Tag Archives: legitimacy

International Law in Gaza: Legality and Legitimacy Perspectives

24 Jul

[Prefatory Note: this post needs updating, but it still seems relevant in pointing to the generally neglected interplay between legality and legitimacy as important modes of assessing conrroversial transnational behavior of states, especially with respect to the war/peace agenda of geopolitical actors, which for reasons of convenience I identiy as the five Permanent Members of the Security Council.]

Abstract: International law failed in Gaza after October 7 to stop genocide and crimes against humanity despite authoritative rulings by the ICJ and ICC, and resolutions in the UN General Assembly. Israel consistently defied international law, being shielded in doing so, by ‘lawful’ geopolitical shielding and complicity by the NATO permanent members of the UN Security Council, especially by the United States. Such obstruction created enforcement, complicity, and accountability gaps that has allowed Israel’s criminality to proceed. These formal legal condemnations of Israel’s conduct do support the conclusion that international law is weak whenever its assessments clash with strategic interests of geopolitical actors. This should not be interpreted to mean that international law is irrelevant to the pursuit of justice or rights-based peacemaking . International law remains potentially important as it legitimates civil society activism and solidarity initiatives with a people, in this case the Palestinians, struggling for their basic rights. Hypothetically, if the ICJ and ICC had sided with Israel, accepting legal arguments about Israel’s right of self-defense or the counter-terrorist nature of its use of force, then the contradictions between law and justice would have given Israel a (deeply contested) legal entitlement to carry out genocide, ethnic cleansing, and overall criminality. It is notable that most wars since 1945 have been won by the side that prevails in the Legitimacy War, and not as political realists continue to insist, by the side with superior military capabilities. That is capturing the high moral and legal ground in a violent conflict is often more decisive than dominating the battlefield as the colonial powers and the US should have discovered in the Vietnam War. A mobilized people as in the anti-apartheid campaign can shift the balance of political forces to favor human rights and justice. Whether this will happen in the Gaza context remains uncertain due to the severity of the genocide and the depth of complicit behavior by the governments of the liberal democracies, especially the United States.

Did International Law Fail in Gaza? Yes and No

The failures of international law in relation to the prolonged and cruel genocide taking place in Gaza for a period approaching two years are more obvious that its limited successes and positive, if indirect, impact of the underlying struggle to promote basic Palestinian rights. It seems appropriate to lament these failures as being far more consequential than any successes for the entrapped Palestinian civilian population of Gaza, with extended genocidal tremors bringing further misery to Palestinians living in the Occupied West Bank supposedly under Israeli protective administration legally required to respect international humanitarian law. The core failure of international law, and of the United Nations as the principal site for enforcement in situations of this kind, is the inability to implement authoritative renderings of international law that are of benefit to victimized persons suffering from pervasive criminality. In an early 2024 an Interim judgment of the International Court of Justice almost unanimously granted South African requests for Provisional Measures back in the first months of 2024, which if complied with or enforced would have greatly mitigated Palestinian suffering for all the months that followed.

Additionally, the International Criminal Court accepted the Chief Prosecutor’s dramatic recommendation that arrest warrants be issued for Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and former Minister of Defense, Yoav Gallant. It was unlikely at the time of issuance that these arrest warrants would never be actualized, but the struck a mighty symbolic blow that infuriated Israel and angered its ally, the United States. It was a persuasive step in challenging the public discourse that had previously held sway to the extent that Israel was the victimized party, not Gaza or the Palestinian, and it was Israel that had a legal entitlement to strike back. Although the arrest warrants covered crimes committed before October 7 they can a dark shadow over such Israeli pretensions that the IDF was ‘the most moral army in the world.’

Neither authoritative of these ejudicial initiative has been enforced, nor has the juridical actions even attempted to impose some level of accountability on those powerful states or their leaders whose governments aligned themselves with Israel by lending various forms and levels of material, strategic, and diplomatic support, making them complicit for failing to uphold the Genocide Convention’s emphasis on preventing and punishing the crime of genocide and seeking to end the impunity of geopolitical actors and their protected allies. Beyond this, the issue of corporate complicity has been almost totally neglected until the UN Special Rapporteur on Occupied Palestine. Francesca Albenese, controversially highlighted corporate compllicity in her June 2025 UN Report, which made her almost immediately subject to targeted unlawful sanctions imposed by the US Government in a defiant lawless challenge to the independence for UN experts.[1]

What is revealed is the normative order operative since 1945 is seriously deficient  when examined closely. It was never endowed with the autonomous capabilities to make international law effective in the face of non-compliance by a geopolitical actor (conveniently identified here as the five permanent members of the Security Council or P%) or a state enjoying geopolitical protection by way of the veto or by direct alignment by a formal alliance as with NATO members. In effect, for these two categories of sovereign states  (that is, violators and their powerful protectors) adherence to international law when it comes to global security issues is essentially voluntary and was intended to be so from the outset.[1] Nevertheless, from the perspectives of civil society activists or governments giving priority to a reconceptualization of national interests more in line with the contemporary global public good, international law has become a useful policy instrument for resistance on behalf of a global normative order that is post-geopolitical with respect at least in the setting of global security, war, genocide prevention, and human rights, including economic and social rights.[2]   

This defining operative reality of international law, even as progressively interpreted, in relation to the war/peace agenda can be summarized as producing several gaps that are responsible for widespread disappointment when it comes to the effectiveness of international law and lowered expectations of transcending geopolitics in relation to responses by the United Nations in this most vital area of international relations.[iii] For the sake of clarity these gaps can be briefly identified:

Enforcement Gap: The International Court of Justice in responding to South Africa’s formal submission alleging Israel’s violation of the Genocide Convention in the course of its military operations constituted genocide, displayed a juridical respect for a regulative view of international law in its near unanimous rulings that granted several of South Africa’s requests for interim measures given the humanitarian emergency conditions in Gaza.[iv] The ICJ is empowered to declare the law authoritatively in response to legal disputes referred to it for resolution, but it is dependent on compliance by the losing party or enforcement sanctions imposed by the Security Council, which are hampered by the veto (both its inhibiting prospect or actual exercise) in contexts with a geopolitical dimension.

In this instance Israel refused to comply with interim rulings based on a finding that it was ‘plausible’ to view Israel proclaimed intentions together with its combat tactics as genocide and the right of veto possessed by the NATO P5 members of the Security Council were standing by to nullify any serious enforcement efforts or punitive action. Additionally, the interim character of the ICJ judgment, although of historic significance, was an additional concern arising from ponderous legal proceedings that might take several years before a final judgment is forthcoming. At such a point, the genocidal reality will have been superseded by developments and the ICJ outcome would be mainly of significant as a precedent, yet itself weakened by a provision in the ICJ Statute denying any legal obligation to respect prior ICJ pronouncements.

Accountability Gap: As with enforcement, accountability for international wrongdoing is subject to a geopolitical exception that is illustrated by the approach taken after World War II (itself foreshadowed by the feeble effort to hold actors accountable for criminal acts dddafter World War I). This approach rejected accountability tied to violations of international law by all states during the war. In deference to geopolitics accountability was determined by the winners and imposed on the losers who were prosecuted and punished. This underlying dichotomy was given a ‘civilized veneer’ by according the accused losers of some elements of due process and the appearance of a fair trial. In contrast, the crimes of the winners, including indiscriminate bombing of German and Japanese cities and the use of atomic bombs, were not legally scrutinized, much less prosecuted and punished. From a regulative perspective this treated international law as a partisan policy instrument rather than as a universally applicable restraint on the behavior of sovereign states. This precedent set in the aftermath of World War II also incorporated these regressive features of international relations into the normative order established to cope with the unmet dangers of the nuclear age, as well as the related risks of the emergent Cold War.[v] In effect, global security and large-scale war prevention were entrusted to the P5 to address outside the framework of the UN, which resulted in arms races, periodic war/peace crises, reliance on secretive deterrence frameworks that were completely removed from any pretensions of legality or even some mechanism of custodial guardianship. This discretionary nuclearism was further geopoliticized by the selective nonproliferation regime that seems blind when it comes to Israel’s covert acquisition of a nuclear arsenal while committed to waging war against Iran to destroy its nuclear program, especially its enrichment facilities. The structure reveals a reliance on the prudence of political leaders of the nuclear weapons states, which seems a fragile basis on which to stake the future of the human species.

Complicity Gap: The reference here is to the legal responsibility of governments, corporations, banks, and international institutions/alliances that have either openly or covertly intentionally aided and abetted the commission of serious international crimes, including genocide. In the context of the Gaza genocide the support given to Israel by several Western governments was instrumental in carrying out the crime. It included the provision of weaponry, funds, intelligence-sharing, steadfast diplomatic protection against moves to censure or sanction, and a willingness to go along with Israel’s diversionary, manifestly false legal, moral historical narratives of self-defense counterterrorism, and antisemitism. The issue of criminal complicity was central to the 2025 SR Report containing data and analysis pointing to high profits from genocide gained by 48 named corporations and financial actors, including some of the most prominent. Such truth-telling by the SR, Francesca Albanese, led Israel’s primary supportive government, the United States, to impose the previously mentioned personal sanctions, themselves unlawful as applied to a UN undertaking. This punitive pushback by the US was obviously intended to inhibit criticism of the economic infrastructure of Israeli support, as well as to warn the ICC, the UN, and other political actors, including the Palestine Authority, to refrain from future efforts to attack Israel or the United States from the perspective of international law.[vi] It was also reinforced Israel’s defamatory propaganda that Ms. Albanese was long unfit for the job because of her antisemitic beliefs and performance as SR, thus wrongfully challenging UN attempts to expose human rights abuses and hold perpetrators accountable. In this instance, such action interfered with UN efforts relating to the genocide through reliance on the veto-free Special Procedures capabilities of Human Rights Council;

Pedagogical Gap: This may be the least familiar and yet in the long run the most significant gap, which in my view, is all-important for closing the other three gaps in the post-1945 global normative order. This pedagogical gap needs to be narrowed, if not closed, for there to be any realistic hope of incorporating a regulative view of international law into the worldview and operational code of foreign policy elites in relation to global security, war prevention, and crime prevention agendas.[2]

Yet the pedagogical gap is the most daunting ideological barrier because it remains unacknowledged reflecting the ideological hegemony of outmoded militarized versions of political realism  within the policymaking domains of geopolitical actors and their civilian infrastructures of well-funded lobbying on behalf of special interests and think tanks subscribing fully to the critical realism of governmental foreign policy establishments. There is no immediate way of overcoming this barrier, and my advocacy is initially directed at revamped citizenship training and public international law instruction and practice around the world. The central objective would be to place a greater emphasis on adapting political realism in international relations to the underlying urgencies of climate change, ecological instabilities, genocidal violence, the menace of nuclear weapons, and aggressive recourse to force to resolve international conflict situations. International law in its regulative role illuminated by critiques of geopolitical usages and historical international roles including giving legal backing to economic exploitation and colonial arrangement should be included in interdisciplinary and sophisticated law school instruction and scholarship. This should be understood as part of an upgraded and reconfigured perception of the relations between adherence to international law and the pursuit of national interests and the public good. As matters now stand the most influential centers of study and policy research are dominated by anachronistic ideas of legal and foreign policy pedagogy tied to various versions of militarized group think, intolerant even of such prudently inclined and morally sensitive political realist thinkers as John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, John Bacevich, and Trita Parti who continue to identify themselves ‘realists.’[3] I suppose their exclusion from Washington’s corps of foreign policy advisors is mainly due to their greater skepticism when it comes to national reliance on military approaches to foreign policy challenges. Such views are unwelcome and unrepresented in the inner circles of foreign policymaking of the geopolitical or P5 actors, perhaps most overtly in the United States, a telling sign that the military/industrial complex remains an impediment to the adoption, or even the serious discussion, of less militarist and more cooperative interpretations of global security.

Hopefully, the influence of TWAIL perspectives on younger generations of students and teachers will sharpen their critical convictions with what is identified here as ‘progressive interpretations of international law.’[vii] As is understandable TWAIL scholarship and advocacy has sought up to now mainly to criticize and reform international law in the economic sphere engaging the right to development from the perspectives and priorities of the Global South. In the future it seems reasonable to expect more attention to be devoted to policy challenges in the spheres of global security and war/peace. The Treat of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, 2021) is an example of Global South leadership with regard to denuclearization and abolition of nuclear weaponry. Another example is the degree to which challenging the enforcement gap with respect to the Gaza genocide have been due to legalist initiatives at the UN and elsewhere pushed almost exclusively by countries in the Global South.[viii]

Because of the political realist dominance in the policy realm of ideas, the subject-matter of public international law tends to be marginalized, except as it bears on trade and investment, in law schools, and most influential lawyers have little knowledge of either its constructive potential or its systemic disregard in policy-making arenas of decision. This should be challenged and changed, adapting cooperative multilaterism, which depends on codifying agreements in the form of enforceable treaties, to policy concerns of global scope. Future security, stability, and even species survival depend on making these adjustments in a timely manner, and will only happen as a result of civil society pressures, which until now have ranged from weak to non-existent

Reevaluating International Law’s Response to the Gaza Genocide: A Legitimacy War Perspective

Without underestimating the weaknesses of international law in relation to global security, war/peace issues, and genocidal internal politics, it is nevertheless even with these flaws an important policy instrument in the context of civil society activism and public discourse in relation to the quest for  demilitarized justice-driven peace and ecologically sensitive stability among states. With respect to the Gaza genocide, post-1945 international law with regard to this crime is set forth in the 1948 International Convention of Genocide that was relied upon by South Africa’s widely praised recourse to the ICJ, with interim proceedings at The Hague given wide TV coverage and receiving favorable coverage of the presentation of its principal allegations against Israel: violation of the Genocide Convention and unlawfully blocking the international delivery of humanitarian aid to the population of Gaza long deprived by Israel of the necessities of life. Such a visual and theatrical presentation of the international arguments for and against Israel’s policy in Gaza has had a major impact on the continuing process of delegitimizing Israeli claims of self-defense, counterterrorism, and antisemitism further informed by its contention of being victimized by the October 7 attack that it claims was ‘the real genocide.’

At the same time, the carefully crafted and TV broadcast legal arguments of the South African team lent legitimacy to the South African requests for interim measures on an emergency basis and the weaknesses of Israel’s responses had a major public delegitimizing impact, including on the previously self-censoring most influential international media platforms. These patterns were reinforced by the ICJ Interim Rulings granting South Africa’s requests for provisional measures, especially characterizing its principal allegation as ‘plausible genocide’ and ordering Israel to stop impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

What gave this historic interim set of rulings additional legal credibility was the near unanimous vote among the 16 participating judges, and beyond this, the professionalism of the legal reasoning and conclusions that did not mirror their national affiliations. This alone tended to refute US/Israeli dismissal of the legal outcome in the ICJ as matters of politics not law.[ix] Until the present, the media continued to self-censor explicit descriptions of Israel’s behavior in Gaza as ‘genocide,’ but recently the NY Times broke ranks with a guest column by an academic genocide specialist, Omar Bartov, although ambiguously as it published prominently a notorious genocide-denier, Bret Stephens, a few days later. Yet on balance part of the delegitimating trends affecting Israel’s stature as a state among states is the normalizing of ‘genocide’

Even though the enforcement gap precluded implementation of the ICJ rulings, the decision is correctly interpreted as having as a breakthrough in the civil society protest efforts to turn the tide of discourse and public opinion in the Legitimacy War that up to then Israel, benefitting from Western governmental, media self-censorship, and Israeli inflated accounts of supposed Hamas atrocities slanting public perceptions to forgo judging the severity of Israel’s response for several months. This attitude of indulgence was largely abetted by decontextualizing the October 7 attack to enable Israel’s response to seem within the scope of reasonableness in asserting a self-defense rationale for its retaliatory attack. This shielded Israel from criticism and censure throughout the remainder of 2023.[x] As important as the formal behavior of the established intergovernmental tribunals were in the legitimacy competition, the voice of independent experts, most notably associated with the Special Procedures mechanisms established by the UN Human Rights Council, especially the brilliant institutional innovation of appointing Special Rapporteurs to address significant human rights themes or problematic country conditions.[xi] Partly due to Israel’s sensitivity about criticism, its formidable media influence, and the Zionist diaspora lobbying and support network, the SRs for Occupied Palestine have increasingly become a controversial center of attention either by way of praise for their truthful reports despite harassment intended to be disabling or because of the relentless campaigns to question their credibility as impartial experts. This dynamic peaked during the first three years of Francesca Albanese six-year tenure, climaxing with the US Government imposition of unprecedented and legally questionable sanctions on July 9, 2025, barring her entry to the US and freezing any American assets she might possess.[xii]

The formation of the Gaza Peoples Tribunal is a further legitimating development with respect to the Palestinian struggle and its Sarajevo Declaration is a clear statement of opposition to Israel’s policies and the complicity of most liberal democracies.[xiii] A further legitimizing development if the courageous civil society efforts to offset Israeli refusal to allow unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid is by way of the Freedom Flotilla initiatives, that also were delegitimizing as far as Israel is concerned due to crude attempts to disrupt the delivery missions, punitively seizing of the nonviolent activists undertaking these hazardous voyages, culminating with their detention and deportation.[xiv]

A further symbolic battleground in the Legitimacy War is being struck by governments mainly in the Global South, so far most noticed by the activism of the Hague Group, which met at Bogotá in July at the invitation of co-chairs from South Africa and Columbia, featuring an opening inspirational remarks by Francesca Albanese and ending with the issuance of a statement signed by representative of 12 governments recommending the adoption of six measures intended to exert pressure on Israel to end the Gaza genocide.[xv] Earlier supporters of Israel’s genocide in Gaza have been showing some signs of opposition as evidenced by the ambiguous decisions of France, UK, and Canada to recognize Palestinian statehood belatedly and conditionally and the  UK parliamentary inquiry initiated by Jeremy Corbyn seeking an end to British support for Israeli genocide in Occupied Palestine.[xvi]

Israel itself contributed to its rogue status by a series of delegitimating acts, none perhaps more impactful than its combat policies causing severe hunger and massive malnutrition in Gaza, and then cloaked in by fake claims associated with the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. This policy has resulted in more than one thousand deaths due to starvation, including young children, and IDF sniper violence at the food delivery sites. Such a genocidal policy provoked large-scale protests including in Western countries. Israel and the US policies associated with the weaponization of humanitarian aid in the cruelest imaginable manner, initially by formally excluding UNRWA and other international actors from aid delivery in Gaza on the unsubstantiated grounds that a tiny fraction of its Palestinian personnel was implicated in the events of October 7 or diverted to Hamas. It turned out after an investigation to be based on flimsy evidence alleging 12 UNRWA staff of an estimated 13,000 collaborated with Hamas in carrying out the attack. Israel succeeded in mounting an effective, punitive propaganda campaign to defund UNRWA, although its humanitarian work of providing health services, education, food, and shelter for many thousand Palestinian refugees despite enduring more than 300 staff deaths resulting from Israeli targeted bombardments of UNRWA facilities.[xvii]

As appalling was its response to criticism for denying international deliveries of desperately needed food was to set up a ‘Gaza Humanitarian Foundation,’ funded and administered by the US together with Israel, relying on supervision by a US ‘private contractors’ (mercenaries) to run the four Gaza food distribution centers inconveniently located in comparison with both the 400 such sites humanely situated and managed for decades by UNRWA in contrast to the IDF lethal violence Palestinians encountered at the GHF sites, which have resulted in more than 1000 deaths among the crowds of hungry Palestinians seeking urgently needed food for their starving families and themselves. This practice was daily reported visually and narrated extensively in previously self-censoring sites by brave journalists that risked being targeted themselves, with an intensifying delegitimizing effect on underlying perceptions of Israeli outrageous benign claims of humanitarian intentions. Israel’s plans to construct a ‘Humanitarian City’ built as a confinement center for Palestinians displaced by Israeli operations during the period of reconstruction is another Orwellian deep dive into the severest forms of repression disguised as ‘humanitarianism.’  Such transparent deceptions accentuate Israel’s delegitimating way of dealing with a resident civilian population forcibly torn from its devastated homeland and deep nationalist attachments to the land of its ancestors. Such an initiative has even been denounced by Israel’s former Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert. 

Also relevant to this recital of delegitimizing policies and practice is Israel’s defiant responses manifested ever since its establishment to authoritative rulings of international law as expressed by the ICJ and ICC, as well as toward majoritarian criticisms of Israel’s failure to respect international law or human rights in numerous General Assembly resolutions and in its rejections of its obligations in international humanitarian law as encapsulated in the 4th Geneva Convention governing Belligerent Occupation regulating Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories resulting from the 1967 War.[xviii] 

In effect, the combination of Palestine’s enhanced legitimacy due in large part due to having international law and morality on its side, as reinforced by Israel’s reliance on complementary delegitimizing policies and practices exhibiting a patterns of behavior evident long before October 7. It can be traced back to the ethnic cleansing inflicted by the Nakba in 1948 and forward to apartheid structures of Israeli practice as analyzed and assessed in a serides of expert studies by the most respected human rights NGOs and by the UN Economic and Social Council of West Asia (ESCWA).[xix] It is highly incriminating that the liberal democracies of the West, priding themselves on anti-racist progress in their own countries and supportive of the anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa, remained silent until this day in the face of these persuasive indictments of Israeli racism.

Causal linkages are difficult to establish, but this kind of pushback against Israel’s policies toward Occupied Palestine, have had the tendency to shift the balance of legitimacy decisively during the prior two years in favor of the Palestinian narrative in the Legitimacy War. The early results have been to lead governments supportive of Israel in Europe and elsewhere to start back pedaling, and to lead the citizenries in these countries to shift policies and behavior more strongly in the direction of the implementation of Palestinian rights under international law, especially in relation to the recognition and realization of the Palestinian inalienable right of self-determination. Whether recent trends toward the recognition of Palestinian statehood are an empty gesture meant to convey a concern for Palestinian interests or a  long overdue signal of a transformative shift in the approach of Western countries to Israel/Palestinian conflict remains hidden within a smoky crystal ball. In forthcoming diplomacy it may be, as the once promising Oslo diplomacy turned out to be, a trap for Palestinians and a gateway to annexation or Bantuization of  Palestinian aspirations.

Concluding Observations

The law/legitimacy nexus is particularly relevant in the course of an anti-colonial struggle, making it of great significance that the settler colonial template has come to displace the earlier Zionist narratives relating to a post-Holocaust sanctuary for a Jewish homeland and a modernizing twist captured in the phrase ‘making the desert bloom.’ The combination of Palestinian rights denied and Israeli wrongs confirmed, gives international law leverage in the legitimacy debate that arises in the course of all self-determination and liberation struggles, and by reference to the historical record shows, contrary to the postulates of the political realists, that the side with the inferior military capability has most often politically prevailed since 1945. The British discovered this in India and Malaya, the French in Algeria and Indochina, the Dutch in Indonesia, and the Americans in Vietnam. Inferior military capabilities of colonized nations were neutralized by the outcome of the Legitimacy Wars, despite the great suffering inflicted in the process, because the nationalism of the resident population was willing to outlast the repressive side due to its deep legal, moral, and psychological beliefs in the righteousness and achievability of their struggle. 

This is a lesson of the last 80 years that adherents are incapable of learning because it would entail an abandonment of militarized geopolitics and encourage adherence to a functionally grounded cooperative multilateralism more congruent with the global public good, adherence to international law and morality, and redirecting resources from militarism to mitigating dangers of nuclear war, global warming, energy transition, and ecological instability.

The immediate application of this analysis to the Palestinian ordeal is almost impossible, partly due to its complex interaction with several other daunting issues of international relations. Zionism is not just a dominant ideology in Israel, reinforced by Holocaust nightmares and ultra-religious patterns of justification, that also has so far benefitted from a sophisticated network of overseas influence. Beyond this, the West still covets Western hegemony in the Middle East for its energy reserves, as well as its markets for weaponry and Western goods, and geographical proximity to trade routes. Despite the collapse of European colonialism, the US has led the post-colonial project of imperial exploitation and domination in the region with Israel as a crucial strategic partner. This is not just an economic undertaking, it is an inregral aspect of ‘the clash of civilization’ anticipated by Samuel Huntington in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, and still the locus of key fault lines, epitomized by the Palestinian challenge to Israel and Iran’s hostility to West encroachment, and secularism.[xx]

The key question that follows from the Palestinian victory in the Legitimacy War is whether a coherent Palestinian nation can still emerge from the hot embers of the Gaza genocide. In the aftermath will the national movement among Palestinians, including those confined to refugee camps for decades, will flourish and avoid being dispersed physically and fragmented politically. In effect, will the remarkable Palestinian sumud, resistance, and resilience be able to regroup and remain sufficiently committed to achieve a pragmatically shaped solution of a quality that brought unexpected constitutional democracy to South Africa?  

[1] See report to UN by Francesca Albanese, “From the Economy of Occupation to the Economy of Genocide,” A/HRC/r9/13, 16 June 2025.   Sameur in France.  GNQP Statement; SHAPE Statement

[1] Some prominent examples in the Gaza context are the normative encounters between the independent legal experts of the UN Human Rights Council, especially in relation to the last four Special Rapporteurs (SRs) for Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967. For pre-Albanese assessments by three prior UN SRs see Richard Falk, John Dugard, and Richard Falk: Protecting Human Rights in Palestine: Working Through the United Nations, Clarity Press, 2022. Such encounters have been highlighted in the intense friction between SR Francesca Albanese and governments supporting

the reputation of international lawyers and legalism in the context of international relations. By ‘progressive’ is meant that international law is interpreted as a regulative framework rather than a policy instrument subject to double standards in responding to the polices of adversaries and to those of allies and properly criticized as exercises in moral hypocrisy and state propaganda that undermines the reputation of international lawyers and legalism in the context of international relations. See Falk & Hans von Sponeck, Liberating the United Nations: Realism with Hope, Stanford University Press 2024. In light of the support of Israeli genocide on the part of most liberal democracies, the hopefulness expressed by the title is seems naïve, at least in the short run. 

[1] See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel),  ICJ interim decisions, 26 January 2024, 28 March 2024. See generally Alexander Wentker, “More and More Disputes on War and Genocide are being Litigated at the International Court of Justice,” Chatham House Report, 4 September 2024.

[1] See Richard H. Minear, Victors’ Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, Princeton University Press, 2016; Gary J. Bass, Judgment at Tokyo: World War II on Trial and the Remaking of Modern Asia, Knopf, 2023.

[1] Relevant here is the focus of the Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the international crime. At least for parties to the treaty, this would seem to brand complicity as prima facie participation in the crime. But see Reed Rubenstein, Senior Legal Advisor of US Secretary of State, as warning the ICC that ‘all options are on the table’ if it does not refrain from hostile acts against Israel or the US, governments, states that deny the jurisdiction of the ICC in relation to themselves as non-parties to the Rome Statute establishing the legal framework of the ICC. The Rome Statute in fact claims jurisdiction over non-signatories if the alleged crime occurs on the sovereign territory of a treaty party, in this instance Palestine. Of course, Rubenstein although has a title that suggests a legalist perspective made a purely political, really a geopolitical argument at the UN that is implicitly dismissive of legal relevance. “US threatens ICC: Drop Israel war crimes probe or ‘all options on the table,’ Middle East Eye [ https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/united-states-icc-drop-israel-war-crimes-probe-all-options-table]

[1] Hidden here, is the biasing of judgment by the strong influence of special interests as evidenced by the US Congressional bipartisan and shameful honorific welcoming of Israel’s Prime Minister despite his notorious role as the chief and most unapologetic perpetrator of the Gaza genocide. These special interests associated with strategic alignments and economic benefits involve a maximum effort to at the reassertion of Western dominance of the world after the collapse of European colonialism and the end of the Cold War as serving economic interests. In different ways the three recent armed conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran are manifestation of both this urge to dominate and to deter Russia and China from mounting challenges.

[1] Among the most notable challenges of a legalist character have been the South African submission to the ICJ in late 2023, the Hague Group challenge at Bogotá of July 2025, and several UN General Assembly Resolutions seeking international guidance with respect to a mandatory ceasefire and the legal status of Israel role under the 4th Geneva Convention of being the Occupying Power of Palestinian Territories after 1967, including Gaza. On the latter see authoritative near unanimous Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, “Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Territory, including Gaza,” 19 July 2024.   In contrast, the Western liberal democracies of Europe and North America have refused to subject Israel’s response to the October 7 attack to legal scrutiny, and have endorsed and materially supported its genocidal response, unreservedly until a groundswell of civil society protests have induced all of Israel’s supporters except for the US to engage in ‘damage control’ by acting in defiance of Israel wishes such as belated recognition of Palestinian statehood, often accompanied by conditional clauses that would withdraw the statehood pledge or that impose conditions on the Palestinians such as hostage release.

[1] Only one ICJ judge, Julia Subutinde from Uganda, relied on this absurdly distorted reasoning and voted against all of the rulings in the South Africa genocide submission on the ground that since she regarded the dispute as ‘political’ rather than ‘legal’ dispute, and hence, the ICJ lacked jurisdictional authority. It seems absurd and distorted in view of the clearly legal contention that Israel was violating provisions of the Genocide Convention.

[1] by portraying the Hamas attack as worst-case ‘terrorism’ with no account taken of Israel’s numerous and unapologetic violations of international law, including defying the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 on its Separation Wall and violations of the Apartheid Convention(1973) as well as the legal duties spelled out in the 4th Geneva Convention, the context including a punitively interpreted blockade established in 2007 after Hamas’ electoral victory the prior year; Israel’s complacency in view of several reliable warnings of an impending attack from Gaza and its appearance of seeking a pre-planned pretext for activating its obviously planned end game of territorial annexation and Palestinian ethnic and political erasure to be put into operation under the cover of a response to the Hamas attack

[1] The Human Rights Council has 48 thematic and 14 country mandates, each with an appointed special rapporteur, normally serving without compensation for two three-year terms. Special rapporteur can withdraw by resigning at any point, and can be challenged by the Assembly of 47 UN member states for exceeding or departing from the designated scope of the mandate. 

[1] For pre-Albanese experience of the three prior SRs see Falk, Note 2. Also, Marjorie Cohn, “Ex-UN Special Rapporteur says Francesca Albanese Deserves Nobel Prize, Not US Sanctions,” Truthout, July 14, 2025

[1] See Gaza Peoples Tribunal issued the Sarajevo Declaration of the Gaza Tribunal on May 29, 2025.

[1] Rosane, Olivia, “Israeli Navy Seizes Second Gaza-Bound Freedom Flotilla Vessel in 2 Months,” Common Dreams, July 26, 2025.

[1] Hague Group, Emergency Conference of States, Bogotá, 2025, attended by 30 countries, addressed by Francesca Albanese, Issued “Joint Statement on the Conclusion of the Emergency Conference on Palestine,” 16 July 2025, committing 13 signatory countries to integration into their domestic legal systems the acceptance and implementation of six concrete measures, including an arms embargo, prohibition of carriage of military equipment to Israel by ships flying their national flag, comply with international law duty to take actions to prevent genocide and seek accountability for all serious international crimes, and seek to accept universal jurisdiction as a national judicial basis for granting victims of Israeli abuses in Occupied Palestine Territories a means to seek legal redress for harms suffered.

[1] The motivations behind these recent various moves by France, Germany, and Canada purporting to affirm Palestinian statehood, in the face of Israeli and US objections, is to revive the failed ‘two-state Oslo diplomacy’ under the less favorable conditions. If ever implement by the present configuration of forces it would likely eventuate in a Palestinian ‘bantustan statelet’ demilitarized and neutralized. Although it might curtail the full realization of the Zionist Project, its proponents would insist that such acts are as far as Palestinian self-determination and identity claims can be acknowledged. Such an outcome would in no way would fulfill the liberation criteria attached to the fulfillment of the Palestinian right of self-determination by authentic Palestinian representatives. This ‘solution’ would leave Israel free to maintain Zionist apartheid views of Jewish supremacy as embodied in the adoption by the Knesset of the 2018 Basic Law. See detailed Chinese Academy Newsletter, “Palestine as a Battleground in the US-France Influence Game,” 28 July 2025, carefully analyzing the French calculations underlying Macron’s declaration of support for Palestinian statehood. Although an incisive analysis it understates the role of domestic pressures in shaping the Macron decision.

 

[1] See Ian Martin UN, “UNHQ Report of Inquiry into Incidents in the Gaza Strip,” bearing on Israel discrediting attacks and punitive exclusions of UNRWA and other UN Gaza humanitarian aid initiatives.

[1] See especially the two near unanimous outcomes in the ICJ: The Advisory Opinion of July 19, 2024 and the Interim Judgment of the ICJ on March 26, 2024 as cited in Notes 4 & 8. The arrest warrants issued by the ICC have had a delegitimizing impact that exceeds their legal relevance as accountability measures. Unlike the ICJ the ICC is not part of the UN and several important states have declined to become parties to the Rome Statute, the treaty framework governing ICC proceedings, including Israel and the US, as well as Russia and China. Along with other states who are parties, these governments refuse to cooperate with the ICC in relation to the implementation of arrest warrants, which means the ICC remains unable to pursue indictment, prosecution, and punishment phases of international criminal law enforcement.

[1] See Falk & Virginia ; HRW; AI; B’Tselem

[1] Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, 1996, which is a revised version of his much-debated 1993 article in Foreign Affairs in the same year, and notable for substituting China for Islam as the primary adversary of the US and the West after the Cold War.


 

[1] International law, as is all law, itself is subject to sharp critiques as serving the interests of the rich and powerful in the Global West, including with respect to the subject-matter of war and peace if assessed from the perspective of justice rather than interests. The two world wars and anti-colonial movements of the last century made some impact on this prior experience as did jurisprudential contributions of scholars (e.g. Balakrishnan Rajgopal, Upendra Baxi) from the Global South, giving rise to the TWAIL movement that continues, and seeks to align international law with justice as with the development of right to development, the principle of self-determination, and rights of resistance by peoples subject. Oona Hathaway and Shapiro accord great significance to the Pact of Paris (1928) outlawing aggressive war in their book. And the advent of nuclear age made war prevention a practical imperative for all states, but eventuated in the normalization of this category of weaponry, splitting the governments of the world between a reliance on deterrence and calls for nuclear disarmament signaled by the Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), a project of the Global South, so far rejected by leading governments in the Global North. It remains the case that ‘political realism’ controls the foreign policy of leading countries, and reflects the economic and political interests of predatory capitalism, militarized geopolitical calculations, and post-colonial imperialism. The UN after 1945 allowed the ‘winners’ to enjoy impunity for their international crimes (but not the ‘losers’) and to shape the future of world order by continuing to base global security on preserving the freedom of action of the victors in World War II. What has changed is that there now exists an alternative international law discourse, more closely aligned with the public good, that is available to challenge the behavior of geopolitical actors, but not yet influential in shaping the foreign policy of geopolitical actors. Henry Kissinger, the arch realist of our time admitted his annoyance with assistants who reminded him of relevant constraints of international law that he believed should be seen in the formation of war/peace statecraft.  

[2] Adopting a ‘regulatory’ perspective toward international law does not ensure justice but only promises consistency in the application of law, and respect for the authoritativeness of decisions by institutions such as the ICJ and ICC that are empowered to resolve legal disputes. Such an understanding of a law-oriented approach has recently been Government indirectly repudiated by the US, perhaps most clearly by its announced sanctions on Palestinian Authority officials because of their role in the ‘internationalization’

of the Gaza conflict by their submissions to the ICJ and ICC, an action described in the sanctioning statement as contrary to ‘the national security interests’ of the US. See BBC coverage,  

[3]


[1] See report to UN by Francesca Albanese, “From the Economy of Occupation to the Economy of Genocide,” A/HRC/59/13, 16 June 2025.  GNQP Statement; SHAPE Statement

[2] Some prominent examples in the Gaza context are the normative encounters between the independent legal experts of the UN Human Rights Council, especially in relation to the last four Special Rapporteurs (SRs) for Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967. For pre-Albanese assessments by three prior UN SRs see Richard Falk, John Dugard, and Richard Falk: Protecting Human Rights Through the United Nations: , Clarity Press, 2023. Such encounters have been highlighted in the intense friction between SR Francesca Albanese and governments supporting Israel’s military operations in Gaza, dramatically highlighted by sanctions imposed on her, barring entry and freezing private economic assets. See Falk, “Sanctioning Francesca Albanese,” The Nation, July 15, 2025. See also law-influenced initiatives of the Gaza Peoples Tribunal, The Hague Group, and Ahmet Davutoglu & Richard Falk, ed., Genocide in Gaza: Global Voices of Conscience, Clarity Press, 2025. Sanctioning Albanese appears to violate two relevant international treaties binding on the US: Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (the Host Country Agreement).

[iii] By ‘progressive’ is meant that international law is interpreted as a regulative framework rather than a policy instrument subject to double standards in responding to the polices of adversaries and to those of allies and properly criticized as exercises in moral hypocrisy and state propaganda that undermines the reputation of international lawyers and legalism in the context of international relations. See Falk & Hans von Sponeck, Liberating the United Nations: Realism with Hope, Stanford University Press 2024. In light of the support of Israeli genocide on the part of most liberal democracies, the hopefulness expressed by the title is seems naïve, at least in the short run.

[iv] See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel),  ICJ interim decisions, 26 January 2024, 28 March 2024. See generally Alexander Wentker, “More and More Disputes on War and Genocide are being Litigated at the International Court of Justice,” Chatham House Report, 4 September 2024.

[v] See Richard H. Minear, Victors’ Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, Princeton University Press, 2016; Gary J. Bass, Judgment at Tokyo: World War II on Trial and the Remaking of Modern Asia, Knopf, 2023.

[vi] Relevant here is the focus of the Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the international crime. At least for parties to the treaty, this would seem to brand complicity as prima  facie participation in the crime. But see Reed Rubenstein, Senior Legal Advisor of US Secretary of State, as warning the ICC that ‘all options are on the table’ if it does not refrain from hostile acts against Israel or the US, governments, states that deny the jurisdiction of the ICC in relation to themselves as non-parties to the Rome Statute establishing the legal framework of the ICC. The Rome Statute in fact claims jurisdiction over non-signatories if the alleged crime occurs on the sovereign territory of a treaty party, in this instance Palestine. Of course, Rubenstein although has a title that suggests a legalist perspective made a purely political, really a geopolitical argument at the UN that is implicitly dismissive of legal relevance.

[vii] Hidden here, is the biasing of judgment by the strong influence of special interests as evidenced by the US Congressional bipartisan and shameful honorific welcoming of Israel’s Prime Minister despite his notorious role as the chief and most unapologetic perpetrator of the Gaza genocide. These special interests associated with strategic alignments and economic benefits involve a maximum effort to at the reassertion of Western dominance of the world after the collapse of European colonialism and the end of the Cold War as serving economic interests. In different ways the three recent armed conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran are manifestation of both this urge to dominate and to deter Russia and China from mounting challenges.

[viii] Among the most notable challenges of a legalist character have been the South African submission to the ICJ in late 2023, the Hague Group challenge at Bogotá of July 2025, and several UN General Assembly Resolutions seeking international guidance with respect to a mandatory ceasefire and the legal status of Israel role under the 4th Geneva Convention of being the Occupying Power of Palestinian Territories after 1967, including Gaza. On the latter see authoritative near unanimous Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, “Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Territory, including Gaza,” 19 July 2024.   In contrast, the Western liberal democracies of Europe and North America have refused to subject Israel’s response to the October 7 attack to legal scrutiny, and have endorsed and materially supported its genocidal response, unreservedly until a groundswell of civil society protests have induced all of Israel’s supporters except for the US to engage in ‘damage control’ by acting in defiance of Israel wishes such as belated recognition of Palestinian statehood, often accompanied by conditional clauses that would withdraw the statehood pledge or that impose conditions on the Palestinians such as hostage release.

[ix] The sole ICJ judge that bought this absurdly distorted reasoning was the Ugandan judge who voted against all of the rulings on the ground that since it was a political rather than legal dispute the ICJ lacked jurisdictional authority.

[x] By portraying the Hamas attack as worst-case ‘terrorism’ with no account taken of Israel’s numerous and unapologetic violations of international law, including defying the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 on its Separation Wall and violations of the Apartheid Convention(1973) as well as the legal duties spelled out in the 4th Geneva Convention, the context including a punitively interpreted blockade established in 2007 after Hamas’ electoral victory the prior year; Israel’s complacency in view of several reliable warnings of an impending attack from Gaza and its appearance of seeking a pre-planned pretext for activating its obviously planned end game of territorial annexation and Palestinian ethnic and political erasure to be put into operation under the cover of a response to the Hamas attack

[xi] The Human Rights Council has 48 thematic and 14 country mandates, each with an appointed special rapporteur, normally serving without compensation for two three-year terms. Special rapporteur can withdraw by resigning at any point, and can be challenged by the Assembly of 47 UN member states for exceeding or departing from the designated scope of the mandate. 

[xii] For pre-Albanese experience of the three prior SRs see Falk, Note 2. Also, Marjorie Cohn, “Ex-UN Special Rapporteur says Francesca Albanese Deserves Nobel Prize, Not US Sanctions,” Truthout, July 14, 2025

[xiii] See Gaza Peoples Tribunal, Sarajevo Declaration

[xiv] Rosane, Olivia, “Israeli Navy Seizes Second Gaza-Bound Freedom Flotilla Vessel in 2 Months,” Common Dreams, July 26, 2025.

[xv] Hague Group, Emergency Conference of States, Bogata, 2025, attended by 30 countries, addressed by Francesca Albanese, Issued a “Joint Statement on the Conclusion of the Emergency Conference on Palestine,” 16 July 2025, committing 13 signatory countries to integration into their domestic legal systems the acceptance and implementation of six concrete measures, including an arms embargo, prohibition of carriage of military equipment to Israel by ships flying their national flag, comply with international law duty to take actions to prevent genocide and seek accountability for all serious international crimes, and seek to accept universal jurisdiction as a national judicial basis for granting victims of Israeli abuses in Occupied Palestine Territories a means to seek legal redress for harms suffered.

[xvi] As Craig Mokiber has pointed out the idea behind this international move toward Palestinian statehood is the establishment of a ‘bantustan statelet’ demilitarized and neutralized, and by such acts be done with Palestinian identity claims, which in no way would fulfill the liberation criteria of the Palestinian right of self-determination. Leaving Israel free to maintain Zionist views of Jewish supremacy as depicted in the adoption by the Knesset in the 2018 Basic Law. See Chinese Academy Newsletter analyzing the French announced declaration of support for Palestinian statehood

[xvii] See Ian Martin UN, “UNHQ Report of Inquiry into Incidents in the Gaza Strip,” bearing on Israel discrediting attacks and punitive exclusions of UNRWA and other UN Gaza humanitarian aid initiatives.

[xviii] See especially the two near unanimous outcomes in the ICJ: The Advisory Opinion of July 19, 2024 and the Interim Judgment of the ICJ on March 26, 2024 as cited in Notes 4 & 8. The arrest warrants issued by the ICC have had a delegitimizing impact that exceeds their legal relevance as accountability measures. Unlike the ICJ the ICC is not part of the UN and several important states have declined to become parties to the Rome Statute, the treaty framework governing ICC proceedings, including Israel and the US, as well as Russia and China. Along with other states who are parties, these governments refuse to cooperate with the ICC in relation to the implementation of arrest warrants, which means the ICC remains unable to pursue indictment, prosecution, and punishment phases of international criminal law enforcement.

[xix] See Falk & Virginia ; HRW; AI; B’Tselem

[xx] Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, 1906, which is a revised version of his much debated articles in Foreign Affairs in the same year, and notable for substituting China for Islam as the primary adversary of the US and the West after the Cold War.

ACTING BEYOND THE STATE: TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN AWAKENING?

20 Jun

[Prefatory Note: The following review of Ayça Çubukçu’s For the Love of Humanityis scheduled to appear in a forthcoming issue of the London Review of International Law.]

 

ACTING BEYOND THE STATE: TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN AWAKENING?

 

Ayça Çubukçu,For the Love of Humanity: The World Tribunal on Iraq, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018.

 

 

Ayça Çubukçu’s For the Love of Humanity theorizes the global anti-war movement occasioned by the Iraq War of 2003 around her experience of involvement in an elaborate global initiative culminating in a tribunal established by ‘world citizens’ that held its final session in Istanbul. Beyond question, the Iraq War Tribunal (WTI) was an extraordinary undertaking from start to its finish, a worldwide non-hierarchical network of civil society activists that prior to the Istanbul finale in 2005 had organized separate tribunal sessions devoted to the Iraq War in major cities around the world including London, Seoul, Copenhagen, New York, Stockholm, several Japanese cities, Rome, Frankfurt, Genoa, Barcelona, Lisbon. Although there are many examples of prior citizen tribunalson a variety of controversial issues, none before achieved this global scale or were guided by such a grand visionary ambition.

 

The acknowledged inspirational origin of the WTI was the Bertrand Russell Tribunal organized in 1967 to document American criminality associated with its engagement in the Vietnam War. Relying on the prestige of the great British philosopher and his influential moral voice this innovative tribunal based its credibility on the participation of celebrity Western left intellectuals, with Jean-Paul Sartre serving as President.[1]What was most notable about the Russell Tribunal was the novel appropriation of a statist legal framework by private citizens for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive legal inquiry into the Vietnam War. The Tribunal secretariat gathered testimonies of witnesses and commentaries of experts, but based its authority to pass judgment largely on the reputation of its 24 prominent members, mostly men, including such iconic cultural figures as James Baldwin, Simone de Beauvoir, and Peter Weiss. Among its members was Lelio Basso, a prominent Italian jurist and legislative figure who later founded the Permanent Peoples Tribunal (PPT) in Rome on the basis of this experience, which has held many comparable sessions over the intervening years on a variety of issues that governments and the UN found too hot to handle.

 

As Ayça Çubukçushows so brilliantly, relying on an ethnographic approach, the WTI was shaped with this background in mind, but with much more organizational self-consciousness and sense of enduring purpose that any earlier civil society initiative of this kind. WTI also featured a populist, feminist, and activist organizing strategy that was very different in style and substance than all earlier tribunal initiatives that were the work of progressive elites as facilitated by a closely knit group of organizers. Çubukçurecounts, as integral to the process, the conceptual struggles among the organizers about how to address the challenge of claiming an authority to pass legal judgement not only on the behavior of powerful sovereign states but also on the criminal culpability of their leaders. The ‘law’ framing this populist venture involved a convergence of motives, chief among which is the claim that ultimate sovereignty is located in people as a belonging to nascent polity of humanity rather than the institutions of government, whether national or international. Additionally, a justification for WTI was the widely endorsed political assumption that geopolitical leverage had paralyzed international law and the UN, allowing the overriding of Iraq’s sovereign rights causing negative impacts on global justice, world peace, and the wellbeing of Iraqi people. Relying on unattributed direct quotations of the participants at a lengthy WTI organizing session, Çubukçumakes us appreciate the clarifying fact that the organizers shared an overall hostility to the Iraq War despite their realization that the US/UK intervention had toppled a cruel dictator, guilty of many crimes against humanity. In this way the mission adopted by the WTI was to accord priority to worldwide anti-war and anti-imperial goals even granting that there were some human rights benefits resulting from the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

 

This policy assessment was the backdrop for a broader, fundamental, essentially jurisprudential question about the nature of the WTI as an initiative with many of the legal trappings and pretensions of a judicial proceeding yet conducted without the presence of the defendants or any prospect of enforcement. Çubukçuis attentive to this crucial issue of how to endow the WTI with legitimacy given its lack of formal authority. The Russell Tribunal was dismissed in mainstream circles as an anti-war propaganda stunt, a kangaroo court that proceeded on the basis of pre-determined conclusions that were alleged to make a mockery of the tribunal format. At the same time, the law framing of the inquiry was believed necessary to give WTI a credibility with mainstream opponents of war and the media that it could not have achieved by way of a mere political condemnation. In effect, the WTI was claiming that its proceedings provided the public with correct interpretations of international criminal law. These interpretations filled the normative vacuum created by the political failure of the current world order system to overcome the impunity of geopoliticalwrongdoers.

 

Considering the issue more deeply, it is well to recall that the generally affirmed war crimes tribunals after World War II (at Nuremberg and Tokyo) also went forward on the basis of pre-determined results, although the defendants were present in the courtroom, accorded partial rights of defense, and the judgment reached was enforced and the defendants punished. These tribunals did receive criticism as ‘victor’s justice,’ but mainly because of impunity, that is, the crimes of the winners (e.g. strategic bombing, atomic attacks on Hiroshima, Nagasaki) were not subject to prosecution and could not even be invoked as defenses by those accused. Çubukçudiscusses in some detail the contrast between the parallel American organized trial of Iraqi leaders held under the auspices of the Iraqi High Tribunal in Baghdad and the subsequent execution of Saddam Hussein. Such a formalized judicial proceeding in Iraq was obviously intended to serve as a kind of vindicating ritual for the attack, yet compromised by impunity for the crimes of the US/UK attackers and occupiers, as well as by the bloody end game of the botched execution of Saddam Hussein. It was as much a show trial as anything done during the notorious Stalin period in the Soviet Union that also indulged in judicial escapades, and in terms of the quality of the legal assessment compared unfavorablyto the overall undertaking of the WTI.

 

What most interests Çubukçuis the challenge of using the legal scaffolding by WTI while not endowing international law with sanctity, given its historic role of upholding war and justifying imperial undertakings, including in the past European colonialism. She instructively compares the role of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo that gave a qualified endorsement to the Kosovo War with the WTI to make the point that the NATO War in 1999 set an unfortunate legal precedent for the Iraq War. In effect, international law enjoys, at best, an equivocal relationship to justice when it comes to restraining war making diplomacy of dominant states, and so should not be unconditionally affirmed.

 

In this sense, Cubukcu’s most provocative contribution is undoubtedly the quite original depiction of the driving force that animated the formation and operation of the WTI. In her striking formulation it was ‘the love of humanity.’ The thirst for legalism, a concern with justice per se, and building a global anti-war movement were all contributing factors, but as complements to the core motivation of ‘species love.’  This conclusion overrides, but does not invalidate the claims of the WTI to clarify the relevance of international law against geopolitical violators. The love of humanity encompasses the anti-war animus of a global movement that made use of a tribunal format so as continue activist opposition to the bellicose behavior of the United States that was hiding its imperial master plan behind a hypocritical commitment to protect human rights and promote democracy. In her view, the WTI, above and beyond all else was an expression of an emergent cosmopolitan ethos of species love that transcended national boundaries and could only be activated by the agency of the peoples of the world. It was this activation by the WTI that is for Çubukçuits greatest achievement, as well as constitutes the ultimate basis of its legitimacy.

 

The book ends somewhat enigmatically with a pronouncement that law and empire cannot be reliably disentangled, and for this reason law must be ‘interrogated and overturned’ in a similar progressive move that provided the stimulus to the WTI and the repudiation of the Iraq War. Instead of law, Çubukçuopts for a humanistic version of cosmopolitan populism, expressed by reference to species identity, and given a special twist by invoking the unexpected strong referent of ‘love.’ The book ends whimsically with these words: “Perhaps then, less violent and necessary may be acting for the love of humanity.” (157) We can only hope thatÇubukçu’s next ambitious book will be devoted to explicating this tantalizing sentence!

 

Part of what makes this book so impressive is that its radical vision is sustained and deepened by sophisticated reference to the ideas of many of the leading European political philosophers of the last hundred years and by a social science methodology that relies on an ethnographic record compiled by a participant-observer who doubles as author. This fine, memorable book possesses a theoretical and practical significance that extends well beyond the confines of the WTI experience.[2]Çubukçunot only observes, reports, philosophically comments, but she engages by taking sides. As such, she is part of a recent academic trend toward ‘partisan objectivity,’ disclosing openly the author’s point of view rather than pretending neutrality. For anyone concerned about political activism, transnational organizing, a new progressive agenda, international law, the ethics of resistance, and the post-colonial, post-Cold War world order this book is required reading.

 

 

 

 

]

[1]For  an account of the Russell Tribunal including a text of the proceedings see John Duffett, ed., Against the Crime of Silence (Flanders, NJ: O’Hare Books, 1968)

[2]For a comprehensive presentation of the WTI proceedings see Muge Gursoy Sokmen,World Tribunal of Iraq: Making the Case Against War(Olive Branch Press, 2008). 

2017: Palestine’s Three Dark Commemorations

16 Jan

 

 

 

Increasingly, Palestinians seem doomed to become subjects, or at best second-class citizens, in their homeland. Israeli expansionism, United States unconditional support, and UN impotence. These factors are combining to create dismal prospects for Palestinian self-determination and for a negotiated peace that is sensitive to the rights and grievances of both Palestinians and Jews.

 

Recalling three notable commemorations to be observed in 2017 may help us understand better how this distressing Palestinian narrative unfolded over the course of the past hundred years. Perhaps, such remembrances might even encourage the rectification of past failures, and encourage flagging national and international efforts to find a way forward even at this belated hour. The most promising initiatives are now associated with a growing global solidarity movement dedicated to achieving a just peace for both peoples. For now, neither the United Nations nor traditional diplomacy seem to have much leverage over the play of social and political forces that lies at the core of the Palestinian struggle. Only the nonviolent resistance of Palestinians to their prolonged ordeal of occupation and transnational civil society militancy seem to have any capacity to exert positive leverage over the status quo and to sustain hope.

 

At the same time, legitimacy and visibility remain important, and here the UN and international society have important roles to play, especially to reaffirm the legitimacy of Palestinian goals and grievances, the importance of political compromise, and the persisting refusal of Israel to show respect for international law, the authority of the United Nations, and the world public opinion.

 

 

1917

 

On November 2, 1917 the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, was persuaded to send a letter to Baron Lionel Rothschild, an influential supporter of the world Zionist project, expressing the support of the British government, for the aspirations of the movement. The key language of the letter is as follows:

 

His Majesty ‘s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

 

An obvious initial observation is why was Britain moved to take such initiative in the midst of World War One. The most plausible explanation is that the war was not going so well, nurturing the belief and hope by British leaders that siding with the Zionist movement would encourage Jews throughout Europe to back the Allied cause, especially in Russia and Germany. A second motivation was to further British interests in Palestine, which Lloyd George, then Prime Minister, regarded as strategically vital to protect the overland trade route to India as well as safeguard access to the Suez Canal. An apparent third motivation was as an expression of gratitude to Chaim Weizmann, a Zionist leader, for his contributions as a chemist to the British war effort. And finally, there were many Europeans, including Balfour himself, who agreed with Zionism that the only lasting assurance of an elimination of anti-Semitism was for Jews to migrate to Palestine.

 

The Balfour Declaration was controversial from the day of issuance, even among some Jews. For one thing, such a commitment by the British Foreign Office was a purely colonialist undertaking without the slightest effort to consider the sentiments of the predominantly Arab population living in Palestine at the time (Jews were less than 10% of the population in 1917) or to take account of rising international support for the right of self-determination to be enjoyed by all peoples. Prominent Jews, led by Edward Montagu, Secretary of State for India at the time, opposed the Declaration, fearing that it would fan the flames of anti-Semitism, especially in the cities of Europe and North America. Beyond this, the Arabs felt betrayed as Balfour’s initiative was seen both as breaking wartime promises to the Arabs of postwar political independence in exchange for joining the fight against the Turks. It also signaled future troubles arising between the Zionist promotion of Jewish immigration to Palestine and the agitation of the indigenous Arab population, as well as producing in the midst of the Arab world a country with great military capabilities in relation to the surrounding region.

 

It should be acknowledged that even Zionist leaders were not altogether happy with the Balfour Declaration. There were deliberate ambiguities embedded in its language. For instance, Zionists would have preferred the word ‘the’ rather than ‘a’ to precede ‘national home.’ Also, the pledge to protect the status quo of non-Jews was seen as inviting trouble in the future, although as it turned out, this assumption of colonialist responsibility was never taken seriously. Most importantly, the Zionists received support only for the ambiguous reality of a national home rather than a clear promise of a sovereign state with full participatory rights in international society. On this latter point, informal backroom British diplomatic chatter agreed that a Jewish state might emerge in the future, but it was believed that this could happen only after Jews became a majority in Palestine, which happened only by way of the permanent dispossession of hundreds of thousands of Arab Palestinians in the course of the violent establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, which was also shadowed by the recent confirmation of the magnitude of the Holocaust.

 

It is worth this backward glance at the Balfour Declaration to realize how colonial ambition morphed into liberal guilt and humanitarian empathy for the plight of European Jews after World War II, while creating an endless nightmare of disappointment, oppression, and rightlessness for the Palestinian population.

 

 

 

1947

 

After World War Two, with strife in Palestine rising to intense levels, and the British Empire in free fall, Britain relinquished its mandatory role and gave the fledgling UN the job of deciding what to do. The UN created a high level group of diplomats to shape a proposal, resulting in a set of recommendations that featured the partition of Palestine into two communities, one for Jews, the other for Arabs. Jerusalem was internationalized with neither community exercising governing authority nor entitled to claim the city as part of its national identity. The UN report was adopted as an official proposal by a large majority of UN members in the form of General Assembly Resolution 181.

 

The Zionist movement purported to accept 181, while the Arab governments and the representatives of the Palestinian people rejected it, claiming it encroached upon rights of self-determination and was grossly unfair. At the time, Jews formed less than 35% of the population yet were given more than 55% of the land. It seems also that the Zionist acceptance of 181 was tactical rather than a principled commitment to confine border to the territory granted to Jews. This interpretation is reinforced by Israel’s refusal to withdraw from the land allocated to Palestine by 181 after fighting ceased in 1948, and instead Israel became a state based on ‘the green line’ borders that greatly enlarged the territorial expanse set aside for Jews in the UN plan.

 

As is widely appreciated, a war ensued, with armies of neighboring Arab countries entering Palestine being defeated by well-trained and armed Zionist militias. Israel won the war, obtaining control over 78% of Palestine at the time an armistice was reached, dispossessing over 700,000 Palestinians, and destroying several hundred Palestinian villages. This experience is the darkest hour experienced by the Palestinians, a continuing occasion of mourning, being known among Arabs as the nakba, or catastrophe.

 

 

 

 

 

1967

 

The third anniversary of 2017 is that associated with the 1967 War, which led to another military defeat of Arab neighbors, and the Israeli occupation of the whole of Palestine, including the entire city of Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli victory changed the strategic equation dramatically. Israel that had been previously viewed as a strategic burden for the United States was now appreciated and acknowledged as a strategic partner with impressive military capabilities, and thus deserving of unconditional geopolitical support.

 

In famous Resolution 242 UN Security Council unanimously decided on November 22, 1967 that the withdrawal of Israeli forces should be negotiated, with certain agreed border modifications understood to be minor, in the context of reaching a peace agreement that included a fair resolution of issues pertaining to Palestinian refugees living throughout the region. There was no expectation that Israel would avoid withdrawal, and immediately obstruct diplomacy by embarking on the unlawful settlement undertaking.

 

During the next fifty years we have come to realize that 242 has not been implemented. On the contrary, Israel has further encroached on Occupied Palestine through the continually expanding settlements and related infrastructure of roads and security enclaves, including the separation wall found unlawful by a near unanimous majority of the International Court of Justice in 2004.

 

A point has now been reached where few believe that an independent Palestinian state co-existing with Israel is any longer feasible or even desirable, making further reliance on ‘a two-state’ solution delusional, playing into Israeli hands by giving additional time to carry forward a hybrid approach that mixes in the West Bank and East Jerusalem a de facto pattern of gradual annexation with an apartheid structure of occupation. Despair follows because no plausible alternative to the two-state solution enjoys political traction, except possibly an Israeli one-state solution imposed upon the Palestinians at the cost of effectively relinquishing Israel’s lingering pretensions of democracy. Whether the alternative political form of an ethnocracy enjoys political legitimacy is questionable from either a human rights or global public opinion perspective.

 

 

Conclusion

 

These dark remembrances reveal three stages in the steadily worsening Palestinian reality. They also reveal the inability of the UN or international diplomacy to solve the problem of how Palestinians and Jews should share the land. It is too late to reverse altogether these strong currents of history, but the challenge remains acute to find a humane outcome that somehow finds a way to allow these two peoples to live peacefully and securely together or in separated equal political communities that do not trample upon Palestinian rights. Let’s fervently hope that a satisfactory solution is miraculously found or achieved before another dark remembrance commands our attention.  

 

Imperiled Polities: Egypt and Turkey—Two Visions of Democracy

25 Jan

 

The Meaning of a 98.1% Vote

 

In mid-January there was a vote in Egypt as to whether to approve a constitution drafted by a 50-person committee appointed by the interim government put in place after the military coup carried out on July 3, 2013. The constitution was approved by 98.1% of those who voted, 38.6% of the eligible 53 million Egyptians. This compares with 63.8% support received by the constitution prepared during the presidency of Mohammed Morsi from the 32.9% of the Egyptian citizenry that participated in the vote. It should be observed that this new constitutional referendum was boycotted by both the Muslim Brotherhood and various of the youth groups that has been at the forefront of the anti-Mubarak upheaval in 2011. Also the validity of the vote was further discredited because of the atmosphere of intimidation in Egypt well conveyed by the pro-coup slogan: “You are either with me or with the terrorists.” Not only had the MB been criminalized, its assets seized, its leaders jailed, its media outlets shut down, but anyone of any persuasion who seemed opposed to the leadership and style of General el-Sisi was subject to arrest and abuse.

 

In the background here are questions about the nature of ‘democracy,’ and how to evaluate the views of people caught in the maelstrom of political conflict. On one level, it might seem that a vote of over 90% for absolutely anything is an expression of extraordinary consensus, and as a result el-Sisi’s constitution is far more popular than Morsi’s constitution, and hence more legitimate. Reflecting on this further makes it seem evident, especially when the oppressive context is to taken into account that the one-sided vote should be interpreted in the opposite manner, making Morsi’s vote more trustworthy because it reached plausible results. Any vote in a modern society that claims 98.1% support should be automatically disregarded because it must have been contrived and coerced. In effect, we cannot trust democratic procedures to reveal true sentiments in a political atmosphere that terrorizes its opponents, and purports to delegitimize its opposition by engaging in state crime. The consent of the governed can only be truly ascertained if the conditions exist for the free and honest expression of views for and against what present power-wielders favor.

 

Maybe, however, the connections made between democracy and legitimacy, seeking this populist signal of approval by the ritual of a vote, is itself a kind of blindfold. It would seem that a majority of Egyptians did, in fact, welcome the el-Sisi coup, believing that a military leadership would at least ensure food and fuel at affordable prices and restore order on the streets. In other words, most citizens in crisis situations posit order and economic stability as their highest political priorities, and are ready to give up ‘democracy’ if its leaders fail to meet these expectations. In my view, what has happened in Egypt is the abandonment of the substance of democracy by the majority of the Egyptian people, as reinforced by the suppression of a minority hostile to the takeover. This dynamic is hidden because the discourse and rituals of democracy are retained. It is this process that I believe we are witnessing as unfolding in Egypt. In effect, polarization of the first two-and-half years following the overthrow of Mubarak has been followed by the restoration of autocratic rule, but due to the intervening embrace of political freedom, however problematic, the new autocrat is even harsher than what was rejected at Tahrir Square three years ago.

 

The Politics of Polarization and Alienation  

 

Amid this political turmoil that has been spoiling the politics of the Middle East is a conceptual confusion that contributes to acute political alienation on the part of those societal elements that feel subject to a governmental leadership and policy agenda that is perceived as hostile to their interests and values. Such circumstances are aggravated by political cultures that have been accustomed to ‘one-man shows’ that accentuate tendencies toward adoration and demonization. Each national situation reflects the particularities of history, culture, values, national memories, personalities, and a host of other considerations, and at the same time there are certain shared tendencies that may reflect some commonalities of experience and inter-societal mimicry, as well as the deformed adoption of Western hegemonic ideas of modernity, development, constitutionalism, and governance, as well as of course the relationship between religion and politics.

 

The recent disturbing political turmoil in Turkey and Egypt, each in its own way, is illustrative. In both countries there are strong, although quite divergent, traditions of charismatic authoritarian leadership, reinforced by quasi-religious sanctification. Very recently, however, this authoritarian past is being challenged by counter-traditions of populist legitimacy putting forward impassioned demands for freedom, integrity, equity, and inclusive democracy, which if not met, justify putting aside governmental procedures, including even the results of national elections. Within this emergent counter-tradition is also a willingness to give up all democratic pretensions so as to restore a preferred ideological orientation toward governance, that is, resorting to whatever instruments are effecting in transferring control of the state back to the old order that had lost control of the governing process by elections, and had poor prospects of democratically winning power in the future.

 

In Egypt, this circumstance led to unconditional opposition to the elected leadership, especially to Mohammed Morsi, the president drawn from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood. The aim of this opposition, whether or not consciously espoused, seemed to have been to create a crisis of governability of sufficient depth to provoke a crisis of legitimacy, which could then produce a populist challenge from below that brought together ideological demands for a different orientation and material demands for a better life. It is true that Morse lent a certain credibility to this rising tide of opposition by a combination of incompetence and some clumsy repressive moves, but this was almost irrelevant as his secular and fulool opponents wanted him to fail and never allowed him even the possibility of success. For such opponents, the idea of living under a government run by the MB was by itself intolerable. In the end, many of those who had pleaded so bravely for freedom in Tahrir Square were two years later pleading with the armed forces to engage in the most brutal expressions of counter-revolutionary vengeance. Whether this will be the end of the Egyptian story for the near future is difficult to discern, the downward spiral suggests insurrection and strife for the foreseeable future.  

 

In Turkey, such a collision has recently produced turmoil and highlighting the dangers and passions that accompany lethal polarization, initially, in the encounters of the summer of 2013 at Gezi Park and some months later in a titanic struggle between Tayyip Recip Erdogan and Fetullah Gulan generating a rising tide of mutual recriminations and accusations that threatens the AKP dominance of the political process, a threat that will be soon tested in the March local elections, especially those in Istanbul and Ankara. Turkey is different than Egypt in at least two major respects. First of all, its economy has flourished in the past decade, producing a rising middle class, and a business community with lots to lose if investor confidence and currency exchange rates decline sharply. This reality is complicated by the fact that part of those that have gained economically have been aligned with the AKP, and by the degree to which the Turkish armed forces are also major stakeholders in the private sector. Secondly, a major achievement of the AKP leadership has been to depoliticize the role of the Turkish military, partly to protect itself against interference and partly to satisfy European Union accession criteria.

 

Alienation and emotional distress is more a symptom than an explanation of why there exist such strong political tensions. Better understood, these conflicts are about class, religion, status, political style, the benefits of governmental control, and availability of capital and credit. An additional source of public antagonism is the unresolved, and mostly unacknowledged, debate about the true nature of democracy as the legitimating ideal for good governance in the 21st century. One perplexing element is language, especially its use by politicians concerned with public opinion. There is this impulse on one side to base governmental legitimacy on pleasing the citizenry, and the impulse on the other side is to insist upon fidelity to law and constitutionalism. Both sides have powerful arguments that can be invoked to support their claims. There is no right and wrong, which is infuriating for polarized discourse that can only raise its voice to shout in higher decibels, but can never reach a conclusion of the sort that might resolve a scientific debate or solve a mathematical puzzle. Each side is motivated by unshakeable convictions, and has no disposition to listen, much less appreciate, what the others are saying. In effect, good governance is impossible in the absence of community, and what has become evident is that society unity is currently unattainable in the presence of the sort of alienation that has gripped the publics in Egypt and Turkey, and elsewhere. 

 

Part of the controversy, but only part, can be reduced to these differences over the very nature of democracy. Another part, as discussed in relation to the vote on the Egyptian constitution, involves the abandonment of democracy in substance while insisting on its retention in form.

 

Varieties of Democracy

 

The word democracy itself needs to be qualified in one of two ways: majoritarian or republican. And here is the central tension: the public myth in all countries that deem themselves ‘modern’ endorse the republican tradition of limited government and internal checks and balances, while the political culture is decidedly ambivalent. It can spontaneously legitimize the majoritarian prerogatives of a popular leader with strong backing on the street and among the armed forces, even at the cost of republican correctness. Because of this reality, there exists a tendency by those social forces being displaced through societal power shifts to view a newly ascendant leader through a glass darkly. They suddenly lament authoritarian tendencies that never troubled them in the past when their elites held the reins of governmental authority. Part of the recent confusion is that sometimes the authoritarian tendency gets so corrupted that it loses support even among those who share its class and ideological outlook, and a reformist enthusiasm emerges. This happened in Egypt, but its tenure was short lived as its adherents, drawn from the ranks of the urban educated elites, quickly realized that their interests and values were more jeopardized by the ‘new’ order than it had been by the excesses of the ‘old’ order. 

 

We find in Egypt this pattern played out through the wildly gyrations in the perception of the armed forces as a political player. In the Mubarak Era the armed forces were the central pillar of the state, and a major beneficiary of governmental corruption, neoliberal inequities, and a principal perpetrator, along with other security forces, of state crime. In the Morsi period of governance the armed forces seemed to stay in the background until either responding to or prompting the populist mandate of the opposition exhibited by mass demonstrations and media mobilization based on a paranoid image of Muslim Brotherhood rule and widespread genuine distress about economic stagnancy and political disarray.

 

After the July 3rd coup led by Morsi’s Minister of Defense, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the armed forces set aside the constitution, installed a transitional government, promised new elections, and set about drafting a constitution that embodied the hegemony of the armed forces. What has taken place, however, is an undisguised exercise of authoritarian closure based on declaring the former choice of the citizenry, the Muslim Brotherhood, to be a ‘terrorist’ organization whose leadership were victims of several atrocities, imprisoned, forced underground, and fled the country. Nevertheless, despite these repressive measures, the armed forces are proceeding on a basis as if their action has been mandated by ‘democracy,’ that is, by majoritarian demands for change enacted on the streets of Egyptian cities and through the subsequent endorsement of the repressive steps to be undertaken by the regime, eventually validated through demonstrations, voting, and electoral ratification. In the background of such a counter-revolutionary turn, of course, were weak institutions of government accustomed to operate for decades within a strict authoritarian political space, and a governmental bureaucracy whose judiciary and police continued to ideologically aligned with the old order. Such an entrenched bureaucracy seems to have regarded the reemergence of authoritarian and militarized politics as natural, linked in their imaginary with Egypt’s ancient heritage of greatness and more comfortable with such domineering figures as Nasser and Mubarak as compared to the density and seeming incapacities of Morsi.

 

Challenging Democracy in Turkey

 

The situation in Turkey is much more subtle and less menacing, yet exhibits several analogous features. Despite the outcome of elections that brought the AKP to power initially in 2002, a development subsequently reinforced by stronger electoral mandates in 2007 and 2012, most of the opposition never accepted these results as politically acceptable, and immediately sought to undermine the elected leadership in a variety of legal and extra-legal ways. In the background of this alienation was the implicit and feared belief that the AKP was mounting a challenge to the hallowed legacy of Kemal Ataturk, as well as to the rigid Turkish style of secularism that was periodically reinvigorated by the armed forces that staged coups, which in 1982 had imposed a highly centralized, security oriented constitution on the country. With political acumen, the AKP maneuvered pragmatically in an impressive manner, creating a rapidly growing economy, seeking to play a conflict resolving role throughout the Middle East, and repeatedly proclaiming a fidelity to the secular creed as the foundation of public order, and by stages subjecting the armed forces to civilian control. Despite the magnitude of these achievements the AKP and Erdogan never gained an iota of appreciation or respect from the anti-religious Kemalist opposition that claimed to be the only legitimate guardians of Turkish ‘secularism.’  Strangely, this alienated opposition was never able to present a responsible political platform that could give the Turkish people a positive alternative, and so the prospects of mounting an electoral challenge remained poor, especially given the accomplishments of the AKP.

 

In such a setting this intensely alienated opposition seemed increasingly dependent on manufacturing a crisis of legitimacy that would restore the old state/society balance that had prevailed since the founding of the republic in 1923. The Ataturk legacy included a somewhat reluctance acceptance of procedural democracy in the form of free and fair elections with the apparent implied assumption that the outcome would remain faithful to his modernist orientation, modeled on Europe, that accompanied the founding of the republic. The range of opposition was limited by a law allowing the closure of political parties that seemed to be straying from the prescribed Kemalist path. When the AKP defied these expectations in 2002, the opposition became quickly fed up with the workings of  ‘democracy,’ and seemed early on to count on being rescued, as in the past, by a military intervention that they hoped would be encouraged by the U.S., which was assumed to be unhappy about the Islamist leanings attributed to the AKP political base and leadership.  The disappointment among the old secular elites arising from the failure of these expectations to materialize deepened the alienation and frustrations of opposition forces, especially on the part of urban elites in the main cities of Turkey in the western part of the country, which exaggerated the faults of the government and ignored its achievements.

 

With such considerations in mind it was understandable that there would be exhilaration among the opposition generated by the Gezi Park demonstrations in the summer of 2013, especially in its initial phases that were as much a protest against the AKP’s embrace of an environmentally rapacious neoliberalism as it was against the authoritarian excesses of the Erdogan leadership. This enthusiasm weakened when the Gezi movement was substantially hijacked in its subsequent phases by the most extreme tendencies of the alienated opposition, which seemed to believe that Gezi presented an opportunity to fashion a full-fledged crisis of governability out of this narrowly focused protest that might force the resignation of Erdogan, if not the collapse of the AKP. There was an attempt to take advantage of escalating public outrage that resulted after excessive force was used by the police to maintain order in the Gezi context. Of course, Erdogan’s harsh style of discourse, including off the cuff opinions that reflected his Islamic devoutness, were part of the broader political atmosphere, and were particularly alarming to an already alienated opposition, reinforcing their their underlying beliefs that any alternative would be better for Turkey than what the AKP was bestowing upon the country. The situation was aggravated  after the AKP electoral success in 2011. It seemed to give Erdogan confidence that he need no longer adhere to his earlier cautiously pragmatic approach to leadership, and he adopted the sort of swagger that both frightened and disgusted an opposition that was not inclined to give him any leeway.

 

Similarly, the more recent, unexpected, and still obscure and bitter public falling out between the AKP and the hizmet movement has injected a new virus into the Turkish body politic posing unpredictable threats. It may turn out that this conflict represent nothing more fundamental than a struggle for relative influence and power that calmer minds will resolve before long. Perhaps also Turkey is experiencing some of the almost inevitable mishaps associated with keeping one political party with a strong leader in power for too long. Such prolonged control of government almost always produces scandal and corruption, especially in a political culture where the rule of law and the ethics of civic virtue do not have a very strong grip on behavioral patterns. In the more distant Turkish past are the memories of Ottoman times when the country was a regional power center, governed by highly authoritarian figures, a hallowed past that was secularized in the last century but not challenged in its essential role in Turkish political culture.

 

Majoritarian and Republican Democracy Assessed

 

With this mix of considerations in mind, the distinction between ‘Majoritarian Democracy’ and ‘Republican Democracy,’ although simplifying the actual political texture, seems important.  In Majoritarian Democracy the leadership is essentially responsible to the electorate, and if its policies reflect the will of the majority, the views and values of opposed minorities need not be respected. Critical views treat such forms of government as susceptible to the ‘tyranny of the majority,’ which has subjective and objective realities distinguishing between what is perceived and what is actually taking place. Arguably after Morsi’s election in 2012, and given the embittered opposition that seemed unwilling to accept the outcome of the vote, the Muslim Brotherhood used the prerogatives of office in a failed attempt to impose the majoritarian will, and may itself have been prepared to change the rules of the political game so as to retain control. Part of the majoritarian mentality is to locate a check on its excesses in the will of the citizenry, and thus when the people are mobilized to demand a new leadership for the country without waiting upon the niceties of the next elections, the path is cleared for the sort of military takeover that occurred last July. Of course, majoritarian dynamics are subject to manipulation by anti-democratic forces whose zeal is directed toward gaining control of the state.

 

‘Republican Democracy’ in contrast starts with a generally skeptical view of human nature, and seeks above all to find procedures and support the nurturing of a political culture that prizes moderate government over efficiency and transcendent leadership. The American self-conscious adoption of Republican Democracy at the end of the 18th century, as spelled out for the ages in The Federalist Papers, is a classic instance of molding a constitutional system that was wary of majorities and protective of minorities and of individual rights ( although totally blind to the human claims of slaves and native Americans). Unlike Egypt or Turkey, Americans were seeking to arrange a different future for themselves than was associated with British royalism, and its absolutist pretensions. In the background, were political thinkers such as John Locke with a stress on the link between good governance and rights and Montesquieu who argued along analogous lines about the cardinal relevance of separation of powers to the avoidance of the concentration and excesses of state power. Delinking government from religious claims of certainty was also consistent with republican sensitivity to human flaws and the general ethos of Lord Acton’s famous saying ‘power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.’

 

Because over time every political system faces crises, the American founders realized that the envisioned arrangements would only survive the tests of time if two conditions were realized: first, reverence for the constitution by both lawmakers and citizens, and secondly, judicial supremacy to override legislative and executive swings toward either implementing the momentary passions of the mob or aggrandizing power and authority, and thereby upsetting the delicate balance of institutions. Despite this self-conscious commitment to the republican approach, in times of war and crisis, the democratic feature of accountable power-wielding tends to yield to claims of national security and public expediency. And once such departures from republicanism become entrenched, as a result of a long period of warfare or in relation to nuclear weaponry, and now transnational terrorism, the authoritarian genie is able to escape from the constitutional bottle. As the American motto of ‘eternal vigilance’ reminds us, there are no safe paths to moderate government, and its most influential advocates realized that their wishes might be so defeated that they recognized that the people enjoyed ‘a right of revolution’ if despite all precautions the governing process had become despotic.

 

It need hardly be argued that neither Egypt nor Turkey are remotely similar to the United States or Europe, but the superficial embrace of democracy by these and other countries might benefit from examining more closely the menace of Majoritarian Democracy in a fragmented polity and the difficulties of establishing Republican Democracy in political cultures that have been so long dominated by militarism and authoritarianism. Egypt is experiencing the essentially anti-democratic restoration of authoritarian militarism, while Turkey is trying to preserve sufficient stability and consensus to enable the self-restrained persistence of procedural democracy and a successful process of constitutional renewal that rids the country of the 1982 militarist vision of governance, and moves toward creating the institutional and procedural frame and safeguards associated with Republican Democracy. Beyond this, however, will be the immense educational challenge of shaping a supportive political culture that entrenches republican values in public consciousness, above all a respect for individual and group rights and an inclusive approach to policy formation that seeks participation by and approval from stakeholding constituencies opposed to the majority. Such a vision of a democratic future for Turkey implies a process, not an event, and will require an ongoing struggle inevitably distracted by both manufactured and authentic crises of legitimacy. The hope is that moderate minds will prevail, serving the long-term interests of a state and its peoples that retain great potential to be a beacon of light for the region and beyond.