Tag Archives: Israel

Israel Exposes Its Political Agenda: ‘land’ not ‘security’; Gaza as Prelude, West Bank as Prize

31 Aug

[Prefatory Note: Modified responses to questions posed by Rodrigo Craveiro, a journalist with the Brazilian newspaper, CORREIO BRAZILIENSE, on 8/29/24, addressing the concerted Israeli military operation, extending the tactics and devastation of its attack on the Gaza Strip since last October, to the occupied West Bank. Again, Washington’s silence is almost as dismaying as Israel blatant disregard of law and standards of decency.] 

  1. I would like to quote you on this military operation in West Bank. How do you see that? What was the purpose?

From the outset of Israel’s response to the October 7 attack, I believed that it was being used as a pretext for ‘ethnic cleansing’ to induce massive departures of the resident Palestinian populations from the three Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), with a long undisclosed priority being systemic expulsion coupled with massive devastation of the West Bank. It should not be forgotten that when the Netanyahu coalition at the start of 2023, that is, months before the Hamas attack, took over occupation and administration of the OPT it was viewed even in Western circles as the ‘most extreme’ in Israel’s history. What made it extreme from Day One were two characteristics: the appointment of Itmar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, leaders of the far right religious Zionist parties in the Netanyahu coalition insistent on an ethnic cleansing agenda, as the chief administrators of Occupied Palestine, and the closely associated greenlighting of West Bank widespread settler violence in West Bank villages while the political leadership in Israel smiled obligingly.

What could be clearer than that the Zionist Religious Right was persuaded to join the Netanyahu coalition because it was given unconditional assurances that a Jewish supremist state would be pursued to complete the Zionist Project of establishing Greater Israel in all of the Promised Land. The prominence given Ben Gvir and Smotrich and the intensity of settler violence could not have been a clearer signal that two-staters were pursuing a Zombie solution, and yet the somewhat sullen silence of Diaspora liberal Zionism in the face of these developments exposed both liberal delusions and its self-righteous superficiality. The liberal approach was always more about us in the Diaspora than about ‘them’ (including even Israeli Jews but certainly the Palestinians long recruited against their will to make the major sacrifices to allay the guilt feelings of the Western democracies for hardly lifting a finger in opposition to the grotesque excesses of European antisemitism).

The Israeli response in Gaza over the last 11 months has horrified most peoples of the world, especially of the Global South, while enjoying the active complicity of the liberal democracies of most elites in the Global West. It has now reached a stage where it has undermined Israel’s reputation as a legitimate political actor, creating a vital decision point, signaled by these lethal attacks on the West Bank cities of Jenin, Tulkarm, and Juber. The IDF commander of this latest military operation, Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, was quick to point out to the media that this was not an isolated incident to discourage Palestinian militancy but the beginning of a sustained military operation in the West Bank. This represents both a military and political escalation motivated by a commitment ‘to finish the job’ while regional and global anti-Israeli sentiments are already at fever pitch, but now ‘the job’ is revealed to the more attentive public to be what it has always secretly been, a campaign to achieve the coercive incorporation of the West Bank into Israel. This enlarged view of ‘the job’ that American pro-Israelis were earlier tricked into believing they were supporting, which was supposedly limited to the destruction of Hamas as a terrorist political actor and the elimination of its leaders, effectively propagandized as dehumanized  ‘terrorists.’

The Israeli leadership as ever master of shaping the public discourse, still seeks to pull wool over eyes by describing this escalation of the scope of their post-October 7 rampage, insist on justifying their West Bank behavior as directed at West Bank Palestinian militancy. Any fool knows that the most effective way to achieve such a result would be to rein West Bank settler violence, but that is not even part of the conversation. It should not be forgotten that from the perspective of international law the West Bank remains an Occupied Territory subject the 4th Geneva Convention that prohibits Jewish settlements, collective punishment, and imposes legal duties on the Occupier to uphold the safety, security, and material health and wellbeing of an Occupied People. This reading of international law as it pertains to the West Bank was given an authoritative confirmation in the July 19th Advisory Opinion of a nearly unanimous International Court of Justice, which was met in Tel Aviv with a show of condescending scorn and in Washington by looking away altogether.

Even the brave, knowledgeable, and perceptive current UN Special Rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, who rarely takes a false step bought into the core of the Israeli public narrative when she described this surge of official Israeli violence as “a serious pattern parallel with what is happening in the Gaza Strip” in the course of an interview with Drop Site News. I believe it is not parallel but integral to the politics underlying Israel’s response to October 7, which from the outset set up its campaign to induce a new nakba in the West Bank, preceded by this genocidal sideshow in Gaza. In effect, Gaza was Act 1 in a political theater piece of at least two acts.

From this follows my judgment that virtually the entire Israeli response since October 7 has been about land and only incidentally, if at all, about security, except in the secondary sense of warning (or deterring) regional enemy attacks, which means mainly Iran . If security had been the primary concern there were much less bloody and more effective and legally acceptable ways to go about a response: tightening border security, using sophisticated intelligence/surveillance skills to control opposition and resistance in Gaza, and even seeking a normalization of relations based on mutual respect for international law. Relevant here is the near unanimous July 19 Advisory Opinion of the International Court that clearly set forth multiple reasons for regarding Israel’s continued occupation of Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank as unlawful, calling on the UN and UN member states to implement its rulings, and on Israel to comply.

If my conjectures are even only partly a corrective of the official version of the Hamas attack, it makes essential an official, trustworthy international investigation of what  really happened on October 7 and how it was decontextualized to serve Israel’s need for a self-serving rationale of the violence that was unleashed for reasons other than the attack. In retrospect, it seems clears that the events themselves were hyped in ways that invalidated criticism of Israel’s behavior and did not contextualize the attack in relation to pre-October 7 recent and structural provocations, the validity of resistance against settler colonialism, and the prolonged nature and severity of Israeli collective punishment of Gazans, the denial not only of rights of self-determination but of rights of return. 

A final observation in the form of a conjecture. US diplomacy used its leverage to discourage further Israeli provocations of Iran to lessen risks of being drawn into a regional war. In exchange, Israel was quietly assured that if it extended the Gaza military operation to the West Bank it would not meet with significant governmental resistance from the US or Europe. In other words, it could get away with completing its master plan of extinguishing the territorial existence of Palestine as well burying the prospect of Palestinian statehood in any viable form once and for all.

  • Do you see the risk of a third intifada after what is happening in Gaza and West Bank?

I believe the greater threat as of now is of a second nakba (catastrophe) involving confronting Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank with a choice between enduring genocide or fleeing across borders to neighboring Arab countries; so far, Gazan have withstood the pressure to leave, and enduring the unspeakable alternatives of genocide or a permanent refugee status. Such an outcome would be a further stage in a process that goes back to pre-Israel Zionism, which is to make Palestinians so persecuted in their own country that many are compelled to flee for safety across international borders as happened in 1948, and under international law unlawfully denied any right of return.

Such an exclusionary second nakba is not necessarily inconsistent with a third intifada, which would be more like the second than the first, that is it would include armed resistance. What probably prevents a new intifada, which would undoubtedly enjoy more sympathy and gain greater support than the earlier two, is the absence of Palestinian political will to expose themselves to an even more extensive genocidal response.

Beyond this, the resolution of East Jerusalem still awaits further action. Almost off camera have been exhortations and symbolic encroachment on the Al Aqsa compound by settler extremists. Even a wider religious war cannot be ruled out if the Netanyahu coalition continues to call the shots when it comes to the Palestinian future.

  • The Israeli leader, Benny Gantz claimed it´s necessary to repeat in West Bank the military strategy for Gaza. How do you see that?

As with other Israeli leaders, Gantz is using a security rationale for what is better understood as a land-grabbing and people-emptying undertaking. As argued above the overriding purpose of Israel’s behavior since October 7 is to take advantage of the attack (as its propaganda specialists have portrayed it) to address the primary Zionist agenda item of establishing Greater Israel as a Jewish supremist state stretching from at least the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, a pre-Netanyahu image of Israeli sovereign territory explicitly embedded in a 2018 Basic Law adopted by the Knesset.

The difference between the Israeli mainstream and the Netanyahu-led extremists is best interpreted as one of style and patience, not substance. The dominant expectations of opposed Israeli establishment groupings raise questions of religion and Jewish tradition, but more fundamentally about power in controlling state/society and international relations of Israel’s government.

Rodrigo Craveiro

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Will the ICC Act? The Netanyahu/Gallant Arrest Warrants are a Truth or Dare Moment?

17 Jul

A Shaky Start for the ICC

Since its establishment in 2002 the International Criminal Court has struggled tofind a path to legitimacy. Its establishment was a triumph for the Global South and civic activism in extending the potential reach of international criminal law to the countries of the Global North. ICC prospects were limited from the outset by its organizational identity being situated outside the formal UN framework and even more so, by the failure of the geopolitical ‘big three’ of the US, China, and Russia to join, and in relation to present concerns, by Israel’s refusal. The ICC has 124 members including the liberal democracies in Western Europe, all states in South America, most in Africa, and  many in Asia. Despite this wide representation it has struggled throughout its existence for credibility, influence, respect, and legitimacy.

In its early years the ICC was deservedly blamed for concentrating its activities on the alleged wrongdoing of sub-Saharan African leaders, suggesting a racialist bias. Then later on, in relation to US and Israel’s alleged crimes in Afghanistan and Occupied Palestine, the ICC prosecutor sat on the files containing abundant evidence justifying at the very least, diligent investigations to determine whether indictments and prosecution were legally warranted, and by doing nothing, an impression was formed that the ICC was so weak and insecure that it could not hope to resist geopolitical, Western backdoor manipulations. ICC inaction in this instance was partly attributed to the radical ultra-nationalism of the Trump presidency that had the temerity to impose personalized sanctions on the prosecutor of the ICC should the tribunal open a case against either the US or Israel. Such sanctions were abandoned when Biden became president but the underlying hostility to ICC accountability.

The story goes on, but with new twists. When Russia attacked Ukraine in early 2022, the ICJ was called upon by the NATO West to act decisively with unaccustomed haste. The ICC obliged by expediting its procedures to move forward on an emergency basis to make a determination as to whether Putin and others should be immediately indicted for war crimes and arrest warrants issued. This unusual request for haste appeared to serve the geopolitical interests of the West, again somewhat racialized by the fact that ICC activism was on behalf of Ukraine a majority white, Christian victim of alleged war crimes. Such haste and pressures from the West had never before in the brief existence of the ICC been so enlisted. The ICC obliged, further compromising its credibility, by issuing arrest warrants for Putin and a close assistant, confirming the suspicion that it could be bullied even by non-parties to the Rome Statute that states adhered to if seeking status as parties, active in the work of the ICC.

Such haste with respect to Russia was not at all evident in relation to Gaza, despite the far greater urgency, considering the magnitude and severity of the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe facing the Palestinian people. To date it has withheld a meaningful response to the legal effort of Chile and Mexico to have the ICC investigate allegations against Israel. These two governments were seeking an ICC investigation and appropriate responses to the violations of the Genocide Convention by Israel in the course of carrying out its retaliatory attack on Gaza after October 7 that seemed designed to ignore the civilian innocence of the Palestinian people in Gaza in a prolonged process of imposing collective punishment on an occupied people, itself a violation of Article 33 of the 4th Geneva Convention.  This difference in ICC responses to these two initiatives reinforced an impression of double standards in the tribunal’s treatment of allegations of international crimes. In this instance the behavior of the ICC contrasted unfavorably with the laudable efforts of ICJ to do what it could do by way of declaring the relevant international law. The effectiveness of the ICJ Interim Orders was hampered by its inability to induce compliance by Israel or enforcement by the UN. These unfortunate frustrations were also attributable in part to the complicity of the liberal democracies in aiding and justifying Israel’s response to the Hamas attack.

Is the ICC Escaping from its Bad Reputation Thanks to Israel?

Against this background, it was inevitable that the ICC would be widely viewed as a weak institution, above all by not initially obtaining participation or cooperation of such important states as the US, Russia, China, and of course, Israel. In this regard, the ICC was most unfavorably compared to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to which all members of the UN were automatically parties. The ICJ was widely respect for maintaining a high degree of professionalism and juridical dignity in the course of assessing the merits of legal disputes referred to the tribunal for adjudication even when geopolitical strategic interests were present. This positive reputation of the ICJ was greatly enhanced by its near unanimous Interim Orders of January and March 2024 granting several Provisional Measures requested by South Africa to impede Israel’s behavior that seemed to lay a plausible basis for concluding that Israel was guilty of ‘genocide’ in Gaza, although no such conclusion was reached, and the substantive legal status of the genocide allegation deferred until the ICJ rendered its decision on the merits.

Israel was also legally ordered by the ICJ to allow humanitarian aid to reach Palestinian civilians without interference, at least until the final judgment on the merits of the genocide contention could be rendered.  This was expected to happen in years hence after the ICJ had an opportunity to respond to further elaborate oral and written pleadings by the parties and those actors given leave to intervene. This process was expected to last for several years, quite likely reducing the existential relevance of the ICJ judgment as the killing would have hopefully have stopped long before the Court had time to rule. The decision would still have jurisprudential value as an authoritative interpretation of the crime of genocide, and might give rise to the establishment  of preventive and early response mechanisms in anticipation of future genocides. It is possible that the passage of time would reduce the intensity of partisan geopolitics, creating a better atmosphere for cooperative moves to strengthen the global normative order against futue outbreaks of genocidal violence.

Despite the cautious legal professionalism of the ICJ a nearly unanimous panel of the seventeen judges found Israel sufficiently responsible for ‘plausible genocide’ to grant Provisional Measures in response to South Africa’s request. [Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel, ICJ Orders, 192, 20240126 & 192 20240328, ProvMesures)]; [see also systematic assessment of Special Rapporteur on Occupied Palestine for the UN Human Rights Council, Francesca Albanese, ‘Anatomy of a Genocide,’ A/HRC/55/73, 25 March 2024].

These orders legally require Israel to take a variety of steps to stop engaging in genocidal behavior including interference with efforts to deliver food and medicine to starving and desperate Palestinians huddled together in dangerously crowded collective misery in the small city of Rafah on the Egyptian border. The prospect of bloody extensions of genocide are daily proposed by Israeli leaders in their murderous attacks on Rafah, much overcrowded condition resulting from sheltering large numbers of Palestinian civilians. Israel also issued a series of evacuation orders purporting to shift Palestinians to ‘safe zones,’ but in practice subjecting even these areas in Central Gaza to devastating attacks. This pattern of evacuation orders and continuous attack has  put the finishing touches on Israel’s actions that are more and more widely perceived as repudiations of the minimal moral sensibilities of a common humanity as well as carrying out mortal threats to the life prospects of Palestinians now estimated at over 186,000 by the highly respected medical journal, Lancet. This higher figure than the death statistcs compiled and verified by Gaza Public Health sources the direct Israeli violence, results from counting as deaths attributable to the attacks, Palestinians missing as presumably buried beneath piles of rubble, as well as the deaths caused by starvation, malnutrition, inadequate sanitation.  Using the Lancet estimate of the proportionate loss of life in Gaza (without taking account of injuries, physical and mental) if occurred in US society would amount to 2,900,000 fataities, which is a figure greater than the total loss of American loss of lives in all the wars of the entire 20th century.

A Redemptive Moment for the ICC?

If asked even a week ago, I would have said that Bibi Netanyahu would have been the very last person on the planet to come to the institutional rescue of the ICC, although he did so in a backhanded way. Netanyahu leaped to respond after leaked rumors suggested that the ICC was on the verge of issuing arrest warrants naming Netanyahu, the Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, and Army Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi. Somehow this prospect so agitated Netanyahu that he chose to go on the offensive in advance of any formal action. His five-minute video tirade against the ICC is worth watching by everyone—

 https://x.com/netanyahu/status/1785362914519519597?s  1-–if only to get a sense of just how potentially formidable the ICC might become if it performs in conformity with its statute. On balance, if it takes Netanyahu’s misplaced sense of outrage to shame the ICC into finally doing its job, so be it.

At the same time Netanyahu’s gross distortions of what was happening in Gaza were extreme enough to provide valuable material to late night TV humorists. The obvious purpose of Netanyahu’s tirade was to whitewash over six months of an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe imperiling the individual and collective survival of the long abused civilian population of Gaza.  Israeli behavior is so macabre as to be beyond the realm of good-natured, apolitical comedy, providing more of an occasion for weeping and mourning the lost and ravaged lives, and devasted cities, hospitals, places of worship, schools, and UN facilities.

It is within this setting that the ICC seems to have been given an opportunity to act finally in accordance with its mandate, to redeem its reputation for spinelessness, and strike a symbolic blow in the increasingly worldwide struggle to stop Israel’s genocide in Gaza. It is technically possible and undoubtedly politically tempting for the prosecutor to disappoint these expectations by limiting ICC action against Israeli and Hamas leaders to their alleged  pre-October 7 crimes. Such an evasion would be within scope of the 2015 initiative of Palestine, a party to the Rome Statute, which was initiated in such a manner that any crime after 2014 was potentially indictable. Such an evasion would be a double disappointment for those seeking to increase pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire followed by a series of restorative acts that could include redress, reparations, accountability, and reconstruction punitive directives.

We are left with the puzzle of why Israel’s reaction to the ICC, in view of its low institutional esteem, was seen as so much more threatening to Israel than the more authoitative directives of the far more established ICJ. Could it be that the criminal character of the ICC and the personal nature of arrest warrants are more of an emotional pushback than  mere legal rulings? Or was the ICC perceived as low hanging fruit, which even Israel took respectful account of the ICJ legal proceeding, and participated both in appointing a prominent Israeli jurist as an ad hoc judge and by taking part in the proceedings by offering a defense of their actions in Gaza.

Netanyahu phrased his key argument against the arrest warrants as posing a mortal threat to the right of democracies to defend themselves against their evil enemies, singling out Iran.  Such a view, reverses the perceptions of peoples throughout the world excepting those governments and right-wing elements that support  Israel in the Global West and the hardest core Zionist ideologues. Increasingly, even in the strongholds of Zionist influence, softer versions of Zionism and more independent Jewish voices are siding with the pro-Palestine protesters, reacting against the stark reality of genocide.

A Concluding Remark

We should all know by now that Israel has no intention of complying with international law no matter what the source of authority. In this sense, the importance of the ICJ and potentially, the ICC, is to strengthen the growing tide of pro-Palestinian sentiment around the world, and an emerging consensus to escalate civic solidarity initiatives of the sort that contributed to the American defeat in Vietnam despite total battlefield military superiority and that doomed the South African apartheid regime. In this regard, the utterances of the most influential international institutions entrusted with interpreting international law have more impact in high profile political situations such as exist in Gaza, than does do either the ICJ or ICC, and for that matter, than even the UNSC. Once again if the Palestine people do finally realize their basic rights, it will be thanks to the resistance of those victimized as reinforced by the transnational activism of people everywhere.  It may be in launching his vitriolic attack on the ICC, Netanyahu was subconsciously delivering his\ mendacious sermon to the aroused peoples of the world. 

We now know that the Prosecutor of the ICC did recommend to a sub-commission in the form of a panel of judges the issuance of arrest warrants for Israeli and Hamas leaders, and so far no decision has been forthcoming. Notable, also, was the omission of genocide from the crimes charged to the Israeli leadership. The US reacted with anger, as exhibited by President Biden, that the ICC Prosecutor seemed to create a moral equivalence between Israel and the terrorist organization, Hamas. Critics of Israel and complicit states in contrast objected to the equivalency but from an opposite position—making an attack justified by Hamas’ right of resistance within the limits of international humanitarian law equivalent to Israel’s 9+ months of genocide.

Perhaps needless to observe, the ICC has yet to deliver its judgment.

‘Occupied’ Palestine: Jerusalem Annexed, Gaza Genocide, West Bank Apartheid

20 Jun

[Prefatory Note: RAF interview conducted by Daniel Falcone, published in Truthout, May 13, 2024, and republished here with modifications of my responses to reflect intervening developments. In the month since the initial publication, the situation as described below has become even more severely abusive toward the civilian population of Gaza, with the Israeli Government making no effort to uphold its legal or moral responsibilities as Occupying Power to protect the Occupied Palestinian People under its administrative control as requi red in the 4th Geneva Convention governing Belligerent Occupation. The Israeli Government has exhibited a total absence of empathy, in policies and practices that exemplify the worst features of the international crime of apartheid. Even if life in Gaza quiets down, housing restored, Israel security forces withdrawn and some gestures of normalization have been made, the situation in the West Bank, unless modified, will continue to exhibit apartheid characteristics generating a different kind of humanitarian catastrophe. Overall, the Palestinian future can only be redeemed by terminating the Israeli role at the earliest possible time and internationally enforcing the dismantling of Israeli settlements, removal of settlers, and the termination of Israel’s administrative presence and repression. The UN although reporting and documenting human rights violations committed by Israel has so far lacked, in the face of P5 strategic support of Israel, the ability or relevant political will to implement its own recommendations relating to compliance with international humanitarian law. That which is humanly necessary seems politically impossible; the result is a moral scandal of global significance, and a human tragedy brought on my unspeakable and persistent criminality.]

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Israel Continues Unfettered Colonization of the West Bank Amid Genocide in Gaza

Daniel Falcone: The West Bank has posed the biggest challenge to the Zionist settler movement’s pursuit of a “Greater Israel.” Amid the genocidal campaign in Gaza, Israel has expanded its settlement project and markedly increased colonial violence and human rights abuses against Palestinians. “Killings are taking place at a level without recent precedent” in the occupied West Bank, according to a report by Human Rights Watch.

In this exclusive interview for Truthout, international relations scholar Richard Falk reminds us of the reality and aims of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Falk details the degradation, starvation, human rights abuses, unchecked political power and resource control in the occupied Palestinian territories. He also explains the U.S.’s aims in the West Bank and how they differ from those in Gaza.

Daniel Falcone: With a lot of the attention on Gaza due to the extremity of Israel’s bombing in Rafah, the West Bank is sometimes overlooked in media reports and political discussions about the ongoing Palestinian struggle for survival. How can we understand the differences between Israel’s strategic aims in Gaza and the West Bank?

Bottom of Form

Richard Falk: The three territories of East Jerusalem, West Bank and the Gaza Strip have experienced rather different conditions of occupation and governance during the 57 years of Israeli control, none of them with remotely positive results.

The whole of Jerusalem was officially declared by the Knesset in 2019 to be “the eternal capital of the Jewish state of Israel.” Such a unilateral action on Israel’s part was incompatible with international humanitarian law. It also violated the letter and spirit of unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 242, which immediately after the 1967 War looked toward the complete withdrawal of Israel’s occupying armed forces in the near-term future with an unspecified consideration give Israeli demands for “minor border adjustments.” It has always been a Palestinian demand and expectation of most international advocates of a two-state solution that East Jerusalem would be the capital of any future Palestinian state. This Palestinian position has been generally regarded as an integral element of the UN consensus that developed around the widespread support for “a two-state solution” that persists today despite many reasons to believe it would not be sustainable.

In 1967 Gaza was deemed the third and least important element in the administration of the occupied territories that came under Israel’s control during the war. Its status was viewed ambivalently at first, mainly because it was deemed outside the Zionist project. The Zionist commitment to return to “the promised land” that formed the geographic contours of the Zionist vision of a Jewish supremacy state was not included in most versions of Zionist thought and political vision. It also seemed overcrowded and imporverished at first, possessing little economic promise from Israel’s point of view. Nevertheless, in the period of 1967 to 2005 Gaza was treated by Israel as part of Occupied Palestine, with an intrusive and abusive IDF [Israel Defense Forces] military presence, and the unlawful establishment of Jewish settlements along the Gaza coast that became home for 8,000 Jewish settlers. The administration of Gaza was long viewed by Tel Aviv as an economic burden and security challenge for Israel, and a center of Palestinian resistance radicalism.

The major resistance initiative directed at Israeli occupation known as the First Intifada originated in Gaza in 1987, challenging both Israel and the Palestinian leadership of Yasser Arafat and the coalition of secular Palestinian groups known under the rubric of the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization]. In 2005, Israel formally “disengaged” from Gaza, contending that the withdrawal of its armed forces and the dismantling of its settlements relieved Israel of further responsibilities as Occupier in Gaza, with possible future peace solutions for the Gaza Strip as involving of some sort of federated arrangement whereby Gaza would become subject to the sovereign control of Jordan and/or Egypt. This Israeli interpretation of disengagement was rejected by the UN and both Arab states. They considered Israel’s revised approach to Gaza as nothing more substantive than a redeployment of IDF ground forces to just across the Israeli border coupled with the maintenance of total control of Gaza’s air space and offshore waters. The approach also included a tight regulation of the entry and exit of persons and goods to and from the Strip. Despite announcing “disengagement” as a step toward peace Israel never overcame the perception of Gaza as “the largest open-air prison” in the world, which for many in Gaza, including secular Palestinians, meant growing sympathy with and support for Hamas as dedicated to active struggle to obtain Palestinian sovereign territory.

The complex Gaza narrative after disengagement included the unexpected 2006 electoral victory of Hamas, previously listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and EU, as well as Israel. Despite Hamas agreeing to forego “armed struggle,” in 2007 Israel imposed a strict and economically punitive blockade of goods and persons seeking to leave or enter Gaza, engaging in periodic major military operations, described by Israeli security advisors as ‘mowing the lawn’ and putting the population on what was unfeelingly described as “a diet” by restricting the import of food.  Despite Israel’s repressive moves and military incursions, Hamas put forward long-term ceasefire and co-existence proposals that were ignored by Tel Aviv and Washington. When such an effort to suspend the violent aspects of the conflict failed, Hamas revived it resistance struggle. A creative nonviolent campaign of resistance known as “the Great March of Return” attributed to Palestinian refugees and their descendants, as well as Hamas, was met with deadly Israeli sniper violence in 2018 at the border, including the apparenr lethal targeting of well-marked journalists.

Finally, Israel’s provocations and the Hamas-led attack of October 7 set the stage for the latest genocidal phase of Israel’s presence, combining the wrongs of occupation with many crimes of oppression, dehumanization, devastation, starvation, ethnic cleansing and apartheid, culminating in genocide. It seemed that as of 2024, Gaza is strategically and economically far more important to the right-wing Benjamin Netanyahu government and its settler temperament than it was earlier. This is due to the discovery of extensive offshore oil and gas deposits, and a reported interest in a major engineering undertaking that has blueprinted the Israeli construction of a Ben Gurion Canal traversing part of Gazan territory, with the goal of creating an alternative to the Suez Canal. While the devastation Gaza was still a daily reality, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, obscenely proposed luxury waterfront homes for settlers in a Gaza emptied of Palestinians.

It is against this background that the West Bank has posed the biggest challenge to the pursuit of “Greater Israel,” which was the animating ideal of the settler movement. Maany settlers were closely allied with the extreme right Religious Zionism coalition partner of the Netanyahu-led government that took over the governance of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in January 2023. From its first days of governance, it became clear that Israel was preparing to push to completion a maximal version of the Zionist Project. Israeli radicalism along these lines was exhibited by the greenlighting of settler violence on the West Bank that included a series of inflammatory incidents intended to make the Palestinians feel unsafe and unwelcome in their own homeland. The occupying government in Tel Aviv revealed its orientation through tacitly approving settler violence rather than responsibly fulfilling their legal duties to protect Palestinian residents. Crimes against West Bank Palestinian residents, including land seizures and gratuitous vigilante violence, were not only tolerated but applauded by rightist members of Netanyahu’s inner circle.

Of supplemental relevance was the official endorsement of increasing the settlement population in the West Bank by expanding building permits and territorial extensions to settlers and their settlements — already estimated to number 700,000 (500,000 in the West Bank, 200,000 in East Jerusalem). This move to ensure Israeli permanence on the West Bank was combined with the acceleration of diplomacy that focused on forming a de facto alliance with Sunni-dominated Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and the containment and destabilization of Shiite-dominated Iran. Further, Netanyahu’s September 2023 performance at the UN General Assembly in which he arrogantly displayed a map of “the new Middle East” on which Palestine was erased — treated as nonexistent — must have made a show of Palestinian resistance imperative.

These elements are the background context preceding the Hamas-led attack of October 7. The true character of the attack itself needs to be internationally investigated, given the extensive and credible warnings given to the Israeli government, Israel’s ultra-sophisticated surveillance capabilities, and the inflated initial accounts that blamed Hamas for all the most barbaric crimes allegedly committed during the attack. Some of the initial macabre claims of October 7 were later discredited and even modified by Israel. The most suspicious element of the Israeli response was its readiness to embark upon a genocidal campaign, which, while concentrated on Hamas and Gaza, seems also intended to induce a second Nakba with major secondary impacts on the West Bank residential security of Palestinians.

In the months preceding the Hamas-led attack, the West Bank had been the scene of increased settler violence and a heightening of the IDF’s repressive tactics. In the years before October 7, Israel was found guilty of the international crime of apartheid in a series of well-documented reports compiled by objective, expert sources (Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and B’tselem). Liberal democracies and the mainstream media refused to acknowledge this damaging consensus bearing on the legitimacy of Israeli occupation of the West Bank, and instead smeared and blacklisted Israel’s critics. The US Government deflected questions from the media, refusing to respond substantively and opting for institutional silence despite the mounting evidence and legal analysis of objective sources.

In addition to the settlements, Palestinian property rights, mobility and security of residence were undermined and threatened in various ways in the West Bank. Palestinian land was further encroached upon at the end of the 20th century by the construction of a separation wall between pre-1967 Israel and the West Bank that expropriated additional Palestine-owned land and divided villages such as Bil’in. Although this mode of constructing the wall on occupied Palestinian territory was found to be illegal by a near unanimous majority of the judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2003, Israel defied the findings of the Advisory Opinion, as requested by the UN General Assembly over the objections of the US and Israel. In the end Israel continued its wall project without deference to international law or international procedures of accountability.

Israel’s rejection of attempts to establish Palestinian statehood with sovereign rights within delimited borders have long concentrated upon the West Bank. This pattern goes back as long ago as 1947, when the UN approved a controversial plan for the partition of Palestine relying on internal and international borders derived from the British mandate over Palestine. In the dark shadows being cast by the Holocaust and given influence by Zionist pressures, there emerged a UN consensus that the only viable solution for the struggle of the two peoples claiming Palestine as their homeland was to split sovereign rights between two equal states, assumed to be named Israel and Palestine.

Distinguished commentators from both peoples opposed such a territorial division for a variety of reasons, well summarized from a Jewish perspective in Shaul Magid’s The Necessity of Exile and from a Palestinian perspective in the later writings of Edward Said.

Always the central question, even if often left implicit, was the destiny of the West Bank and its residents, as well as whether Palestinian “security” would be restricted by demilitarization and dependence on Israeli forbearance in the two-state models, and whether the Zionist commitment to a Jewish supremacist state, as projected in Israel’s 2018 Basic Laww, could be accommodated or needed to be modified in the one-state models.

Falcone: What are the U.S. goals in the West Bank and how do they differ from its Gaza policy?

Falk: The U.S. has a strong reputational interest in retaining the identity of the West Bank as Occupied Palestinian Territory. If Israel extends its sovereignty over the West Bank, which it has long claimed should be classified as “disputed territory” rather than “occupied territory,” it would bring to a screeching halt any further pretense by the U.S. government to be serious about the advocacy of a “two-state solution.”

Trump’s proposed “deal of the century” contained a nominal Palestinian mini state to sustain the illusion that the interests of both peoples were being considered, but it failed to fool almost no one, including two-state advocates that naively envisioned two states with equal sovereign rights and sovereign control over national security policy. .

American credibility as an “honest broker” in the Oslo Peace Process, and elsewhere, was greatly eroded by its gradual acquiescence in the establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank despite their patent illegality and their negative impacts on a meaningful political compromise embedded in the final territorial allocation  of Palestine between the two peoples. The U.S.’s mild reaction to settlement expansion was limited to the muffled whisper that such behavior “was not helpful.” In actuality it was essential to the validation of the Israeli network of settlements.

By now, given the bipartisan U.S. endorsement of Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its repeated use of the veto to block a meaningful ceasefire directive and a widely supported initiative to treat Palestine as a full member of the UN, I believe that the U.S. could not any longer put itself forward as a trustworthy intermediary in any future bilateral negotiating process. It would covertly and overtly become Israel’s international sword and shield, exhibiting the extreme partisanship of the US while its leaders and media falsely claiming that the American posture supports adherence to international law and diplomatic balance.

With regard to the differing interests of the U.S. in the West Bank and Gaza, it comes down to two issues: first, supporting Israel’s right to defend itself in Gaza, while maintaining Israel’s legitimacy as an occupying power in the West Bank and insulating its violations of international humanitarian law from UN censure, boycotts and sanctions; and secondly, recognizing that the West Bank is the integral core of a Palestinian state.


Falcone: How does Israel complicate the work on the ground by scholars, activists and elected officials? The fact that the two regions are separate seems to make the problem even more insurmountable. 

Falk: The differing character of Israel’s approaches to the two areas creates many complications for those who seek normal operating conditions. Gaza is considered by Tel Aviv to be administered by Hamas, a terrorist entity in its view, whereas the West Bank is co-administered with the quasi-collaborationist Palestinian Authority to ensure that resistance activities are minimized, or when occurring, treated punitively by Palestinian security forces. Even peaceful forms of resistance face harsh punishment in the form of Palestinian enforcement , and since Israel came under more extremist leadership, the conditions of daily life have become so unpleasant and dangerous that some Palestinians are being forced to leave for neighboring countries, and accept the loss of their homeland, becoming refugees or exiles, harboring resentment and hatred resulting from their mistreatment in what was their homeland.

Until recently the balance of opinion in Israel was wary about any Israeli state that purported to include Gaza. This wariness was associated with Israeli concerns about an emergent “demographic bomb” accompanying any attempt to absorb an additional 2.3 or 2.4 million Palestinians with high fertility rates into Greater Israel. As Israel has replaced its liberal democratic façade with a hardening apartheid regime the issue of democratic legitimacy has receded.

In the West Bank, Israel was nervous about the effect of civil society activism, and even scholarly work and cultural expressiveness, generating unfavorable international publicity as to the nature of such a prolonged occupation. As mentioned, the Israeli occupation is currently being challenged at the ICJ following a General Assembly request to legally assess the continued validity of Israel’s administrative role, given the passage of time, unlawful practices, and frequent recourse to severe forms of collective punishment. This UN effort to challenge Israel’s occupation comes after 57 years without the slightest sign of willingness to implement the withdrawal of Israeli forces envisioned by UN Security Council Resolution 242 and in the face of numerous flagrant continuing violations of international humanitarian law. Quite the contrary, as Israel seems more dug into a permanent domineering presence in the West Bank.

Even prior to the present Netanyahu government, Defense Minister Benny Gantz issued decrees in 2021 banning the activities of respected West Bank NGOs by classifying them “terrorist organizations.” Elected Palestinian leaders have been harassed and imprisoned despite Israel’s collaboration on security and administrative funding over the years with the Palestinian Authority, which is distrusted and disapproved by a growing number of Palestinians inside and outside of the Occupied Territories.

Falcone: What is the role of the West Bank in President Joe Biden’s foreign policy? 

Falk: The West Bank is an indispensable component of Biden’s persistent, although half-hearted advocacy of a two-state solution. This advocacy was always half-hearted and never a persuasive expression of genuine U.S. policy intentions. The two-state mantra seems more and more like a public relations posture to satisfy world public opinion as time passes without the slightest expectation that it will ever be realized except possibly in some nominal form. If it had been a genuine goal, Biden would have challenged Israeli moves of recent years, which became more pronounced since the Netanyahu coalition took over in 2023. Even if Biden is regard as lacking high intelligence, few regard him as so stupid that he remains oblivious to Israel’s quest for a Greater Israel.

 It was an open secret that this extremist coalition was committed to the unilateral completion of the Zionist Project by establishing Greater Israel in the shortest possible time even if it required brute force and massive ethnic cleansing to get the job done. Extending Israeli sovereignty to the West Bank would have the consequence of making even formalistic adherence to two-state advocacy a sign of geopolitical ignorance, so out of touch with the geographic contours of Palestinian statehood as to be in the category of a bad joke.

A viable Palestinian state presupposes full sovereign rights over the West Bank, which must include territorial governance and the substantial dismantlement of the settlements. Neither seems likely to happen if Zionist ideology continues to shape the policy of the Israeli state. It would be awkward for Biden to be asked what kind of Palestinian state does the U.S. favor. He likely would be inclined to answer evasively by saying that “it is up to the parties.” But if he was forthright, it would probably look like a permanently demilitarized Palestinian state with settlements governed according to Israeli law, exempted from territorial regulation, and traveling on roads for Jews only to and from Israel proper. Such a Palestinian state might could possibly the formal requirements of statehood, but it would be a nonstarter for many Palestinians, who continue to insist on their inalienable right of self-determination. The long Palestinian ordeal, stretching over the course of more than a century, would not be ended by the willingness of Israel to allow the formation of a puppet state. After its complicity in the Gaza genocide, the US, as well as any other NATO and G7 should be ruled out of any future part in a genuine peace diplomacy. It is a dangerous sign that the US geopolitical weight is still great enough to allow it to put forward a post-Gaza peace initiative that even Israel is willing to endorse, and so is Hamas. The days of American leadership in global diplomacy should have ended during its months of being a facilitator of the crudest and most transparent genocide of all history, transmitted by images and on site commentary in real time to the peoples of the world.

Palestine, Iran, and Populist Resistance: The Limits of Law, Morality, and the UN

3 May

[Prefatory Note: An interview with the Qods News Agency (Qodsna), the first specialized news agency in Iran, focusing on issues related to the Palestinian cause. The interview was published a week ago in Iran, and is reprinted in modified form that seeks to take account of the Palestinian struggle as connected with wider regional and global conflict patterns, and is giving rise to worldwidestudent protests against genocide and complicity with genocide, as well as a tidal wave of global consciousness sweeping away the cobwebs of political and moral complacency.]

  1. Given the fact that Israel has killed over 34,000 Palestinians in Gaza, mostly women and children, and prevented the entry of international humanitarian aid into the besieged strip, what is your opinion on nearly 200 days of onslaught in Gaza and its aftermath on Palestinians’ lives? How do you describe the genocidal onslaught and war crimes in Gaza?

What has taken place over the last 200 days in Gaza is the most transparent genocide in all of human history. It is the first time that the daily atrocities were broadcast and seen by the peoples of the world in real time. Past genocides have been known almost totally in retrospect through official reports, films and memoirs, which reconstruct horrifying events but after a passage of time. Those Palestinians who managed to survive physically such sustained violence of this extreme character are reported to be suffering from mental disabilities that could persist for their entire life. It is a tragic, dehumanizing ordeal, above all for children. It is further shocking that Israel should remain insulated from denunciation and accountability despite its continuing practice of such extreme criminality.

Genocide should be understood to exist from three quite distinct moral, political, and legal perspectives. The moral perspective is made clear in Gaza by the declared intentions, policies, and practices of Israel’s highest leaders, and carried out in a totally disproportionate, indiscriminate, and lawless manner, and aggravated by consistently sadistic and demeaning treatment of Palestinian civilians who fall under the control of the Israeli armed forces. The political perspective is established in Gaza by numerous trustworthy witnesses and victims, as well as by vivid visual evidence of genocide in line of justifications adopted by Israel and its supporters. Yet the political assurances about the commission of genocide is vulnerable, as here, to the be overridden by geopolitical considerations and strategic calculations. The legal perspective relies on the presentation of evidence and interpretations of international law, above all by the delineation of genocide in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). Provisional conclusions as to international law can be derived from the opinions of legal experts holding important professional positions. For instance, the current UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur for Occupied Palestine, Francesca Albanese issued an excellent report in March 25, 2024 entitled ‘Anatomy of a Genocide’ [A/HRC/55/73]that carefully analyzed the elements of the crime and concluded that the facts and law supported the allegation of genocide. And yet until a qualified national or international tribunal with jurisdictional authority to assess the charge of genocide examines the evidence and hears the arguments of the defendant government or political actor it is impossible to say with technical propriety that the behavior in question is genocide from a legal perspective.

2-How can the world public put pressure on governments to force Israel to stop atrocities in Gaza?

It has proven difficult to challenge Israel effectively at the UN and elsewhere. Powerful countries in the Global West are complicit in supporting Israel’s policies and practices, including Israel’s misleading claim that it possesses an unlimited right to defend itself in response to the Hamas attack of October 7. The liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America are prominent among governments lending varieties of support to Israel that extends to endorsing Israel’s gross distortions of facts and law, which has had a detrimental effect on the authority of international law and the UN. The US above all has been guilty of double standards, using international law as a policy instrument to attack its adversaries such as Russia and China and disregarding its relevance with respect to the behavior of allies and friends such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and India.

It is important to also understand the more passive complicity of Israel’s main Sunni Arab neighbors that fear challenges from Hamas-type Islamic movements more than intrusions on their autocratic stability associated with the establishment of Israel or post-colonial intrusions by Western powers. It was a surprise to many in the West that the governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia cooperated in defending Israel on April 13 against the Iranian retaliation for Israel’s April 1st attack on its Syrian consular facility, killing two of its top military advisors. This pattern of regime politics in the Arab world does not reflect the outlook of the population in these countries, which shares a strong affinity with the Palestinian struggle and is often oriented with Islamic leadership of populist, protest Arab politics as was evident during and after the Arab Spring.

South Africa has been applauded widely for taking the initiative to bring allegations of genocide to the International Court of Justice under Article XI of the Genocide Convention that legally empowers any party to the treaty to bring a dispute with another party before the ICJ. Although the ICJ rose above politics by rendering an historically important, near unanimous interim decision granting several of South Africa’s requests for Provisional Measures on January 26, 2024. Unfortunately, this preliminary ICJ order had little behavioral effect as Israel defied the interim obligatory adjustments in Gaza pending a subsequent decision on whether the allegation of genocide has been legally established after fully weighing pro and con arguments.

Israeli defiance and US dismissive attitude toward the authority of the ICJ given its view of Israeli violence in Gaza fully exposed ‘a UN crisis of implementation’ of great significance. Given Israel’s refusal to comply meant that any effort to enforce the ICJ Interim Orders would depend on action by the Security Council, which would almost certainly be vetoed by the United States. Additionally, an ICJ decision on the merits with respect to genocide must await comprehensive oral arguments and written pleadings, as well as the time needed by the judges to do their own inquiries, a legal process that would not be completed for several years, which would likely be after present emergency conditions in Gaza had been resolved for better or worse.

Nevertheless, the ICJ Interim Order was an impressive vindication of international law and a legitimating demonstration of the legal professionalism and political independence of the Court. It has also had an authenticating impact on the governments of the Global South and even more worldwide in relation to civil society, including even in the United States and other complicit countries where the surge of student pro-Palestinian protest activism cannot be wholly disconnected from the authoritative findings of the ICJ disregard in policy by Washington almost as much as by Tel Aviv. Whether this pressure will remain robust enough to result in coercive actions by way of boycotts and sanctions, and pariah status, remains to be seen, but at minimum it suggests that even in this unfavorable political setting international law and populist activism offer some hope that genocide can be stopped and its perpetrators held accountable, if not formally, then by the action of peoples around the world.   

3-What do you think about Palestinian resistance fighters’ right to initiate the October 7 operation against Israel?

The right of resistance on the part of a people long occupied and abused is well established. Prior to October 7, Israel’s commission of the crime of apartheid in its manner of governing the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian minority in Israel had been documented in detailed reports by several of the most respected human rights NGOs including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well as by the Israeli NGO, B’tselem, and by UN’s ESCWA.

While the right to resist is certainly justified by the conditions imposed over the long period of occupation, which featured Israeli failure to uphold its duty as Occupying Power to protect Palestinian civilians under its control, it does not confer unlimited rights of resistance. Tactics of resistance, as for other armed groups including those operating under the authority of a sovereign state, are obliged to comply with international criminal law, and not abuse or target civilians, impose collective punishment, and commit atrocities. Yet unlike the apartheid and genocide allegations against Israel, there is as yet no authoritative account of what happened on October 7. There were, at first, luridly exaggerated claims of barbarous behavior reported to the world by Israel, but later modified by retractions and much skepticism about Israel’s depiction of events on that day. Until an international factfinding commission is established and given full cooperation there will be doubt about the extent to which the criminality of the Hamas attack tainted its resistance claims, and the degree to which Israel itself was negligent about heeding warnings and otherwise responsible for the lapse of border security.

4-How can the Palestinian people achieve their rights and overcome the ongoing occupation?

The Palestinian people are winning the struggle for public support in civil society and among many governments in the Global South. The rise of popular support for Palestinian rights even in complicit governments may erode somewhat their willingness to continue normal relations with Israel. Whether this political post-Gaza reappraisal is enough at this stage to make a difference with regard to ending Israeli occupation is not clear at present. Prior anti-settler colonial struggles have been eventually won by a colonized people if they manage to survive the almost inevitable genocidal assault by settlers to their existence. The breakaway British colonies in North America, Australia, and New Zealand managed through genocidal tactics to marginalize or eliminate the resistance of native and indigenous peoples and complete their settler colonial projects; South Africa failed, and the project collapsed. Israel is in that space where it will either join the settler colonial ‘success’ stories or it will succumb to national resistance, with Jews either giving up the Jewish supremacy claims of Zionism or finding a means to coexist with Palestinians on the basis of true equality and mutual respect, presupposing a honest accounting of the past as with some sort of truth and reconciliation process that has smoothed a transition from repressiveness to constitutionalism. The best example of managing such a transition was South Africa, benefitting from the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, yet also experiencing bumps in the road along the way. Its pro-Palestinian ICJ initiative was a symbolically important way of honoring the enduring legacy of Mandela’s anti-apartheid struggle.

5-As you know, Israel attacked Iran’s consulate, killing its military advisors in Syria which is considered contrary to international conventions, which prompted a military response by the country. What is your take on Iran’s punitive response to Israel, especially in terms of international laws?

The Iranian retaliatory strike against Israel caused neither deaths nor damage, although had its array of missiles and large number of drones not been destroyed, it might have had a war-generating disproportionate effect. The interpretation of Iran’s retaliation remains ambiguous. Did it intend to display its military capabilities to attack Israel directly without inflicting major damage or was it an operational failure in the sense that the intention was to be as destructive as possible. Without clarity on this question, it is impossible to make an intelligent assessment of the relevance of international law to the events of April 13th.

The legal status of retaliatory violence is a gray area of conflicting opinions among law experts, often colored by political identities and jurisprudential orientations. On the one side are legalists who suggest that all retaliations violate the UN Charter and international law by validating uses of international force only in situations of a sustained armed attack across an international border. By this reading even a modest retaliation against the Damascus attack was not lawful.

As with other issues, this strict reading of international law is not descriptive of international practice with respect to acts of retaliation, which in practice over the years validate ‘reasonable’ retaliations so long as proportionate in relation to the provocation. Israel’s second attack on Iran, however, would seem to be unlawful as it ignored the reality that it initiating the cycle of violence on April 1st by its lethal attack on Iran’s consular facility in Damascus, and to regard it as entitled by any standard of law or reasonableness would tend to continue the cycle of interactive violence indefinitely.

Biden’s Warning to Netanyahu: Political Maneuver, Not Policy Shift

6 Apr

[Prefatory Note: The post below contains modified responses to questions posed by a Brazilian journalist, Rodrigo Creviero on 4/4/2024. It is critical of President Joe Biden’s ‘muscular approach’ to the conduct of foreign policy, specifically in relation to China, Russia, and Israel, as played out at the expense of the peoples of the world, including the real interests of the American people. Biden is guilty of war-mongering, reluctance to engage in peace diplomacy, and complicity crimes of support given to Israel while carrying out a prolonged genocide against the long abused civilian population of Gaza along with demonizing and dehumanizing the resistance leadership exhibited by Hamas. In reactions to past genocides the US has done less to oppose their perpetrators than it should  have, but never before has it been an active accomplice, and in the process, undermining the authority of the most widely endorsed norms of international law and demeaned the institutions and procedures internationally available for purposes of interpretation and enforcement.]


1– Biden urged Netanyahu to reach “immediate ceasefire” in Gaza and called on Israel to act in the “next hours and days” in the face of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. How do you see that?

Biden’s call for concrete steps to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches Palestinians in Gaza comes very late, given a geocidal assault on the civilian population that is in its sixth month. Also, the effort to persuade Netanyahu to reach a ceasefire was not elaborated with the same urgency or seriousness as the humanitarian insistence on allowing aid to reach starving Palestinians. A cessation of Gaza violence has long been vital if further devastation of Palestinians is to be minimized, if not avoided, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its January 26 Interim Order decreed in support of South Africa’s plea for Provisional Measures as a response to its preliminary conclusion that it was ‘plausible’ to regard Israel’s violence in Gaza as genocide, the highest international crime that cannot be excused because of claims of self-defense or national security. It is notable that legal absolutism when it comes to genocide is supported by near unanimity among the 17 judges composing the adjudicating panel of jurists, and including judges from the United States, Germany, France, and Australia whose governments had supported Israel’s response to October 7. The ICJ was widely applauded for following the law rather than flags of nationaal allegience, analyzing facts and relevant norms of international law despite the face that the Security Council failed to implement its Interim Order and Israel defied its Interim Order. What the ICJ ordered jnfluenced the symbolic domain of international by legitimating concerns about genocide in Gaza and legitimting the resolve of civil society groups.

Biden’s highly publicized move seems primarily motivated by two developments other than a late surge of empathy for Palestinian suffering: first, shifts in US public opinion away from unconditional support for Israel, which are endangering his prospects for victory in the November presidential election and the fact that Monday’s clearly deliberate attack on the aid convoy of the World Central Kitchen resulted in the death of seven Europeans, sparking media outrage and anger among those governments that had been among Israel’s supporters. No such anger in Washington or hostile media attention were given to prior and worse atrocities responsible for mass casualties among children and women so long as the victims were Palestinians. The surfacing of these concerns, especially in the US, help explain why the public disclosure of the Biden/Netanyahu phone call occurred with official blessings. Such sensitive tensions between previous allies are not normally addressed with such transparency. Such diplomatic moves are considered more effective if carried on secretly, or at least discreetly. Biden evidently was more concerned about winning back Democratic Party voters and reassuring European allies that Western lives should be treated as off-limits for Israel in the future.

Even more disturbing was the explicit support given by Biden to Israel’s recent provocative actions directed at Iran during the 30 minute phone call. The leaders spoke in the aftermath of a targeted attack on April 1st that killed seven Iranian military advisors (including three commanders) while they were present in Iran’s consular building in Damascus, a location entitled by international law to immunity from attack.

Such provocations risk a devastating wider war. Iran has declared its intention to retaliate rather than be passive in the face of Israeli military strikes and assassination of prominent Iranian military commanders, and other violations of Iranian sovereignty by Israel. Given this background, Biden publicized reassurance of support for Israel’s provocations acts as a signal to Netanyahu, facing frustrations in Gaza, rejection by Israelis, and possible imprisonment in Israel on past charges of corruption, to embark upon a wider war with Iran in ways that will exert great pressure on the US to become actively involved in the military operations likely to result and divert attention from policy failures of Israel during these past months.

2—How do you analyze this intensifying of pressure by United States against Israel now?

It seems belated, and partial at best, and easily managed by Tel Aviv without any changes in its approach to Hamas or Palestinian statehood. As suggested, it could tempt Netanyahu to embroil Israel, but also Iran, in a regional war with global dimensions. As suggested, Netanyahu is extremely unpopular among Israelis, with growing protests against his leadership. These factors undoubtedly creates temptations on Netanyahu’s part to divert attention from the failure of Hamas war policy, both as a military operation and in making Israel a pariah or rogue state in the eyes of the peoples of the world, and an increasing number of governments in the Global South.

Given reports of Netanyahu’s defiant response to these ‘pressures’ from the US are coming  come too late and even now have an ambiguous impact, taking too abstract a form, not including an arms embargo or international peace force, and not raising even a possibility of support for UN-backed sanctions. I would conclude that Biden’s much publicized warning to Netanyahu presaging a US shift will not have significant humanitarian or peacemaking influence on Israel’s resolve ‘to finish the job’ by an attack on Rafah that produces devastation and many casualties in that beleaguered city giving hazardous shelter to more than ten times its normal population of somewhat more than 100,000. And could, paradoxically make things worse if Netanyahu seizes upon Biden’s apparently unconscious message to Tel Aviv that the time may have come to shift the eyes and ears of the world to a confrontation with Iran.

3- I am preparing a special article on 6 months of war. How do you evaluate the impact of the last 6 months in the efforts of a peace process in the future and in the relations between Israel and Palestinian people?

At this point, there seems no credible positive scenario for future Israel/Palestine relations. An Israeli consensus, not just the government, is deeply opposed to the establishment of a viable Palestinian sovereign state while the world consensus insists on establishing a Palestinian state with international borders and the enjoyment of equal rights in all respects, including security as Israel. The Palestinian people have not been consulted by either side of this nationalist cleavage and seems more and more inclined to opt for a single secular state with equal rights of both peoples as long favored by independent Palestinian intellectuals such as Edward Said.  

The UN attempted to impose a two-state solution in 1947 without taking account of the Arab majority indigenous population, and it led to failure, periodic wars, and much suffering. In my view, a sustainable future for both Palestinians and Jews depends on a peace process, with neutral international mediation, and respect for the right of self-determination in the framework of negotiations between legitimate, self-selected representatives of both peoples acting in a unified whole of their own devising.

At present, neither Palestine nor Israel, for differing reasons, is in any position to represent their respective constituencies in a manner that is either legitimate or effective. More specifically, Palestine remains divided between the PLO/Palestine Authority leadership in Ramallah and Hamas in Gaza, with additional elements seeking participation in representing the Palestinian people, including the 7 million refugees and exiles. Israel, in contrast, has had a coherent political elite during most of its existence, but now must act to soften tensions between religious and secular constituencies that have been intensifying in recent years to be a credible partner in the search for a political compromise that clears the path to sustainable peace for both peoples based on coexistence, equality, and effective internal and regional security arrangements jointly administered. Stating these conditions highlights how difficult it will be to make the transition from apartheid/genocide realities to the sort of solution roughly depicted.

The South African case, although vastly different, is instructive. It points to two factors that make what seems impossible happen in circumstances that swwm hopelesss: the release from prison of a unifying leader; a majority recognition that a win/win outcome for both peoples rests on genuine compromise and non-interference by third party governments and international institutions.

Pursuing Justice Through Law: Edward Said, the Gaza ‘War,’ and Advocacy Jurisprudence

9 Mar

[Prefatory Note The post below is long. The article is devoted to several of my recent central concerns. It was initially published in Global Community:Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence, superbly edited by Giuliana Ziccardi (Oxford, 2023). Comments and conversation warmly invited. Adapted from annual Edward W Said Memorial Lecture entitled “The Enduring Legacies of Edward Said,” The American University in Cairo, Nov. 4, 2023]

Pursuing Justice Through Law: Edward Said, the Gaza ‘War,’ and Advocacy Jurisprudence

Richard Falk

Abstract

An exploration of forms of interaction bearing on the assessment of advocacy jurisprudence. This entails underlying reflections on relations between

scholarly identity and public engagement as contextualized by Israel’s military response in Gaza. to the October 7 Hamas attack, featuring a comparison between partisanship in legal inquiry and in the interpretation of literature. It also involves a jurisprudential orientation that presupposes the inevitability of partisanship and favors an explicit acknowledgement rather than pretensions of objectivity, which implies my bias against legalism and its replacement by a disciplined insistence that political and moral contexts be brought into the open. The overall rationale for such an approach is to seek a better alignment between law as practice with justice as the embodiment of humane values exhibiting universal criteria. Although these considerations apply to any legal system, the preoccupation of the article is with conceptions and applications of international law.

Pursuing Justice Through Law: Edward Said, the Gaza ‘War,’ and Advocacy Jurisprudence*

Richard Falk**

Prelude

My career as a teacher and writer on international law has been devoted to realigning law with justice, which involved identifying and deconstructing Orientalist biases that reflected early European tendencies to use law to advance geopolitical interests while simultaneously promoting a llegitimating ideology of civilizational and racial superiority with countries associated with the Global West.[1] Of notable prominence in this regard, was the use of international law to accord legal respectability to European colonialism, including settler colonial offshoots in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Jurists played their part by validating colonial relationships and obscuring the cruelties of colonialist behavior in many settings, including the acceptance of practices and policies now proscribed as ‘genocide’ but were treated neutrally as falling into the domain of conflictual politics, that is, beyond the limits of legal accountability so long as the perpetrators were white Christains and the victoms were persons of color. Only when the victims were ‘European’ as with the Armenians (1915) and later, the Jews, was the idea of criminalizing such behavioral patterns given a name and taken seriously as ‘the crime of crimes.’ Yet the racist/civilizational elements have not been fully eradicated as the political violence in Gaza illustrates where the Palestinian victims are dehumanized and the Israeli perpetrators are given legal cover by speciously inapplicable claims of self-defense.

In the course of seeking concretely to align law with justice I often found greater inspiration and kinship less with my law colleagues in the Global West, with some notable exceptions, and more  with what we now identify as dissenting public intellectuals in such cognate disciplines as cultural studies, history, humanities, and social science. In this personal professional trajectory I found Edward Said’s work and public life to be inspirationally congenial as well as motivated by similar humanistic goals that I loosely associate with justice, an admittedly subjective category that needs to be explicated in concrete circumstances.[2]

There are admittedly unsettling features of such a jurisprudential standpoint. The epistemology underlying such a viewpoint adopts certain juridical points of light while rejecting others and interprets them in context, such as the prohibitions imposed on genocide, apartheid, and ecocide, or the Charter llimitations on the use of force in international relations. In almost every concrete instance there is room for contradictory interpretations of what the law prescribes, suggesting that all assertions of unlawfulness or humanistic claims of justice involve advocacy, either for or against fand seek distance from the artificial clarity insisted upon in mainly prevailing legal traditions that strive for an ideals of objectivity.[3] Those that do government lawyering, perhaps motivated by ideology, ethical conceptions, or notions of stability and balance, are similarly selective in interpreting facts and law so as to ensure that international law conforms to their preferred foreign policy commitments. Law functions in such settings as a source of justification, and the articulation of intellectual support in scholarly or journalistic settings is also premised on advocacy jurisprudence, although typically disguised for the sake of persuasiveness. Such work is performed by what might be called ‘assenting public intellectuals’ who characteristically have access to the most influential media platforms as well are welcomed in the corridors of government. To reverse the slogan of dissenters, it is a matter of ‘power talking truth,’ which perceived by oppositional tendencies in civil society as legal cover for state propaganda.

It is my intention here is to discuss law and geopolitics in the inflamed atmosphere of the ongoing high intensity violence taking place in Gaza, alleged to be a response to the Hamas attack in a series of Israeli border communities on October 7, 2023. Edward Said’s life and work as a Palestinian public intellectual living in America seems highly relevant to gain insight into my underlying objective of achieving a better alignment of law and justice. Justice is here conceived in a first approximation as overcoming the hegemomic, hierarchical, and racializing nature of international law in its historical, cultural, and political roles as validating the civilization behavior and biased of the Global West/ A second approximation by reference to contemporary instruments of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, as well as the Nuremberg Principle and certain provisions of the UN Charter.[4] A third approximation occurs when a judicial tribunal issues a judgment that draws conclusions as to the law on the basis of considering the positions advocated by the contending parties. A fourth approxiximation occurs at levels of enforcement and accountability.  

Without the strong support of Proofessor Giuliana Ziccardi, as the exceptional veteran editor of the Yearbook I would not have had the courage to attempt to link what was originally a lecture on the life and legacy of a great public intellectual in conjunction with my efforts to align law with justice in international public discourse and even more so in the behavior of sovereign states. 

Edward Said’s relevance

It would be insensitive to any remembrance of Edward to frame my reflections on his legacy without also highlighting the uncertain, presently unknowable significance of the extreme gravity of the historic tragedy deeply afflicting the entire, previously long abused civilian population of Gaza explained and now justified by Israel as a response to the Hamas attack of Oct 7th. With each passing day of devastation and atrocity associated with Israel’s military attack, the Hamas provocation, terrible as in its own way it was, it seems increasingly detached from Israel’s extended response. Israel tries to keep the connection to the attack relevant to its disproportionate response by stressing the plight of an estimated 240 or more hostages being held by Hamas, itself a distinct war crime, and by media reports about the deep fissures in Israeli confidence that they were living in a secure atmosphere.[5] Yet as far as public disclosure so far reveals, Israel’s government fails to negotiate a prisoner exchange, and engages in an an unlimited attack that does not seem to offer much of value in exchMy attempt is to reflect on Edward’s amazing legacy while contextualizing these remarks in the current agonizing encounter that are darkening the storm clouds that have long haunted the future of the Palestinian people.

A Few Words on Edward’s Life

When thinking about what aspects of Edward’s varied, vivid personality and wide range of valuable writings I first felt overwhelmed. I took the easy way out by deciding to speak somewhat generally about Edward’s extraordinary legacy that makes his life, ideas, and perspectives more relevant 20 years after his death than when he was alive. Few scholars gain by their publications Edward’s influential intellectual afterlife.

It is difficult to talk about Edward without understanding what he meant to convey in his praise for a dissenting ‘public intellectual.’ Edward’s wished to affirm those for whom their signature trait was truth-telling and bearing witnessing to performative evil, especially embodying the public authority and the power of the modern sovereign state.

In a revealing interview with Tariq Ali not long before Edward’s death he acknowledged some related worries particularly by what he called ‘the commodification’ of public intellectuals in the US, personified by the then media stardom of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, two smart persons who clearly antagonized him by using their screen time to advance an imperial agenda on behalf of their preferred American foreign policy. More generally, Said felt that the think tanks in Washington were stealing the thunder of progressive thought and the high quality of debate that he hoped to engender in university settings and academic writing. It is my sense that that we as citizens are daily exposed to a post-truth public discourse currently deployed, and relied upon, by many world leaders that is far more regressive and alienating than the deteriorating role of public intellectuals that had so concerned Said while he was still alive. Part of what makes this discourse historically now so menacing is that it is rarely challenged by high tech media even in the constitutional democracies that continue to proclaim their political virtues of welcoming debate and tolerating dissent, now best constued as an Orwellian trope that obscures more than it reveals.

It is impossible to consider Edward’s legacy without venturing comments on the experience and contents of his breakthrough book, Orientalism.[6] It was this book that brought Edward fame but also several (mis)readings that bothered him deeply. Edward’s culturally grounded erudite approachto the relations of the West to the Arab world was always nuanced, pointing to the diversities and cultural failings on both sides of the civilizational divide. This made reductive interpretations of such dualisms as speaking of ‘the Orient’ or generalizing about ‘the Orientalist’ deeply misleading. Of course, Edward may have contributed to the confusion by his hostility to Bernard Lewis and his Arabist acolytes’ presentations of the Islamic world. He found such cultural stereotypes well-suited to adoption by imperialists in the post-colonial West as a policy tool, but more because of their policy agenda than their embrace of negative stereotypes about the Arab world and its behavior. There were other scholarly voices in the West whose academic assessments Said found desrving of attention, and often congenial even if containing criticisms of various aspects of Arab behvior. In other words, not all who studied and wrote about the Arab world were guilty of the sins of Orientalism.

Said was most convincing when arguing that the literary works in colonial Europe gave a moral underpinning to colonizing mentalities. These works brilliantly analyzed by Said did, perhaps unwittingly, serve indirectly the dark designs of imperial activists, and still do. It was a major contribution of Orientalism to make many aware of the Orientalizing tendencies of those seeking to exploit the resources and manipulate the strategic outlook of Islamic World elites in the Middle East.

It is such an implicit framing of the Zionist movement of forced displacement and subjugation of the native resident population of Palestine that underpinned Said’s profound critique of Israel’s 1948 celebratory self-righteous narrative. This narrative for Palestinians will be forever memorialized as the nakba, of catastrophe and exclusion that was not only something that happened in 1948 but describes a process that has continued ever since, and is now is in the midst of one of its most traumatizing iterations. It is this Israeli sense of imperial destiny that is currently continuing the gruesome work of justifying forced displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian people living in northern Gaza, an undertaking done with distressing ferocity. The rationalizations emanating from Tel Aviv are situational, but the impact on Palestinian normalcy are similar, reawakening the nightmare of 1948. Yet in Orientalist centers of power of the West what shocks and angers most of the non-Western world as genocide is claimed to be permissible because characterized as a response to ‘terrorism.’[7] By the use of this word alone Israel frees itself from any need to claim it was acting within the law. Supposedly, the T-label confers on Israel a legal entitlement to forego any pretense that its response to the October 7 attack is proportional and properly restricted to military targets. Israel’s hasbara fictionalizes and distorts the realities of what is happening that either disseminates falsehoods or deflects attention from unpleasant truths.

In contrast, the Palestinians, and the Arab street and peoples of the Global Souh spread throughout the world, including many less educated people than the pro-Israeli policymakers in the West are not fooled. They are moved to take spontaneous action by fiery images of huge bombs dropped on crowded refugee camps and on hospitals filled to capacity with wounded or dead infants, children, and severely injured adults. The peoples of the world, including many in the Global West, are smart enough to believe what they see and put aside the propaganda that they hear, becoming enraged by the steady flow of lame excuses for atrocities put forward by apologists and genocidal ideologues in Israel and their powerful allies in the Global West.

As with Orientalism it would be perverse to address Edward’s legacy without revisiting his approach to Israel/Palestine struggle. The special resonance at this time is certainly worse than what Edward’s darkest imaginings anticipated when contemplating what was the future of Palestine and its people twenty years ago.

While Edward was alive, the unresolved conflict involving Palestine increasingly defined his identity as a public intellectual. As well, the sufferings of the Palestinian people caused him great personal anguish. Edward came to possess one of the few keys that if properly turned decades ago might have avoided much of the ensuing misery for both peoples, allowing Jews and Arabs, despite their historic missteps to learn to live together peacefully and justly, rather than engage in what has become a macabre death dance. Edward’s humanistic vision of what should and could have been now seems as remote as the most distant star in the galaxy.

The horrifying events of recent weeks in Gaza account for this less comprehensive treatment of Edward’s legacy, but is not meant to detract from the pertinence of Said’s legacy to the Palestinian fate. These days it would be escapism, indeed denialism, to downplay the preoccupying bloody atrocities occurring in Gaza. In my view, it is not only Palestinians that are the victims. By its recourse to overt genocidal behavior Israel and Zionism have also irreparably tarnished their reputation, and that of Jews generally, overshadowing the prior historic horrifying experiences of victimization endured by the Jewish people and modernizing successes of Israel. Critical observers long have understood that Israel’s gains were achieved at a great human cost. Israel is now putting itself at risk of being perceived the world over as the most disreputable pariah state of our time.

The catastrophic events daily unfolding in Gaza also encourage a departure from standard academic ways of remembering a cherished scholarly friend from a safe aesthetic distance. Previously I might have mentioned a few anecdotes that displayed Edward’s joie de vivre and essentially comic sense of life. He was great fun to be with despite frequently teasing friends and colleagues in challenging ways, especially expecting friends to do better, whether it was on a tennis court or by an engagement with the Palestinian struggle.

It was my good fortune that our lives touched one another at several levels. Such contacts were apart from the convergence of our shared political commitment to a just and sustainable peace between Israel and Palestine, and elsewhere. To begin with, we both had close ties to Princeton University (Edward thrilled my graduate seminar by taking over the class each year for one session, which had its downside as I had to teach those same students the following week). Edward’s political mentors, Eqbal Ahmad and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod were separately my close friends and the four of us formed a kind of braintrust on Palestine/Israel that met periodically in Edward’s Columbia office. Beyond this, we both over-indulged racquet sports pretending that their value in our lives was partly free psychotherapy. In addition, our children became friends. My first secret adolescent crush was inspired by the daughter of my father’s closest friend who mfany years later she married Edward’s PhD advisor at Harvard with whom he became a lifelong friend, with droll side effect of reconnecting me with this lapsed romantic phantasy of my youth.

Of course, there were also fundamental differences in our lives and identities, which seem relevant to the nature of Edward’s particular worldview and ways of ‘being-in-the-world’:

–Edward’s birth in Palestine, childhood in Egypt, and adulthood in America gave him that ‘out of place’ sense of exile that his early memoir made famous, an image which puzzled others who regarded him as a role model of super-success in academic America. Yet as his enticing autobiography makes plain his sense of not fully belonging anywhere, while emotionally confusing for him at times, allowed him to feel somewhat at home everywhere. This hybridity was integral to his envisioning of reality as combining an intense national outlook associated with his ethnicity to a high culture brand of humanist cosmopolitanism.

In contrast, I was spatially exclusively rooted in the American experience from birth, but as I grew to maturity, so much so as to tempt me to say that I was ‘out of place, in place.’ Gradually I became more marginalized almost to a point that could be labeled a form of voluntary ‘inner exile.’ This strange identity became even stranger when combined with a later sense of being a partial expatriate (mainly thanks to my Turkish wife and the time we annually spend together in Turkey);

–To summarize, Edward and I, in our different ways, despite our different life trajectories, were both inside/outsiders, never rejected by our surroundings but neither were we fully accepted or accepting; although ironically Edward increasingly nurtured and clarified his sense of belonging almost exclusively to the torments and dreams of the Palestinian nation, while I continuously diluted my taken-for-granted childhood sense of belonging to the American nation (and even more so to the American nation-state);

–undoubtedly the biggest difference between us was that Edward wrote Orientalism, with its worldwide persisting influence and impact, while I wrote books on international law that few read unless they were forced to do so by the few idiosyncratic progressive law teachers, always an endangered species in corridors of legal studies, at least in white settler colonial societies.

 Israel’s War Against the People of Gaza  

Despite the extreme grimness of the topic, as indicated, there is no responsible way to evade further commenting upon the horrifying Israeli response to the Hamas attack of October 7 as it relates to Edward’s legacy. This response dangerously reinforced by crucial diplomatic cheerleading and funding support by the United States, climaxing so far in the provocative movement of two aircraft carrier groups into the Eastern Mediterranean. Leading EU members along with the UK went out of their way to lend Israel a helping hand. In view of the ongoing genocidal saga in Gaza this is such a deeply disturbing and dangerous set of developments as to shape the present political consciousness of almost everyone. It has become as the bombs continue to fall in Gaza, especially in Middle Eastern venues, to consider anything other than this unfolding multi-dimensional crisis transparently and vividly portrayed day and night on TV, making the events in Gaaz the most globally transparent instance of genocide in all of human history.

I believe this change of emphasis from what I had originally intended is faithful to the personality, character, and commitment of Edward Said. He possessed remarkable gifts of merging analytical mastery with a passionate ethical/political immersion in the historical present. Confronting what is happening in Gaza, and how it illuminates what is wrong with Israel and the Global West would have certainly aroused in Edward the most intense response of outrage, not only directed at the genocidal policies animating Israel’s leaders cruelly carried out a series of massacres against a totally vulnerable and captive civilian population of Gaza. This ordeal is epitomized by the death, maiming, and traumatizing of every child of Gaza, an outcome of the documented bombing of hospitals, medical convoys, refugee camps, schools, UN buildings. This extreme devastation is further aggravated by the official blood curdling Israeli decree issued by Israel’s Minister of Defense a month ago that totally cut off all deliveries of food, electricity, and fuel to the already impoverished Gazan population, a community already heavily burdened by the world’s highest unemployment and poverty rates, a consequence of 16 years of an economy-crippling blockade. If this were not enough, the Israel attack was waged in a manner that accentuated these terrifying conditions, most unacceptably by the impossible forced evacuation ordering 1.1 million Palestinians in the northern half of Gaza Strip to abandon their homes and livelihoods to go South with no place to go, no safe way to get there, and once there with no place to live and no prospect of a job. This was a fiendish mandatory directive that could neither be followed nor ignored, a nightmare in real life beyond even Kafka’s darkest imagining.

I am quite sure that if Edward was addressing an audience anywhere in the world he would also vent his rage at the complicity of the US government and the refusal of the corporate media to fulfill its commitment to approach world news as if truth and reality were truly its mission. What we find in much of the top tier media in the West is a style of news coverage that is generally faithful to the biases of government policy that has been energetically promoting the dissemination of a pro-Israeli narrative throughout the ‘war’ on Gaza. These views are backed by belligerent government spokespersons and think tanks in Washington that continue even now to present the crime of ‘genocide’ as if it is an instance of justifiable ‘self-defense.’ Instead of giving some attention to responsible critics of Israel’s behavior, even realist mainstreamers like John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Anatol Lieven, the most respected TV news channels, such as CNN, repeatedly invite as their guests IDF spokesmen or leaders, and an endless stream of generals and Washington foreign policy experts in the West who tend to dwell on the tactical obstacles facing Israel’s unquestioned alleged mission of destroying Hamas as an organization and killing as many of its leaders as it can find. The commentary rarely complicates the portrayal of Hamas as ‘terrorists’ although it often meaninglessly and disingenuously cautions a defiant Israel to conduct its future operations within the limits set by international law and with due regard to the protection of civilians. This is a ridiculous bit of guidance given the complete failure to criticize Israel’s ongoing reliance day after day on Israel’s lawless tactics and decrees from its leaders that lend unquestioning support to the toxic action of its military forces, seem intent on inflicting devastating damage on the person and property of Gazan civilians with no established link to Hamas, and utterly contemptuous of critical voices.

If we are to gain a measure of objectivity it is necessary to deconstruct the main items of state propaganda that has muddied the waters of understanding Gaza violence throughout the Global West, while as noted not fooling the street protests throughout most of the rest of the world. Five points stand out in this regard:

     –first of all, the reductive presentation of Hamas as a terrorist organization when in fact it is the elected government of an Occupied Territory subject to the 4th Geneva Convention which outlines the obligations of the Occupying Power, with a special emphasis on the duty to protect the civilian population.

     –secondly, the manipulative identification of Hamas as nothing other than October 7 attack, which if it is as it seems to be, is certainly an undertaking, however provoked, fraught with extreme criminality and patent cruelly. The Hamas attack even if as barbaric in its execution as being portrayed, and on the basis of past reportage there is reason to be suspicious of Israeli battlefield justifications, overlooks other facts that more adequately delineate the true identity of Hamas. Hamas after being elected and taking control of the Gaza Strip from a corrupt and passive Fatah leadership associated with the Palestinian Authority has been administering Gaza since 2007 despite it being controlled by Israel as the world’s largest open air prison, its inmates further victimized by a punitive blockade years ago described by Israeli official advisors as explicitly implemented to keep all Gazans on a subsistence diet. Whatever else, Hamas is an elected political actor that since 2006 has been representing the people of Gaza, and as such is entitled to exercise rights of resistance although subject to limits set by international law.[8] Hamas earned legitimacy and Pa;estinian respect as a continuing and leading source of active resistance, something that has at least since Arafat’s death in 2004 eluded the international representation of the Palestinian people by the Palestinian Authority despite its well-known collaborative security relationship with Israel, especially resented in the West Bank in recent years.

It should be appreciated that the commission of a war crime, however heinous does not reduce a political actor to such an isolated act that make its reality reducible to an embodiment of terrorism. If this logic prevailed Israel would have been a terrorist movement from the early days of the Nakba in 1948, and many times over before and since.[9] Extreme crimes of a non-state and state actors were perpetrated by the Zionist movement before 1948, and by Israel subsequently. These documented crimes included ‘collective punishment’ (Article 33, Geneva IV) and ‘apartheid.’[10]

In the midst of the Israeli retaliatory fury the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, tried his best to overcome the good versus evil dualism of Israeli hasbara, as propagated in the West, by telling the assembled governments at the UN that the Hamas Attack, which he joined in strongly condemning, did not occur in a vacuum, which indirectly references Israeli crimes of oppression and Palestinian rights of resistance. For daring to speak truth to power Guterres was pilloried by Israel for suggesting, however mildly and indirectly, that Israel had severely provoked the people and Hamas leadership of Gaza for so long and cruelly that violent acts of resistance were the almost inevitable response, and as such called for self-scrutiny rather than a self-blinding orgy of vengeance. Once more Israel greeted criticism with an angry exaggerated response, demanding the resignation of Guterres and calling this self-evident truth a blood libel against the Jewish people. In this feverish pushback, it fortunately failed in its declared objective, and yet it achieved its most serious intended result of repudiating truth-telling and debate and shifting attention from the message to the messenger. What is remembered is not reminding governments of the context of the Hamas attack, but rather whether the call for the resignation of the Secretary-General was justified or not.

     –thirdly, even those seeking a post-Hamas role for the PLO and PA in Gaza with the status of being the sole continuing international representative of the Palestinian people, acknowledge an unspecified need for what is described as the ‘reconstituting’ of the PA. In coded language relying upon the abused word ‘moderate,’ it seems widely understood by Israel’s supporters as implying zero tolerance for the assertion of internationally certified legal rights of armed resistance and a low-profile advocacy of legal rights of Palestinians including the muting of objections to West Bank settlements and their further expansion. Such restrictions on Palestinian reactions to unlawful Israeli settlement expansion, land grabbing in the West Bank, and settler crimes against the occupied native population being carried out in an atmosphere of impunity and further often facilitated by the greenlighting of Israeli security forces to refrain from offering protection to Palestinians in the face of violent harrassment. Security restrictions imposed on West Bank political activity disappear when it is the Jewish settlers rather than the Palestinian residents that embark on a violent rampage that kills and wounds even those Palestinians who have sullenly adapted to their fate as a permanently oppressed people living according to the whims of an apartheid regime. It is instructive to compare Israel’s middle of the night terrorizing arrests carried out against stone-throwing children or their predatory attacks on Palestinian rituals associated with the harvesting of olives with the forbearance exhibited toward the lethal violence of the Jewish settlers;

     –fourthly, this settler phenomena, itself a direct, defiant, continuous, and massive violation of Article 49(6) of Geneva IV, is the current combat front line of Zionist militants who have long sought sovereign control over the West Bank, and its encouragement is directly subversive of any prospect of a two-strate solution, which despite this, remains the international mantra of advocates of a peaceful solution. One is led to wonder whether this advocacy is a cynical recogniztion of the futility of exerting real pressure on Israel or an example of evasive and naïve wishful thinking. In this sense, as with a skilled magician, some Israeli leaders seem content to have public attention preoccupied with Gaza rather than paying critical attention to the real endgame of Zionist maximalism, which centers on achieving Israeli sovereign control over the West Bank, the only part of ‘the promised land’ yet to be reabsorbed into the Jewish supremist, apartheid state of Israel. While we rightly weep over the acute suffering of the Gazans, we should also be taking a hard look at the simultaneous tolerance, more accurately interpreted as encouragement, by Israel’s leaders of escalating settler lethal violence and ethnic cleansing politics in the West Bank.

As with Gaza, the Israeli settlers are not shy about revealing their goals by way of menacing threats directed at the Palestinians. It went almost unnoticed in the Western media that after a recent violent settler demonstration in the West Bank, leaflets were affixed to Palestinian cars in the neighborhood with a simple chilling message ‘leave or we will kill you;’

     –fifthly, it needs to be stressed that the present unity government in Israel is put before the world as a temporary ‘war’ response to Oct. 7.  It was intended to underscore the war narrative, and the need to overcame earlier sharp divisions among Jews about the nature of the Israeli Jewish state. It seems true that the current unity government reflects a broad ethnic consensus among Israeli Jews that ‘vengeance’ without restraint was justified in response to the Hamas attack, and indeed alleged necessary if Israel was to avoid future attacks. More tangibly this meant for those so believing, finding an alternative to Hamas to administer Gaza in ways that curbed Palestinian militancy, whether from Hamas or other Palestinian groups of which Islamic Jihad is best known but not the only one. Liberal Zionists tend to argue that such a policing approach has almost no chance of succeeding on its own in restoring Israeli security unless tied to a peace proposal. To have any chance it needs to be combined with giving the Palestinian people a collective belief that a fair peace can be peacefully achieved within the framework of a two-state solution. Such an envisioned future presumes that Israel is finally prepared ‘to walk the walk’ of a two-state solution comprising at the very least inclusion of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as the capital of the new Palestinian state, as well of course as Gaza. As of now, such a future is the stuff of dreams, and lacks a grounding in the realities of either Israel or the US to be a viable political project.

I find this moderate option to be a totally dubious day after tomorrow scenario—most of all because the Netanyahu-led government emphatically doesn’t want it, and never has; it has almost been erased in our collective memory that the Netanyahu coalition that took control at the beginning of 2023 was generally described even in Washington as the most extremist government when it came to the Palestinians during the entire history of Israel. If Tel Aviv has its way, and now may have more latitude than in the past to establish ‘Greater Israel’ under the smokescreen of Gaza and geopolitical worries about a wider war further damaging the world economy and destructive of fragile regional stability. I firmly believe that this total rejection of Palestinian territorial grievances and rights under international law is at the core of Israel’s real Peace Plan.[11]

Even in the highly unlikely event that Netanyahu is forced to resign for his responsibility in the Oct 7 intelligence/security failure, and the Netanyahu extremist coalition government collapses, this kind of future for Israel/Palestine seems a non-starter. Over half a million settlers in the West Bank will fight Tel Aviv rather than having their expansionist ambitions thwarted by implementing any kind of agreement that requires a durable and humane accommodation with the Palestinians. At minimum a sustainable peace presupposes a Palestinian governing authority that has credibility with most Palestinians and a freeze on further settlement construction or more radically, arrangements for a coerced settler withdrawal to within Israel’s pre-1967 Israel borders. It would also necessitate an Israeli willingness to dismantle apartheid within its own state and implement rights of return for long languishing Palestinian refugees in neighboring countries. Even mentioning the magnitude of these adjustments suggests that liberal Zionists living around the world in secure diaspora conditions have little insight into Israel’s resolve to complete the Zionist Project on its terms, and to accept a variety of political costs associated with such an ambition.

As of now the most probable morning after tomorrow setting is likely to produce Israeli victory claims in Gaza, Hamas nominally replaced by a secular grouping of moderate secular Gazans Israel thinks it can rely upon, and a continuing Israeli effort to secure sovereign control in the West Bank, which implies further measure of ethnic cleansing and is virtually certain to produce a new cycle of Palestinian resistance. The Palestinian response if faced with such prospects will undoubtedly shape new modes and styles of resistance reinforced by a greatly increased global solidarity movements at the grassroots level of people, with the UN essentially silent, and even Western governments wary of continuing unconditional support of Israel. If resistance is sustained in effective initiatives, and complemented by greatly increased support from the region and world, it might signal moves among Israeli elites of the type that produced the South African transformative response to the growing pressure from internal resistance and external solidarity initiatives to dismantle apartheid and constitute a new government based on inclusive human rights, including a long deferred Palestinian right of self-determination.

The outcomes in Gaza and West Bank, although weakening Israel’s standing regionally and globally may have the perverse effect of stiffening the Israeli willingness to risk everything by mounting a final campaign to erase the Palestinian challenge, and not primarily in Gaza, once and for all, even if this means a consummated genocide. It will be up to the mobilized peoples of the region, of the Islamic state, and of the Global West to rise up sufficiently to prevent the fulfillment of such a scenario. At present, there is no sign of this happening, but if the present onslaught in Gaza continues much longer and is accompanied by rising violence in the West Bank such an outcome cannot be ruled out.

Geopolitical Ramifications of Israel’s Campaign in Gaza

A first line of reflection in reaction to this series of alarming developments, is to step back from the immediacy of Gaza, and to suggest the relevance of the global context within which these events have occurred. Before Oct 7 and after the Feb 24, 2022 Russian attack on Ukraine some thoughtful persons began to be conscious that a contested geopolical transition was underway that could affect drastically the world order that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union. The outcome of such a transition could be something that either mitigated or aggravated the dangers of major warfare that were evident before Oct 7.

In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, there was a burst of enthusiasm in the West, not only for victory over the Soviet Union and what it stood for, but for a more peaceful and prosperous world order. Hopes were invested in a new kind of economistic global setting in which market forces associated with trade and investment would create a benevolent future for the whole world, geopolitical rivalries and militarism would recede, with peace and security anchored in the diplomatic and defensive military capabilities of the United States, given credibility by the war-prone foundation of ‘full-spectrum dominance.’ This sequel to the Cold War, often labeled ‘neoliberal globalization’ was preoccupied with the financialization of the world economy, with government responsibility for the wellbeing of people diminished, while a growing need to meet an ominous ecological challenge caused by the modern carbon-based economy and known to the public by the soothing words ‘climate change,’ a situation best handled by multilateralism, that is, cooperative problem-solving on a global scale.[12]

The real breakdown of this Global West vision came by way of a series of profound order-challenging developments: the spectacular rise of China between 1980 and 2020, the Russian return to the geopolitical stage, and the unresolved conflict between the Islamic world and the West playing out in the Middle East, with oil and Israel being the core issues. In these respects, the Ukraine War and the Gaza War are parallel pivotal developments in these confrontations between the forces of order and those of change that few persons remain reluctant to talk about. Those that champion a  post-colonial reenactment of Western world hegemony as the best attainable framework for peace and security that humanity tend to be advocates of victory over Russian designs in Ukraine,  restraint of China in relation to the future of Taiwan, and wish for Israeli success in overcoming Palestinian resistance the completion of the Zionist Project by way of the formal establishment of Greater Israel.

In effect, this is an argument in favor of a transition to a revival of a world order dominated by the interests, political rhetoric, and economic priorities of the Global West as presided over by a US-led coaltion. The was the case in the aftermath of the other two global transformations of the past century: the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall, each of which coincided with defeats of fascism and communism, rival ideologies with their own conflictual world order agendas.

If considered from this wider perspective, the current Gaza/West Bank ordeal should be viewed as a conflict that is not just about Israel and Palestine. It is a conflict about the stability and structure of the region upon which many countries in the Global West continue to depend in meeting their energy needs. It also showcases Western fears and hostilities toward Islamic pressures whether from migration or anti-Western radical forms of nationalism.

This may help explain why, beyond the influence of Zionism, the U.S. has so blindly and unconditionally thrown its support to Israel despite its aggressive and discrediting behavior that undermines trust in the quality of US world order leadership. Israel has managed so far to retain the visible assurance of Western support no matter what it does to the Palestinian people and however arrogantly it flouts international law and the UN Charter. This reflects its strength as a strategic asset of the West and also its extraordinary influence on the domestic political life of the US and UK.

Looked at from the opposite angle, Hamas struck on Oct 7 not only to remind Tel Aviv and the world that the Palestinians were not going to stand by quietly as their presence was being publicly erased. Erasure is what Netanyahu seemed to boast about when he flashed before the UNGA in September 2023 a map of ‘the new Middle East’ with Palestine erased as a territorial presence in the region. This ethnic erasure was given further concreteness at the muddying of the waters at the G20 in September 9-10, 2023 meeting in Delhi that projected a Middle East corridor from India to the Arab World. Such an undertaking was widely interpeted to assume normalization of relations with Israel and the removal of Palestinian grievances from any relevance to this new policy agenda of the region.

The Middle East role in this transition from the post-Cold War reality has been openly ideologized as a new and latest phase of the West’s historic struggle against a reconstituted ‘axis of evil’ which the French leader, Emmanuel Macron, advocated within the framework of anti-terrorism. He put forward this controversial interpretation of world political trends while on a solidarity October visit to Israel during the attack on Gaza, in effect an anti-Islamic coalition of the willing was so overtly proposed in mid-October. He sought to downplay his openly civilizational initiative as an ‘anti-Hamas coalition,’ claiming resemblances to the anti-Daesh (or ISIS) coalition that emerged as a reaction to the US/UK invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, which included the dismantling of Iraqi armed forces. Macron seemed to magnify the already terrible drama of good and evil playing out in Gaza by referencing the connections with Hezbollah and Houthis, but also Syria, and above all Iran. Perhaps, also, it was Macron’s way of ingratiating himself to his Israeli hosts by deflecting attention away from the terrible happenings in Gaza to a wider conflict in which Israel was managing the conflict zone on behalf of the West.

This recourse to a systemic explanation of the Hamas attack recalls the once fashionable ideas of Samuel Huntington who in 1993 alerted the world to an anticipated post-Cold War reconfiguration of world politics as ‘a clash of civilizations.’ Huntington expressed his doubts that peace would follow the end of the Cold War, believing rather in the emergence of a new cast of adversaries hostile to the Global West.[13] Such a civilizational encounter would reconfigure militarized conflict rather than promoting peace, justice, development, and ecological prudence to form the basis of post-1989 world order. If we step back from the transparent immediacy of horror generated by Israel’s targeting of hospitals, refugee camps, and UNRRA buildings in Gaza, and interpret the wider reaches of this violent drama our picture of what is strategically at stake is considerably enlarged. Taking account of the relevance of Hezbollah, Houthi, Syrian, and above all Iranian solidarity with Gaza, as reinforced by the persisting large protest rallies in the city streets in Islamic countries, and indeed throughout the Global South, Huntington’s expectations of 30 years ago seem to be a prophetic prelude to Macron’s initiative as well as to the 9/11 attacks. Huntington’s words resonate anew as they formerly did when articulated just after the Cold War “[n]ation-states remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts will occur between nationals and groups of different civilizations…The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”[14]

Others have elsewhere observed that the conflict between Western civilization and  Islam has a lineage that goes back 1300 years. Huntington’s ideological ally at the time was none other than Bernard Lewis who introduced an Orientalist twist by demeaning the whole of Islam as “a culture of rage” portraying those of Islamic faith, in Edward Said’s words, as nothing other than “a neurotic sexualized being.”

In a further twist, the Hamas leadership rationalized its attack on Oct 7 as a necessary way of conveying to Israel that the Palestinians were not going to consent to erasure. Further, in an inversion of the Western images of the Arab as responding only to force [see Raphael Patel, The Arab Mind (1973, updated 2007], Hamas argues with apparent plausibility that Israel only responds to force, and that Palestinian were led to mount an attack to awaken Israelis to the resolve of the Palestinians to resist erasure.

These contrary images of this clash of civilizational mentalities serves as an illuminating, if unconscious, backdrop for Israel’s Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant, disgusting language describing the battle against Gazans in words that will be long remembered in the annals of genocidal rhetoric: “We are fighting against human animals, and we will act accordingly.” To so overtly dehumanize Palestinians, as well as  its demeaning negation of animals, could make the often insurmountable challenge of establishing genocidal intent easy for prosecutors to meet. Of course, the quoted phrase is further incriminating as its role seemed a public explanation of why food, electricity, and fuel would be totally cut off from any form of transmission to Gaza. All in all Gallant’s notorious decree is fully consonant with Israel’s practices during this past month of violence. It also gains relevance by the failure of Netanyahu or other Israeli officials to modify or in any way soften Gallant’s self-incriminating language. What Galant said is consistent with other statements by Israeli leaders including Netanyahu and by IDF tactics and public rationales confirming such attitudes toward the whole of the Palestinian people.

There is little doubt that the outcome of these two ongoing ‘wars’ will deeply influence the prospects for the stability and acceptance of Western worldwide post-colonial and post-Cold War economic, political, and cultural patterns of hegemony. The hawkish interpretation insightfully, if indirectly, regards the active and undisguised complicity of the Western governments in relation to Gaza as a matter of grand strategy rather than as a testimonial to Zionist influence. This is important to understand, although in light of the rising chorus of moral/legal objections to Israel’s behavior in Gaza, it is rarely publicly acknowledged.

What is new with respect to Samuel Huntington sense of ‘the West against the rest’ was his failure to take note of the Islamic challenge being spearheaded by non-state actors adopting the pre-modern means of combat at their disposal and largely focused on resisting further Western penetration rather than through violence overseas as was the onetime tactic of Al-Qaeda. What 9/11 and later Islamic jihadism added was a religious rationale to resistance and conflict with the West whose identity took largely non-state forms. In effect, the  geopolitically phrased assessments of Huntington acquired a moral fervor.

Instead of waging a geopolitical war to determine global power alignments, the war against Hamas can be, as Macron intimated, also internalized giving a fresh stimulus to European Islamophobia and anti-migrant politics. Even during the Cold War the Russians were never demonized as a people or was their civilization demeaned, partly because they were after all white Christians not ‘human animals.’

A politics of demonization, although used in an inflammatory way by Biden in relation to Ukraine, was confined to the person of Vladimir Putin. The main argument consisted of self-serving legalistic rationalizations for defending Ukraine, while excluding from consideration such contextual issues as prior internal violence against the Russian-oriented minority in the Donbas oblasts along with Kyiv’s repudiation of the Minsk 2014-15 agreements, and NATO’s increased engagement with the country’s security policies after the Maidan Coup in 2015.

There are revealing similarities in the Global West responses to these two violent conflicts that are bound to have transformative influences on the future of peace and security in the world. Those who favor a strong material and diplomatic commitment to Ukraine, as with those showing unconditional support of Israel, become hysterical if provocations of Russian aggression or the pre-history of the Hamas attack are taken seriously into account. This is because a fair appraisal of these two contexts subverts the high ground of moral purity and political justification implicit in the militarist modes of response, as well as rendering ambiguous the presume clarity of the claimed legal right of self-defense in the two instances.

The supposedly humanistic President of Israel,  Isaac Herzog, adopted the good versus evil framework of Netanyahu that refuses to make the slightest concession to the realities witnessed by the peoples of world. Herzog’s entire effort was to draw the sharpest possible distinction between Israel as the agent of a humane future for all and the Palestinians as the exemplification of the worldview of their barbaric adversary. His words featured as a guest opinion piece in the NY Time are an example of the one-eyed crusading civilizing vision that a broad spectrum of Israelis endorse:

Against our will, we in Israel find ourselves at a tipping point for the Middle East and for the world and at the center of what is nothing less than an existential struggle. This is not a battle between Jews and Muslims. And it is not just between Israel and Hamas. It is between those who adhere to norms of humanity and those practicing a barbarism that has no place in the modern world.[15]

It would seem, at this point, that what is being endorsed in the West, is a second coming of the ‘clash of civilizations’ worldview as further embellished by invoking the dualism of good and evil. It is blended with a last-ditch effort to sustain the unipolar geopolitical alignment that emerged after the Cold War amid a world beset by ecological instabilities as never before. Biden made a lame effort to ideologize the latter stages of the post-Cold War atmosphere by describing the current era as an epic global struggle between ‘democracies’ and ‘autocracies,’ but it was largely ignored as the claim was beset by obvious empirical contradictions of inclusion and exclusion.

The outcome in Gaza for Israel also has major implications for the region and world, including possibly inducing a normalizing diplomacy with Iran, and greater respect for the norms of non-intervention in internal societies, especially Muslim majority countries in closer conformity to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. All things considered, the world will be safer and more secure if the politics of self-determination are managed nationally rather than by a US-led NATO directorate. As well, a positive reappraisal of conflict-avoiding invisible geopolitical fault lines such as were the pragmatic contribution of World War II diplomats at Yalta and Potsdam, and their renewal in the present altered circumstances of seeking conflict management.

Some Alternative Futures for Israel/Palestine

Against this geopolitical background, it seems now appropriate to make conjectures about what sort of future will emerge the violence in Gaza and how it might shape the destiny of Palestinians and Israelis, including the roles will be played by regional and global forces.

As the bombs continue to fall and rockets fill the air in Gaza, some reaching Israel, various ideas are being advanced by outsiders about probable and desirable futures. Three future patterns emerge at this from the rubble and the rising death toll:

–the pessimist’s future: Israel despite alienating people throughout the world retains sufficient hard power leverage to win the peace, establishing a Greater Israel that incorporates the West Bank, reconstitutes the governance of Gaza under a Palestinian Authority leadership to serve as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, possibly even looking to recognize a Gaza micro-state as ‘Palestine.’ I think that this outcome would not satisfy internal or international demands for an acceptable Palestinian solution, and would not end or even mitigate the apartheid nature of present Israeli governance or inhibit resistance activities on the Palestinian side;

–utopian envisioning: holding Israel responsible for the criminality of its Gaza campaign, requiring accountability of the main perpetrators for their crimes and imposing reparations for damage done to Palestinians homes and property; acknowledgement by the Israeli President and Prime Minister of the historic wrongs done to the Palestinian people by the Nakba and subsequent abuses, a point stressed by Edward Said and others with the accompanying sentiment ‘There will never be peace until there is such an acknowledgement is made.” Democratic secularism in a unified or co-existing states based on no ethnic nor religious criteria, featuring democratic elections, and human rights. A right of return of all Palestinian refugees and their descendants. Zionism would revert to the Balfour ethnic pledge of a Jewish ‘homeland’ but no state. The fact that something analogous along these lines happened in South Africa suggests that it could happen in Israel/Palestine, but it seems far beyond the reach of practical politics at present, although the Israeli NGO, International Committee Against Housing Demolition (ICAHD) has circulated a roughly comparable proposal in early November 2023;

–stalemate renewed: a return to the status quo preceding the Hamas attacks, with modifications, but apartheid, border control and blockade roughly as before, resistance continues, global solidarity intensifies in ways that gradually shift the balance of forces in a Palestinian.

None of the Oslo hype clouds the present search for final outcomes of the Palestinian struggle to attain its long denied basic rights as a people and nation. Yet for the foreseeable future the outlook for peace remains dark, including in, maybe especially in Israel.

Concluding Remarks

I would like to believe that Edward would have agreed with most of what I have said, although among his many virtues, was that of intellectual independence, which on occasion could be experienced as a certain cantankerousness. It is entirely possible that after Edward listened to these remarks would approach me after these remarks with a scowl and his half ironic, half serious putdown:  ‘Richard, you can’t be serious.’

Despite my intention to be engaged, my words may still have come across as too academic. Yet I must reaffirm that the events of the last month have resulted in the most tormenting emotions that I have ever experienced in reaction to public events. I confess that to some, my rather academic style may seem designed to hide partisanship. To counter such an impression I will conclude by removing any doubt as to where I stand.

I firmly believe that this is a time for persons of conscience to take action as well as to pierce the propaganda manipulating feelings, perceptions, and allegiances

It is past time to confront the double standards and moral hypocrisy of the Global West’

It is also a time to mourn and grieve the terrible human costs endured by the people of Gaza, but also a time to show solidarity with those seeking peace and justice at great risk

And finally, this is a time to repudiate the horrors of warfare and political violence, the disgrace of genocide, and better arrange our lives and organize our collective endeavors on the power of love, courage, struggle, justice, and hope.

Concluding Remarks

As jurist, citizen, and human rights activist, the issues of aligning law in the books with justice in the life of Palestinians has both tested my commitment to a word order in which law and justice become closely aligned. This cannot happen so long as the UN and the management of power and security is left to the priorities of geopolitical actors, at present the US, China, and Russia, particularly if their relations are strained by the emergent struggles particularly evident in relation to Ukraine and Taiwan. The US seeks to retain the unipoarity—that is, the exclusion of other geopolitical aspirants from the managerial roles of global security—in the face of growing challenges not only from Russia and China, but also from the BRICs and a realigned Global South.

The lives of dissenting public intellectuals whether rooted in the scholarship of the humanities, at which Edward Said excelled, or the academic engagements of a social scientist devoted to the alighment of law and justice, the imperatives of values, thought, and action need to be fused and their impact on governmental and UN actors dramatically increased if world order challenges are to have any chance of being addressed in humane and effective ways. In a constructive sense, all legal analysis rests upon disclosed or suppressed what I have characterized as ‘advocaacy jurisprudence.’ Such an assertion builds on the work of legal realism and critical legal studies, and in keeping with the Lasswell/McDougal explicit endorsement of liberal constitutionalism as the guiding principle of constructing legal outcomes, although slightly disguised by their claim of a scientific social science epistemological foundation for their normative preferences.


* Adapted from Edward W Said Memorial Lecture: The Enduring Legacies of Edward Said

The American University in Cairo, Nov. 4, 2023


[1] My jurisprudential orientation accords with and is influenced by Noura Erakat pathbreaking JUSTICE FOR SOME: LAW AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE (2019)

[2] Others I would mention in the ssame spirit are Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg, Cornel West, David Ray Griffin, and from a distance, Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Bertand Russell, Mohatma Gandhi, and Martin Buber. Within my disciplinary orientation of international law, I found the critical work and normative perspectives of TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Llaw) as a compatible complement to the work of jurists in the Global West working toward a similar realignment of law and justice as are dissenting public intellectuals. In this regard I would mention Asli Bali, Noura Erakat, Darryl Lee, Lisa Hajjar, Victor Kattan, and Penny Green as currently active examples in the US/UK setting.

[3] See the influential writings of Hans Kelsen and the many conscious or unconscious Kelsenites. Also relevant is the writing of Max Weber trying to curtail the influence of religion in policy formation and give way to Enlightenment values privileging science. In some attempts to objectify a preferential set of values the issue of subjectivity is shifted but not eliminated. See Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2003) The most notable undertaking of this sort was attempted by the New Haven School of International Law, as principally propounded by Harold Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal at Yale Law School. See their Jurisprudence for a Free Society (1991)

[4] By ‘first approximation’ I want to again emphasize that legal norms are not self-elucidating. Their ambiguity is

somewhat arbitrarily overcome by leaving the authority to finalize the interpretation of norms to judicial bodies.

The dissatisfaction among liberals about the outlook and judgments of the US Supreme court in recent years reveals tensions in the alignment between law and justice. During the Warren Court it was political conservatives that were distressed by what they regarded as misalignment of law and justice. 

[5] There are enough discrepancies between the initial Israeli account of the Hamas attack and what actually happened on Oct 7 to support the appointment of an international commission should be arranged to produce a trusted objective and comprehensive account of what actually happened on that tragically eventful day.

[6] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1978)

[7] No words in political discourse are more manipulated than are ‘genocide’ and ‘terrorism.’ The former

to criminalize dehumanizing behavior, while the later suspends the laws of war be dehumanizing those

that use political violence as an instrument of armed struggle, with more or less justification.

[8] Although indefinite in its contours, international law authrorizes armed resistance to oppressive rule. See UN General Assembly Res. 2625 (1975).This makes the Hamas attack to be a hybrid event, both containing war crimes and a resistance rationale. This rationale points to the failure to find a peaceful solution after more than 75 years.

[9] See Thomas Suarez, How Terrorism Created Modern Israel (2016)

[10] See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the International Crime of Apartheid, 1973; recently documented by Michael Lynk 2021 report to the HRC in his role as SR, Michael Lynk in Richard Falk, John Dugard, Michael Lynk, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE: WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS (2023), 297-312; also the authoritative reports of the UN’s ESCWA, and NGOs Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and B’Tselem.

[11] This reasoning of mine should be compared to the proposals published on October 22, 2023 in Foreign Affairs by the former PA Prime Minister, Fayyad Salam ideas.

[12] For ellaboration see Richard Falk, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE (2001)

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72: 22-49 (1993)

[14] Ibid, Note 13.

[15] The President of Israel: Isaac Herzog, “This Is Not a Battle Just Between Israel and Hamas,” NY Times, Nov. 3, 2023.

Gaza: The Wider Context

1 Mar

[Prefatory Note: my essay of explication on the inexplicable, as published by Eure-Med Monitor at the end of February 2024]

COMMENTARY: In Gaza, the west is enabling the most transparent genocide in human history

Richard Falk

Update of 2/25/24 EuroMed Article by Richard Falk:

It is helpful to conceive of the Israeli settler colonial undertaking in Palestine as having reached its decisive phase, and as such concerns in addition to resources, land and people. From an Israeli perspective, ‘more land, less Palestinians’; from a Palestinian perspective, ‘steadfastness and resistance in relation to land and residence rights.’

The latest news pertaining to Gaza as reported in the Western media and government circles is that a six week pause in the onslaught in Gaza is being negotiated in Paris and Doha, and possibly will take effect on March 10th, the beginning of Ramadan. The deal being negotiated centers on the release of women, children, and the elderly among the 99 Israel hostages still held by Hamas, and an exchange that is rumored to lead to the freeing of 300 Palestinians currently held in Israeli prisons, often under abusive conditions.

It is coupled with a continuing announced intention by PM Netanyahu of a planned attack on the southernmost Gaza city of Rafah, which is now sheltering as many as 1.5 million displace Palestinian or more than half of Gaza’s 2.3 million population and more than ten times the number of people normally living in Rafah.

The overall genocidal attack in its fifth month now has resulted in more than 30,000 Palestinian deaths with another 7,000 missing, and over 70, 000 injured many badly.  A further estimated 576,000 are coping with imminent famine conditions, 85% of Gaza population is displaced, and 80% of residential housing has been destroyed or seriously damaged, as well as 96% of Gaza agricultural infrastructure destroyed or damaged.

To calibrate the extent of loss and suffering by reference to the current US population of 335 million would mean multiplying the above Palestinian casualty statistics by more 140 times, and many fear that starvation, disease, and the Rafah attack will greatly increase Palestinian losses.

Recall Samuel Huntington’s controversial, yet influential, 1993 Foreign Affairs article, “The Clash of Civilizations,” which ends with the provocative phrase, “The West against the rest.” Although the article seemed far-fetched 30 years ago, it now seems prophetic in its discernment of a post-Cold War pattern of inter-civilizational rivalry. It is rather pronounced in relation to the heightened Israel/Palestine conflict initiated by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israeli territory with the killing and abusing of Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers, as well as the seizure of some 200 hostages.

Clearly this attack has been accompanied by some suspicious circumstances such as Israel’s foreknowledge, slow reaction time to the penetration of its borders, and, perhaps most problematic, the quickness with which Israeli adopted a genocidal approach with a clear ethnic cleansing message. At the very least the Hamas attack, itself including serious war crimes, served quite  conveniently as the needed pretext for the 100 days of disproportionate and indiscriminate violence, sadistic atrocities, and the enactment of a scenario that looked toward making Gaza unlivable and its Palestinian residents dispossessed and unwanted.

Despite the worldwide transparency of the Israeli tactics, partly attributable to ongoing TV coverage of the devastating and heartbreaking Palestinian ordeal, what was notable was the way external state actors aligned with the antagonists. The Global West (white settler colonial states and former European colonial powers) lined up with Israel, while the most active pro-Palestinian governments and movements were initially exclusively Muslim, with support coming more broadly from the Global South. This racialization of alignments seems to take precedence over efforts to regulate violence of this intensity by the norms and procedures of international law, often mediated through the United Nations. South Africa broke this pattern by its historic initiative at the ICJ that resulted in a near unanimous Interim Order on January 26, 2024, which seems to have had no impact on Israel military tactics or interference with the delivery of humanitarian aid or support by the Global West.

This pattern is quite extraordinary because the states supporting Israel, above all the United States, have claimed the high moral and legal ground for themselves and have long lectured the states of the Global South about the importance of the rule of law, human rights, and respect for international law. This disregard the manifest of intent of the Genocide Convention to  urge compliance with international law and morality by both sides in the face of the most transparent genocide in all of human history. In the numerous global pre-Gaza genocides, the existential horrors that occurred were largely known after the fact and through statistics and abstractions, occasionally vivified by the tales told by survivors or given expression in novels or films. The events, although historically reconstructed, were not as immediately real as these events in Gaza with the daily reports in real time from brave journalists in the Gaza combat zones for more than four months, enduring many deaths..

Liberal democracies failed not only by their refusal to make active efforts to prevent genocide, which is a central obligation of the Genocide Convention, but more brazenly by openly facilitating the continuation of the genocidal onslaught. Israel’s frontline supporters have contributed weapons and munitions, as well as providing targeting intelligence and even assurances of active engagement by ground forces if requested, as well as providing diplomatic support at the U.N. and elsewhere throughout this crisis. 

    Liberal democracies failed not only by their refusal to make active efforts to prevent genocide, but more brazenly by openly facilitating continuation of the genocidal onslaught   

These performative elements that describe Israel’s recourse to genocide are undeniable, while the complicity crimes enabling Israel to continue with genocide remain indistinct, being situated in the shadowland of genocide. For instance, the complicity crimes are noted but remain on the periphery of South Africa’s laudable application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that includes a request for Provisional Measures crafted to stop the genocide pending a decision on the substance of the charges of genocide. The evidence of genocide is overwhelmingly documented in the 84-page South African submission, but the failure to address the organic link to the crimes of complicity is a weakness that could be reflected in what the court decides.

Even if the ICJ does impose these Provisional Measures, including ordering Israel to desist from further violence in Gaza, it may not achieve the desired result, at least not before the substantive decision is reached some three to five years from now. It seems unlikely that Israel will obey Provisional Measures. It has a record of consistently defying international law. It is likely that a favorable decision on these preliminary matters will give rise to a crisis of implementation.

The law is persuasively present, but the political will to enforce is lacking or even resistant, as here in certain parts of the Global West, and the ICJ lacks any independent enforcement authority. The UN leaves, as usual, implementation at the mercy of the veto-burdened Security Council..

The degree to which the U.S. has supplied weaponry with U.S. taxpayer money would be an important supplement to rethinking the U.S. relationship to Israel that is so important and which is underway among the American people—even in the Washington think tanks that the foreign policy elites fund and rely upon. Proposing an arms embargo would be accepted as a timely and appropriate initiative in many sectors of U.S. public opinion. I hope that such proposals may be brought before the General Assembly and perhaps the Security Council. Even if not formally endorsed, such initiatives would have considerable symbolic and possibly even substantive impacts on further delegitimizing Israel’s behavior and stimulating solidarity initiatives..

A third specific initiative worth carefully considering would be timely establishment of a People’s Tribunal on the Question of Genocide initiated by global persons of conscience. Such tribunals were established in relation to many issues that the formal governance structures failed to address in satisfactory ways. Important examples are the Russell Tribunal convened in 1965-66 to assess legal responsibilities of the U.S. in the Vietnam War and the Iraq War Tribunal of 2005 in response to the U.S. and U.K. attack and occupation of Iraq commencing in 2003.

Such a tribunal on Gaza could clarify and document what happened on and subsequently to October 7. By taking testimony of witnesses, it could provide an opportunity for the people of the world to speak and to feel represented in ways that governments and international procedures are unable to enact, given their request for Provisional Measures to stop the ongoing Gaza onslaught, it will increase Global South and civil society pressure on Israel and its supporter governments to comply. As Israel has refused to make even efforts to comply with the near unanimous Interim Order of the ICJ, it has escalated pro-Palestinian solidarity efforts throughout the world and cast Israel into the darkest regions of pariah statehood.

In such an atmosphere, nonviolent activism and pressure for the imposition of an arms embargo and trade boycotts as well as sports, culture, and touristic boycotts will become more viable policy options, and can be given symbolic and substantive reality within the private sector, even among individual consumers. This approach by way of civil society activism proved very effective in the Euro-American peace efforts during the Vietnam War and in the struggle against apartheid South Africa, and elsewhere.

Israel is becoming a pariah state due to its behavior and defiance exhibited toward legal and moral norms. It has made itself notorious by the outrageously forthright acknowledgement of genocidal intent of its highest leaders with respect to Palestinian civilians whom they are under a special obligation to protect as the occupying power.

Being a pariah country or rogue state makes Israel politically and economically vulnerable as never before. At this moment, a mobilized civil society can contribute to producing a new balance of forces in the world that has the potential to neutralize the sway of Western post-colonial imperial geopolitics that has dominated the global management of power since the end of the Cold War more than 30 years ago..

It is also relevant to take note of the startling fact that the anti-colonial wars of the last century were in the end won by the weaker side militarily. This is an important lesson, as is the realization that anti-colonial struggle does not end with the attainment of political independence. It needs to continue to achieve control of national security and economic resources as the recent wave of anti-French coups in former French colonies in sub-Saharan Central Africa illustrate. The most recent of these coups occurred in Niger about a year ago.

In the 21st century weapons alone rarely control political outcomes. The U.S. should have learned this decades ago in Vietnam, having controlled the battlefield and dominated the military dimensions of the war, and yet having failed to achieve control over its political outcome, and correctly perceived as having lost the war..

The U.S. is disabled by its internal political structure from learning the appropriate lessons from such defeats. Such learning would weaken the leverage of the military-industrial-government complex, including the private sector arms industry and the corporatized media. This would subvert the domestic balance in the U.S. and substantially discredit the global geopolitical role being played by the U.S. throughout the entire world.

So, it is. currently an anachronistic situation. Despite knowing what to do. yet well-entrenched special interests preclude rational adjustments, and the military malfunctions and accompanying geopolitical alignments persist, ignoring costly failures along the way.

In effect, experience suggests strongly what should be done, but the political clout does not exist to get the needed job done. Global public opinion is shifting, peace-minded coalitions are forming, and demonstrations globally are building opposition to continuing the war.

Iran

There is a huge U.S./Israel propaganda effort to tie Iran to everything that is regarded as anti-West or anti-Israeli. It has intensified during the Gaza crisis, starting with the October 7 attack by Iran’s supposed proxy Hamas. You notice even the most influential mainstream print media such as The New York Times routinely refers to what Hezbollah or the Houthis do as “Iran-backed.” Such actors are reduced misleadingly to being proxies of Iran. In contrast, references to Ukraine never make explicit the US or NATO backed and materially supported Kyiv government, which is so much more tangible than whatever involvement Iran seems to have with pro-Palestinian initiatives undertaken by non-state actors in the region.

This way of denying agency to pro-Palestinian actors and attributing behavior to Iran is a matter of Israel/US state propaganda trying to promote belligerent attitudes toward Iran to the effect that Iran is our major enemy in the region, while Israel is our loyal friend. At the same time, it suppresses the reality that If Iran is backing countries and political movements, it obscures what the U.S. is doing more overtly and multiple times over throughout the Middle East.

It is largely unknown what Iran has been doing in the region to protect its interests. Without doubt, Iran has strong sympathies with the Palestinian struggle, and is strongly in favor of minimizing US presence and influence.. Those sympathies coincide with its own political self interest, especially its national security, in not being attacked. Additionally, Iran has lots of problems arising from opposition forces within its own society.

But I think dangerous state propaganda is building up this war-mongering hostility toward Iran. It is highly misleading to regard Iran as the real enemy standing behind all anti-Israeli actions in the region. It is important to understand as accurately as possible the complexity and unknown elements present in this crisis situation that contains dangers of wider war in the region and beyond. As far as is publicly known, Iran has had an extremely limited degree of involvement in the direct shaping of the war and Israel’s all-out attack on the civilian population of Gaza.

Hamas and a Second Nakba

While I was special rapporteur for the U.N. on Israeli violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, I had the opportunity to meet and talk in detail with several of the Hamas leaders who are living in Doha and Cairo, as well as in Gaza. In the period between 2010 and 2014, Hamas was publicly and by back channels pushing for a 50-year cease-fire with Israel. It was conditioned on Israel carrying out the unanimous 1967 Security Council mandate in SC Res 242 to withdraw its forces to the pre-war boundaries of “the green line” established after the 1948 War. Hamas had also publicly sought a long-range cease-fire with Israel after its 2006 electoral victory in Gaza of up to 50 years.

Neither Israel nor the U.S. would respond to those diplomatic initiatives. Hamas leader Khalid Machal, the most intellectual of the Hamas leaders with whom I met, told me in some detail that he had personally warned Washington of the tragic consequences for civilians on both sides of the conflict, if it was allowed to go on without a long-term cease-fire sustained and accepted. Machal’s efforts were confirmed by non-Hamas independent sources, which also confirmed that this effort to prevent further violence met with no encouragement in either Tel Aviv or Washington.

entanglement with geopolitical hegemony in relation to international criminal law and structures of global governance.

The South African World Court Case, Pariah State, and Popular Mobilization

The South African initiative is important as a welcome effort to enlist international law and procedures for its assessment and authority in a context of severe alleged criminality. Since the ICJ, the highest tribunal on a supranational level, has responded favorably to South Africa’s highly reasonable and morally imperative

Where can Palestinians go as the population suffers from famine and continued bombing? What is Israel’s goal?

I see the so-called commitment to thinning the Palestinian presence in Gaza as leading deliberately to a functional second Nakba. This is a criminal policy. I don’t know that it has to have a formal name. It is not a policy designed to achieve anything but the decapitation of the Palestinian population, if not in whole, at least in part, explaining the ICJ concern about halting what leaves the strong impression of genocide. Israel is exerting incredible pressure t to move large numbers of Gazans to the Egyptian Sinai, and the Egyptian al-Sisi government has declared that it opposes an influx of Palestinian refugees, yet rumors suggest that elaborate efforts to overcome Egyptian resistance include large-scale debt relief and IMF loans..

This is not a policy. The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are being confronted with a threat of elimination or replacement, which is a characteristic of every settler colonial project. The Israeli campaign after October 7 was not predominantly directed toward Hamas’ terrorism nearly as much as it was focused on the forced evacuation of the Palestinians from Gaza and intent on the related dispossession of most Palestinians from the West Bank, the real prize of this military campaign and the priority of the settler-oriented Netanyahu coalition government..

If Israel really wanted to deal with its security in an effective way, much more efficient and surgical methods would have been relied upon. There was no reason to treat the entire civilian population of Gaza indiscriminately as if it every Gazan was implicated in the Hamas attack, and there was certainly no justification for Israel’s genocidal response. The Israeli motivations seem more related to completing the Zionist Project than to restoring territorial security. All indications are that Israel used the October 7 attack as a pretext for a preexisting master plan to get rid of the Palestinians whose presence blocks the establishment of Greater Israel by finally obtaining sovereign control over the West Bank and at least portions of Gaza.

For a proper perspective we should remember that before October 7, the Netanyahu coalition government that took power at the start of 2023 was known as the most extreme government ever to govern the country since its establishment in 1948. The new Netanyahu government in Israel immediately gave a green light to settler violence in the Occupied West Bank and appointed overtly racist religious leaders to administer those parts of Palestine still occupied. What made it extreme, was its rejection of the pretense of a negotiated end to a struggle between the two peoples that purported to be based on co-existence rather than victory by the stronger side. The UN consensus, with almost universal support, presupposed Palestinian sovereign statehood while many Palestinian intellectuals and activists favored a single possibly confederated secular state guaranteeing ethnic and secular equality.

With the Gaza onslaught ambiguity was removed from Israel’s settler colonial end game , consisting of Israel claiming territorial sovereignty over the whole of the so-called promised land, enabling Greater Israel to come into existence as a Jewish supremacy state in accord with the forthright earlier Basis Law enacted in 2018 long before the Netanyahu coalition and the Hamas attack took place. What the Gaza operation since October is added is a resolve by Israel to defuse the so-called ‘demographic bomb’ by inducing Palestinian death and departure by mounting a sustained campaign of unrelenting state terror, with its heavy reputational costs exacted among the peoples of the world, including even in the long supportive Global West, where in the US and elsewhere pro-Palestinian sentiments become relevant to electoral outcomes scheduled to occur in 2024 and beyond.

The Need for a Different Context

We need to establish a different context than the one that exists now. That means a different outlook on the part of the Western governmental and NGO Jewish networks in the former colonial Europe and settler colonial white governments elsewhere steadfast supporters of Israel even now. This implies a different internal Israeli sense of their own values and security interests, and their own future development. The South African suggestive antecedent shows that it is only when sustained substantive pressure is brought to bear on national governing elites that have gone to these extreme lengths of relying on apartheid or genocide that startling transformative moves away from hegemony in the direction of constitutionally-based coexistence occur.

The lengths that the Israeli government has gone are characteristic of settler colonial states. All of them, including the U.S. and Canada, have acted violently to neutralize or exterminate the resident Indigenous people. That is what this genocidal interlude is all about. It is an effort to realize the goals of maximal versions of Zionism, which can only succeed by eliminating the Palestinians as rightful claimants to live in the coveted land, much less share in its governance. It should not be forgotten that in the weeks before the Hamas attack, including at the U.N., Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was waving a map of “the new Middle East” that had erased the existence of Palestine.

Undoubtedly, one of Hamas’ motivations was to negate the view that Palestine had given up its right to self-determination, and that Palestine could be erased from political consciousness. Recall the old delusional pre-Balfour Zionist slogan: “A people without land for a land without people.” Such utterances of this early Zionist utopian phase literally erased the Palestinians who for generations lived in Palestine as an entitled Indigenous population, and anticipated what became a top priority political project. With the Balfour Declaration of 1917, this settler colonial vision was embodies in the governance of the Palestinians, enjoying the blessings of the leading European colonial powers and the liberal democracies that emerged after the indigenous people of the land no long presented a political obstacle to their replacement.

Given post-colonial realities, the Israeli project is historically discordant than earlier settler colonial undertakings, and hence more extreme. It exposes the reality of Israel’s policies and the inevitable resistance response to Israel as a self-proclaimed racially supremacist state. Israeli state propaganda and management of the public discourse long obscured this maximalist agenda of Zionism  and we are yet to know whether this was a deliberate tactic or just reflected the phases of Israel’s development and self-confidence.

This may turn out to be a moment of clarity with respect not only to Gaza, but to the overall prospects for sustainable peace and justice between these two embattled peoples that must reflect the exercise of rights of self-determination and achieve some version of constitutially equal coexistence..

Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor is a Geneva-based independent organization with regional offices across the MENA region and Europe

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Foreword, Suzanne Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistance: Everything Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)

26 Feb

           

[Prefatory Note: I am re-posting this text because of its relevance to ongoing events and with this new Prefatory Note, partly because illness has kept me from a normal blogging rhythm. The post below is the text of my foreword to Suzanne Hammad’s important book, which explores from an ethnographic perspective, the deep and often hidden roots of resistance to alien occupation, and gives an account based on her lived experience about the specificities of Palestinian resistance in the West Bank town of Bil’in, a place known for public protests against the intrusive presence of Israel’s unlawful separation wall. This tale of resistance is also anguishly relevant to ongoing relevant to the criminal onslaught being carried out by Israel in Gaza, illustrating the extremities of violence relied upon by the Occupying Power to a totally vulnerable entrapped Palestinian population of 2.3 million persons as its regime of apartheid culminates in textbook genocide, a human catastrophe like no other in its transparency accentuated by support received from liberal democracies in the West.]  

RAF Foreword to

Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything

            Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)

[Prefatory Note: I am re-posting this text because of its relevance to ongoing events and with this new Prefatory Note, partly because illness has kept me from a normal blogging rhythm. The post below is the text of my foreword to Suzanne Hammad’s important book, which explores from an ethnographic perspective, the deep and often hidden roots of resistance to alien occupation, and gives an account based on her lived experience about the specificities of Palestinian resistance in the West Bank town of Bil’in, a place known for public protests against the intrusive presence of Israel’s unlawful separation wall. This tale of resistance is also anguishly relevant to ongoing relevant to the criminal onslaught being carried out by Israel in Gaza, illustrating the extremities of violence relied upon by the Occupying Power to a totally vulnerable entrapped Palestinian population of 2.3 million persons as its regime of apartheid culminates in textbook genocide, a human catastrophe like no other in its transparency accentuated by support received from liberal democracies in the West.]  

RAF Foreword to Suzanne Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything

            Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)

This fascinating book gives us not only creative ways of grasping the underlying continuities of the Palestinian ordeal but also a truly original conception of why the long arc of resistance and resilience, stretching across time and taking certain distinctive forms, has been sustained for more than a century in the face of assorted trials and tribulations. None of these tests of Palestinian resistance was greater than the double assault on the fundamentals of Palestinian normalcy in the West Bank than that posed by the ever-expanding settlement movement and the connected construction of an encroaching Separation Wall on mostly occupied Palestinian land commencing in 2001.

Suzanne Hammad views the evolving Palestinian reality through an ethnographic lens that complements what the media reports, leaders and intellectuals have to say, and militants achieve by direct confrontation with the daily[MK1]  experience of Palestinians living under the heavy boot of Israel’s apartheid regime which pursues with accelerating vigor its own agenda of ethnic cleansing and dispossession of people from their land. To carry out such an exploration led Hammad to conduct her field research for three years in a single West Bank community, the village of Bil’in. The implications of her findings have a broad resonance for Palestinian studies as they illuminate the realities of many similar villages subject to occupation, and indeed inform the situation and consciousness of all Palestinians regardless of whether living under occupation, in Arab refugee camps, or in pre-1967 Israel. In this sense, Bil’in with its population of less than 2000 offers us a rich metaphor by which to decipher the entire Palestinian predicament, and better appreciate the various modes of response that underpin resistance not only to the existential abuses being experienced under occupation but to the foreshadowing of an inevitable liberation that Israel’s state violence is capable of punishing harshly, yet unable so far to destroy. It might even be unable to comprehend such resistance. It is bringing to light these under-appreciated facets of Palestinian sumud or steadfastness that makes this book illuminating reading for all who wish to gain a deeper comprehension of this tragic struggle that remains horizonless as to beginning and end.

Although Bil’in is but one of many West Bank villages, its selection by the author as her main case study is hardly accidental or arbitrary. This village distinguished itself from many other superficially similar villages in at least two important[MK2]  ways. First, residents experienced the severe intrusion of the Wall upon its living space, vividly exemplified by the barbed wire, electrified fence passing through Bil’in in ways that cut its residents off from 60% of their agricultural growing and grazing land, as well as the surrounding ‘empty’ areas used for recreation, reflection, and spiritual growth, including gatherings of the whole community during holidays, and even more during the harvesting times, especially of olives. Bil’in’s inhabitants were cut off by a permit system that was required to pass the single gate in the wall that granted them permission to go beyond the mostly residential part of the village, and in some cases, gain access to their own farmland. Secondly, residents reacted through collective anti-Wall protests every Friday for at least 15 years starting in 2005. The continuity and persistence of these protest dramatized Palestinian opposition to the Wall and the resolve of villagers to resist non-violently, yet with courage and resolve. This activism in Bil’in contrasted reliance on peaceful methods with the violent brutality of Israel’s apartheid regime, which imposes Jewish supremacy even in occupied Palestine and in defiance of international humanitarian law. In relation to the Wall, Israeli defiance became overt as Israel rejected the near unanimous (14-1) findings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 2004. Such an authoritative legal endorsement of Bil’in fundamental grievance added legitimacy to the Friday protests by confirming that it was unlawful for Israel to construct a supposed security Wall on Occupied Palestinian Territory, and hence the Wall should be dismantled, and the Palestinians given reparations for the harm sustained. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion was the related idea that Israel’s situating the Wall on Palestinian territory was more a land grab than a genuine security measure.

We ignore the special contribution of Hammad’s inquiry if we are content with this most visible level of interaction, which is to depict both the depth of Palestinian suffering and its transcendence in the lived daily life of the residents of Bil’in. On the one side a deprivation so severe that it prompts inhabitants to pronounce their condition by such sayings as ‘we’re alive only because we are not dead yet” or “if we had the chance we would choose death over living under occupation.” And yet, this is not at all the bleak understanding that Hammad seeks to impart, which is rather a seemingly contradictory sense in Bil’in that our life is not worth living and yet if we will go on living our values, resisting Israel’s encroachments, and transcending their harmful intentions, by nurturing the pride and pleasure associated with sustaining our way of life in the face of hardships, humiliations, and humbling adjustments we will be living the best possible life given the circumstances. To get at this interface between despair and transcendence, Hammad enables us to listen closely to the voices of Bil’in’s people, which dominate the text. This witnessing by Bil’inians decries the pain of profound loss yet seamlessly affirms their pride and meaning of life by maintaining organic connections as best they can with the land and their ancestral homes by doing as much of what they did before the Wall by walking alone or with a friend in the arid wilderness beyond the fertile land or convening the village children and elders to take part in the annual olive harvests that are more than agricultural and livelihood happenings, but are truly sacred rituals that combine work, play, festivals of remembrance, and defiant reaffirmations of a sense of belonging that guns, settlements, and provocations are incapable of damaging, let alone destroying.

Along the way we become privy to many telling details that add credibility to this seeming impossible atmosphere of existential contradiction. For instance, the residents of Bil’in do not waste a moment of regret lamenting their decision to stay in their homes as near as possible to their land on the wrong side of the Wall, come what may in terms of settler violence, encroachment, and Israeli tactics of repression. On the contrary, those Palestinians who departed from their homes and land increased their experience of injustice and suffering associated with Israeli 1948 tactics of dispossession and subsequent reenactments of the nakba; in retrospect, those so coerced, should for their own sake have stayed, resisted, and even accepting death as preferable to displacement, however cruelly induced to attain the Zionist settler colonial goals.

In another telling example, Hammad show us how those Bil’in residents rendered unable to grow their own subsistence food on their diminished farmland, losing the dignity associated with living off the produce yielded from one’s own land as generations before them had done. A further creative initiative undertaken not only for practical reasons, but in the spirit of nonviolent resistance is a food sovereignty movement in Bil’in which seeks to act collectively as a community to maintain local subsistence living standards without outside dependence.

These ways of balancing the ordeal of the occupation against a resolve to live as authentically as possible in traditional ways is what most truly captures the complex truths of life in Bil’in. In other words, the weekly protests that gave Bil’in worldwide prominence are the visible display of stubborn resistance. These marches to the wall opposed by Israel’s active military presence are the front story, but it is the back story of the daily lived life of residents that is the core of a resistance-unto-death that is quietly enacted on an hourly basis by the people of Bil’in. This extended exposure to the voiced experiences of Bil’in’s residents also abandons the conventional reliance of scholarly inquiry on the binary optics of oppressor/victim or victim/resister. This enriches the appreciation that Palestinian life under occupation is not properly interpreted as an either/or reality, but is more truly constituted by a richer interwoven texture of creative adaptation, stubborn revolt, depressing captivity, and liberating defiance.

Suzanne Hammad’s relationship to this account of her experience in Bil’in is at once deeply personal while at the same time managing to uphold the best traditions of academic rigor. She does not obscure her own background whose father left Nablus in the 1967 War for the sake of economic opportunity to start a family outside, taking refuge in an Arab country. She makes no effort to offer a balancing rationale for the Zionist Project or set forth the Israeli security narrative, yet this book came across to me as not only revelatory but entirely trustworthy. Hammad attains her goals by allowing the people of Bil’in to speak about their lives in ways that enlighten readers no matter how familiar they are with the large literature on the Palestine struggle. This study is also a rebuke to those who insist that objectivity requires a total detachment from partisan perspectives by achieving an understanding of Palestinian resistance that has eluded conventional scholarship for more than seven decades.

There are some lingering questions that make me urge Hammad to consider undertaking a sequel.

            –Is this attachment to home and place especially strong in Bil’in because the fence/Wall bisects the lived life of the village, or has this sense of loss transcended the physicality of Bil’in to become part of a broader Palestinian imaginary by way of empathy and projection?

            –If after a few years, will a renewed immersion in Bil’in after a year or so confirm the persistence of Hammad’s findings, given the heightened Israeli provocations of the extremist leadership that took over the Israel government at the start of 2023, and put the West Bank at the top of its expansionist policy agenda?

            –How do the daily lives of city dwellers in Jenin or Nablus exhibit resistance in ways that either resemble or differ from Bil’in and from one other?

            –And even more wider afield, is everyday Palestinian resistance, with its pride of place and home attached to sumud unique to the Palestinian reality, or is it paralleled in other national situations of sustained repression of an ethnically distinct people in similar or differing ways? For example, Kashmir, Western Sahara, Catalonia, Tibet, Rohingya (Rakhine State, Myanmar)?

Hammad’s inspiring study has many additional ramifications that invite further study, but as a way of conceiving the Palestinian ordeal this book presents the most convincing, compassionate, and imaginative understanding of just how deep and abiding are the roots of Palestinian resistance. It is a great achievement as well as a loving tribute to the forms of resistance enacted by the village people of Bil’in against the apartheid regime of mighty Israel.

Richard Falk

Rome, July 24, 2023


Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything

            Starts and Ends with the Land (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)

This fascinating book gives us not only creative ways of grasping the underlying continuities of the Palestinian ordeal but also a truly original conception of why the long arc of resistance and resilience, stretching across time and taking certain distinctive forms, has been sustained for more than a century in the face of assorted trials and tribulations. None of these tests of Palestinian resistance was greater than the double assault on the fundamentals of Palestinian normalcy in the West Bank than that posed by the ever-expanding settlement movement and the connected construction of an encroaching Separation Wall on mostly occupied Palestinian land commencing in 2001.

Suzanne Hammad views the evolving Palestinian reality through an ethnographic lens that complements what the media reports, leaders and intellectuals have to say, and militants achieve by direct confrontation with the daily[MK1]  experience of Palestinians living under the heavy boot of Israel’s apartheid regime which pursues with accelerating vigor its own agenda of ethnic cleansing and dispossession of people from their land. To carry out such an exploration led Hammad to conduct her field research for three years in a single West Bank community, the village of Bil’in. The implications of her findings have a broad resonance for Palestinian studies as they illuminate the realities of many similar villages subject to occupation, and indeed inform the situation and consciousness of all Palestinians regardless of whether living under occupation, in Arab refugee camps, or in pre-1967 Israel. In this sense, Bil’in with its population of less than 2000 offers us a rich metaphor by which to decipher the entire Palestinian predicament, and better appreciate the various modes of response that underpin resistance not only to the existential abuses being experienced under occupation but to the foreshadowing of an inevitable liberation that Israel’s state violence is capable of punishing harshly, yet unable so far to destroy. It might even be unable to comprehend such resistance. It is bringing to light these under-appreciated facets of Palestinian sumud or steadfastness that makes this book illuminating reading for all who wish to gain a deeper comprehension of this tragic struggle that remains horizonless as to beginning and end.

Although Bil’in is but one of many West Bank villages, its selection by the author as her main case study is hardly accidental or arbitrary. This village distinguished itself from many other superficially similar villages in at least two important[MK2]  ways. First, residents experienced the severe intrusion of the Wall upon its living space, vividly exemplified by the barbed wire, electrified fence passing through Bil’in in ways that cut its residents off from 60% of their agricultural growing and grazing land, as well as the surrounding ‘empty’ areas used for recreation, reflection, and spiritual growth, including gatherings of the whole community during holidays, and even more during the harvesting times, especially of olives. Bil’in’s inhabitants were cut off by a permit system that was required to pass the single gate in the wall that granted them permission to go beyond the mostly residential part of the village, and in some cases, gain access to their own farmland. Secondly, residents reacted through collective anti-Wall protests every Friday for at least 15 years starting in 2005. The continuity and persistence of these protest dramatized Palestinian opposition to the Wall and the resolve of villagers to resist non-violently, yet with courage and resolve. This activism in Bil’in contrasted reliance on peaceful methods with the violent brutality of Israel’s apartheid regime, which imposes Jewish supremacy even in occupied Palestine and in defiance of international humanitarian law. In relation to the Wall, Israeli defiance became overt as Israel rejected the near unanimous (14-1) findings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 2004. Such an authoritative legal endorsement of Bil’in fundamental grievance added legitimacy to the Friday protests by confirming that it was unlawful for Israel to construct a supposed security Wall on Occupied Palestinian Territory, and hence the Wall should be dismantled, and the Palestinians given reparations for the harm sustained. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion was the related idea that Israel’s situating the Wall on Palestinian territory was more a land grab than a genuine security measure.

We ignore the special contribution of Hammad’s inquiry if we are content with this most visible level of interaction, which is to depict both the depth of Palestinian suffering and its transcendence in the lived daily life of the residents of Bil’in. On the one side a deprivation so severe that it prompts inhabitants to pronounce their condition by such sayings as ‘we’re alive only because we are not dead yet” or “if we had the chance we would choose death over living under occupation.” And yet, this is not at all the bleak understanding that Hammad seeks to impart, which is rather a seemingly contradictory sense in Bil’in that our life is not worth living and yet if we will go on living our values, resisting Israel’s encroachments, and transcending their harmful intentions, by nurturing the pride and pleasure associated with sustaining our way of life in the face of hardships, humiliations, and humbling adjustments we will be living the best possible life given the circumstances. To get at this interface between despair and transcendence, Hammad enables us to listen closely to the voices of Bil’in’s people, which dominate the text. This witnessing by Bil’inians decries the pain of profound loss yet seamlessly affirms their pride and meaning of life by maintaining organic connections as best they can with the land and their ancestral homes by doing as much of what they did before the Wall by walking alone or with a friend in the arid wilderness beyond the fertile land or convening the village children and elders to take part in the annual olive harvests that are more than agricultural and livelihood happenings, but are truly sacred rituals that combine work, play, festivals of remembrance, and defiant reaffirmations of a sense of belonging that guns, settlements, and provocations are incapable of damaging, let alone destroying.

Along the way we become privy to many telling details that add credibility to this seeming impossible atmosphere of existential contradiction. For instance, the residents of Bil’in do not waste a moment of regret lamenting their decision to stay in their homes as near as possible to their land on the wrong side of the Wall, come what may in terms of settler violence, encroachment, and Israeli tactics of repression. On the contrary, those Palestinians who departed from their homes and land increased their experience of injustice and suffering associated with Israeli 1948 tactics of dispossession and subsequent reenactments of the nakba; in retrospect, those so coerced, should for their own sake have stayed, resisted, and even accepting death as preferable to displacement, however cruelly induced to attain the Zionist settler colonial goals.

In another telling example, Hammad show us how those Bil’in residents rendered unable to grow their own subsistence food on their diminished farmland, losing the dignity associated with living off the produce yielded from one’s own land as generations before them had done. A further creative initiative undertaken not only for practical reasons, but in the spirit of nonviolent resistance is a food sovereignty movement in Bil’in which seeks to act collectively as a community to maintain local subsistence living standards without outside dependence.

These ways of balancing the ordeal of the occupation against a resolve to live as authentically as possible in traditional ways is what most truly captures the complex truths of life in Bil’in. In other words, the weekly protests that gave Bil’in worldwide prominence are the visible display of stubborn resistance. These marches to the wall opposed by Israel’s active military presence are the front story, but it is the back story of the daily lived life of residents that is the core of a resistance-unto-death that is quietly enacted on an hourly basis by the people of Bil’in. This extended exposure to the voiced experiences of Bil’in’s residents also abandons the conventional reliance of scholarly inquiry on the binary optics of oppressor/victim or victim/resister. This enriches the appreciation that Palestinian life under occupation is not properly interpreted as an either/or reality, but is more truly constituted by a richer interwoven texture of creative adaptation, stubborn revolt, depressing captivity, and liberating defiance.

Suzanne Hammad’s relationship to this account of her experience in Bil’in is at once deeply personal while at the same time managing to uphold the best traditions of academic rigor. She does not obscure her own background whose father left Nablus in the 1967 War for the sake of economic opportunity to start a family outside, taking refuge in an Arab country. She makes no effort to offer a balancing rationale for the Zionist Project or set forth the Israeli security narrative, yet this book came across to me as not only revelatory but entirely trustworthy. Hammad attains her goals by allowing the people of Bil’in to speak about their lives in ways that enlighten readers no matter how familiar they are with the large literature on the Palestine struggle. This study is also a rebuke to those who insist that objectivity requires a total detachment from partisan perspectives by achieving an understanding of Palestinian resistance that has eluded conventional scholarship for more than seven decades.

There are some lingering questions that make me urge Hammad to consider undertaking a sequel.

            –Is this attachment to home and place especially strong in Bil’in because the fence/Wall bisects the lived life of the village, or has this sense of loss transcended the physicality of Bil’in to become part of a broader Palestinian imaginary by way of empathy and projection?

            –If after a few years, will a renewed immersion in Bil’in after a year or so confirm the persistence of Hammad’s findings, given the heightened Israeli provocations of the extremist leadership that took over the Israel government at the start of 2023, and put the West Bank at the top of its expansionist policy agenda?

            –How do the daily lives of city dwellers in Jenin or Nablus exhibit resistance in ways that either resemble or differ from Bil’in and from one other?

            –And even more wider afield, is everyday Palestinian resistance, with its pride of place and home attached to sumud unique to the Palestinian reality, or is it paralleled in other national situations of sustained repression of an ethnically distinct people in similar or differing ways? For example, Kashmir, Western Sahara, Catalonia, Tibet, Rohingya (Rakhine State, Myanmar)?

Hammad’s inspiring study has many additional ramifications that invite further study, but as a way of conceiving the Palestinian ordeal this book presents the most convincing, compassionate, and imaginative understanding of just how deep and abiding are the roots of Palestinian resistance. It is a great achievement as well as a loving tribute to the forms of resistance enacted by the village people of Bil’in against the apartheid regime of mighty Israel.

Richard Falk

Rome, July 24, 2023


 [

Suzanne Hammad on Embedded Palestinian Resistance in Bil’in in West Bank: Rooted in Land and Home

6 Feb

[Prefatory Note: I wanted to share a foreword that I wrote to an exceptional ethnographic study of everyday resistance by residents of the Palestinian village of Bil’in, quite near Ramallah, based on the Suzanne Hammad three years of residence and informed observation. It enriches our understanding of core forms of resistance embedded in home and land. It offers a parallel to the commin perception of resistance as distinct protest activity, both violent and non-violent, for which Bil’in was previously international known as a result of its weekly protests that were provoked by the intrusive construction of the Israeli separation wall. This book written well before October 2023 when the genocidal onslaught by Israel on Gaza was published in 2023 by Rowman & Littlefield, and available in a Kindle edition, unfortunately with a high price-tag.]

Suzanne Hammad, Toward a Theory of Emplaced Resistances: Everything

            Starts and Ends with the Land, Foreword by Richard Falk, 2023.

This fascinating book gives us not only creative ways of grasping the underlying continuities of the Palestinian ordeal but also a truly original conception of why the long arc of resistance and resilience, stretching across time and taking certain distinctive forms, has been sustained for more than a century in the face of assorted trials and tribulations. None of these tests of Palestinian resistance was greater than the double assault on the fundamentals of Palestinian normalcy in the West Bank than that posed by the ever-expanding settlement movement and the connected construction of an encroaching Separation Wall on mostly occupied Palestinian land commencing in 2001.

Suzanne Hammad views the evolving Palestinian reality through an ethnographic lens that complements what the media reports, leaders and intellectuals have to say, and militants achieve by direct confrontation with the daily experience of Palestinians living under the heavy boot of Israel’s apartheid regime which pursues with accelerating vigor its own agenda of ethnic cleansing and dispossession of people from their land. To carry out such an exploration led Hammad to conduct her field research for three years in a single West Bank community, the village of Bil’in. The implications of her findings have a broad resonance for Palestinian studies as they illuminate the realities of many similar villages subject to occupation, and indeed inform the situation and consciousness of all Palestinians regardless of whether living under occupation, in Arab refugee camps, or in pre-1967 Israel. In this sense, Bil’in with its population of less than 2000 offers us a rich metaphor by which to decipher the entire Palestinian predicament, and better appreciate the various modes of response that underpin resistance not only to the existential abuses being experienced under occupation but to the foreshadowing of an inevitable liberation that Israel’s state violence is capable of punishing harshly, yet unable so far to destroy. It might even be unable to comprehend such resistance. It is bringing to light these under-appreciated facets of Palestinian sumud or steadfastness that makes this book illuminating reading for all who wish to gain a deeper comprehension of this tragic struggle that remains horizonless as to beginning and end.

Although Bil’in is but one of many West Bank villages, its selection by the author as her main case study is hardly accidental or arbitrary. This village distinguished itself from many other superficially similar villages in at least two important ways. First, residents experienced the severe intrusion of the Wall upon its living space, vividly exemplified by the barbed wire, electrified fence passing through Bil’in in ways that cut its residents off from 60% of their agricultural growing and grazing land, as well as the surrounding ‘empty’ areas used for recreation, reflection, and spiritual growth, including gatherings of the whole community during holidays, and even more during the harvesting times, especially of olives. Bil’in’s inhabitants were cut off by a permit system that was required to pass the single gate in the wall that granted them permission to go beyond the mostly residential part of the village, and in some cases, gain access to their own farmland. Secondly, residents reacted through collective anti-Wall protests every Friday for at least 15 years starting in 2005. The continuity and persistence of these protest dramatized Palestinian opposition to the Wall and the resolve of villagers to resist non-violently, yet with courage and resolve. This activism in Bil’in contrasted reliance on peaceful methods with the violent brutality of Israel’s apartheid regime, which imposes Jewish supremacy even in occupied Palestine and in defiance of international humanitarian law. In relation to the Wall, Israeli defiance became overt as Israel rejected the near unanimous (14-1) findings of the World Court’s Advisory Opinion of 2004. Such an authoritative legal endorsement of Bil’in fundamental grievance added legitimacy to the Friday protests by confirming that it was unlawful for Israel to construct a supposed security Wall on Occupied Palestinian Territory, and hence the Wall should be dismantled, and the Palestinians given reparations for the harm sustained. Implicit in the Advisory Opinion was the related idea that Israel’s situating the Wall on Palestinian territory was more a land grab than a genuine security measure.

We ignore the special contribution of Hammad’s inquiry if we are content with this most visible level of interaction, which is to depict both the depth of Palestinian suffering and its transcendence in the lived daily life of the residents of Bil’in. On the one side a deprivation so severe that it prompts inhabitants to pronounce their condition by such sayings as ‘we’re alive only because we are not dead yet” or “if we had the chance we would choose death over living under occupation.” And yet, this is not at all the bleak understanding that Hammad seeks to impart, which is rather a seemingly contradictory sense in Bil’in that our life is not worth living and yet if we will go on living our values, resisting Israel’s encroachments, and transcending their harmful intentions, by nurturing the pride and pleasure associated with sustaining our way of life in the face of hardships, humiliations, and humbling adjustments we will be living the best possible life given the circumstances. To get at this interface between despair and transcendence, Hammad enables us to listen closely to the voices of Bil’in’s people, which dominate the text. This witnessing by Bil’inians decries the pain of profound loss yet seamlessly affirms their pride and meaning of life by maintaining organic connections as best they can with the land and their ancestral homes by doing as much of what they did before the Wall by walking alone or with a friend in the arid wilderness beyond the fertile land or convening the village children and elders to take part in the annual olive harvests that are more than agricultural and livelihood happenings, but are truly sacred rituals that combine work, play, festivals of remembrance, and defiant reaffirmations of a sense of belonging that guns, settlements, and provocations are incapable of damaging, let alone destroying.

Along the way we become privy to many telling details that add credibility to this seeming impossible atmosphere of existential contradiction. For instance, the residents of Bil’in do not waste a moment of regret lamenting their decision to stay in their homes as near as possible to their land on the wrong side of the Wall, come what may in terms of settler violence, encroachment, and Israeli tactics of repression. On the contrary, those Palestinians who departed from their homes and land increased their experience of injustice and suffering associated with Israeli 1948 tactics of dispossession and subsequent reenactments of the nakba; in retrospect, those so coerced, should for their own sake have stayed, resisted, and even accepting death as preferable to displacement, however cruelly induced to attain the Zionist settler colonial goals.

In another telling example, Hammad show us how those Bil’in residents rendered unable to grow their own subsistence food on their diminished farmland, losing the dignity associated with living off the produce yielded from one’s own land as generations before them had done. A further creative initiative undertaken not only for practical reasons, but in the spirit of nonviolent resistance is a food sovereignty movement in Bil’in which seeks to act collectively as a community to maintain local subsistence living standards without outside dependence.

These ways of balancing the ordeal of the occupation against a resolve to live as authentically as possible in traditional ways is what most truly captures the complex truths of life in Bil’in. In other words, the weekly protests that gave Bil’in worldwide prominence are the visible display of stubborn resistance. These marches to the wall opposed by Israel’s active military presence are the front story, but it is the back story of the daily lived life of residents that is the core of a resistance-unto-death that is quietly enacted on an hourly basis by the people of Bil’in. This extended exposure to the voiced experiences of Bil’in’s residents also abandons the conventional reliance of scholarly inquiry on the binary optics of oppressor/victim or victim/resister. This enriches the appreciation that Palestinian life under occupation is not properly interpreted as an either/or reality, but is more truly constituted by a richer interwoven texture of creative adaptation, stubborn revolt, depressing captivity, and liberating defiance.

Suzanne Hammad’s relationship to this account of her experience in Bil’in is at once deeply personal while at the same time managing to uphold the best traditions of academic rigor. She does not obscure her own background whose father left Nablus in the 1967 War for the sake of economic opportunity to start a family outside, taking refuge in an Arab country. She makes no effort to offer a balancing rationale for the Zionist Project or set forth the Israeli security narrative, yet this book came across to me as not only revelatory but entirely trustworthy. Hammad attains her goals by allowing the people of Bil’in to speak about their lives in ways that enlighten readers no matter how familiar they are with the large literature on the Palestine struggle. This study is also a rebuke to those who insist that objectivity requires a total detachment from partisan perspectives by achieving an understanding of Palestinian resistance that has eluded conventional scholarship for more than seven decades.

There are some lingering questions that make me urge Hammad to consider undertaking a sequel.

            –Is this attachment to home and place especially strong in Bil’in because the fence/Wall bisects the lived life of the village, or has this sense of loss transcended the physicality of Bil’in to become part of a broader Palestinian imaginary by way of empathy and projection?

            –If after a few years, will a renewed immersion in Bil’in after a year or so confirm the persistence of Hammad’s findings, given the heightened Israeli provocations of the extremist leadership that took over the Israel government at the start of 2023, and put the West Bank at the top of its expansionist policy agenda?

            –How do the daily lives of city dwellers in Jenin or Nablus exhibit resistance in ways that either resemble or differ from Bil’in and from one other?

            –And even more wider afield, is everyday Palestinian resistance, with its pride of place and home attached to sumud unique to the Palestinian reality, or is it paralleled in other national situations of sustained repression of an ethnically distinct people in similar or differing ways? For example, Kashmir, Western Sahara, Catalonia, Tibet, Rohingya (Rakhine State, Myanmar)?

Hammad’s inspiring study has many additional ramifications that invite further study, but as a way of conceiving the Palestinian ordeal this book presents the most convincing, compassionate, and imaginative understanding of just how deep and abiding are the roots of Palestinian resistance. It is a great achievement as well as a loving tribute to the forms of resistance enacted by the village people of Bil’in against the apartheid regime of mighty Israel.

Richard Falk

Emergency London Conference to Stop Genocide in Gaza

2 Feb

Richard Falk discusses ICJ ruling and implications for Israel – YouTube

An interview given on Jan 27 to Middle East Eye during the Emergency London Conference
to stop genocide in Gaza, held a day after the ICJ grant of Provisional Measures
requested by South Africa. The prospect of non-compliance by Israel and its
enablers, shifts responsibility to civil society to overcome the implementation crisis
through global solidarity activism. Together with praise and assessment for the South African initiative,
the role of civil society was a major theme of the conference.