Tag Archives: Sweden

Quran Desecration and Freedom of Expression

17 Aug

[Prefatory Note: The following post is a revised version of responses to questions addressed to by Javad Arabshirazi, a journalist in Iran, on the issues raised by recent Quran Desecration incidents in Scandinavia. The link to the earlier online publication of this interview is below:https://iqna.ir/en/news/3484743/int%E2%80%99l-law-not-strong-enough-to-stop-affronts-to-holy-sanctities-ex-un-rapporteur ]

Q#1: As you know, over the past month, the Quran has been subject to acts of desecration multiple times in Sweden and Denmark. What is your take on these acts?

As a first line of response, I would interpret these acts of desecration as an aspect of the assault by right-wing extremists on secular democracy in Europe. The fact that Sweden was the principal site of these incidents involving the Quran are significant as Sweden was the previously viewed as the most progressive social democracy in Europe with a generally permissive atmosphere, but not a breeding ground of extremist political movements, although quite conformist in its skepticism about religion. The anti-migrant right (but not the desecrating extremists) have emerged from most recent national elections with great influence, although not currently governing the country.

A more proximate cause seems connected with a far-right reaction of anger and fear to the leverage displayed by the Muslim majority state of Turkey in relation to Sweden’s governmental effort to join NATO almost 75 years after the alliance was formed, an undertaking itself indicative of this Swedish swing to the right. The motivation for these desecration incidents from this perspective should be viewed as directed both at the Swedish Government for its apparent willingness to bargain with Turkey on the issue, tarnishing its right-wing credentials by doing so and at Islamist Turkey encroaching on European cultural space in the sensitive sphere of freedom of expression.

Of course, these explanatory remarks are highly conjectural on my part, but they do seem consistent with the behavioral patterns of these extremist fragments (the most prominent leader of these events was a Danish-Swedish lawyer and political extremist, Rasmus Paludan, head of the Danish Strum Kurs (hardline) political party, managed to win only 1.8% of vote in the last Danish election. This weak electoral showing was not enough to qualify the party for seats in Parliament. In response to his role in these embassy provocations, Turkey has issued an arrest warrant charging Paludan with responsibility for a desecration incident posing security threats to the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm earlier this year.

In general, anti-Islamic extremism is both an internal and international challenge to the European Union, which wants to ensure peace and stability within Europe without giving rise to blowback effects in

Muslim majority countries that take offense. For instance, Qatar, although not targeted in Sweden,  removed all Swedish products from its largest market, Souq Al Baladi, and a number of other states have withdrawn their ambassadors from Sweden as expressions of Islamic solidarity. The EU remains reluctant to challenge by recourse to law freedom of expression standards that prevail in several of its leading member states. Josep Borrell, the EU minister for foreign policy, summed up the official response accurately, although elliptically,  by saying on the subject of Quran desecration, ‘Not everything that is legal is ethical.’

A similar approach was evident in the July vote at the UN Human Rights Council of a resolution condemning the desecration of the Quran by the negative votes of the leading European states (UK, Germany, France, joined by the USA). Although these governments publicly deplored the Quran desecration they refused to support the HRC resolution, which was claimed to be an unbalanced text, endangering freedom of expression, and unacceptably close to prohibiting all forms of blasphemy. The overall vote on the resolution of the 47 HRC members was 28-12 (with 7 abstentions). Most HRC members from Africa, as well as China, supported the resolution. The HRC’s official release described the resolution this way: The Human Rights Council July 12th adopted a resolution in which it condemned and strongly rejected any advocacy and manifestation of religious hatred, including the recent public and premedicated acts of desecration of the Holy Quran.” The body of the resolution called upon states to enact national laws reflecting these sentiments, but overall it seems unlikely to have the slightest effect on the 12 states voting against the resolution.

Q#2: How can we stop such acts and help promote interfaith respect and peaceful coexistence among followers of various faiths?

There is a paradox present: The harder efforts are made to stop this highly objectionable behavior by Islamophobic and right-wing extremists groups the greater is their temptation to persist in such action. In the short-term what these groups seek is public recognition and media attention, not power or authority. These are displays of symbolic politics at its worst as it champions ethno-religious supremacy as the alternative to coexistence with dark and evil forces. Quran desecration also serves as a recruiting strategy that attracts those deeply dissatisfied with their lives and receptive to blaming the Islamic other.

And then there is counter-pressures from dogmatic secularists not to alter behavior in response to outcries from foreign religious sources. Such secularists, whether openly or not, seek to insulate from governmental interference anti-religious speech and symbolic acts, however hurtful, even when coming from extremist sources. In the current historical setting of Europe, desecration acts especially those directed at theocratically governed states such as Iran, and more recently, Turkey, enjoy a high level of silent approval from a hostile populace. What is often criminalized and harshly punished as blasphemy in some Muslim majority states, for instance, Pakistan or Bangladesh, is celebrated as protected speech in the secular West.

Inter-faith dialogue if conducted at high enough levels at least promotes a better understanding of cultural and religious differences among countries and civilizations, but the root cause is ethnically and religiously driven extremism, which at its worst sets the stage for autocratic, and even fascist styles of governance, which happened in post-World War I Europe. A further step in moderating such tensions is to mount a major international effort to improve the material conditions in the least developed countries that would have an almost automatic effect of discouraging massive migratory flows now arising from impoverished societies, conflict zones, and climate disaster, disproportionately situated in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The political resonance of Quran burning is emotionally linked for many in the West to the backlash against these patterns of migrating peoples fleeing from alien cultural traditions for economic, political, and ecological reasons. We should appreciate that most people do not leave their homelands unless national living conditions become intolerable and more opportunities seem worth pursuing elsewhere.

With the planet challenged currently by ecological and geopolitical threats to species survival, only ways of acting on a global scale to improve procedures of conflict resolution and inter-governmental cooperation can have any chance of weakening incentives of extremists and those most acutely alienated to carry out attacks against scapegoated religious and ethnic minorities.      

Q#3: Who or what group do you think is behind the affronts? Or who or what group benefits from them?

 As suggested throughout, these affronts to Islam emanate from the extreme right by individuals drawn to fascist beliefs and practices as historically contextualized in relation to time and place. For Hitler and Naziism it was Jews as a people, in the United States those seeking to restore white supremacy it is African Americans, and after 9/11 attacks in 2001 it was Islam while for Donald Trump it has become migrants, especially those entering the country unlawfully.

Extremists tend to flourish in national settings where their acts, while superficially condemned, are congruent with the beliefs and biases of large parts of the population. I feel the danger in Europe arises from the extreme right gaining further political strength through such acts of demonization. The rise of secular populism and its autocratic leaders around the world has produced the suppression of religious freedoms and political participation of Muslims even in many countries within the Arab world, and most pronouncedly in Modi’s India with its drive to achieve Hindu supremacy and even in Myanmar where the military leadership in alliance with the Buddhist majority has ruthlessly suppressed Muslims in the federal state of Rakhine where the Muslim minority, the Rohingya people mostly live.

Q#4: Swedish and Danish officials have deplored the desecration of the Quran, saying, however, that they cannot prevent it under constitutional laws protecting freedom of speech. What are your thoughts on this as an international lawyer?         

Although there is some support for the view that desecration of the Quran and other holy books violate international law, and a July 25 UN General Assembly Resolution drafted by Morocco and adopted by consensus so declares, it is not regarded by most governments in the West as obligatory and would encounter strong resistance if implemented in national criminal codes and operational practices. The emphasis of the resolution is suggested by these words, deploring ”all acts of violence against persons on the basis of their religion or belief, as well as any such acts directed against their religious symbols, holy books, homes, businesses, properties, schools, cultural centers or places of worship, as well as all attacks on and in religious places, sites and shrines in violation of international law.”

There is an underlying jurisprudential problem that is rarely discussed. In the West, meaning in Western Europe and North America, the separation of church and state followed upon decades of religious warfare within Christianity. From the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 onwards until the present the dominant political tradition in various formats has embraced the separation of church and state, including seeking to make the legal order autonomous, that is, resistant to overt religious oversight and direct interference. To be sure, there have been inconsistencies on the level of practice, especially on such symbolic issues as the reproductive rights of women and the character of conscientious objection to obligatory military service. In contrast, it is my understanding that Islamic values reject such a separation, believeing strongly that the law should reflect the precepts of religious guidance or oversight.

In any meaningful sense, I do not think international law is strong enough in relation to these issues at the interface of human rights, sovereign rights, and the sanctity of religious values and practice to impact on behavior at the level of nation states. Perhaps, the struggles for species survival will build enough support for trans-civilizational unity on behalf of the global public good, which has been put forward by some, including myself, as a unique instance of ‘a necessary utopia.’ In the interim, there will be clashes of the sort embedded in diverse ways of handling the desecration of the Quran, the scriptures of other faiths, and holy sites and objects generally. In fashioning responses, we must be careful not to fuel the passions and dark ambitions of such extremists by giving them media feasts that promote their dark designs and feed their sense of self-importance..

Questioning Sweden’s ‘Bold’ Diplomatic Initiative

11 Oct

 

 

 

It was a welcome move, but only in some respects. The new center-left Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan Lofven, in his inaugural speech to Parliament indicated on October 3rd the intention of the Swedish government to recognize Palestinian statehood. He explained that such a move mentioned in the platform of his party is in accord with promoting a two-state solution, and more significantly, that is to be “negotiated in accordance with international law.” The call for adherence to international law in future diplomacy is actually more of a step forward than is the announced intention of future recognition, which has so far received all the media attention and incurred the wrath of Tel Aviv. To bring international law into future negotiations would amount to a radical modication of the ‘peace process’ that came into being with the Oslo Declaration of Principles in 1993. The Israel/United States view was to allow any agreements between the parties to arise from a bargaining process, which is a shorthand for acknowledging the primacy of power, taking account of ‘facts on the ground’ (that is, the unlawful settlements) and diplomatic leverage (allowing the United States to fake the role of ‘honest broker’ while at the same time making sure that Israel’s interests are protected).

 

I suspect that this hopeful language suggesting the relevance of international law was inserted without any awareness of its importance or relevance. Such an interpretation is in line with Swedish official explanations of their initiative as a way of helping ‘moderate’ Palestinian leaders gain control of diplomacy, thereby facilitating the eventual goal of mutual coexistence based on two states. It was presumed by Stockholm without any supportive reasoning, and against the weight of evidence and experience, that a Palestine state could emerge from a reinvigorated diplomacy. No mention was made of the settlements, separation wall, road network that have cut so deeply into the Palestinian remnant, which as of the 1967 borders was already 22% of historic Palestine, and less than half of what the UN partition plan had offered the Palestinians in 1947, which at the time seemed unfair and inconsistent with Palestinian rights under international law.

 

The United States Government spokesperson, Jan Paski, was careful to confirm the Oslo approach adopted by Washington that has been so harmful to Palestinian prospects for a viable state: “We certainly support Palestinian statehood, but it can come only through a negotiated outcome, a resolution of final status issues and mutual recognition by both parties.” Note the pointed absence of any reference to international law. Beyond this, there is less and less reason to suppose that the Israeli government supports a process that leads to Palestinian statehood in any meaningful sense, although Netanyahu repeats in international settings the sterile mantra of saying that any such results can only come from direct negotiations between the parties, and he adds the Swedish initiative if carried out, is declared to be an obstacle to such an outcome. So as not to arouse hopes, Netanyahu adds that no agreement will be reached that does not protect the national interests of Israel and ensure the security of Israeli citizens. When he speaks at home in Hebrew the prospect of a Palestinian state becomes as remote as the establishment of  world government.

 

Unsurprisingly, the head of Israel’s opposition Labor Party, Isaac Herzog, was active in reinforcing Netanyahu’s objection to Sweden’s proposed course of action. Herzog in conversation with Lofven sought to dissuade Sweden from acting ‘unilaterally,’ suggesting that such a move was likely to produce undisclosed ‘undesirable consequences.’ So much for the Israeli ‘peace camp’ that now seems content to act as errand boy for state policy as led by the right-wing Likud.

 

The Palestinian Authority, short on good news since the Gaza attacks, at its highest levels (Abbas, Erakat) greeted the Swedish move as ‘remarkable and courageous,’ as well as ‘great.’ The PA leadership even suggested that recognition of Palestinian statehood could build pressure for a resumption of talks on a two-state solution as if that would be beneficial for Palestine. Such sentiments turn a blind eye toward the Oslo record of failure from a Palestinian point of view, and quite the opposite for Israel.

 

What is the value of the Swedish proposed step, assuming that it takes place? Israel and the United States seemed poised to use full court pressure to persuade Sweden to delay indefinitely making the move, and Sweden has retreated to the extent that it has reassured the world that it is not planning to act ‘tomorrow morning’ and hopes to listen to the views of all interested governments and engage in dialogue before moving forward. At the same time, the British Parliament is set to vote on October 13 on a non-binding resolution urging recognition by Britain of Palestinian statehood.

 

Even proposing recognition of Palestinian statehood is definitely a psychological boost for the Palestinian Authority, but it changes nothing on the ground, and likely makes Israel take some defiant steps such as provocatively issuing permits for additional housing units in the settlements, which it did in 2012 as retaliation for Palestine’s successful bid to be recognized by the UN General Assembly as a non-member observer state (similar to the status enjoyed by the Vatican). Recognition also gives Palestine potential access to the International Criminal Court, which again worries Israel as it should, although the Palestinian Authority has so far held back from seeking to become a party to the ICC, and by so doing gain the capacity to request the prosecutor to investigate various allegations of Israeli war crimes, including the settlements.

 

In international law diplomatic recognition by states has been traditionally viewed as largely a matter of discretion. The United States withheld recognition from mainland China for decades after it had consolidated its governmental control over the territory and its population. Palestine has been long recognized by at least 125 states, and enjoys diplomatic relations as if a state. UN membership presupposes statehood, but it is also highly politicized and subject to the veto by any permanent member of the Security Council. Indications are that, if necessary, the United States will stand alone in using its veto to block Palestine from becoming a member.

 

But why does Israel care so much as nothing changes on the ground? There would seem to be three reasons, none very persuasive. Firstly, since Palestine badly wants to be a sovereign state and a UN member, it would make further concessions to Israel to obtain such a status in the event of further negotiations. Secondly, Israel seems eager to have the formal capacity to deny Palestinian statehood in a full sense so as to allow for the future likely incorporation the West Bank into Israel when the opportune moment arrives. This is a course of action favored by the recently elected Israeli president, Reuven Rivlin, who offers Palestinians a supposedly benevolent ‘economic peace’ in exchange if they swallow their political pride. Thirdly, recognition might give the Palestinian Authority more leverage at the UN and the ICC, and self-esteem in Palestinian circles, especially if other European Union members to follow the Swedish example. At some point down the line Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestine would under these conditions come under increasing legal, moral, and political fire.

 

Yet from the perspective of the Palestinian people as distinct from the Palestinian Authority, does it make sense at this stage in their struggle to continue to act as if the two-state solution could still bring peace? Israel’s feverish settlement activity of recent years seems to be a clear message that a viable sovereign Palestinian state is no longer in the cards. In fact, Sweden seems to be playing the Oslo game after the game has ended for all practical purposes.

 

In other words, if Sweden’s act of recognition had been linked to Oslo’s failure it would be pointing the way toward a constructive turn in peace diplomacy, but to justify it as a step toward the two-state solution achieved by direct negotiations of the sort that has failed repeatedly for more than 20 years seems an ill-considered expression of political innocence on the part of the inexperienced new leadership in Stockholm, a gesture for peace undoubtedly meant in good faith, but seemingly without any awareness that the sick patient died years ago.

 

Interrogating the Arizona Killings from a Safe Distance

11 Jan


I spent a year in Sweden a few years after the assassination of Olaf Palme in 1986, the controversial former prime minister of the country who at the time of his death was serving as a member of the Swedish cabinet. He was assassinated while walking with his wife back to their apartment in the historic part of the city after attending a nearby movie. It was a shocking event in a Sweden that had prided itself on moderateness in politics and the avoidance of involvement in the wars of the twentieth century. A local drifter, with a history of alcoholism, was charged and convicted of the crime, but many doubts persisted, including on the part of Ms. Palme who analogized her situation to that of Coretta King who never believed the official version of her martyred husband’s death.

I had a particular interest in this national traumatic event as my reason for being in Sweden was a result of an invitation to be the Olaf Palme Professor, a rotating academic post given each year to a foreign scholar, established by the Swedish Parliament as a memorial to their former leader. (after the Social Democratic Party lost political control in Sweden this professorship was promptly defunded, partly because Palme was unloved by conservatives and partly because of a neoliberal dislike for public support of such activities)

In the course of my year traveling around Sweden I often asked those whom I met what was their view of the assassination, and what I discovered was that the responses told me more about them than it did about the public event. Some thought it was a dissident faction in the Swedish security forces long angered by Palme’s neutralist policies, some believed it was resentment caused by Palme’s alleged engineering of Swedish arms sales to both sides in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, some believed it was the CIA in revenge for Palme’s neutralism during the Cold War, some believed it could have criminals in the pay of business tycoons tired of paying high taxes needed to maintain the Swedish maximalist version of a welfare state, and there were other theories as well. What was common to all of these explanations was the lack of evidence that might connect the dots. What people believed happened flowed from their worldview rather than the facts of the event—a distrust of the state, especially its secret operations, or a strong conviction that special interests hidden from view were behind prominent public events of this character.

In a way, this process of reflection is natural, even inevitable, but it leads to faulty conclusions. We tend to process information against the background of our general worldview and understanding, and we do this all the time as an efficient way of coping with the complexity of the world combined with our lack of time or inclination to reach conclusions by independent investigation. The problem arises when we confuse this means of interpreting our experience with an effort to provide an explanation of a contested public event. There are, to be sure, conspiracies that promote unacknowledged goals, and enjoy the benefit of government protection. We don’t require WikiLeaks to remind us not to trust governments, even our own, and others that seem in most respects to be democratic and law-abiding. And we also by now should know that governments (ab)use their authority to treat awkward knowledge as a matter of state secrets, and criminalize those who are brave enough to believe that the citizenry needs to know the crimes that their government is committing with their trust and their tax dollars.

The arguments swirling around the 9/11 attacks are emblematic of these issues. What fuels suspicions of conspiracy is the reluctance to address the sort of awkward gaps and contradictions in the official explanations that David Ray Griffin(and other devoted scholars of high integrity) have been documenting in book after book ever since his authoritative The New Pearl Harbor in 2004 (updated in 2008). What may be more distressing than the apparent cover up is the eerie silence of the mainstream media, unwilling to acknowledge the well-evidenced doubts about the official version of the events: an al Qaeda operation with no foreknowledge by government officials. Is this silence a manifestation of fear or cooption, or part of an equally disturbing filter of self-censorship? Whatever it is, the result is the withering away of a participatory citizenry and the erosion of legitimate constitutional government. The forms persist, but the content is missing.

This brings me to the Arizona shootings, victimizing both persons apparently targeted for their political views and random people who happened to be there for one reason or another, innocently paying their respects to a congresswoman meeting constituents outside a Tucson supermarket. As with the Palme assassination, the most insistent immediate responses come from the opposite ends of the political spectrum, both proceeding on presuppositions rather than awaiting evidence.

On one side are those who say that right-wing hate speech and affection for guns were clearly responsible, while Tea Party ultra-conservatives and their friends reaffirm their rights of free speech, denying that there is any connection between denouncing their adversaries in the political process and the violent acts of a deranged individual seemingly acting on his own.  If we want to be responsible in our assessments, we must restrain our political predispositions, and get the evidence. Let us remember that what seems most disturbing about the 9/11 controversy is the widespread aversion by government and media to the evidence that suggests, at the very least, the need for an independent investigation that proceeds with no holds barred.

Such an investigation would contrast with the official ‘9/11 Commission’ that proceeded with most holds barred.  What has been already disturbing about the Arizona incident are these rival rushes to judgment without bothering with evidence. Such public irresponsibility polarizes political discourse, making conversation and serious debate irrelevant.

There is one more issue raised, with typical candor and innocence, by the filmmaker, Michael Moore. If a Muslim group has published a list of twenty political leaders in this country, and put crosshairs of a gun behind their pictures, is there any doubt that the Arizona events would be treated as the work of a terrorist,, and the group that had pre-identified such targets would be immediately outlawed as a terrorist organization. Many of us, myself included, fervently hoped, upon hearing the news of the shootings, that the perpetrator of this violence was neither a Muslim nor a Hispanic, especially an illegal immigrant. Why? Because we justly feared the kind of horrifying backlash that would have been probably generated by Glenn Beck, Rush Limbaugh, Bill O’Reilly,  Sarah Palin, and their legion of allies. Now that the apparent perpetrator is a young white American, the talk from the hate mongers, agains without bothering with evidence, is of mental disorder and sociopathology. This is faith-based pre-Enlightenment ‘knowledge.’

What must we learn from all of this? Don’t connect dots without evidence. Don’t turn away as soon as the words ‘conspiracy theory’ are uttered, especially if the evidence does point away from what the power-wielders want us to believe. Don’t link individual wrongdoing, however horrific, to wider religious and ethnic identities. We will perish as a species if we don’t learn soon to live together better on our beautiful, globalizing, and imperiled planet.