons ………………………………………………………………… 132
The era of humankind 132—Earth system boundaries 133—The problem of voluntarism
135—The ‘tragedy of the commons’ 137—The management of global common
goods 139—The problem of the generations 140—Global majority decision-making 141—
The tragedy of international law 143
market economy …………………………………………………………. 144
Overshoot and ecological footprint 144—The end of the Utopia of growth 145—The
challenge of global eco-social development 146—‘Political barriers’ as the main obstacle
to transformation 147—The process of state formation and the rise of the market economy
148—The ‘double movement’ between market fundamentalism and state interventionism
149—A global eco-social market economy 150
deregulation ……………………………………………………………… 153
The relevance of the ‘double movement’ and the emancipation question 153—The
financial crisis and the continuing systemic risk 154—State intervention to stabilize the
financial system 156—The financial system as a ‘priority global public good’ 157—The
anarchic system of international law 158—Liberalism, Laissez-faire and the question of
a world state 159—The global race to deregulate 160—The key role of tax havens and
anonymous shell companies 161—The hidden trillions 164—Global state formation
as the goal of the counter-movement 165
A world currency and a world central bank 167—The impact of national monetary policy
and currency wars 168—Recent proposals for a world reserve currency 169—The
fiscal race to the bottom 170—Uniform taxation of multinational corporations 172—
Rejection by the OECD 173—Global fiscal federalism and the restitution of fiscal sovereignty
174—Ideas for global taxes 175—The management, supervision and expenditure
of global tax revenues 176
interdependence …………………………………………………………. 179
‘Trans-sovereign problems’ 179—The concept of interdependence 180—Transgovernmental
networks and the merging of domestic and foreign policy 181—The evolutionary
phases of the international order 183—Sovereignty and the era of ‘implosion’ 184
Detailed Contents xi
evolution …………………………………………………………………. 187
The potential for worldwide collapse 187—The Genome as part of the heritage of humankind
188—Reprogenetics 189—Transhumanism and artificial intelligence 190—
Autonomous weapons systems 191—Bioterrorism, nanobots and new pathogens 193—
The need for regulation under global law 194
Nulcear war as ‘the end of all things’ 196—The danger of nuclear war 197—The risk of
nuclear accidents 198—The unfulfilled commitment to general and complete disarmament
200—The architecture of nuclear disarmament 202—The link between nuclear
and conventional disarmament 204—The McCloy-Zorin Accords 206—The unrealized
peace concept of the UN Charter, and UN armed forces 207—The four pillars of a
world peace order 209—The role of a World Parliament 210
The ‘war on terror’ as an end in itself 212—The covert warfare of the USA 212—The
consequences of US foreign policy and the ‘war against terror’ 213—Human rights violations
and the USA’s drone warfare 215—The roots of transnational terrorism and
the relevance of a World Parliament 216—The global surveillance system and universal
disenfranchisement 219—Global data protection legislation 221
post-American era ………………………………………………………. 223
The need for world police law and a supranational police authority 223—The failure of
classical sanctions 224—A supranational police to support the ICC 225—Extending the
prosecuting powers of the ICC 227—Strengthening international criminal prosecution
and a World Parliament 229—Interpol and accountability 231—A World Parliament as
an element of world police law 232—The role and significance of the USA 235
The extent of worldwide hunger and the right to adequate nutrition 238—Population
growth and food production 240—The fragility of global food supply 242—Dependence
on oil and phosphates 244—Hunger as a problem of political economy 244—
The relevance of democracy and the international system 245—Agricultural subsidies,
the WTO and food security 247—Commodity markets and financial speculation 248—
Food security as a global public good and the failure of the G20 249—The FAO, a World
Food Board and global food reserves 250—Free trade, food security and a world peace
order 252—Democratising global food policy and a World Parliament 253
The state of drinking water supply 256—Water security as a global concern 257—The
democratic deficit in water governance and a World Parliament 259
Poverty as a key issue 262—Extreme poverty and the right to an adequate standard of
living 262—The need for a new approach to international development 265—
Economic growth is not enough 266—Social security as the foundation of a planetary
social contract 267—A global basic income 268—Universal access to the global commons
270—The dream of a life free from economic compulsion 270
The emergence of global class conflicts and the role of the middle class 272—The
global precariat 274—The concept of the Multitude 275—The super rich and global
power structures 277—The transnational capitalist class 279—A transnational state
apparatus 280—The interconnections between transnational corporations 281—The
need for a global antitrust authority 282—Global inequality and instability 284—
Inequality as the cause of the financial crisis 285—The growth of capital investments
and a global tax on capital 286—The need for global public policy instruments and a
World Parliament 287—A new global class compromise 289
federalism ………………………………………………………………… 290
The global elite and the question of a world government 290—The spectre of a
global Leviathan 292—Hierarchical order and complexity 294—Different types of
hierarchies 294—The principle of subsidiarity 295—The fragmentation of global governance
and international law 296—Coherent world law and a World Parliament 298—
The bewildering world order and the ‘age of entropy’ 298—The entropic decline of
world civilization? 300—World federalism as a means of reducing complexity 301—A
world state as a taboo topic 302—The teetering paradigm of intergovernmentalism 303—
The standard reactionary arguments 305
deficit …………………………………………………………………….. 307
The waves of democratization 307—Economic development and democracy 309—The
post-industrial transformation in values 310—Democracy as a universal value 312—
The right to democracy 313—The undermining of democracy by intergovernmentalism
315—The influence of transnational corporations 317—The example of the Codex
Commission 317—Fragmentation as a problem of democracy 319—The dilemma of
scale 320—The concept of a chain of legitimation 320—Output legitimation 321—
Accountability to the world’s citizens 323—Equality and representation in international
law and world law 324—The third democratic transformation 326—
International parliamentary institutions 328
Detailed Contents xiii
enlightenment …………………………………………………………… 330
War and socio-political evolution 331—The decline of violence 333—The development
of reason, empathy, and morality 333—The origin of morality in group selection 336—
In-group morality and humanity’s crisis of adolescence 337—Sociogenesis and psychogenesis
340—The widening circle of empathy 340—The transition to an integral consciousness
343—Group narcissm and the Promethean gap 345—The problem of cultural
lag 347—Global identity and the Other 349—The ‘Overview Effect’ and a planetary
worldview 351—Identity, demos, and state formation 353—The progressive
attitude of the world population 357—Global history and world citizenship education
359—‘Big History’ as a modern creation story 360—The continuation of the project
of modernity 362—The new global Enlightenment 365
PART III
Shaping the future: the design and realization of world democracy . . . . 367
The example of the European Parliament 369—The proposal for a UNPA 370—The
extension of powers and responsibilities 371—Growing democratic challenges 374—
The allocation of seats 376
International law and world law compared 379—A bicameral world legislature 381—
A world constitutional court 382
The structural conditions for institutional change 384—A cosmopolitan movement
386—The role of NGOs 388—A UNPA as a catalyst for change 389—Four
factors 391—The stealthy revolution 391—The revolution from below 392—The revolution
from above 393—The trigger 394—Anticipating and averting the horror 395—
Climate-induced events 396—A democratic China 397—In the beginning 399
Index …………………………………………………………………………. 401
Tags: Andreas Bummel, Jo Leinen, World Federalism, World Government, World Parliament